CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL STUDIES

Mortal and Divine in Early Greek Epistemology

A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides

SHAUL TOR

MORTAL AND DIVINE IN EARLY GREEK EPISTEMOLOGY

This book demonstrates that we need not choose between seeing so-called Presocratic thinkers as rational philosophers or as religious sages. In particular, it rethinks fundamentally the emergence of systematic epistemology and reflection on speculative inquiry in Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Shaul Tor argues that different forms of reasoning, and different models of divine disclosure, play equally integral, harmonious and mutually illuminating roles in early Greek epistemology. Throughout, the book relates these thinkers to their religious, literary and historical surroundings. It is thus also, and inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other early Greek attitudes to the relations and interactions between mortal and divine. The engagements of early philosophers with such religious attitudes present us with complex combinations of criticisms and creative appropriations. Indeed, the early milestones of philosophical epistemology studied here themselves reflect an essentially theological enterprise and, as such, one aspect of Greek religion.

SHAUL TOR is Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy in the Departments of Classics and Philosophy, King's College London.

CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL STUDIES

General Editors

R. G. OSBORNE, W. M. BEARD, G. BETEGH,
J. P. T. CLACKSON, R. L. HUNTER, M. J. MILLETT,
S. P. OAKLEY, T. J. G. WHITMARSH

MORTAL AND DIVINE IN EARLY GREEK EPISTEMOLOGY

A Study of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides

SHAUL TOR
King's College London

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

4843/24, 2nd Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, Delhi – 110002, India

79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107028166
DOI: 10.1017/9781139235747

© Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge 2017

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2017

Printed in the United Kingdom by Clays, St Ives plc

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
NAMES: Tor, Shaul, author.
TITLE: Mortal and divine in early Greek epistemology : a study of Hesiod, Xenophanes, and Parmenides / Shaul Tor, King's College London.
DESCRIPTION: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2017. | Series: Cambridge classical studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
IDENTIFIERS: LCCN 2017039153 | ISBN 9781107028166 (alk. paper)
SUBJECTS: LCSH: Pre-Socratic philosophers. | Knowledge, Theory of. | Hesiod. | Xenophanes, approximately 570 B.C.-approximately 478 B.C. | Parmenides.
CLASSIFICATION: LCC B200.K45 T67 2017 | DDC 182–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017039153

ISBN 978-1-107-02816-6 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

לאמי מורתי

To my mother and teacher

CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgements *page* ix
List of Abbreviations xii

Introduction 1

1 Rationality and Irrationality, Philosophy and Religion 10
1.1 Rationality and Irrationality 10
1.2 Some Promising Candidates? Milesians, Hippocratics and Myth-Critics 19
1.3 Philosophy and Religion 36
1.4 Rationality and Irrationality: Religious Belief 48
1.5 Hesiod and Philosophy 52

2 Hesiodic Epistemology 61
2.1 Semantic Overview: *pseudea, alêthea, etyma, homoia* 65
2.2 The Muses' Address and Divine Dispensation in Hesiod 72
2.3 The *Theogony*: Conclusions 90
2.4 Epistemological Optimism in the *Works and Days* and Final Remarks 95

3 Xenophanes on Divine Disclosure and Mortal Inquiry 104
3.1 Divination 108
3.2 Against a Notion of Disclosure 116
3.3 Setting the Limits 128
3.4 Divine Disclosure and Mortal Inquiry 133
3.5 A52 Revisited: A Clean Sweep? 144

Introduction to the Chapters on Parmenides 155

4 Why Did Parmenides Write *Doxa*? 163
4.1 Approaches to the Aetiological Question 163
4.2 Parmenides' Theory of Human Cognition 169
4.3 Cognition, *krisis*, Sense-Perception 183
4.4 Ineluctability and Volition in the Mortal's Relation to *Doxa* 196
4.5 Conclusions: Why Did Parmenides Write *Doxa*? 215

5 How Could Parmenides Have Written *Alêtheia*? 222
5.1 Recap and Introduction: Some Resolutions of the Paradoxical Implications of Parmenides' Theory of Human Cognition 222
5.2 Parmenides on the Soul: Hot Metempsychosis and the Physiology of Divinisation 227
5.3 The Proem in Its Time and Place 250
5.4 Conclusions: How Could Parmenides Have Written *Alêtheia*? 277
5.5 The Ontological Question; Being, Intelligence and Intelligibility in *Alêtheia* 285

6 Retrospect and Prospect 309
6.1 Interrelations 309
6.2 The *daimôn* and Muse of Empedocles 318
6.3 Final Remarks: Reason and Revelation, Philosophy and Religion Again 339

Appendix 347
Bibliography 360
Index Locorum 387
General Index 399

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The roots of this book are in a Cambridge University doctoral thesis, and my first and foremost thanks go to my supervisors, Malcolm Schofield and Robert Wardy. They guided my efforts throughout that treacherous leg of my career with humbling wisdom and knowledge, devoted care, critical but always open-minded insight and unfailing encouragement and patience. In the years since, I was extraordinarily fortunate to receive the same kind and generous support also from David Sedley and Gábor Betegh, who went far beyond the call of duty for doctoral examiners and who likewise were always there to comment on drafts, give a word of advice or puzzle over some ancient texts. I am profoundly grateful to them all.

It will be impossible to detail my debt to all the others who have read or heard my work and to the many conversations from which it has benefited. I must mention George Boys-Stones, István Bodnár, Patricia Curd, Harvey Lederman, James Lesher, Geoffrey Lloyd, Catherine Rowett and James Warren, all of whom kindly read and helpfully commented on earlier drafts of different chapters. In particular, Robin Osborne, Hannah Willey and (again) Gábor Betegh read through the entire manuscript and made invaluable suggestions. None of these people should of course be held responsible for the results. In one form or another, I presented parts of the book at conferences and seminars in Cambridge, London, Glasgow, Durham, St Andrews, Budapest, Prague and Leiden. I owe much to comments from the audiences on those occasions. I am very grateful also to Michael Sharp from Cambridge University Press, for his seemingly inexhaustible reserves of patience and expert advice.

I could not ask for better or more thought-provoking teachers, colleagues and students than the ones I have had in Cambridge (as a student in St John's College and a Junior Research Fellow in

Jesus College) and London (as a lecturer in King's College London). Above all, the ancient philosophy seminars in both institutions – and the ancient philosophy communities in both cities more broadly – have provided a most stimulating and nourishing working environment, and one which I hold dear. I owe also a particular and longstanding debt of gratitude to David Butterfield for his ever generous help, advice and friendship, and for his inspiring example, throughout our years in Cambridge together.

The earliest (doctoral) phases of this study were funded by a St John's College Henry Arthur Thomas Scholarship, an Overseas Research Studentship and an Overseas Trust Bursary. Later stages of the project were made possible by Jesus College Cambridge and King's College London. A period of sabbatical leave granted by the latter was instrumental. I am grateful to those bodies for making my research possible.

I endeavoured to make this book as welcoming as possible to non-expert and Greek-less readers. This was easier to achieve fully in some sections than in others, where the argument is unavoidably more technical. Even in those places, though, I have tried to make the discussion as accessible as possible. I have restricted to the notes issues that some readers may legitimately wish to skip but others perhaps will not, and which would otherwise have disrupted the flow of the text. I have transliterated into English characters important individual Greek words or even brief phrases, when I felt that this might help the Greek-less reader to assess the argument or be interesting for them.

Translations from Greek and Latin sources are in general my own or modified, but I regularly consulted and made liberal use of existing translations. In particular, translations of Hesiod generally follow Most (2006), translations of Xenophanes follow Lesher (1992), translations of Parmenides follow Coxon (2009), Palmer (2009) and Graham (2010) and translations of Empedocles follow Inwood (2001). For these and other pre-Socratics, I also consulted and drew on the translations in KRS (1983) and Curd and McKirahan (2011).

An earlier and shorter version of Chapter 3 was previously published as Tor (2013*a*). The most central ideas in Chapters 4

and 5 were published in much abridged form in Tor (2015). Everything has been expanded, elaborated, rewritten and revised.

During the long process of writing this book, my family gave me the same unconditional and indispensable love and encouragement that they always have. My mother, Michal Arbell-Tor, has been, throughout those years and for as long as I can remember, an unfailingly interested, exercising and exciting person with whom to think and argue about the intellectual questions that preoccupied me. There is no question that it is because of her (and not just for the obvious reasons) that I have ended up doing what I do and in the way that I do it. Finally and most importantly, I thank again Hannah, this time not as the inimitable reader and interlocutor that she is, but as the wonderful partner that she is. Without her love and support I could not imagine this book or my life, nor would I care to.

ABBREVIATIONS

Further to the conventions and works listed below, I follow the abbreviations in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edn).

Alexander	Alexander, P. J. (1967) *The Oracle of Baalbek: the Tiburtine Sibyl in Greek Dress*. Washington, DC.
Beckby	Beckby, H. (1957–1958) *Anthologia Graeca*, 2nd edn, 4 vols. Munich.
Bernabé	Bernabé, A. (2004–2007) *Poetae Epici Graeci: Testimonia et Fragmenta. Pars II. Orphicorum et Orphicis Similium Testimonia et Fragmenta*. Munich.
Campbell	Campbell, D. A. (1982) *Greek Lyric I: Sappho and Alcaeus*. Cambridge, MA.
Chilton	Chilton, C. W. (1967) *Diogensis Oenoandensis Fragmenta*. Leipzig.
DG	Diels, H. (1879) *Doxographi Graeci*. Berlin.
Drachmann	Drachmann, A. B. (1903–1927) *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, 3 vols. Leipzig.
Dübner	Dübner, F. (1969) *Scholia Graeca in Aristophanem*. Hildesheim.
Düring	Düring, I. (1961) *Aristotle's Protrepticus*. Stockholm.
Gaisford	Gaisford, T. (1962) *Etymologicum Magnum*. Amsterdam.
GJ	Graf, F. and Johnston, S. I. (2013) *Ritual Texts for the Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Gold Tablets*, 2nd edn, London.
Gregorio	Di Gregorio, L. (1975) *Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Theogoniam*. Milan.
Hilgard	Hilgard, A. (1965) *Grammatici Graeci*, vol. IV.1–2. Hildesheim.

Irigoin	Irigoin, J. (1993) *Bacchylide. Dithyrambes, Épinicies, Fragments*. Paris.
Isnardi Parente	Isnardi Parente, M. (1982) *Senocrate – Ermodoro: frammenti*. Napoli.
Kindstrand	Kindstrand, J. F. (1990) *[Plutarchi] De Homero*. Leipzig.
Latte	Latte, K. (1953) *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, vol. I. Copenhagen.
Lentz	Lentz, A. (1965) *Grammatici Graeci*, vol. III. 1–2. Hildesheim.
M	Maehler, H. (2001) *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis. Pars II. Fragmenta*. Leipzig.
Müller	Müller, K. (1965) *Geographi Graeci Minores*, vol. II. Hildesheim.
Papageorgius	Papageorgius, P. N. (1888) *Scholia in Sophoclis Tragoedias Vetera*. Leipzig.
Parke	Parke, H. W. (1967) *The Oracles of Zeus: Dodona, Olympia, Ammon*. Oxford.
Pertusi	Pertusi, A. (1955) *Scholia Vetera in Hesiodi Opera et Dies*. Milan.
Pfeiffer	Pfeiffer, R. (1949) *Callimachus*, vol. I. Oxford.
PW	Parke, H. W. and Wormell, D. E. W. (1956) *The Delphic Oracle*, vol. II: *The Oracular Responses*. Oxford.
Rabe	Rabe, H. (1906) *Scholia in Lucianum*. Leipzig.
Rose	Rose, V. (1967) *Aristotelis Qui Ferebantur Librorum Fragmenta*. Stuttgart.
Sandbach	Sandbach, F. H. (1967) *Plutarchi Moralia*, vol. VII. Leipzig.
Scheer	Scheer, E. (1958) *Lycophronis Alexandra*, vol. II. Berlin.
Smith	Smith, M. F. (1993) *Diogenes of Oenoanda: the Epicurean Inscription*. Naples.
Usener	Usener, H. (1963) *Epicurea*. Rome.
Wendel	Wendel, K. (1974) *Scholia in Apollonium Rhodium Vetera*. Berlin.

INTRODUCTION

This book is first and foremost a study of the verses of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. It examines these thinkers as key figures in the emergence of systematic epistemology and systematic reflection on the nature of speculative inquiry. I submit that, in each of the three thinkers, novel forms of critical and reflective thought coexist with novel positions concerning the relation and interactions between gods and mortals. Indeed, in the case of each author, critical thinking on the one hand, and reflections about the interactions between mortal and divine on the other hand, play complex, harmonious and equally integral roles, which can be understood fully only in relation to one another. The thread running throughout the book is the thesis that, for Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides alike, theology and 'anthropology' are logically prior to epistemology.[1] More specifically, their divergent views on the cognitive capacities and limitations of mortals are, and can only be properly understood as, a corollary of their correspondingly divergent views on (i) the nature of the divine, (ii) the nature of the mortal and (iii) the nature of the relation and interactions between them. The book aims not merely to argue for this thesis, but also – and in particular – to demonstrate and explore its usefulness as a fresh perspective on a range of often long-standing interpretative problems.

The book falls into six chapters. In Chapter 1, I situate the inquiries pursued in the subsequent chapters in their proper relation to broader fundamental questions concerning rationality and irrationality, and philosophy and religion. This opening chapter aims to bring to the fore the bigger issues at stake in the subsequent

[1] I use the term 'anthropology' here in an etymological sense, referring to conceptions of the human.

investigations into interrelations between theology and epistemology. In doing so, it clarifies the insight which the results of those investigations afford for our understanding of early Greek philosophy and religion more generally. Historically, we have associated under the single term 'rational' very distinct intellectual phenomena. On the one hand, we describe as 'rational' coherent, critical, inferential, questioning and explicative thinking. On the other hand, we often identify as 'rational' human inquiries that proceed without any appeal to divine interference or aid, as well as, more generally, secularising moves away from god-centred patterns of thought and explanation. In Chapter 1, I consider the problematic influence that these deep-seated associations have exerted and continue to exert on the business of interpreting early Greek philosophy. I submit that the difficult challenge of extricating ourselves from their long shadow lies largely ahead of us. Similarly, we will examine the entrenched expectation that philosophy should operate more or less independently from traditional religion and pull in opposite directions from it, as well as the nexus of assumptions that underpins this expectation. We will ask in what ways, within the context of Greek polytheism, some philosophers can indeed be seen to come into conflict with some traditional religious attitudes and practices and to what extent such critiques were or were not perceived as a religious problem or a social threat. To be sure, philosophical critiques are important and should not be marginalised. But the engagements of philosophers with traditional or non-philosophical religious attitudes are hardly limited to criticisms. Furthermore, philosophical criticisms can sometimes be inextricably combined with positive and creative appropriations, even of those very same aspects of traditional religion that are being criticised. Ultimately, philosophical theologies constitute one aspect of the flexible and inclusive mass of beliefs, representations and practices that was Greek religion. The studies of Xenophanes and Parmenides in this book offer two extended illustrations of these principles.

In Chapter 2, we turn to Hesiod and, in particular, to the striking and enigmatic way in which his Muses articulate their relation to the poet in lines 27–8 of the *Theogony*: 'We know how to speak many falsehoods which are like verities, and we know, whenever

we wish, how to utter truths.' We will consider this address both in its immediate context in the *Theogony* and against the broader background of Hesiod's reflections on the mortal and the divine, and the male and the female. I will argue that, in the *Theogony*, Hesiod decisively and consistently encourages a cautious and destabilising stance in response to the Muses' address: the Muses leave it uncertain – and no mortal poet could himself ascertain – whether the verses which they inspire comprise truths, falsehoods or some combination of the two. Hesiod's understanding of his relation to the Muses, moreover, forms one poetic-epistemological aspect of a coherent and holistic conception of the human condition as a whole. At one juncture elsewhere in the Hesiodic corpus, however, we encounter a competing and more optimistic reinterpretation and revaluation of the Muses' address (*Works and Days* 646–62). We will tentatively consider certain theological developments in Hesiod's thought, which could underlie and explain this divergence between Hesiod's epistemological stance in the *Theogony* and at this moment in the *Works and Days*. More importantly, we will see that a synoptic consideration of the poet's voice, as it emerges from the Hesiodic corpus as a whole, produces a picture of epistemological and theological *ambivalence*. Ultimately, the primary thrust of the Muses' address to the poet is to raise, but leave unresolved, the question of the proper way to interpret it. Put differently, Hesiod's Muses crystallise, not an epistemological position, but an epistemological framework. Within this framework, the problem of epistemology becomes – for Hesiod as for the philosophers who followed his lead – the problem of understanding the nature of the interactions between mortal and divine.[2]

Chapter 3 addresses Xenophanes' reflections on the nature of divine disclosure. By contrast with the common view, Xenophanes does not deny categorically the reality of divine disclosure. Nor, however, does he acquiesce in traditional assumptions of disclosure. Rather, Xenophanes specifically rejects *traditional*

[2] The reasons for according such focused treatment and pride of place to Hesiod are elaborated more fully in Ch. 1.5, which discusses further Hesiod's intrinsic interest and his formative relation to later philosophical thought (or, if one is so inclined: to later, philosophical thought).

conceptions of divine disclosure as theologically faulty. He supplants those traditional conceptions with his own, alternative understanding of what divine disclosure amounts to and how it works. Xenophanes' novel conception of divine disclosure grounds his novel views concerning the possibilities and limitations of mortal beliefs and speculative inquiry. It forms, moreover, one coherent aspect of his overall re-conceptualisation of divinity and of his social and moral world view. Xenophanes, then, does not simply reject traditional ideas about divine disclosure without a trace. Rather, he *transforms* those traditional ideas in radical ways. Xenophanes remained profoundly influenced by what he rejected.

Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the difficult and complex case of Parmenides. In Chapter 4, we will see that Parmenides advances a physiological theory of human cognition. According to this theory, humans *qua* humans must, as a matter of physiological necessity, experience and form beliefs about multiple, heterogeneous, mobile and differentiated things and processes. They cannot but experience and think in terms of such sensory contrasts as light and dark, hot and cold, rare and dense, etc. Famously, however, Parmenides thought that Being or 'what-is' had very different features. What-is is ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, homogeneous and immobile. Why, then, did Parmenides think that mortals must continue to reflect about and strive to understand the natures of generated, multiple, heterogeneous and mobile things and processes, even after they came to realise that the ultimate reality – what-is – involves no generation, multiplicity, heterogeneity or motion? I will argue that Parmenides' theory of human cognition best positions us to answer that much-debated question. To think of and in terms of generated, heterogeneous and mobile things and processes is a necessary and even appropriate aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal. If, however, we explain in this way Parmenides' abiding interest in cosmological accounts of change and differentiation, then a new problem arises. If humans are hardwired to think in terms of sensory contrasts and about differentiated and heterogeneous objects, then how was Parmenides – a human – *also* able to sustain the qualitatively different kind of thought that is necessary for conceiving of the

undifferentiated and homogeneous what-is? If humans must, by physiological necessity, think in terms of multiplicity and heterogeneous differentiation, then how was Parmenides also able to think otherwise? In Chapter 5, I argue that the human agent for Parmenides is not *simply* and *strictly* human. The mortal also possesses a divine part or aspect: his fiery and aethereal soul. The mortal is capable of sustaining a higher-than-mortal type of thinking by momentarily coming to think with – or as – his divine soul. This is, moreover, the fundamental reason for which Parmenides begins his poem by describing his journey to a goddess, who proceeds to disclose the truth of things to him. The goddess, through her disclosure and guidance, enables the mortal to come to think with or as his divine soul and to sustain the higher-than-human thought which is required for the cognition of what-is. It is only through the goddess's initiation, therefore, that Parmenides was able to master the system of argumentation that is developed in the poem, and so to comprehend, evaluate and accept for himself the truth of the doctrines which the goddess revealed.

In this way, we can do justice to the emphatic prominence in Parmenides' poem of both divine disclosure and argumentative reasoning. Furthermore, as we develop this interpretation, we will see Parmenides drawing in positive and appropriative ways on a variety of contemporary and traditional religious models, including poetic inspiration, divinatory oracles, mystery initiations and metempsychosis.

These discussions of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides are offered as essentially self-standing studies that, in conjunction, disclose instructively divergent yet related approaches to epistemology. In Chapter 6.1, we will consider more directly the critical and formative engagements by Xenophanes with Hesiod and by Parmenides with both Hesiod and Xenophanes. Our discussion of the interrelations between the three thinkers will shed further light on, and will itself in turn be illuminated by, the individual studies of them in the previous chapters.

As I indicated above, we begin in Chapter 1 by considering critically certain historical and still-influential notions of rationality and irrationality. *Positive* accounts of rationality, which seek to identify some of what rationality includes and excludes, will not

be a starting point for this book but – within the confines of its particular scope – will be one of its outcomes. In Chapter 6.3, I recapitulate certain, more or less implicit ideas of rationality which I find to be operative in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, as well as in some other models of the interactions between gods and mortals (such as divination). Within the intervening chapters themselves, we will not be helping ourselves to the terms 'rational' and 'irrational' as interpretative tools.

This book does not pretend to offer a wholesale reconsideration of early Greek philosophy nor, indeed, to exhaust the immensely rich and challenging question of the connections between theology and epistemology in early Greek philosophy. I aim to offer here a new analysis of these connections and of their significance in some key episodes in the emergence in archaic Greece of systematic reflection on the nature of speculative inquiry. I by no means wish to suggest that the story ends there. On the contrary, it is my hope that the interpretative approaches developed and pursued here could serve as useful starting points for considerations of other and later developments in philosophy, theology and epistemology. In Chapter 6.2, we will take one such forward look by considering (in a focused and circumscribed manner) one especially important and illuminating later case: the epistemological significance of the *daimôn* and Muse in the thought of Empedocles. We will find that Empedocles too couches his epistemological reflections within a broader theological framework. Furthermore, Empedocles too posits his own version of what I will refer to in this book as 'epistemically significant interactions'. By this term, I mean interactions between mortal and divine agents that enable the mortal to attain knowledge, or to come by potentially true beliefs and views, which he could not have attained or come by independently of those interactions.[3] I will use the terms

[3] Heraclitus would offer another productive test-case for the interrelations between theology and epistemology (cf. Ch. 1.3, n.98). Heraclitus, however, does not predicate his inquiry on a notion of epistemically significant interactions readily comparable to Hesiod's Muses, Xenophanes' model of divine disclosure, Parmenides' goddess or Empedocles' Muse. Inclusion of him in this study would have required not only a significantly longer book, but also one with a somewhat looser thematic focus. As I do not claim to have exhausted the story, so too I do not pretend to have uncovered

'divine revelation' and 'divine disclosure' to refer to the same type of interactions.

As we shall presently see, there exists an artificial schism in the scholarship between conceptions of the early Greek philosophers as systematic, rational thinkers and as poets, mystics and religious figures. This schism also helpfully brings out a methodological divergence. Although we must eschew oversimplifying generalisations here, we can fairly say that, by and large, scholarship in the analytical tradition tends to reconstruct philosophical positions and arguments more through an internal examination pursued independently of advancing claims about their cultural, historical and literary context.[4] Historical reconstructions of *dialectical* context, moreover, tend to privilege a philosopher's formative reactions to the theories of those conventionally classified as his earlier philosophical colleagues. By contrast, what has come to be called the 'anthropological' approach seeks to re-contextualise texts that a long philosophical tradition de-contextualised.[5] At its most radical, however, this approach dismisses the study of theoretical and philosophical reflection in the textual output of those we call early philosophers as a failure to recognise that this output was fundamentally shaped by the agonistic cultural and pragmatic circumstances in which it was produced.[6]

The following investigations into Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides draw essentially and throughout on a consideration of their complex engagements – competitive, polemical, appropriative, critical and creative – with a range of culturally prevalent paradigms of theology and epistemology. Philosophical texts are thus examined in the light of, but are not thereby reduced or assimilated to, their religious, literary and historical contexts. What follows is by focus and structure a study of Hesiodic, Xenophanean and Parmenidean epistemology. But it is also, and

any sort of master key for (early) Greek epistemology. For example, I cannot see that a comparable inquiry into the connections between epistemology and notions of the interactions between mortal and divine would be an especially productive way to approach Democritus' reflections about cognition, perception and speculative inquiry. On Democritus' epistemology, see Lee (2005) 181–250.

[4] Barnes (1982) xii makes the point explicit ('[p]hilosophy lives a supracelestial life etc'); see also Curd (2002) 133–4; Wedin (2014) 5.

[5] As Laks (2003) 20 puts it. [6] Explicitly in Gemelli Marciano (2002) 92, 96.

inseparably, a study of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and, to put it most generally, a range of early Greek attitudes to the relation and interactions between mortal and divine. Homeric material, in particular, figures prominently throughout. This means that we will be encountering in this book what we might call different sorts or modes of 'theology'. When discussing Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, we will generally be dealing with more or less self-conscious, systematic and elaborated reflections about the divine. But we will find that expressions and representations of divination and mystery initiations, for example, can also convey certain conceptions of divinity, albeit in a more flexible and implicit – if not sometimes underdetermined and vague – manner.[7]

I do not wish to stake a universal methodological or theoretical claim. Different interpretative projects require and will reward different interpretative approaches. My contention is that, specifically with regard to the business of analysing the emergence of philosophical epistemology in archaic Greece, methodological purism of either stripe has led, and will inevitably lead, to reductive and distortive portrayals. Here, the analysis of systematic, critical reflection and the contextualisation of philosophical texts in their religious, literary and historical surroundings must, I believe, be pursued in relation to each other and illuminate one another. Logical and philological analysis, cultural and religious history and literary criticism are all indispensable tools. Walter Burkert's diagnosis of the state of Pythagorean scholarship in 1962

[7] On 'theology' as an interpretative category and the need to modify its application in different contexts and in relation to different materials, see further Eidinow, Kindt, Osborne and Tor (2016). A parallel point can be made about our use of the category of 'anthropology' in reference to ancient conceptions of the human. I will not attempt in this book to circumscribe a sharply defined category of 'myth' or 'philosophical myth', which I will then apply to, or tease out of, all the texts under discussion. This book defends particular contentions concerning the roles of, for example, Hesiod's Muses and Parmenides' goddess. If these contentions contravene any global conception of (philosophy's engagement with) myth, then, from the perspective of the present inquiry, so much the worse for that global conception. According to Morgan (2000) 1–37, for example, philosophers, even as they reintegrate myth, universally retain a polemical attitude towards it (e.g. 16–17, 34–5, 290–1). My own account of Parmenides DK28 B1 registers no tension between 'mythical' and 'philosophical' elements in his thought; contrast Morgan (2000) 5, 11, 67–87. As Parker (2011) 23 cautions: '"Greek myths" are not a unified category about which we have any reason to expect that general statements can be made.'

seems urgently relevant for current attitudes to early epistemology: 'The very thing that might seem rash, in view of the fundamental differences of interpretation, is what the nature of the situation demands: as many-sided a treatment of the problem as is possible.'[8]

[8] Burkert (1972; first published in German 1962) 12. 'Many-sided' syntheses of analytical, historical, religious and literary perspectives on early Greek philosophy are pursued by, for example, Cornford (1952); Lloyd (1966), (1979) and (1987); Mourelatos (2008*a*; 1st ed. 1970); Betegh (2004) and Bryan (2012).

1

RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

We must not be misled by the use of the word *theos* in the remains that have come down to us.
John Burnet

1.1 Rationality and Irrationality

We may usefully begin with Parmenides' goddess. Parmenides was active in the city of Elea in South Italy in the early fifth century BCE and composed a poem in Hexametric verse. In the opening lines of his poem, Parmenides describes, in stunning and complex detail, the chariot ride of a youth – a *kouros* – to an encounter with a goddess (DK28 B1).[1] Once the youth reaches the goddess, she welcomes him (DK28 B1.24) and, from that point onwards, remains the sole speaker. The rest of the poem was, in its entirety, an address by the goddess to the *kouros*. The goddess proceeds to issue two rather distinct accounts, one of 'what-is' or 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality' (DK28 B1.29), the other a comprehensive cosmology. Famously, the goddess' account of what-is is developed through a sustained and sophisticated system of deductive argumentation, the first of its kind in extant Western thought. Now, just how we should think about the relation between these different components or aspects of Parmenides' poem – the *kouros*' journey to the goddess and her two subsequent accounts – will be a central preoccupation in the second half of this book. To begin, however, we may step back and ask a broader question: how do we respond to a philosophical poem, which puts its claims in the mouth of a goddess, but which also gives pride of place to a pioneering argumentative method of substantiating those same claims? How do we respond to what strikes *us* as a fundamental

[1] The text is cited and translated in Ch. 5.3.

tension between divine revelation and rational argumentation in a text in which both things are emphatically central and which, nonetheless, does not itself seem to register or gesture towards any tension between them?

We can broadly demarcate two central ways in which modern scholars have historically responded to Parmenides' goddess, two contrasting types of response which, to a significant extent, have framed the modern study of Parmenides.

Most scholars, heeding Burnet's call 'not to be misled' by the use of theological language in our evidence, have viewed the goddess as inessential to Parmenides' philosophy, most often reducing her to (dispensable) poetic imagery on the grounds that the philosopher recommends his truth to us, not because it is divinely sanctioned, but because it is reasoned and logically sound.[2] Those who consider the goddess indispensable, or at least allow that she might play a more substantial and non-metaphorical role of some sort, generally either implausibly downplay the prominence of Parmenides' own reasoning and argumentation[3] or do not proceed to develop an account of how precisely reasoning and divine disclosure might cohere and cooperate, often still considering them dissonant and opposing tendencies.[4]

[2] For example, Reinhardt (1974) 302; Vlastos (1970*a*) 49, cf. (1946) 76; Dolin (1962) 97–8; Tarán (1965) 28; Burkert (1969) 29; (2000) 145 (on 'rational' and 'religious' tendencies, cf. also Burkert (1972) 280 and (1985) 292); Coxon (2009) 17–18, 286; Barnes (1982) 155ff; Mackenzie (1982) 2; Cosgrove (1974) 87–8; Blank (1982) 177; Curd (1998) 104, cf. (2002) 124, 133–5; Sedley (1999*a*) 114; Mogyoródi (2006) 150–1, 157; Lesher (2008) 472–6; Kahn (2009) 215; Granger (2008) 17; (2010) esp. 30–1 (with n.37), 33–5 (at 35–6, Granger allows the possibility of compatabilism between what he calls 'mystical insight', which generates certain beliefs, and reason, which justifies them); Bollack (2011) 20 ('meditation as opposed to revelation'); Clay (2015) 124–6.

[3] Jaeger (1947) 96–8 ('a mere instrument'); Kingsley (1999); Gemelli Marciano (2008); (2013) 45–105; Shaw (2004); cf. Heitsch (1966) 201.

[4] E.g. Diels (2003) 9; Verdenius (1949) 120–1, 128; Cornford (1952) 118–20; Guthrie (1965) 10–12; Miller (1968); Roloff (1970) 199; Pfeiffer (1975) 190; Wiesner (1997) 21; Hussey (1990) 29; Lesher (1994*a*) 16–19; Most (1999*a*) 353–5; Göbel (2002), esp. 159, 167. There are, of course, stimulating exceptions. Bodnár (1989) 65–6 suggests that the goddess discloses to Parmenides propositions that he could not otherwise discover but which he accepts only upon judging them to be true. Bodnár's view is attractive but insufficient. He does not elucidate *why* the mortal cannot 'reach by himself' propositions whose truth-value he can himself determine (he does not address DK28 B16 or the relation between *Alêtheia* and *Doxa*). Mansfeld (1964) 61–2, 260–1 argues that the goddess guarantees the truth of the otherwise indemonstrable premises of Parmenides' syllogisms, which are therefore accepted on trust (cf. Burkert (1969) 27, n.60). I argue in Ch. 5.1 and Ch. 5.4 that this interpretation too, whether tenable or not, fails to appreciate

Here, as often elsewhere, the more extreme positions can offer especially clear and self-conscious articulations of tensions and presuppositions which, in more muted forms, pervade the scholarly discussion quite broadly, and which it remains difficult for us truly to move beyond. The opposing treatments of Parmenides in James Lesher (2008) and Peter Kingsley (1999), in particular, throw these tensions and presuppositions into sharper relief. For Lesher (2008), the view that the goddess is essential to Parmenides' attainment of knowledge would mark the poem as 'a set of truths revealed to him by a divine power', where these truths are accepted unreflectively and *because* they are divinely revealed.[5] But, since Parmenides employs 'carefully reasoned arguments' involving an 'active effort' on his part as on ours, Lesher advocates 'a more "rationalist" or "humanistic" reading': divine disclosure is mere imagery, 'trappings of the older outlook', while Parmenides in fact prescribes, *by contrast*, 'inquiry and reflection'.[6] Kingsley (1999) decries such reductive readings and avers that, since Parmenides' mystic wisdom is manifestly attained by disclosure, it could in no way stem from 'thinking or reasoning,'[7] a position that will not withstand scrutiny of the system of argumentation developed in the poem (especially DK28 B8).[8]

What is most instructive here are the assumptions on which Lesher and Kingsley agree. For both scholars, reasoning and disclosure are incompatible categories. The former considers divine disclosure as the poetic trappings subsequently attached to truths that were attained independently and through reasoning. The latter construes disclosure as genuinely prior and essential to such attainment and dismisses talk of reasoning in Parmenides as an anachronistic imposition on our part. This scholarly dilemma between reasoning and disclosure thus has close affinity with the debate

the complexity of the problem resolved by Parmenides' interaction with the goddess and the fundamental significance of this interaction.

5 Lesher (2008) 473.

6 Lesher (2008) 473–6; cf. similarly Vlastos (1947) 49. Lesher (1994*a*) 18–19, conversely, suggests that Parmenides credited his achievements to 'a combination of mortal and divine efforts'. He does not elaborate how the two might relate to each other.

7 Kingsley (1999) 144, cf. 121.

8 As Granger (2010) insists against Gemelli Marciano (2008) and Mourelatos (2013) insists against Gemelli Marciano (2013).

over the status of Parmenides' journey: is it a genuine religious experience or mere (perhaps allegorical) imagery?[9] André Laks (2003, 2013) – bringing to the surface attitudes which often operate implicitly – gives voice to a similar connection between the question of rationality and the status of religious imagery and discusses it in terms of a general theoretical model. He distinguishes (i) 'phenomena' and (ii) 'references' as (i) the manifestations of certain traditional religious phenomena (claims, patterns of thought, experiences) and (ii) subsequent distanced and figurative or allegorical references to those religious phenomena. He asks, further, whether we can (at least sometimes) legitimately speak of historical processes of 'rationalisation', which lead from the former to the latter, and defends the view that we can indeed see Parmenides (and, to some degree, Empedocles) as exemplifying such a process of rationalisation. Laks' contrast between 'phenomena' and 'references', and his notion of 'rationalisation' help to accentuate the terms in which the dilemma has long been felt and approached: are we to reduce Parmenides' encounter with the goddess to a figurative *reference* to related religious phenomena on the basis of his rationality? Or should we rather reject such reductions as anachronistic, at the cost of downplaying his rationality?

The common ground in the dispute surrounding Parmenides' goddess reflects prevalent and quite general attitudes towards 'rationality', 'irrationality', 'philosophy' and 'religion' in approaches to early Greek thought and culture. There is no question of pursuing here a thorough investigation into these categories, their histories and the sheer diversity of their uses. Such an investigation would be impracticable within the confines of a single volume (let alone this chapter) and insufficiently focused for the particular preoccupations of the study at hand. I wish, rather, to probe a little further and to identify some basic aspects of common usage, which underpin certain tensions and expectations that have exerted a formative influence on the

[9] Genuine experience: e.g. Jaeger (1947) 94–6; Cornford (1952) 11; Mansfeld (1964) 222–73, esp. 223, 251, 259; Göbel (2002) 159; Kingsley (1999) 50; Gemelli-Marciano (2008). (Allegorical) imagery: in addition to the citations given above (n.2), note Fränkel (1975*a*) 1ff; Bowra (1953*c*) 39–40; Tarán (1965) 31, 230; Kirk (1970) 250; Granger (2008).

development of modern scholarly attitudes, and whose elucidation is indispensable for framing this study.

First, ideas of 'rationalisation' typically stem from and reflect a deep-seated association of the rational with secularising tendencies and the irrational with the religious and god-centred. E.R. Dodds' monumental *The Greeks and the Irrational* (1951) epitomises this same association. Precisely because Dodds never pauses to circumscribe the last word in his title, his study comprises an instructive (and in many ways still up to date) index of phenomena implicitly classified under that rubric. Almost every page of Dodds' work proves to be dominated by diverse manifestations of thought and behaviour preoccupied with the divine and especially with various postulations of divine interferences to explain the functioning of the world and human experiences within it (including, for example, direct encounters between gods and mortals, divination, inspiration, god-sent dreams). Correspondingly, it is familiar practice to identify the 'rationality' of early Greek philosophy with the extent (however one construes this extent) to which it emerges by moving beyond such traditional religious, god-centred and mythical modes of explanation.[10] Often, early philosophical accounts are 'rational' insofar as they are 'natural', i.e. insofar as they progress beyond postulations of divine agency or an ordering intelligence[11] or advance a purified or deflated conception of the divine as an impersonal, non-anthropomorphic part or aspect of nature.[12] Again, we regularly describe as 'rationalising', 'naturalising' and 'demythologising' either the removal of the divine from explanatory models and narratives[13] or transitions towards a figurative construal of it.[14]

[10] For some illustrative examples, see e.g. Guthrie (1962) 29; (1965) 389; KRS (1983) 72–5; Laks (2002) 34–5; Humphreys (2004); Granger (2007) 419–22; Kahn (2013) 1–3.

[11] E.g. Naddaf (2006) 164–5, with n.15; cf. (2005) 163.

[12] E.g. Curd (2002) 121; Taub (2003) 74. Cf. more generally Humphreys (2004) 51 ('secularization and rationalization'); also Martin (2009) 292 on the Athenian assemblies: 'When making political decisions, the Athenians thus tended to act in a way we may call rational, not only regarding the logical coherence of their arguments but also in the limitation of these arguments to the human sphere.'

[13] A prominent case is the 'rationalisation' of a myth when this refers to the removal of divine agency from the story, as for example in Griffiths (1999) 181; Stern (1996) 12; Hawes (2014) 12.

[14] E.g. Cornford (1950) 42; Kirk (1970) 240–1; Bremmer (1999) 75–6; Laks (2003).

Second, rationality is associated with the activity of reasoning. Here Parmenides' arguments mark only the limiting case for early Greek rationality. The markers of rationality extend to preoccupations with inference and evidence, questioning, explanation and systematisation broadly construed, a concern with and the capacity for logical coherence and consistency and the fundamental propensity to reflect and speculate through such means about the world and the foundations of one's understanding of it.[15] In this other usage, then, the term 'rationality' is used to pick out aspects of a certain type of thinking: coherent, critical, inferential, questioning and explicative. There is one especially important sense in which this aspect of rationality is conventionally taken – as we saw in the case of Parmenides – to be in tension with god-centred thought. Rational inquiry connotes an active human inquiry which progresses without recourse to notions of interaction with the divine, whereas, correspondingly, divine interferences in inquiry are often taken to comprise a transmission of truths to unreasoning, unreflective and altogether passive recipients.[16]

It bears emphasising, moreover, that it was for a long time a familiar practice in scholarly literature to employ these loaded categories – 'rational' and 'irrational' – casually and as more or less clear terms which require no glossing. Scholars would *identify* as irrational such belief-systems or practices as, say, divination[17] or astrology[18] without pausing to specify in each case *what it is* about them which merits the label and is picked out by it. The significant point here is that acquiescence in cavalier applications of these labels itself allowed 'rational' and 'irrational' to sustain broad and flexible as well as unexamined (not to mention vague) clusters of associations.

[15] See e.g. Lloyd (1979) esp. 62–143 for a study of early Greek philosophical and scientific reasoning. These aspects of rationality are the focus of Barnes (1982) who, indeed, cautions against uncritically linking them with complete repudiations of all things divine (4–5; nonetheless, Barnes retains the expectation that this kind of rationality and god-centred thought should pull in opposite directions, e.g. 98: 'uneasy bedfellows'). Van der Eijk (2005) 9, n.17 calls for a similar disambiguation in the study of ancient medicine.

[16] A telling illustration: KRS (1983) 73 describe Odysseus' rational-analytical capacities as the recognisable toolkit of philosophy and, in the same breath, downplay his relation to divinities as almost incidental to his conduct: 'he is a rational man'.

[17] Burkert (1992) 195, n.2. [18] Dodds (1951) 245–6.

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, these clusters of associations fuelled a developmental narrative, nourished by attitudes characteristic of the European Enlightenment, which depicted the emergence of Greek thought from god-centred, traditional religious and mythical propensities to the secular and critical illumination of reason. John Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* (first published in 1892) gives strong expression to this picture of the first Greek philosophers, but it was Wilhelm Nestle's *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (1942) which most influentially popularised it as a model for the trajectory of the Greek mentality as such.[19] Some of the subsequent challenges to Burnet's and Nestle's models are especially seminal for this study. Dodds (1951) has rendered it impossible to ignore the prevalence in every attested period of the type of (god-centred) phenomena which he investigates as 'the irrational'.[20] Werner Jaeger (1947), already prescribing a middle course between one-sided perceptions of early philosophers as either Enlightened secularists or mystical, developed a powerful account of the prominence of theological problems and theories in pre-Socratic speculations.[21] Francis Cornford (1952) argued for the ongoing, formative and often appropriative relation of early philosophy to older and contemporaneous religious thought and culture. He identified the early philosopher as one of the differentiated types emerging from an older prophet-poet-sage complex and still much indebted to it,[22] while he also dated certain tensions between this differentiated type and the other ones to as early as the first Milesian philosophers.[23] Geoffrey Lloyd (e.g. 1979; 1987) developed nuanced and painstaking explorations of both discontinuities and overlaps in different domains between emerging 'rational'

[19] On Nestle's abiding influence, see Buxton (1999) 1–4; Most (1999*b*) 26–31. For diverse, more or less critical revaluations of Nestle, see Buxton *et al*. (1999); Morgan (2000) 30–7; Fowler (2011).

[20] Cf. Lloyd (1979) 4–5; Harrison (2006) 124.

[21] Jaeger (1947) note v, 6; followed by Guthrie (1952); cf. also Broadie (1999).

[22] Cornford (1952) 62–126. Most (2003) 317–19 sees the Graeco-Roman philosopher as a species of the genus 'divine man' (*theios anêr*), typically (but not invariably) expressing his wisdom and godliness also through rational argument and investigation. Most (1999*a*) and (2007) shows the positive and appropriative engagements of early philosophers with the epic traditions.

[23] Cornford (1952) 127–55.

philosophical and scientific thought and traditional 'irrational' religious and mythical thought. He highlights, for example, the compresence in many Hippocratic texts of notions of illnesses as caused, diagnosed and treated naturally or by divine agency.[24] In the latter half of the twentieth century, the discovery of the Derveni papyrus (probably dating to about 340 BCE) offered new possible insights. Gábor Betegh (2004) has made a strong case for the now-prevalent view that the author of this text is concerned to explicate Orphic theology, eschatology and initiation within a cosmological framework.[25] Thus, for example, the Derveni author identifies Orpheus' Zeus with Mind and intelligent Air (*PDerv.* col.14–17, 19, 23). In the case of Empedocles (fifth century BCE), the publication in 1999 of the Strasbourg papyrus conclusively put to rest already languishing attempts to divorce as two entirely unrelated aspects of his thought his so-called scientific or philosophical speculations and his so-called religious preoccupations.[26]

These important landmarks notwithstanding, there is no question that the deep-seated notion that philosophical (*rational*) thought and religious or god-centred (*irrational*) thought pull in opposite directions continues to pose a fundamental challenge for the development of interpretative models that seek genuinely to move beyond such oppositions and to integrate the different aspects of our evidence for the early Greek philosophers. Once again, the explicit assertions made by the more recent successors of the traditional narrative and its most radical recent debunkers illustrate the tensions at play. Lesher's (2008) model is global: the rational, upbeat and secularised philosophical epistemology of 'the Presocratics' (exemplified by Xenophanes, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, Parmenides and even Pythagoras and Empedocles), in which the mortal argues and is active, succeeds and overthrows the older, defeatist poetic epistemology for which interactions with the divine were central and in which the mortal was passively

[24] See Lloyd (1979) 18–56. *On Regimen* offers one clear illustration of such compresence (see Ch. 1.2).
[25] See Betegh (2004) esp. 283, 354–9; cf. Most (2007) 277–9; Bernabé (2013) esp. 27–8.
[26] See further Ch. 6.2. The papyrus did not, though, put an end to deflationary and deliteralised interpretations of Empedocles' daimonology: Ch. 6.2, n.29.

receptive.[27] Patricia Curd (2002) similarly poses as competing the conception of the pre-Socratics as 'systematic thinkers' committed to 'rational inquiry and naturalistic explanations' independently of divine interferences and as religious thinkers, poets, prophets, healers and law-givers.[28] She ascribes to the pre-Socratics a 'rational' rather than 'poetic, mystical, and religious' intellectual project, and globally defends this traditional interpretation against what she calls 'hypo-rational' objections to it.[29] Correspondingly, Kingsley (1995; 1999; 2003) presupposes throughout his work that the centrality of associations with the divine for the attainment of wisdom in Pythagoras, Parmenides and Empedocles categorically dissociates them from anything like rational, philosophical inquiry or argument. Laura Gemelli Marciano (2002; 2008; 2013) offers a mirror image of the traditional narrative as expressed by Curd: Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles *et al*. are practically-minded religious sages, poets, diviners, healers and initiators, formed by engaging with their cultural surroundings, *rather than* systematic thinkers engaged in rational, philosophical inquiry.

To be sure, many interpreters will not be happy to align themselves with either party.[30] But the problem which such interpreters are facing – and I count myself among them – is not as easy as the decision to grant or deny their assent to one camp or the other. The scholars cited in the previous paragraph give voice to conceptions of philosophy, religion, rationality and irrationality from which we cannot extricate ourselves by simple fiat. The painstaking and challenging work of developing thick interpretative accounts of particular thinkers, texts and movements which *in fact* do justice to both aspects of our evidence, which do not suppress one in the face of the other and, most importantly,

[27] See similarly Curd (2013*a*); Granger (2013*b*) 165–7. [28] Curd (2002) n.b. 115–16.

[29] Curd (2002) 119; see similarly Curd (2013*a*) 222 ('a new "secular philosophical" outlook'). Similar, more or less generalised or qualified attitudes are reflected, for instance, by Humphreys (2004) e.g. 55 ('[t]he new secular model of the cosmos'); Naddaf (2005) n.b. 163; Kahn (2013); Gregory (2013).

[30] For example, Benitez and Tarrant (2015) express dissatisfaction with the 'standard dichotomy' (221) between philosophers as followers of reason, and poets and other contemporary figures as followers of religion. Cf. the discontent expressed in Sassi (2009) 225–9 with both 'hyper-rational' and 'hypo-rational' interpretations of Parmenides.

which integrate – and show how we can integrate – the insights afforded by both, remains largely ahead of us.

An important first step, then, is to disentangle clearly what are distinct intellectual phenomena, which had traditionally been lumped together under the heading of 'rationality': on the one hand, coherent, critical, inferential, questioning and explicative thinking; on the other hand, secularising moves away from patterns of thought in which gods, interactions with gods and divine interferences are central or accommodated. We should not expect from the get-go that the former will always align with the latter or, indeed, that it should tend to do so.

1.2 Some Promising Candidates? Milesians, Hippocratics and Myth-Critics

I do not wish to reject categorically any qualified variation or application of the 'myth to reason' model nor, therefore, the possibility that, in some cases, both aspects of 'rationality' do indeed align in a given thinker or text. Nonetheless, we will examine in this section some of the most important and, at first sight, promising candidates for such an alignment, and this examination will illustrate the difficulty of the question of 'rationality' and 'irrationality' in archaic and classical Greece. It will also give us a better understanding of pertinent aspects of the broad intellectual world which thinkers like Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles inhabited.

Let us turn first to the Ionian cosmologists, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes, who worked in Miletus in successive generations in the late seventh and sixth centuries BCE. According to a traditional and entirely plausible view, the Milesians not only manifest innovative forms of coherent, critical, questioning and explicative thinking – showing an emerging preoccupation with empirical observations and with theories which account for them coherently and economically ('abductive' reasoning) – but also break with what preceded them insofar as they strive towards less mythological and anthropomorphising patterns of cosmological explanation. So, for example, when Anaximander maintains that thunder and lightning occur when

rare and light wind breaks out violently from surrounding thick clouds (DK12 A23), or when Thales traces earthquakes to movements in the water on which the earth rests (DK11 A15; Hippol. *Haer.* 1.1.2), they are markedly and even pointedly forgoing explanatory appeals to the capricious and all-too-human divine persons in terms of whom these phenomena had previously been described.[31]

At the same time, however, our evidence – scarce as it is – suggests that the Milesians move towards a *distinctively* rather than *less* god-centred world view. Thales famously advanced the slogan 'all things are full of gods' (πάντα πλήρη θεῶν, Aristotle, *de An.* 411^{a}7–8 = DK11 A22). Some later writers associate him directly with the idea of divine governance, although we should not put much weight on these sources. So, Philoponus reports what appears to have been a general view (φασί) according to which Thales had stated (ἔλεγεν) that 'providence extends to the extremes and nothing escapes its notice, not even the smallest thing' (*in de An.* 86.30–1).[32] This report, though, could represent an interpretative inference from the 'all things are full of gods' slogan itself. Other sources ascribe to Thales the idea that a divine cosmic intelligence uses water to effect and maintain the world order, but they smack of Stoicising influences.[33] We have better evidence for intelligent divine governance in Anaximander. Aristotle tells us that Anaximander presented his favoured cosmological principle, 'the unbounded' (*apeiron*), as a deathless and indestructible power which surrounds (περιέχειν) and is steering (κυβερνᾶν) all things (*Phys.* 203^{b}10–15 = DK12 A15). Aristotle's term for 'steering' literally and standardly refers to the helmsman's direction of his ship. Our lone fragment of Anaximander (DK12 B1), moreover, indicates that a pattern of cosmic justice characterises the balanced interplay between competing cosmic forces (presumably the opposites), and our evidence from Aristotle (as well as from

[31] See further Gregory (2013) 43–67. This does not mean that the Milesians were not influenced in their cosmogonic and cosmological speculations by earlier Greek and Near-Eastern mythologies; see Burkert (2008) esp. 68–72; cf. (2000) 137–9.

[32] Cf. Sedley (2007) 7, n.21.

[33] See KRS (1983) 97, n.1. Aëtius 1.7.11 = DK11 A23 presents this cosmic mind as an immanent power which itself suffuses water; cf. similarly but less clearly Cicero, *ND* 1.25.2–7 (2–5 = DK11 A23).

Simplicius (*in Ph.* 9.24.13–21), who quotes the fragment) suggests that it is the *apeiron* which governs or 'steers' these well-ordered processes as a kind of cosmic helmsman. Concerning Anaximenes, Aëtius reports as follows: 'Just as, he says, our soul, which is air, controls us (συγκρατεῖ ἡμᾶς), so too breath and air surround (περιέχει) the whole cosmos' (1.3.4 = DK13 B2). Now, it is difficult to say just how much we can infer from this analogy between cosmic air or 'breath' (*pneuma*) and the human soul, even if we assume that the substance of the analogy does indeed go back to Anaximenes.[34] Strictly speaking, Aëtius only reports that Anaximenes said that air 'surrounds' the cosmos. And yet, in this particular respect the point of contact between the analogues is unclear (does the human's soul 'surround' them?). The analogy could instead, then, convey the idea that, in encompassing the world order, the cosmic air relates to it in the same way in which our microcosmic human soul (our 'air') relates to us and controls us: that is, in an animate and (at least largely) intentional manner. Even independently of this difficult and uncertain analogy, however, the fact that Anaximenes appealed to the agency of air to explain, for example, the regular and orderly courses or 'turnings' (*tropai*) of the heavenly bodies (DK13 A15) plausibly suggests that his air not only surrounds the world order like Anaximander's *apeiron*, but also – again, like Anaximander's *apeiron* – exerts an intelligent directive and steering influence on this well-ordered world.[35] Indeed, in the face of a predilection to think of 'pre-Socratic' philosophers as non-teleological thinkers – a predilection which goes back to Plato – it has been persuasively argued that the idea that the world is governed by intelligent divine power was a pervasive and long unquestioned assumption in the sixth and early fifth centuries.[36]

[34] Alt (1973) esp. 157–60 finds in B2 an anachronistic retrojection onto Anaximenes of the later views of Diogenes of Apollonia. This could certainly be true, although Alt dismisses too easily the alternative possibility, that Anaximenes had influenced Diogenes' views (162–4).

[35] Cf. Alt (1973) 132. On the divinity of Anaximenes' air, see further DK13 A10; cf. Pl. *Phlb.* 30a3–c7, with KRS (1983) 150–1; cf. Sedley (2007) 6–7. In the light of these signs of directive control and guidance, we should not consider Anaximander's and Anaximenes' divinities an ultimately atheistic metaphor for nature, contra Whitmarsh (2015) 58–9.

[36] Sedley (2007) 1–8; Guthrie (1952) esp. 90–6; Palmer (1998) 11, 33–4; cf. Warden (1971) 12; Drozdek (2004) 147; Long (1996) 140. In addition to the (patchier) evidence for the Milesians considered here, see Xenophanes: DK21 B25 (see Ch. 3.4); Heraclitus: DK22

Importantly, then, when the Milesians explain thunder and earthquakes in the manner described above, they do not *thereby* implicitly reject the view that these phenomena should be understood as the products of divine activity.[37] By giving a detailed physical specification of some event (say, my hand flexing) we have in no way demonstrated that this event did not constitute a cognisant or intentional action. What little pertinent evidence we have points in the other direction. Anaximander, for example, can take it that thunder and lightning happen because wind breaks out from thick clouds and, equally, as a result of the general steering of all things by the *apeiron* (πάντα κυβερνᾶν). The Milesians do forgo accounts of natural phenomena in terms of the actions of erratic and all-too-human divine agents. They do not, however, forgo accounts of natural phenomena in terms of the actions of divine agents.

What is more, we have no reason to think that the speculations of the Milesians brought them either into a practical conflict with traditional ritual or, indeed, into a logical conflict with general theological assumptions that might plausibly be taken to underpin such ritual. It is often taken as read that the Milesians' cosmology and theology left no room for the traditional gods of cult and prayer, gods who may interfere in human affairs or be responsive to human actions and words. Indeed, scholars often take it that the Milesians sought to limit the divine strictly to the cosmological functions of their cosmological principles.[38] This is all far from clear. The fact that their central cosmic principles are accorded a divine status – or, indeed, are conceived as the

B41 (ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα); B64 (πάντα οἰακίζει); Parmenides: DK28 B12 (πάντα κυβερνᾷ); Diogenes of Apollonia: DK64 B5; cf. Thgn. 373; Soph. *El.* 175–6; *Tra.* 127. Anaxagoras, while avoiding traditional theological vocabulary, describes the cosmic Mind as a supremely cognisant and judicious power (γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει … πάντα ἔγνω) which rules over things (κρατεῖ) and which placed in order past, present and future states of affairs (διεκόσμησε, DK59 B12); with Sedley (2007) 7–30. We will return in the next section to Plato's representation of the early philosophers as non-teleological thinkers. In the *Philebus*, Plato portrays rather differently the agreed-upon tenets of 'our ancient predecessors': 'mind and a certain wondrous understanding arrange and steer' all things (διακυβερνᾶν, 28d7–9); 'mind always rules the all' (30d7–8); 'mind is our king over both heaven and earth' (28c6–8).

[37] Contrast e.g. Whitmarsh (2015) 57; cf. Granger (2013*b*) 171–2, 176.

[38] E.g. Gerson (1994) 1–32, esp. 28; Algra (1999) 53; Gregory (2013) 43–67, cf. 1–22; Granger (2013*b*); Whitmarsh (2015) 53, 65–6.

chief divinity – does not imply that these principles, in their austere cosmological functions, exhaust the sphere of divinity. The fact that air is divine need not mean that nothing else in the world can be meaningfully called a divinity. In order to draw this inference, we would have to assume that the Milesians were monotheists. Our evidence here is even scarcer than elsewhere but, again, what little we have does not substantiate this assumption.

Thales, as we noted, was from early on associated with the slogan 'all things are full of gods'. It is often taken that 'gods' could refer either to souls (to which Thales appears to have appealed as originators of motion: Aristotle, *de An*. 405^{a}19–21 = DK11 A22) or to water (his central cosmological principle).[39] We can also, however, entertain the view that 'gods' involves here something closer to the usual sense of the word. The statement may convey the broader theological thought that the world as a whole is widely inhabited by immortal, animate and sentient agents (perhaps of divergent degrees of power and importance), at least some of whom can impact on us and be responsive to us.[40] The set of 'gods' on such a view could include (prominently) water and/or motion-generating souls, but it need not be exhausted by either or both. The thought that the world confronts us at every turn with divine powers and agents agrees in fundamental ways with attitudes which we find in the verses of Homer and Hesiod.

Augustine expressly states that Anaximenes acknowledged and discussed gods: 'nor did he deny the gods or pass them over in silence (*nec deos negauit aut tacuit*); he did not, however, believe that air was fashioned by them, but that they

[39] See Pinto (2016), who mounts an interesting case for the second alternative. Aristotle suggests a version of the first one, but he overtly presents this as a speculative interpretation (ὅθεν ἴσως, *de An*. 411^{a}7–8) and is perhaps influenced by Plato's appropriation of the dictum at *Lg*. 10.899b.

[40] 'Widely inhabited': Pinto (2016) 252 observes that the slogan can but need not indicate that 'gods' are literally omnipresent in the world. He compares Gorgias' ἅπαντα γὰρ πλήρη φυλακῶν (*Pal*. 12), which does not mean that guards are literally pervading everything but that there are a lot of them around. Equally, it is possible that Thales espoused literal divine omnipresence, if water is (partly) what 'gods' refers to, and if water is omnipresent. These are both plausible but not obvious premises.

originated from air' (*Civ. Dei* 8.2 = DK13 A10). This statement fits with Hippolytus' report that, according to Anaximenes, air is the source 'from which the things that are and were and will be and gods and divine things come to be, and the rest from the offspring of this' (ἐξ οὗ τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ θεοὺς καὶ θεῖα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῶν τούτου ἀπογόνων, *Haer.* 1.7.1 = DK13 A7.1). These remarks come in the context of our most detailed (and seemingly informed) doxographic account of Anaximenes, and there are inconclusive reasons to think that this particular sentence may go back to Anaximenes himself.[41] It is, again, at least likely that the word 'gods' signifies immortal, animate and sentient agents who may be responsive to human words and actions. This is the usual sense of the term and, furthermore, the way in which Augustine puts his point – that Anaximenes did not deny the existence of gods but did make them the offspring of air – suggests the qualified accommodation of existing conceptions of gods within a cosmological framework anchored by divine air. It has been suggested that the phrase 'gods and divine things' signifies exclusively other constituents (or states-of-air) which go into the makeup of the ordered world: fire, wind, earth, stone, etc.[42] This is likely enough as an interpretation of 'divine things' but it is an arbitrary restriction on the meaning of the masculine plural word for 'gods'. Furthermore, as a construal of the conjunction 'gods and divine things' as a whole, this view has the unattractive consequence of reducing both conjuncts into a single category. The list which Hippolytus records is carefully structured. Yes, the final pair, 'gods and divine things', forms a bipartite conceptual unit distinguished from the opening trio. At the same time, each constituent in the list is marked off from the others in a uniform manner (καί … καί) and a simple reduction into a single category would not be possible in the case of any

[41] See Granger (2013*b*) 181–2. Granger observes the assonance and rhetorical accumulation of the sentence (which opens Hippolytus' account of Anaximenes) and interestingly interprets the high-sounding language as Anaximenes' pious praise for divine air in its comprehensive responsibility for all there is, comparing similar language in *Il.* 1.70; Hes. *Th.* 38 (cf. 32); Anaxag. DK59 B12 (καὶ ὁποῖα … καὶ ὁποῖα ἔσται); Emped. DK31 B21.9.

[42] Granger (2013*b*) 181.

other two constituents.[43] We should not baulk at the suggestion that Anaximenes' divine air is capable of generating animate, sentient and responsive agents. Air is, after all, the ultimate generator of all things, including humans.

If Thales and Anaximenes accommodated animate and sentient gods, then nothing in their cosmological speculations would conflict with those gods taking all kinds of effective action in the world to the benefit of individuals or groups of people – much as humans successfully and coherently do, but on a larger scale or in more powerful and diverse ways – in response to prayer and sacrifice.[44]

The Milesians display pioneering preoccupations with speculative inquiry, systematic explanation, observation and abductive reasoning. Relatedly, they critically and pointedly distance themselves from the anthropomorphising patterns of explanation that typify the mythological tradition. And yet, divinity and the intelligent guidance of the world appear to retain a prominent place in their systems. There is, moreover, no evidence for a general logical or theological tension with the assumptions that could plausibly be taken to underpin traditional religious ritual. Greek religion, it must be remembered, was not a theological unity.[45] If the Milesians rejected the anthropomorphising portrayals of the gods familiar from the mythological traditions, it does not follow that they repudiated the basic idea of a multiplicity of sentient and responsive gods, or the practice of traditional cult, which was never concerned to prescribe to the worshipper any particular

[43] Note that, on any interpretation, DK13 A7 and A10 show that Anaximenes did not think that the divine sphere was exhausted by air. Some products of air ('gods and divine things') can be meaningfully designated 'divine' by contradistinction with other products of air (e.g. animals), which cannot be so designated.

[44] The closest that our evidence for any of the Milesians comes to *conceivably* excluding the gods of cult and prayer is Aristotle's remark that Anaximander understood the *apeiron* as 'the divine' (τὸ θεῖον). At a push, one could take the article to suggest that the *apeiron* exhausts the sphere of divinity. Interpreted in this monotheistic way, however, Aristotle's remark would be nothing more than his own excessively strong inference from the fact that Anaximander saw the *apeiron* as divine and ascribed divine attributes to it (ἀθάνατον γὰρ καὶ ἀνώλεθρον ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξίμανδρος, *Phys*. $203^{b}13–15$ = DK12 A15). It is difficult to assess the possible religious import of our reports (DK12 A17) that Anaximander considered as gods 'the innumerable worlds' (Cic. *ND* 1.25) or 'the boundless heavens' (Aët. 1.7.12).

[45] We will return to this point in the next section.

theological conception of the gods. Indeed, our sources suggest that Anaximenes expressly accommodated the gods within his own novel cosmological system.

None of this is to deny that it was *possible*, at least for a casual observer, to see in Milesian-style cosmological accounts of natural phenomena an attempt to write the divine out of the equation altogether and, therefore, a general threat to traditional religiosity. Such suspicious responses to cosmological speculation (especially as represented by Anaxagoras) did emerge later on in Classical Athens (Chapter 1.3). This makes it all the more notable, however, that our evidence for the Milesians offers nothing comparable. We have no sign that they or their contemporaries took their inquiries to compete in a general way for the same logical or conceptual territory with traditional religious attitudes or to supplant them in their own appropriate contexts. Indeed, Plato relates the tradition that Thales and the other members of the Seven Sages offered the first fruits of their wisdom to Apollo by inscribing the famous sayings in his temple at Delphi (ἀπαρχήν … ἀνέθεσαν, *Protag*. 343a1–b3). I do not wish to affirm that the Milesians did, in fact, admit gods who may respond to prayer and sacrifice. Our evidence is too precarious to speak with confidence. But the evidence certainly does not support the common view that their cosmological accounts, or the very distinctive divinities which constituted their key principles, clashed with the traditional postulation of such gods. The ease with which this view is nonetheless habitually asserted instructively reflects problematic expectations concerning the orientation of rational natural philosophy.[46]

[46] Do the Milesian accounts of natural phenomena conflict with their status as *omens*? Conceivably, but only if and when the account maintains that the phenomenon in question results from periodic and entirely predictable processes and occurs on a schedule which cannot be traced to human affairs. Eclipses are one interesting case (Thal. DK11 A5, A17; Hdt. 1.74; Anaximand. DK12 A21–22; cf. Thuc. 7.50.4). This consideration will not, however, affect other omens (birds, entrails, oracles; see Ch. 3.1). Plutarch does present a disagreement between Anaxagoras and the seer Lampon over the explication of a one-horned ram, although the triumphant ease with which he goes on to expose the false dichotomy and conclude that Anaxagoras correctly explicated the 'how' of the phenomenon and Lampon the 'why' makes the anecdote seem like something of a Platonic foil (*Peric*. 6; with Hershbell (1982) 141–3, and Ch. 1.3 for Plato's attitude to Anaxagoras). The sources which report Xenophanes' rejection of divination indicate that he was (together with Epicurus) alone in doing so (DK21 A52). We noted that Plato associated Thales with Delphi.

At first sight, the Hippocratic treatise *On the Sacred Disease* (probably written in the late fifth century BCE) offers a champion example of a text in which both senses of 'rationality' coincide. The treatise attacks the view that epilepsy is the result of divine punishment meted out by angry gods and treatable by ritual purifications, incantations and an assortment of other measures such as avoiding black clothes or goatskin (*Morb. Sacr.* 1–2). Epilepsy is, instead, a hereditary condition caused by an excess of phlegm, which blocks passages to and from the brain (*Morb. Sacr.* 5–16). Furthermore, however false his own theory may be, however ungrounded many of his speculations and however ineffectual his proposed treatments, the author does argue for his views by appeal to empirical evidence and abductive inferences. So, for example, he ingeniously explains that the convulsive limb movements characteristic of epileptic seizures are caused by the air which moves violently up and down the body as it tries but fails to escape through vessels blocked by phlegm, and he similarly traces the loss of voice and cognitive functions to the disruption caused to the supply of air to the brain (*Morb. Sacr.* 10). Equally, the author *reasons* against the purifiers. He observes that they are vulnerable to counter-evidence. If goatskin causes epilepsy, then the inhabitants of Libya should suffer from the disease universally (*Morb. Sacr.* 2). If epilepsy constitutes divine punishment, then why does it affect animals no less than humans (*Morb. Sacr.* 14)? And do these different statements about the causes of epilepsy not constitute an internally incoherent jumble (*Morb. Sacr.* 2)?

And yet, the author does not move from a religious to a secularised world view. Far from removing the divine from his analysis, the author both begins and ends his work by advancing and emphasising an arresting universal theory of disease: 'all are divine and all human' (πάντα θεῖα καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπινα, *Morb. Sacr.* 21, cf. 1).[47] The fact that the author never does more than hint tantalisingly at what either term (or their conjunction) amounts to in his view, and leaves this as to some degree an open matter for his readers' own elaborations, in no way detracts from the prominence

[47] Similar assertions open Ch. 5 and conclude Ch. 16, prominently bookending the author's positive account of epilepsy.

which he accords this thesis. Whatever else, moreover, his theology does involve some form of divine intervention. In Chapter 4, the author writes that his antagonists purify with blood and other such materials those who suffer from epilepsy, as though they were polluted or impious offenders, 'they whom they should have treated in the opposite ways; they should have sacrificed and prayed and brought them to the sanctuaries to supplicate the gods' (*Morb. Sacr.* 4). Now, it is not clear whether the author is saying that those who suffer from epilepsy should have been brought into the temples or only those who are *in fact* in the conditions in which the purifiers falsely believe the epileptic to be (the polluted and the impious).[48] The author leaves it open for us to read the sentence in the former, more inclusive way. Quite possibly, then, he prescribes prayer and sacrifice as *one* proper response to illness. At a minimum, however, he prescribes such temple ritual as the proper response to pollution and impiety. Indeed, the author proceeds to advance the asymmetrical theological view that the divine purifies but does not pollute: 'Well, I myself do not hold that a man's body is polluted by a god, the basest thing by the holiest . . . Indeed, for the greatest and most unholy of our transgressions it is the divine that purifies and sanctifies us and becomes our cleanser' (*Morb. Sacr.* 4).

On the Sacred Disease, in short, exhibits a conflict not between religious and secular world views but between competing theological conceptions of health, disease, pollution and purification.[49] The treatise argues against some conceptions of divine intervention while accommodating others.[50] It at least leaves open the possibility of cooperation between human and divine agencies in the treatment of diseases. The Hippocratic *On Regimen* articulates this attitude more explicitly. The author not only advances certain dietary measures but also mentions Sun, Heavenly Zeus, Zeus Protector of Home, Athena Protector of Home, Hermes, Apollo,

[48] That is, it is not clear whether οὕς looks back to τοὺς ἐχομένους as its antecedent or only to the other masculine plurals after ὥσπερ: καθαίρουσι γὰρ τοὺς ἐχομένους τῇ νούσῳ αἵματί τε καὶ ἄλλοισι τοιούτοις ὥσπερ μίασμά τι ἔχοντας, ἢ ἀλάστορας . . . οὓς ἐχρῆν τἀναντία τούτων ποιεῖν κτλ.

[49] The author even levels a charge of impiety against the purifiers, *Morb. Sacr.* 3–4.

[50] The author is particularly scandalised by what he represents as the purifiers' claims to be able to *coerce* the gods to act, *Morb. Sacr.* 4.

Earth and the Heroes as healers who may be invoked to avert diseases in certain circumstances (4.89; cf. also 90) and prescribes a combination of human and divine efforts: 'Prayer is fitting and surely good, but it is while also lending a hand oneself that one must call upon the gods' (4.87; cf. 89–90). We would be reading against the grain if we interpreted this act, not as an intercessory or petitionary prayer, but as an aspirational self-address or a morale-boosting measure for patients who hold beliefs which the author himself lacks.[51] Such a deflationary construal renders it peculiar that the author should identify so specifically particular gods who are suitable for particular circumstances. His remark that the mortal *too* should contribute (καὶ αὐτὸν ξυλλαμβάνοντα) indicates a combination of human and divine agencies.[52]

The historiographical tradition of what we call the 'rationalisation' of myths looks particularly promising at first sight. The genealogist, geographer and ethnographer Hecataeus of Miletus (born around the middle of the sixth century BCE) began his genealogical work with these words (*BNJ* 1 F1):

Ἑκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.

Hecataeus of Miletus speaks as follows. I write these things, as they seem to me to be true. For the accounts of the Greeks are many[53] *and laughable, as they appear to me*.

Hecataeus opens this prose work not with an invocation of the Muses or any other sign of divine disclosure, but with a polemical appeal to implicit standards of plausibility and respectability grounded in his own authority (ὥς μοι δοκεῖ … ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται). But what is laughable for Hecataeus and what is not laughable? Hecataeus certainly removes from some myths what

[51] Gregory (2013) 92–4.

[52] Nutton (2013) 111–15 dismisses the traditional notion of a general tension or hostility between so-called secular and religious medicine or human and divine healers, and discusses some aspects of the close associations between them in fifth- and fourth-century Greece. For *On the Sacred Disease*, see further van der Eijk (2005) 5, 19–21, 45–73; Nutton (2013) 113–144. *Airs, Waters, Places* (22) offers a similar universal conception of disease (πάντα ὅμοια καὶ πάντα θεῖα).

[53] Hecataeus perhaps hints here both at unsystematic proliferation and internal inconsistency.

we would call their fantastical features and develops alternative explanations for the stories' origins which, while entirely speculative, accord better with observed phenomena. So, for example, Heracles was not dispatched to fetch Hades' dog, Cerberus. Rather, he was sent to fetch a snake, whose swift-acting and deadly poison earned him the name 'the Hound of Hades', whence the confusion arose and the story developed (*BNJ* 1 F27; cf. F19, F26, F35a). On the other hand, the same Hecataeus, who opened his genealogical work in the manner cited above, was also able to trace his own ancestry as far back as a god in the sixteenth generation (*BNJ* 1 T4, F300 = Hdt. 2.143) and to explore more generally questions of divine descent, ascribing to Achelous, for example, a different divine parentage (Sun and Earth) than the one he is accorded in Alcaeus (fr. 450 Campbell = *BNJ* 1 F35b) or in Hesiod (*Th*. 337–40; Hecataeus: *BNJ* 1 F35b, with Pownall (*BNJ*) *ad loc*.).[54]

Like his forerunner Hecataeus, Herodotus (writing in the middle of the fifth century BCE) similarly eschews anything like invocations of the Muses and participates sometimes in the same tradition of myth criticism.[55] The types of direct and personal interactions between gods and humans that we encounter constantly in Homer and Hesiod are missing from Herodotus' own accounts of the past. A famous and notable example is the complete absence of the gods in Herodotus' opening discussion of the successive and historically consequential abductions of certain prominent women, including Io, Europe and Helen (1.1–5). Indeed, Herodotus can sometimes express overt scepticism concerning assertions by his contemporaries of direct divine

[54] In her commentary on *BNJ* 1 F300 = Hdt. 2.143, Pownall convincingly rejects as ungrounded and unmotivated earlier attempts to suggest that Hecataeus' claims for divine ancestry were somehow not truly meant to be taken as such. Moyer (2002) responds to West (1991), who argued that Herodotus had himself fabricated the entire story of Hecataeus' and his own encounters with the Egyptian priests. Even West, though, allows that the details of Hecataeus' genealogy adumbrated in this episode are unlikely to be Herodotus' invention (152). Aëtius ascribes to Hecataeus (along with Heraclitus) a conception of the Sun (one of Achelous' parents, in his account) as an intelligent agent with an ignited mass for a body (ἄναμμα νοερόν, *BNJ* 1 F302d = Aët. 2.20.6).

[55] E.g. 2.55–7 (the oracle at Dodona was not founded by a speaking dove but by a foreign priestess referred to as a 'dove'), cf. 4.8–11; see further Hawes (2014) 8–11; Moyer (2002) 84–7.

visitations. He doubts, for example, the Chaldeans' claims that, in the temple of Baal, the god himself visits the shrine and rests upon the couch (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστὰ λέγοντες, 1.182; cf. 1.60). And yet, the gods dominate *The Histories* and Herodotus clearly considers it a central aspect of his brief as an inquisitive historian to consider questions concerning the (often indirect) ways in which divine interventions guide and at least co-determine the progression of human affairs. Oracles, omens and dreams play major roles in his historical narratives (e.g. 1.6–91; 7.12–19). At one juncture, Herodotus surveys several competing explanations for Cleomenes' fatal madness – including, for example, the Spartans' opinion that Cleomenes simply drank excessive amounts of neat wine – and expressly settles on the view that Cleomenes was divinely punished for his foul play in dealing with the Pythia (6.75, 84).[56] At some junctures, the observation of fitting events which would otherwise constitute extraordinary coincidences leads Herodotus – in a perfectly respectable if no doubt vulnerable example of abductive reasoning – to infer divine guidance (δῆλον ὧν μοι ὅτι θεῖον ἐγένετο τὸ πρῆγμα, 7.137; πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοισι, 9.100).[57]

To take, finally, a later but no less illuminating example, Palaephatus' *On Unbelievable Tales* (probably written sometime in the second half of the fourth century BCE) represents the best-known specimen of the 'rationalist' tradition of myth criticism.[58] Palaephatus pursues a systematic campaign to eliminate from traditional myths their 'unbelievable' features, such as monsters and cross-species metamorphoses. He sometimes argues against such features on broadly biological grounds (centaurs, for instance, are an impossibility because a human cannot swallow what a horse digests, *de Incred.* 1). He always proposes an alternative chain of events, which accords more easily with our experiences, and which explicates how the story originated even as it deflates it (the Centaurs were merely

[56] For divine punishment as a historical factor, cf. e.g. 4.205; 6.91, 139; 7.134–7; 8.129, with Harrison (2000) 102–121; Fowler (2010) 329–30.

[57] With Fowler (2010) 333–4; Parker (2011) 7. On the centrality of the gods in Herodotus' historiography, see further Harrison (2000); Fowler (2010); cf. Kindt (2006) 45–6.

[58] On Palaephatus, see Stern (1996); (1999); Hawes (2014) 37–91. On the uncertain dating of the text, see Hawes (2014) 227–38.

the first people to ride horseback, seen from a distance: *de Incred*. 1).[59] Palaephatus' critiques and historical reconstructions, moreover, are not merely floating in argumentative space. They are integrated into a thought-out theoretical framework, which posits as an organisational principle the regularity of natural processes and phenomena and, therefore, a basic physical and biological continuity between past and present (*de Incred*. pref. 9–12). Furthermore, they are informed – at least purportedly – by first-hand investigations into the indigenous traditions and conditions of the location of each tale (*de Incred*. pref. 22–4). But what is unbelievable for Palaephatus and what is not unbelievable? What sort of thing does Palaephatus target for reasoned criticism and what is he in fact happy to accommodate? Notably, Palaephatus has no trouble speaking of Zeus as a god who might well, if he so wished, intervene in human affairs by effecting the transportation of a mortal from one location to another in *some* way, although – surely – he would not do so by having a maiden ride a bull (*de Incred*. 15). Indeed, Palaephatus even has no trouble allowing that Artemis *could have* transformed Actaeon into a deer: 'But it seems to me that Artemis has the ability to do whatever she wishes' (ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ Ἄρτεμιν μὲν δύνασθαι ὅ τι θέλοι ποιῆσαι, *de Incred*. 6). Yes, nature displays an orderly and unchanging regularity (*de Incred*. pref. 9–12), but, to judge by this revealing statement, this is because the gods, who *could* do otherwise, choose to preserve this regularity and can be reliably expected to continue to do so. The laws of nature are unchanging but not immutable.[60] Interestingly, Palaephatus' rationalisations quite generally focus on eliminating monsters and heroes from traditional tales: he shows little interest in approaching the gods in

[59] On Palaephatus' biological attitudes and their Aristotelian background, see Hawes (2014) 55–8. As is often observed, Palaephatus pursues much the same project of systematic myth-criticism which Plato's Socrates describes and derides at *Phdr*. 229d–e.

[60] *Pace* Stern (1996) 10, therefore, Palaephatus is not struggling with a conflicted attraction to the principles of (i) divine omnipotence and (ii) immutable natural laws. Principle (ii) has no textual basis in Palaephatus. Pref. 9–12 does not use modal language. Stern (1996) 10 ultimately asserts – incompatibly with the statement about Artemis in *de Incred*. 6 – that 'Palaephatus imagines the power of the gods as limited.'

a similar fashion.[61] Palaephatus' particular brand of critical reasoning shows no tension with the postulation of interventionist and even omnipotent gods and does not bring him into conflict with the traditional pantheon (although it does seem to exclude any story which ascribes to the gods capricious and unpredictable conduct). It would be tendentious to insist that such tension and conflict would have been 'next in order' on Palaephatus' agenda, had he only persevered sufficiently in his project of rationalisation.

To approach the question from another direction, can we point towards cases of *irrationality*, in which the marked *absence* of characteristic features of rational thinking coincides with distinctively god-centred attitudes? In fact, Henk Versnel's thought-provoking study, *Coping with the Gods* (2011), is devoted to drawing out a pertinent aspect of Greek religion. Versnel develops a rich argument for the view that Greek religion is typified by what he calls 'luxurious multiplicity'. On this view, incompatible stories, representations and beliefs about gods coexist side-by-side in different contexts in a peaceful and serene manner, without generating anxiety or concern over their incompatibility. The case of divine cult names (*epikleseis*) represents one of Versnel's more convincing examples. When we encounter (as we constantly do) gods with the same 'first-name' and different cult names, are we dealing with multiple, locally worshiped gods or with multiple designations for one single god? Is Zeus Olympios *the same* god as Zeus Ephestios or Zeus Meilichios, or are these all distinct divine agents? Versnel mounts a strong argument for the view that this was not a question which the Greeks in general experienced as a problem to be addressed and definitively resolved. In different contexts, different attitudes to this issue may (or may not) come to the fore, without generating general concerns regarding the inconsistency between them.[62]

[61] This thematic point is often noted, e.g. Stern (1996) 9–10, 24. Contrast, for example, Hecataeus *BNJ* 1 F35a: Pluto was actually the first mortal to have spoken of post-mortem punishment as a reason to live justly.

[62] See Versnel (2011) 60–87, offering a wide-ranging discussion of the evidence. In different passages, Callimachus instructively reflects both a unifying take (*Ap.* 69–71) and a separatist one (fr. 200a Pfeiffer); cf. Versnel (2011) 82. In X. *Symp.* 8.9, Socrates suspends judgement in the case of Aphrodite Ourania and Aphrodite Pandemos.

A preoccupation with logical coherence is undoubtedly a key feature of what we identify and discuss as rational thinking. Insofar as Versnel successfully demonstrates the phenomenon of luxurious multiplicity in Greek religion, his thesis, I think, has interesting implications for the question of rationality and irrationality. Aspects and instances of Greek theology which display comfort with inconsistency – which are characterised by the peaceful coexistence of logically competing conceptions of the gods – are, *to that extent*, irrational. We need not be using that label pejoratively here. The flexible appeal to different theological conceptions and explanatory principles in response to different contexts – as each situation demands – could be thought of as a natural, useful and even intellectually honest response to the ultimate unknowability of the divine.[63] There are, however, at least two important types of counter-example to Versnel's thesis.

First, we do encounter texts that express coherent theological positions and polemically exclude alternatives. The opening lines of the first *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus* offer one clear example. The poet surveys the various traditions regarding the birthplace of Dionysus and rejects them as falsehoods (ψευδόμενοι) in favour of his own view: the god was, in fact, born on Mt. Nyssa (1.1–9). We will find much more complex instances of coherent and occasionally polemical approaches to certain questions of theology in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles.[64]

Second, we also find texts in which competing theological views are indeed juxtaposed, but where their co-presence is anything but peaceful or serene. A passage in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, which we will have occasion to cite and discuss (Chapter 2.2), offers one powerful example. Within the space of a few lines (267–73), Hesiod vacillates between competing conceptions of Zeus as a reliable, just dispenser of punishments and rewards and as an inconstant governing force, which operates according to ultimately unforeseeable whims. This juxtaposition is a source of fraught consternation and anxiety. Hesiod is all too aware that this conception of Zeus as a capricious force, which he

[63] Versnel (2011) 213 makes similar remarks (not using the term 'irrational').
[64] On Hesiod, see also Ch. 1.5.

momentarily entertains here, would be disastrously incompatible with his overarching ethical campaign in the *Works and Days* to promote the life of justice (270–2). I suggested that we can meaningfully describe as irrational the peaceful juxtapositions of competing theological conceptions and representations that are characteristic of what Versnel calls luxurious multiplicity. By the same token, when Hesiod hesitates here between competing theological alternatives, while precisely making an issue of their mutual incompatibility and divergent ethical ramifications, he exemplifies Greek theological rationality.[65]

Our consideration in this section of selective but important and revealing candidates for 'rationality' and 'irrationality' throws up two key points. First, the connection between the two broad senses of 'rationality' which were distinguished above – coherent, critical and argumentative thinking on the one hand and secularising tendencies on the other hand – may not be arbitrary, but it is certainly contingent rather than necessary. Second, it is imperative to consider each particular thinker or text in their own right (which does not mean, of course, to ignore their explicit or implicit connections with other thinkers or texts). We cannot infer or suspect a tendency towards secularisation from the presence of reasoned argumentation or on the basis of general expectations concerning the direction in which 'rational' thinking should tend. We must ask in each case where, if anywhere, the evidence allows for a distinction between rationality and irrationality[66] to be drawn and what precisely can be seen to fall on either side of the divide. It is only on the basis of such particular, context-sensitive and bottom-up analyses that patterns (of whatever breadth) can eventually be argued for and discussed.

[65] Compare the argument in Gagné (2013) 238 n.160 against Versnel (2011) 201–12 that Solon's competing appeals, within the same hymn, to retributive theodicy (fr. 13.1–32 W) and the arbitrary forces of fate or chance (33–70 W) do not *peacefully* coexist but are pointedly opposed to one another. Interestingly, Plutarch deleted lines 267–73 of the *Works and Days* 'on the grounds that they were unworthy of Hesiod's judgement concerning justice and injustice' (so Proc. Σ *Op*. 270–3 Pertusi). We will see in Ch. 2.2 that these lines do connect profoundly with Hesiod's reflections elsewhere about divine dispensations.

[66] Or, if and when these Greek words are not only used but also contrasted with one another (as at Pl. *Gorg*. 523a), between '*logos*' and '*mythos*' (cf. n.19 above).

1.3 Philosophy and Religion

Our reconsideration in this book of the relation between so-called 'rational' and 'irrational' attitudes embodies also a reconsideration, within the particular remit of this study, of the expectation that 'philosophy' and 'religion' should come into conflict and of the ways in which they can be seen to do so.

In his *City of God* (6.5), Augustine discusses a trichotomy, expressed by the famous first-century BCE Roman scholar Varro, between three different types of theology: first, a 'mythical' or 'fantastic' theology deployed by the poets, second, a 'natural' theology deployed by the philosophers and third, a 'civic' theology deployed by the city and its religious officials in the administration of state cults. Varro concludes: 'The first theology is especially adapted (*accommodata*) to the theatre, the second to the world, the third to the city.'[67] Few historians today would accept that the Greeks in general operated with a clear and widely recognised division between poetic and civic gods.[68] By contrast, the Varronian idea of 'natural theology' – whatever its original intentions – has long offered a theoretical framework which was welcome and attractive for scholars who saw the Greeks' philosophical theology as operating on a qualitatively different plane to traditional and popular religious attitudes and practices. Scholars have repeatedly given voice to the perception that philosophical theology always or at least very predominantly related to such traditional attitudes and practices – if it related to them at all – in the manner of explicit polemic or implicit dismissal. The interpretative model of 'natural theology', in short, continues to exert a real and deep-seated influence on our expectations concerning the orientation of early Greek philosophical reflections about the

[67] Augustine presents Varro as distinguishing competing theological world views and competing gods, and as favouring 'natural theology'. But the scheme could rather delineate different and severally legitimate theological registers through which our relation to the gods can be articulated and understood (cf. Most (2007) 276–7). This is what Posidonius (Aët. 1.6.9) seems to have done when he demarcated three forms through which reverence concerning the gods has been set out for us (διὰ τριῶν . . . εἰδῶν): of nature (taught by philosophers), of poetic myth and of civic laws and customs (*nomoi*).

[68] Mikalson (e.g. 2010 esp. 16–19) is an exception; for some objections, see Tor (2012).

gods.[69] As an interpretative category, 'natural theology' is also closely connected to the ideal of an independent, 'rational' human inquiry, which proceeds without any appeal to divine revelation or intervention.[70]

We find in Plato a distinct but instructively related representation of early Greek philosophy, which was to exercise enormous influence on later conceptions of the so-called 'pre-Socratics'. Plato's Socrates, in his intellectual autobiography in the *Phaedo*, portrays the 'inquiry into nature' (*peri physeôs historia*), which preceded his own novel philosophical turns, as a search for non-teleological, mechanistic and material explanations for the constitution and character of all things. A recitation from Anaxagoras' book (the only earlier thinker mentioned by name), who made Mind a central principle of his philosophy, raised hopes, which were quickly dashed: Anaxagoras failed to use his Mind and did not in fact advance teleological explanations for natural phenomena (*Phd*. 96a5–99d2). Aristotle's favoured terms for his philosophical predecessors are '*physiologoi*' and '*physikoi*', and his own canonical account of the beginnings of natural philosophy in *Metaphysics Alpha* is clearly influenced by Plato's *Phaedo*.[71] The interesting historical question for Aristotle here is not in the first instance one about divine intelligence or teleology. For Aristotle, Anaxagoras' value lay in the progress which he made towards demarcating the material and efficient causes from one

[69] Vlastos (1970*b*) is a classic statement of this approach. Jaeger (1947) also begins from and operates within Varro's framework of 'natural theology' (1–4). The book-length accounts of ancient Greek philosophy and religion by Gerson (1994) and Drozdek (2007) adopt a broadly Varronian approach (Gerson features 'natural theology' in his title). On early Greek philosophy in particular, see further e.g. Curd (2013*a*); (2015); Gregory (2013); Kahn (2013); Whitmarsh (2015) 52–68; also (with some distinctive modulations) Graham (2013*b*).

[70] See e.g. Granger (2013*b*) 165, who labels the earliest Greek philosophers 'natural theologians' on the grounds that 'they call upon no Muse and depend on no divine revelation or sacred text'. Granger (2007, 2008, 2010, 2013*a*, 2013*b*) works within the interpretative tradition of natural theology, although he also cautions that the early philosophers remained influenced by theological assumptions in the religious tradition, which they nonetheless always sought to criticise, naturalise and purify.

[71] On this canonical account, see the chapters in Steel (2012). On Aristotle's discussion of the early natural philosophers in *Metaph*. A.3–4, see esp. Barney (2012) and Betegh (2012). The latter examines Aristotle's account of Anaxagoras and his inheritance from Plato's *Phaedo*. For echoes of the *Phaedo* in *Metaphysics Alpha*, cf. also Menn (2012), 211–16; Hülsz (2013) 188 n.3.

another, a breakthrough which required the insight that matter could not organise itself. Nonetheless, the way in which Aristotle articulates this breakthrough echoes the *Phaedo*'s narrative. It was unsatisfactory to commit the good and beautiful state of things to spontaneity and chance (τῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τύχῃ); and so, 'when someone said that mind is present in nature, just as it is in animals, as the cause of the order and of the entire arrangement, he seemed like a sober man by comparison with the random statements of his predecessors' ($984^{b}11$–19). Aristotle echoes Plato, moreover, in his complaint that Anaxagoras failed to make proper explanatory use of this cosmic principle, merely wheeling it out when at a loss for some other explanation ($985^{a}10$–21).[72] The implication of all this concerning still earlier thought is clear. The pre-Anaxagorean *physiologoi* – the drunkards to Anaxagoras' sobriety – failed to achieve even such an ultimately disappointing recognition of the promise of a universal divine intelligence for the inquiry into nature.[73]

In what was to become a very influential passage, then, Plato had portrayed the 'pre-Socratic' philosophers as thinkers who operated with strictly mechanistic and non-teleological cosmogonies and cosmologies. To be sure, neither Plato nor Aristotle suggests that the pre-Socratics denied the existence of gods in general. Still, Plato's narrative offers us a strikingly secularising portrayal of the workings of early cosmology itself. On this portrayal, the first philosophers completely excluded divine will and intelligence from their accounts of natural phenomena. Aristotle's own secularising attitude towards the *physiologoi* is indirectly reflected in the label which he uses for their own

[72] Betegh (2012) 133–4, though, argues that the primary focus of Aristotle's own criticism is more that Anaxagoras appealed to Mind unsystematically and haphazardly than that he always unduly diminished its causal role.

[73] Aristotle allows that talk of love or desire in Hesiod, Parmenides and Empedocles could convey related, if even more embryonic and implicit, preoccupations with efficient causation and with the good and fine order of things, $984^{b}22$–$985^{a}10$, cf. $988^{a}14$–17, 33–4. In *de An.* 1.2, Aristotle discusses earlier thinkers who, he says, made soul a first principle. In the cases of Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia, Aristotle specifies that their principle was one of both knowledge and motion (τό τε γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, 405^{a} 18, 23). In the cases of Thales, Heraclitus and Alcmaeon, he only explicitly relates the soul to motion ($405^{a}19$–21, 25–$405^{b}1$), although concerning Heraclitus he adds elliptically that what is in motion is known by what is in motion ($405^{a}27$–8).

predecessors – the earlier and more obscure '*theologoi*' – with whom, at least within the domain of natural philosophy, he favourably contrasts the *physiologoi*.[74] Plato's representation of Socrates' predecessors in the *Phaedo* differs from the conception of them as 'natural theologians'.[75] And yet, the Platonic narrative strikes some attractive notes for scholars who wish to follow certain versions of the natural theology model. It fits well with the idea that reflection on the divine played at most a subordinate role in early Greek natural philosophy and was far removed from preoccupations with the gods elsewhere in Greek culture. It also gives comfort to the position that the early philosophers retained only a radically attenuated and non-interventionist notion of god, something closer in fact to a principle or law of nature.

We have already seen reason to believe that the Platonic narrative is deeply problematic. When discussing the Milesians in the previous section, we noted that, in fact, our evidence for many of the early Greek philosophers undercuts Plato's suggestion that Socrates' philosophical predecessors had failed to consider or operate with a notion of intelligent divine governance.[76] Furthermore, what we highlighted and criticised when we considered modern treatments of the Milesians was one important illustration of the 'natural theology' approach to early Greek philosophy. The standard claim, that the Milesians restricted the divine to the austere cosmological functions of their key principles and, by doing so, clashed directly and quite generally with traditional religious attitudes, runs far ahead of our evidence (if not in a different direction from it). That particular interpretative claim draws its plausibility chiefly from the implicit expectation that philosophical, *natural* theology should operate on a separate and qualitatively different plane to traditional religion.

[74] E.g. *Metaph*. $1000^{a}9$–10; $1071^{b}26$–8; $1075^{b}24$–7. On these Aristotelian classifications, see further Palmer (2000). On secularising tendencies in Aristotle and the Peripatetic doxographic tradition more generally, see Mansfeld (2013).

[75] See Heidel (1910) for a classic modern statement of the Platonic picture; cf. e.g. Naddaf (2005) 163 (the pre-Socratics understood *physis* as 'blind necessity (*ananke*), without any recourse to intentional cause') and Kahn (2013; but contrast Kahn (1979) 272).

[76] Ch. 1.2, with n.36. Note the citations there of Plato's own conflicting remarks in the *Philebus* on the consensual views of earlier thinkers.

Here as before, it will be helpful to locate ourselves between two extremes. At the opposite end to the natural theology approach, it has been argued that, since Greek religion itself comprised a variety of practices and 'a way of referring to the world', rather than a particular body of beliefs, we can never meaningfully speak of early philosophy as objecting to traditional religion.[77]

The denial that we can speak of particular belief-components in relation to Greek religious attitudes and practices is a radical inference from certain important features of Greek (and Roman) religion which, in a sufficiently moderate and flexible formulation, can be described uncontroversially.[78] Greek religion involved organised cults but nothing like fixed dogma, authoritative scriptures or an established Church. The Greeks routinely regulated ritual and publicly scrutinised its performance, but they made no attempt to prescribe particular theological interpretations of ritual or to police religious beliefs in general. They bore a broadly loose and relaxed attitude towards different ways of thinking about the divine. Indeed, contrasting conceptions and representations of the gods were ubiquitous and coexisted without tension.[79] The resulting tendency among modern historians to marginalise the historical and interpretative significance of religious beliefs has, however, come under instructive criticism. Yes, the Greeks did not themselves typically isolate beliefs about the gods as a matter for religious anxiety or scrutiny. Nonetheless, if we – as interpreters of Greek religion – wish to give plausible or sometimes even coherent accounts of certain religious discussions, expressions, representations and practices, then we must register the operation of certain fluctuating and indeterminate sets or systems of beliefs which are reflected in those religious phenomena or which best account for them. It is this principle which we

[77] Boys-Stones (2009) 1–3 and *passim*.

[78] The radical position is also advanced by Giordano-Zecharya (2005) and refuted by Versnel (2011) 539–59. The latter shows, among other things, that the expressions *theous nomizein* and *theous hêgeisthai* are standardly used with both cognitive ('to believe in gods') and ritualistic ('to worship gods') force, with both readings often being simultaneously possible.

[79] On this point, see esp. Versnel (2011), see further Ch. 1.2; cf. Gould (1985) 7–8; Most (2003) 301–4; Betegh (2006*a*) 627–8; Kearns (2006) 324; Kindt (2012) 19–25.

see at work in, for example, Parker's and Versnel's contentions that the continued practice and perceived efficacy of such activities as prayer, divination and reciprocal gift-giving are intelligible only in relation to widespread beliefs in the existence of interventionist and communicative gods,[80] in Harrison's explorations of the textual articulations, the applications, the sustainability and the explanatory significance of different and not infrequently competing propositions about the gods,[81] or in Gould's well-known conception of Greek religion as a system concerned prominently with *framing* lived experience and rendering it *explicable*.[82] As Harrison puts it: 'To seek to describe Greek religion by means of a stark opposition of ritual and dogma is little more than to offer a choice of two caricatures.'[83]

The overall situation is more complex and less tidy than is suggested either by the 'natural theology' model or by the categorical denial that early philosophical theology ever clashed with traditional religious attitudes.

Xenophanes (working in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE) is one important thinker whom later tradition identified as a philosophical ancestor and who exposes and questions some central traditional religious beliefs and even (in divination) practices. Indeed, Xenophanes expressly circumscribes a category of belief (*dokos*, DK21 B34.4) and uses this category to refer to certain religious attitudes which he presents as both misguided and universal ('but the mortals believe (*dokeousi*) that gods are born etc … ', DK21 B14; note A12, where the affirmation of

[80] Parker (2011) 1–39; Versnel (2011) esp. 552–3. See also Osborne (2016) on the theological attitudes implicit in sacrificial regulations and, on the interrelations of beliefs and ritual practices, Kearns (2006) 322–4 and Kowalzig (2007) 1–3 (discussing Plato's reflections at *Lg.* 10.887c-e on how the belief in the existence of gods underlies, and is strengthened by, ritual activities). See further the discussions in this book of, for example, divination (Ch. 3.1) and mystery initiations (Ch. 5.3).

[81] Harrison (2000) esp. 18–22; (2006) esp. 135–6; (2007) esp. 376, 380–4; (2015*b*).

[82] Gould (1985) esp. 4–5, 14, 32–3. Note that none of the interpretative projects listed here require us to render the mental experiences of individual religious practitioners the object of our inquiry (on this point, cf. Feeney (1998) 15, 30–1). But see Harrison (2015*a*) on the upsurge in studies which strive to do just that. See, for example, the universalising cognitive approach pursued by Ustinova (2009), for some reservations about which see Tor (2010). For more general reservations about some cognitive approaches, see Kindt (2012) 44.

[83] Harrison (2000) 20.

divine births is branded impious).[84] We can go even further. What Xenophanes targets for questioning is a pervasive *system* of interrelated beliefs, which comprises the mutually reinforcing biological, visual, cognitive and moral views that the gods are fundamentally *like us* in how they come to be, what they look like, how they think and how they behave and misbehave (DK21 B10–16, B23). In Chapter 3, we explore at length Xenophanes' polemic against traditional models of divine disclosure.

When we look to Classical Athens, moreover, we can point to some real evidence of tension and confrontation. Here too, though, we must be careful. Not all of our evidence is as reliable as it appears at first sight. In particular, while some later biographical sources report that a number of intellectual figures in fifth-century Athens (including Anaxagoras, Protagoras and Euripides) were subjected to legal and other persecutions, historians have raised substantial and, in some cases, compelling challenges against these claims. We hear, for example, that the Athenians wished to burn Protagoras' books because of his agnosticism (Timon *apud* Sextus Empiricus, *M* 9.57) – or actually did so (Diogenes Laertius, 9.52) – and that they condemned him to death and he was forced to flee the city (Sextus Empiricus, *M* 9.56). But we can scarcely square these later claims with Socrates' assertion to Anytus in Plato's *Meno* (91d–e) that Protagoras consistently enjoyed an excellent reputation (εὐδοκιμῶν οὐδὲν πέπαυται), both in Athens and all over Greece, throughout his 40-year career as well as after his death.[85] In his *Pericles* (32.2), Plutarch writes that Diopeithes, in an effort to direct suspicion against Pericles through his association with Anaxagoras, introduced a decree which provided for state prosecution (*eisangelia*) against 'those who do not

[84] Xenophanes does not thereby express a dismissive view of 'beliefs' as such. In B35, he appears to present his own views as instances of belief. See further Bryan (2012) 6–57 and below: Ch. 3.3–5.

[85] See further Dover (1988), Wallace (1994) and Gagné (2009). Among other things, they highlight internal inconsistencies in our reports, the influence exerted by the lionised model of Socrates on later ideals of the civic intellectual, and the striking readiness of ancient biographers to fabricate and elaborate stories, sometimes even on the basis of comedic sources (e.g. Satyrus – just after asserting that Euripides was prosecuted for impiety – affirms that he was attacked by women during the Thesmophoria, clearly treating Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* as the record of a historical event: *vit. Eur.* col.10).

acknowledge divine matters (τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας) or teach accounts (λόγους) about celestial objects'. We certainly cannot exclude that this (or some such) decree was passed in the 430s, although the failure of any other source to mention it, even when doing so would have been highly apposite, should give us pause.[86] At any rate, we have no evidence of prosecutions under Diopeithes' decree and foreign intellectuals did not hesitate to visit Athens during the latter decades of the fifth century.

We do not, however, need to rely on such problematic evidence in order to recognise that there did emerge in Classical Athens a strain of suspicion against philosophical speculation, especially in connection with its perceived religious implications. In 399 BCE, Socrates was accused of – and eventually executed for – corrupting the youth, refusing to acknowledge the gods acknowledged by the city (θεούς . . . οὐ νομίζοντα) and introducing new and different divinities (δαιμόνια καινά, Plato, *Apol*. 24b; Xenophon, *Mem*. 1.1.1; Diogenes Laertius, 2.40). Socrates' accusers may have been spurred in part by political motivations, but the fact that they successfully pursued such a religious charge is itself instructive.[87] In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates worries that the same people who credit the rumours that he studies the things in the sky and under the earth (like the natural philosophers) and makes the weaker argument stronger (like the sophists) also 'believe that those who pursue such inquiries do not even acknowledge gods' (18b–c). Later on, he remarks similarly that his detractors have simply charged him with those shopworn stereotypes, among them 'not acknowledging gods' (θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν), which are readily attached to all philosophers (τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα, 23d). With these remarks, Socrates scarcely suggests that the natural philosophers have merited this reputation for

[86] E.g. Σ Aristoph. *Av*. 988; Σ *Eq*. 1085; Σ *Vesp*. 380 Dübner (these scholia collect information about the fervent Diopeithes in religious contexts); Ephor. *BNJ* 70 F196 = Diod. Sic. 12.39.2; X. *Mem*. 4.7.6. We may add Plato's *Apology* (see anon). For scepticism concerning the historicity of Diopeithes' decree and speculations about likely origins for the report in Plutarch, see further Dover (1988) 146–7, Wallace (1994) 137–8.

[87] See Ober (2010) for the specificity of Socrates' trial to its very particular historical and political context in an Athens that was reeling from the Peloponnesian war, the bloody rule of the Thirty and the tumultuous restoration of democracy in 403 BCE.

a general denial of gods, but he does bear witness to the existence of the stereotype. Later on, when Meletus claims that Socrates does not accept the divinity of Sun and Moon but says that the former is a rock and the latter earth, Socrates retorts that Meletus appears to have confused him with Anaxagoras (26d).[88] Socrates also suggests that his caricaturised portrayal in Aristophanes' comedy had contributed to popular misconceptions of him (19c). And indeed, Aristophanes' *Clouds* (first staged in 423 BCE) not only presents Socrates as a crackpot natural philosopher but also makes the same connections, to which Socrates alludes rather critically in Plato's *Apology*, between the cosmological speculations of natural philosophers and general denials of the gods. In the play, Socrates will not recognise any gods other than the Clouds (365) – he later adds Chaos and Tongue (423–4) – and leaves no room for anything that could be called Zeus (οὐδ' ἐστὶ Ζεύς, 367). His new disciple, Strepsiades, promises that he will no longer sacrifice to any other gods, or even speak with one if he happened to bump into them (425–6). A chorus in Euripides draws similar connections, aligning the person who acknowledges god (θεὸν ἡ[γε]ῖσθαι) with the one who disavows 'the crooked deceits of those who talk about the heavens' (μετεωρολόγων ... ἀπάτας, *TrGF* 5.913).

Whatever the intentions of early cosmologists, then, it was at least *possible* to see in their distinctively demythologised and non-anthropomorphic accounts of natural phenomena a global threat to traditional religious beliefs and worship. This is the case, even if this perception was found particularly among people who did not suffer from excessive familiarity with the strange intellectual

[88] Socrates does not thereby suggest that Anaxagoras was an atheist. In his last dialogue, the *Laws*, Plato sketches a complex position which does combine a naturalistic and non-teleological cosmogony and cosmology with the atheistic thesis that the gods were invented as a device for social and legal control (10.889a–890a). Sedley (2013*a*, 2013*b*) interestingly but speculatively argues that what Plato describes is not his own concoction of different positions (this is the common view, e.g. Mayhew (2008) 76–89) but an actual underground and anonymous movement of atheists in late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens. An atheistic reduction of the gods to a device for social control was expressed in the famous Sisyphus fragment (S.E. *M* 9.54), albeit through the mouth of the villainous Sisyphus (Aët. 1.7.2). It is much less clear that Prodicus' theory, that humans first formed their notion of the gods by deifying such beneficial things as corn and water (S.E. *M* 9.17–18), amounts to a denial of the existence of gods; see further Sedley (2013*b*) 141.

pursuits of which they were suspicious (as Plato's Socrates suggests), and even if Aristophanes and Euripides play on and exaggerate these suspicions rather than substantiate them. Be that as it may, for us to privilege as paradigmatic such hostile responses to philosophy, and whatever legal persecutions took place in the very specific political and intellectual climate in Athens around the late fifth and early fourth centuries, would be to distort what was overall a relaxed relationship in pre-Christian antiquity between philosophical speculation and the religious life of the cities and their inhabitants.[89]

Xenophanes, by his own account, spent almost seven decades travelling from city to city throughout Greece, flogging his wisdom and his views (DK21 B8, B45) as a thing of great civic value (B2).[90] Xenophanes, it appears, was welcome wherever he went. He gives no hint of hesitation on his part or of blowback against his critiques of traditional religious beliefs. Indeed, the attacks against Socrates were a dramatic and exceptional event even within the spatial and chronological confines of late fifth- and early fourth-century Athens. Protagoras staked an agnostic position (DK80 B4) and, to judge by Plato's near-contemporary testimony, this did not harm his appeal and reputation in Athens. Year after year, moreover, the Athenians attended and celebrated productions of Euripides' plays, which featured not only expressions of piety, but also such radical theological challenges as Bellerophon's derisive assertion of atheism: 'Does someone say that there are indeed gods in heaven? There are not, there are not, if a man is willing not to give credence to an ancient account like a fool' (*TrGF* 5.286).[91] According to Xenophon, Aristodemus the Small, with whom Socrates argued about this, openly and publicly denied the reality of divine providence and, therefore, avoided and even mocked the practice of sacrifice and divination (*Mem.* 1.4.2–18). If we look towards later periods, the Epicureans openly rejected the existence of providential gods who may respond to prayer and sacrifice (*Sent.* 1; *Ep. ad Menoec.* 123–4), although they did not object to ritual practice itself

[89] See similarly Most (2003) 305–7; Betegh (2006*a*) 625. [90] See further Ch. 3.5.
[91] Compare the scathing denial of theodicy in Eur. *TrGF* 5.506 and contrast the assertion of both theism and theodicy in (Eur.?) *TrGF* 2.624.

(Philodemus, *Piet*. 737–51; Lucretius, *DRN* 6.68–79). The Stoic Zeno faced no persecution when he denied the sanctity and appropriateness of temples (*SVF* 1.264). The Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics developed a broad battery of arguments that questioned the existence and nature of the gods from numerous theological perspectives (Cicero, *ND* 3.29–52; Sextus Empiricus, *PH* 3.2–12; *M* 9.137–90).[92]

Nonetheless, we should also not exaggerate the general tolerance of the Greeks by imagining that the public airing of radical theological and religious views carried no social risk and never faced what Parker calls the informal 'social censorship of speech'.[93] The evidence which we reviewed from Plato, Aristophanes and Euripides demonstrates this social risk, and the charges brought against Socrates were its highly extraordinary limiting case. Diogenes Laertius records the anecdote that, when the Megarian philosopher Stilpo was asked whether the gods felt gratitude for prayers and adorations, he replied that such questions should not be discussed in the street but in private (2.117).[94] Equally, however, there is a great gap between recognising the reality of such social risk (at least at some junctures of Greek history) and maintaining that philosophical theology was always or largely thought to clash in a global and general way with traditional religious attitudes and practices. Our sources do not bridge this gap. Indeed, the absence of any archaic evidence comparable to the Athenian evidence discussed here should give us pause.

The Greeks' general tolerance towards theological speculations and criticisms reflects something important about Greek religion. Quite apart from philosophical theology, Greek religion presents us with 'a jostling mass of competing beliefs and values and interpretations and uncertainties'.[95] As we noted above, while ritual practice was regulated and publicly scrutinised, no attempt was made to regulate its interpretations or religious beliefs quite generally. This theological flexibility and the Greeks' general comfort with contrasting conceptions and representations of the

[92] On the religious provocations perpetrated by (or ascribed to) the Cynics, see Goulet-Cazé (1996).
[93] Parker (2011) 38. [94] Cf. also S.E. *PH* 3.2; *M* 9.49. [95] Parker (1997) 148.

gods reflect in part a widespread recognition of the ultimate unknowability of the divine.[96] It is hardly clear precisely what aspects of the flexible 'jostling mass' which Greek polytheism comprises *must* be excluded by early inquiry into nature. Indeed, insofar as the project of early natural philosophy was to explain the emergence and current structure of the cosmos and of the living beings which inhabit it (a set which can easily include gods as well as humans and animals, as we saw for example in the case of Anaximenes in Chapter 1.2), there is no *obvious* reason that this particular project should encroach on, or clash with, religious ideas of cultural and political importance about the involvement of the gods in human civic institutions and endeavours or in the affairs of individual worshippers. Furthermore, once we stop thinking of 'religion' (a word without parallel in ancient Greek) as a unified whole, then what philosophical criticisms of particular attitudes, interpretations or (more rarely) practices we do find convey not an external, anti-religious outlook but internal religious modifications.[97]

The engagements of philosophers with traditional or non-philosophical religious attitudes are by no means limited to criticisms and, even when the philosophers do criticise, their critiques do not always involve a traceless rejection of what they criticise. We will explore in later chapters two extended test cases by examining how Xenophanes (Chapters 3 and 6.1) and Parmenides (Chapters 5 and 6.1) engaged with traditional and current ideas of divinity, poetic inspiration and divination as well as (in Parmenides' case) mystery initiation and metempsychosis. We will find in those thinkers complex and often inextricable combinations of criticism and creative appropriations. Xenophanes was both scandalised and influenced by traditional

[96] Herodotus famously states that 'all humans have an equal measure of knowledge about [the gods]' (2.3). For expressions of the unknowability of the gods, cf. e.g. *Od*. 23.81–2; Xenoph. DK21 B34; Pind. fr. 61 M; Aesch. *Ag*. 160–6; Eur. *Hel*. 711–12, 1137–43; *Or*. 418; And. 1.139; Isoc. 1.50. Protagoras' agnosticism (DK80 B4) takes this theological attitude one step further. On divine unknowability as a factor in Greek religion, see Parker (2011) 33; Harrison (2000) 191 (with nn.31, 33), 258 (with n.29).

[97] For this point, cf. similarly Most (2003) 307–8; Harrison (2006) 132; (2007) 382; Betegh (2006*a*) 626; Boys-Stones (2009) 3; Kindt (2015) 40; contrast Dodds (1951) 191.

ideas of divine disclosure. Parmenides appropriates positively and puts to novel philosophical use ideas of deification and metempsychosis, as well as models of interactions between mortals and personal gods adumbrated in the traditions of mystery initiations. Our study of these test cases will support Lloyd's seminal contention that, when analysing the emergence of the 'philosophical' from the 'traditional', we must never invoke 'any talk of a different mentality, a different logic, or a totally different conceptual framework'.[98] Most importantly, if the theses defended in this book are on the right lines, then the pioneering strides in philosophical epistemology taken by Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles represent an essentially theological enterprise. As such, this enterprise was not just profoundly influenced by certain aspects of Greek religion: it constituted part of the 'jostling mass' which was Greek religion.[99]

1.4 Rationality and Irrationality: Religious Belief

It has been observed that, to dismiss or marginalise any talk of belief on the grounds that the Greeks did not operate with a monotheistic and scriptural category of belief, is precisely to over-privilege the monotheistic and scriptural perspective.[100] Pausing on this insight briefly will enable us to get clearer on the

[98] Lloyd (1979) 265 and *passim*. Heraclitus' remarks on religious attitudes and practices (DK22 B5, B14–15, B32, B92–3, B96) would offer another productive test case, but an adequate discussion of these difficult texts would require a longer book with a different thematic focus. Heraclitus has often been pegged as an enemy of traditional religion, e.g. Kahn (1979) 263, 266–7; Burkert (1985) 309; Wildberg (2011) 215; Gregory (2013) 112–13, 125. Other scholars argue that Heraclitus in fact criticises misguided and misleading attitudes towards religious practices and their associated patterns of thought rather than those practices and patterns of thought themselves; see C. Osborne (1997) esp. on B5 and B15; Adomenas (1999); cf. Boys-Stones (2009) 4. Most (2013) esp. 164–6 reasonably questions the notion that Heraclitus champions a systematic approach to religion. He sees Heraclitus as deeply preoccupied with religious and theological questions and as, in different fragments, accommodating, reinterpreting, rejecting and raising open-ended questions about different Greek religious attitudes and practices. In Tor (2016), I argue that in DK22 B93 Heraclitus both devotes involved and creative theological reflection to Delphic Apollo and appropriates his divination as a framework within which to understand the nature of his own dialectical practice.

[99] Most (2003) 308, 319 characterises in similar terms Graeco-Roman philosophy as a whole. Cf. Kindt (2015) 40: 'we should not exclude . . . "personal" views from the way in which we define and delimit religion'.

[100] Harrison (2000) 20.

peculiar conditions which frame our peculiar habit of associating the one word 'rational' with both the reasoning and the secular.

Tertullian, a Christian thinker writing in the second and third centuries CE, lists in his *On the Flesh of Christ* such assertions as 'the Son of God died' and 'having been buried, he rose again', and comments with a pointedly provocative paradox: 'it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd … it is certain, because it is impossible' (*prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est … certum est, quia impossibile*, 5.4). It is only by accepting these claims, which would of course appear as folly if subjected to the ordinary measures of wisdom 'in the world' (*in saeculo*), that one will become truly wise (5.1). In a manifesto of Young Earth creationism published in 1999, Kurt Wise writes: ' … if all the evidence in the universe turns against creationism, I would be the first to admit it, but I would still be a creationist because that is what the Word of God seems to indicate.'[101] These statements are provocative but not incomprehensible to us only because we know to recognise 'religious belief' as a special and distinct *kind* of belief. We must not depict a consensus where there is anything but one, but for many, at least, as for Tertullian and Wise, religious belief is a question of faith, where this means that it is self-consciously insulated from what we ordinarily recognise as procedures of criticism and evaluation and typically involves some concomitant form of self-commitment and trust. It is neither possible nor necessary to convey here how pervasive this notion of faith is in monotheistic Western thought. We find it championed, challenged and reflected on in thinkers as varied as, say, Martin Luther, who pronounces reason 'the greatest enemy that faith has', Pascal, who insists on the superiority of that religious conviction which is not acquired or preserved through reasoning, Wittgenstein, whose reflections on what he calls 'an extraordinary use of the word "believe"' revolve throughout around this same conception of a special, religious kind of belief which, properly understood, does not *pretend* to be a matter of reasonableness, and Alvin Plantinga, who seeks rather to demonstrate the 'rational acceptability of Christian belief' and to challenge the widespread view that such belief 'lacks justification, rationality,

[101] Wise (1999) 332; quoted by Dawkins (2007) 323.

or warrant'.[102] Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century CE) nicely illustrates how the familiar monotheistic readiness to approach religious belief as a special kind of belief is historically connected with scripture when, before attempting to establish and elucidate the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of reasoning (*logos*), he stipulates that, even should this venture fail, we will retain our determined faith unchanged (τὴν πίστιν ἀμετάθετον ἕξομεν, *ad Ablab*. 3.1.38.19–39.7).

We do not, to my knowledge, encounter such qualitative isolations of 'religious belief' in the non-scriptural context of pre-Christian Graeco-Roman sources. A partial parallel in Cicero (*ND* 3.5–6, 9–10) is instructive precisely for its fundamental dissimilarities. Cotta advances the claim that, *qua Roman statesman and priest* (n.b. *ND* 2.168.3–4; 3.5.4–6, 3.6.1–5), he ought (*debeo*, 3.6.4) to accept, on the authority of tradition and the ranking religious officials, and independently of argument, the propriety of Roman state cult and, correspondingly, certain rudimentary propositions (e.g. *deos esse*, 3.9.11). Equally, however, Cotta himself stipulates that such acceptance would be *improper* for Balbus, who, *qua* philosopher (*a te enim philosopho*, 3.6.3–4), must rationally ground his belief-system (in the domain of religion just as in any other). What the Academic Cotta delineates, then, are the divergent commitments of civic priest and philosophical theologian, not the inherently distinct nature of 'religious belief' as a special kind of belief. We find nothing like Gregory's insulations in, say, Plato's theological reasoning in *Republic* 2–3 or *Laws* 10, a point which Eusebius, for one, observes and criticises (*PE* 13.14.1.1–3.1).[103]

[102] Martin Luther (1995) no.353; Pascal (2008) noo.110, 131; Wittgenstein (1966) 58–9, and throughout 53–72; Plantinga (2000) vii, xiii. See Evans (2005) for a brief survey of diverse attitudes, both historical and contemporary, to the relation between faith and reason, ranging from the 'rationalist' to the 'fideist' extremes. On fideism, see also Penelhum (1983).

[103] For scripture as a new perspective in emerging competition with philosophical reason, cf. Boys-Stones (2009) 21. On the Cicero passage, cf. Graver (2009) 128 ('[t]his is not the fideism of later ages'). Plato's *Timaeus* 40d6-e4 offers another interesting but, again, partial, significantly dissimilar and by no means straightforward parallel. First, the tone of the passage, and of Timaeus' assertion that, despite their failure to produce likely or compelling proofs, we should still believe (πειστέον, 40d7) the theogonies composed by the supposed offspring of the gods in question, is not at all obvious. Timaeus (or Plato?) keeps a pointed distance from *the poets'* claims for divine ancestry

In another treatise, Tertullian asks 'what has Athens to do with Jerusalem?' and maintains that Christianity had supplanted philosophy: 'We have no need of curiosity after Christ, no need of inquiry after the gospel' (*de Praesc. Haeret.* 7.9–13). In the introduction to his doctoral thesis, Karl Marx finds in Prometheus' assertion 'I hate all the gods' (Aeschylus, *Pr.* 975) the universal motto of philosophy itself – a cry for mortal liberation and independence from religion which emblematises philosophy's 'absolutely free heart'.[104] There is, of course, a great deal between heaven and earth other than Tertullian and Marx. But the strange agreement between their programmatic remarks reflects well how our historically contingent and peculiar insulation of faith and religious authority from human reasoning reinforces our expectation that philosophical ('rational') and religious ('irrational') thought should pull in opposite directions.

In polytheistic Greece, we encounter neither in philosophical nor in other contexts such isolations of 'religious beliefs' as special in kind, as independent from, and incommensurable with, beliefs in other domains, and as insulated from and contrasted with the activity of reasoning.[105] We will find in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles different models of divine disclosure and divine intervention which, in different ways, facilitate or even necessitate critical human reflection and human inquiry.

(ὡς ἔφασαν, 40d8; φασκόντων, 40e2), and one could plausibly find a measure of irony in, among other things, his deflationary description of the bygone births of gods as mere 'household matters' for the poets (οἰκεῖα, 40e2; cf. the reserved που at 40d9). Plato is, at any rate, perfectly willing elsewhere to have Socrates criticise such poetic authorities, not least on matters which concern the familial affairs of their claimed divine ancestry (e.g. *Euth.* 6a-c). Second, Timaeus' remark is, on any reading, a circumscribed one. He does not refer in a general way to beliefs about the gods or the divine, but specifically to the issue of birth (τὴν γένεσιν, 40d6–7) and specifically in relation to only one particular class of generated gods as distinct from another (note 40e4; see 41a3–5, 40a2–40d5). Though both the Plato and Cicero passages offer fascinating early expressions of thought-patterns which are not unrelated to later monotheistic fideist attitudes, neither passage can be assimilated to such later attitudes and neither isolates religious belief as a special, distinct kind of belief.

[104] Marx (2008) 13–15.

[105] Parker (2011) 1–13 interestingly identifies the operation of what he calls 'evidences' for ancient Greek religious beliefs, expressions (mostly casual) of which are found in archaic and classical sources (e.g. the apparent efficacy of worship and divination, fitting coincidences, the appearance of design).

1.5 Hesiod and Philosophy

I noted in the Introduction that this book pursues a self-consciously circumscribed investigation. It does not aim to exhaust what there is to be said about its guiding themes. On the contrary, it is hoped that the interpretative approaches developed here could offer starting points for other similar investigations (see further Chapter 6.2). Nonetheless, in the light of the very fact that the type of inquiries pursued here could be extended almost open-endedly in relation to further materials, the chosen structure of the subsequent chapters and especially the focused treatment of Hesiod require a word of justification. This discussion will also lead us helpfully into our examination of Hesiod's epistemology in the next chapter.

First, Hesiod is intrinsically interesting. He is, I submit, our earliest extant thinker who critically isolates the question of the conditions of human speculation, articulates a coherent framework within which to consider it and integrates it into a broader conception of the human condition. In short, we must not say that 'Before [Xenophanes] there is no reflective discussion about knowledge.'[106] We have long thought of a questioning and problematising response to unreflective and overly blithe stances as a hallmark of the pre-Socratic philosophers. When it comes to the nature of divine disclosure and its implications for the epistemic predicament of mortals – if not elsewhere as well – Hesiod manifests these characteristics in full.[107] Second, in order to analyse Hesiod's critique, we will need to consider how he relates to a pervasive poetic and epistemological tradition, which presents us both with related (if less sharply defined) worries and misgivings and with claims and assumptions which are vulnerable to those worries and misgivings. Thus, our study of Hesiod (in conjunction with our discussion of divination in Chapter 3.1)

[106] Graham (2010) 132.

[107] The view that Hesiod sets out to problematise unreflective stances concerning disclosure does not require us to postulate an overly neat and naïve evolutionary model of early Greek poetics, such that Hesiod is the *first* to put a question mark over poetic truth-claims. Halliwell (2011) 19 rightly criticises such evolutionary models, noting that the Homeric epics contain their own subtle negotiations of the relation between truth and poetry.

will best equip us with an understanding of the most dominant epistemological attitudes and strategies in relation to which Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles also position themselves. Third, in critically isolating the question of epistemology Hesiod clearly casts it in particular theological terms. For Hesiod, to understand the epistemic limitations of mortals and the (problematic) prospect of epistemic betterment is, manifestly, to understand the nature of (i) the mortal, (ii) the divine and (iii) the relation and the interactions between them. Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, on my view, develop their own radically divergent approaches to these same epistemological problems through this same general theological strategy. Insofar as these (central) test cases go, I submit, it is not merely the case that Hesiod first demarcates the problem of epistemology: Hesiod crystallises the major contours of an emerging religious enterprise of systematic reflection on the conditions of speculative inquiry. We will find in Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles illuminating polemical responses to Hesiod, which are nonetheless influenced by, and essentially continuous with, this epistemological breakthrough. Indeed, it may be plausibly argued that Xenophanes and Parmenides pitch their polemical responses as reactions specifically to the way in which Hesiod first articulates and introduces the Muses' relation to him (Chapter 6.1). It is a truism that Hesiod bore a formative relation to philosophical cosmogony and cosmology. We will find in him a key initiator of philosophical epistemology.[108]

[108] It would be difficult to exaggerate and impossible even to sketch here the depth and scope of Hesiod's influence on later Greek thought and culture (Hdt. 2.53 and Herac. DK22 B57 ('Hesiod is the teacher of the most people') are famous early testaments). Koning (2010) is an extensive study; on philosophy, see 189–233. Koning (2010) 200–17 identifies Hesiod's importance also for early epistemologists, but our accounts bear little resemblance. Indeed, Koning sees Hesiod's epistemological stance simply as blithe reliance on divine disclosure (200). Most (1999*a*) explores the foundational and fundamental influence exercised by Homer and Hesiod on the style, subject matter and substance of early Greek philosophy. For Hesiod's influence on Ionian cosmogony and cosmology, see e.g. Cornford (1952) 187–201; Stokes (1962) and (1963); Lloyd (1966) 192ff; KRS (1983) 34; Rowe (1983) 125, n.14; Sedley (2007) 2ff; Koning (2010) 190–200. For Hesiod's impact on Plato, see Boys-Stones, Haubold *et al*. (2010). I refer to Aristotle presently. For later enlistments of Hesiod as a philosophical ally, see e.g. *SVF* 1.167 (Zeno); 1.539 (Cleanthes); 2.1077, p.316, 12–15 (Chrysippus); Plot. 4.3.14.78–80.

This is not the place to pursue a general discussion of the peculiarities of the label 'pre-Socratic' or of the extent to which we can or cannot isolate early Greek philosophy in general as a distinctive intellectual phenomenon and demarcate it sharply from other contemporary or later intellectual developments.[109] It is, however, important that we highlight and dissociate ourselves from two connotations, which have sometimes attached to talk of 'pre-Socratic philosophy' and 'early Greek philosophy'. First, the interest of early philosophers in cosmology is doubtlessly important and central, but these were breathtakingly ambitious and holistic thinkers. Historically, scholars have often over-privileged as primary or even exclusive the cosmological projects of the pre-Socratics to the suppression of their (typically undifferentiated) theological, epistemological, methodological, psychological, ethical, political and ontological preoccupations.[110] Second, the thinkers who have been conventionally classified as pre-Socratic philosophers certainly engaged with other and earlier thinkers who have also been so classified, and these engagements are doubtlessly important and central. But we have sometimes tended to imagine that early philosophers engaged with other, earlier philosophers in a primary or consciously distinctive way, and we have often marginalised their engagements with figures and attitudes not conventionally classified as 'philosophical', as though the early philosophers knew when they were and when they were not responding to fellow philosophical colleagues.[111] Xenophanes' intellectual interlocutors were epic poets and diviners no less than Ionian cosmologists. Parmenides was engaged in a reflective dialogue with, for example, the ideas underpinning the initiatory Gold Tablets no less than with Xenophanes. It is a significant point that those pre-Socratic thinkers whom later Greek writers identify as earlier philosophers did not already distinguish themselves with that label.

[109] For different views on these matters, see Long (1999) 5–13; Laks (2002); Sassi (2002) esp. 71–3, 77; Naddaf (2006); Lloyd (2002); Gemelli Marciano (2002) esp. 112.
[110] I follow Long (1999) 5–7, 11–12; cf. also Curd (2002) 121; Sassi (2002) 72.
[111] For the observation, cf. Robbiano (2006) 16. For the historiographical tendency, see e.g. Naddaf (2006) 165; Kahn (2013) 5.

Notably, Heraclitus does not demarcate different *kinds* of rival sages when he states: 'Much-learning does not teach how to have understanding; otherwise, it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus' (DK22 B40).[112] We cannot, however, leave at that the question of Hesiod's relation to early philosophical inquiry. Antiquity already offers diverse attitudes.[113] Hesiod can be straightforwardly included in or excluded from the business of philosophising. Diogenes Laertius writes that Parmenides 'philosophises through verses, just like Hesiod and Xenophanes and Empedocles' (φιλοσοφεῖ, 9.22.11–12).[114] Sextus, by contrast, easily helps himself to the view that Hesiod is no competent judge of philosophical matters (τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, *PH* 3.123.1–2).[115] Aristotle sees Hesiod as sufficiently involved in explaining natural phenomena to engage with him as a proto-cosmologist.[116] Hesiod's employment of 'Eros' as a moving and attracting force wins him recognition alongside Parmenides and Empedocles as someone who gestures towards a final and efficient cause, albeit in an embryonic and obscure manner.[117] At another juncture, though, Aristotle complains that 'those who follow Hesiod and all the theologians … talk over our heads' and discourages serious engagement with 'those who deal in mythological sophistries' (τῶν μυθικῶς σοφιζομένων, *Metaph*. B.4 $1000^{a}5$–19).[118] So, we should not overlook the qualification 'in a way' (πώς) in Aristotle's nonetheless striking recognition of mythological speculative curiosity: 'and the lover-of-myth is also in a way

[112] Cf. Gemelli Marciano (2002) 112.

[113] Koning (2010) 106, 191 oversimplifies when he portrays an ancient consensus that Hesiod was a philosopher.

[114] Cf. less unequivocally Hippol. *Haer.* 1.26.1–2 = *DG* 574–5 (citing *Th.* 108–39; note περὶ φύσεως … λέγει); Σ *Op.* 130–1, 130a Pertusi.

[115] Recall also Posidonius' demarcation between philosophical 'natural' and poetic 'mythical' registers of theology, Aët. 1.6.9 (cf. n.67 above). Hesiod is mentioned as an example of mythical theology at 1.6.14–15.

[116] *Metaph*. A.8 $989^{a}8$–12; *Cael.* 3.1 $298^{b}28$; *Phys*. 4.1 $208^{b}29$–33. Aristotle is motivated in part by his cyclical view of human civilization and his notion that vestiges of knowledge from the previous pre-cataclysmic period are preserved in the form of myths, e.g. *Metaph*. Λ.8 $1074^{b}10$–13, with Johansen (1999) 285–91; Palmer (2000) 192–203.

[117] *Metaph*. A.4 $984^{b}23$–$985^{a}7$; cf. Palmer (2000) 188.

[118] See Lloyd (1999) 155; Johansen (1999) 289. Cf. *Metaph*. N.4 $1091^{b}4$–10, with Ross (1966) *ad loc*.

a lover-of-wisdom' (καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν, *Metaph.* A.2 982^{b}18–19).[119] Other ancient passages accentuate what is anyway implicit in the rich reception of Hesiod in later Greek philosophy, namely that Hesiod is *good to think with* for philosophical inquirers. In one story, for example, the schoolboy Epicurus embarks on his philosophical career after Hesiod's assertion, 'first of all Chasm came to be' (*Th.* 116), sparks his curiosity and makes him wonder what, in that case, Hesiod thinks Chasm came to be *from* (Sextus Empiricus, *M* 10.18–19; Diogenes Laertius, 10.2).[120]

Hesiod's complex and systematic theogony is simultaneously a cosmogony and a cosmology. His system of developing (familial) relations between different divine and (simultaneously) natural, societal and psychological powers amounts to a universal explanatory account of the world's principles of organisation and operation.[121] On those sorts of grounds, scholars have sometimes pronounced Hesiod philosophical or semi-philosophical.[122] If most scholars nonetheless remain disinclined to consider Hesiod a philosopher, this seems to do above all with the irremediably mythological nature of his theogonic-cosmogonic accounts[123] and his apparent disinterest in disciplining those accounts by explicit or implicit argumentation.[124] Long disqualifies Hesiod from the company of the early philosophers also for not being 'critical and unconventional' and for not aiming to have an 'educationally provocative' and 'transformative' impact on his audience.[125] But those charges are, on my view of Hesiod, unwarranted.

A different reason for not counting Hesiod a philosopher was adduced by Rowe (1983), who ascribes to him what he labels the

[119] Guthrie (1970) 250 highlights the qualification. On Aristotle's complex attitude towards the *theologoi*, see Palmer (2000).
[120] See also e.g. Pl. *Apol.* 41a6–8; *Tht.* 155d (with Hes. *Th.* 265–6); cf. *Crat.* 406a3–5.
[121] Following KRS (1983) 73; see also Clay (2003) e.g. 14–20.
[122] E.g. Fränkel (1975*b*) 102–7, 515; Gigon (1945) 13, 22ff; Wade-Gery (1949) 81, 86; more recently, Koning (2010) 233–5; cf. also Clay (2003) 2; see further Rowe (1983) 124; Kirk (1970) 238.
[123] KRS (1983) 73; cf. Vlastos (1970*b*) 100–1; less subtly, Burnet (1930) 6. Some scholars are open to the idea that myths at least manifest their own 'rationality', insofar as they display their own speculative content and often highly abstract strategies for organising and representing experience; see Burkert (1999); Sassi (2002) 65–6; KRS (1983) *loc. cit.*
[124] Long (1999) 12–13; Naddaf (2006) 166, n.20; cf. Lloyd (1979) 233.
[125] Long (1999) *loc. cit.*

'multiple approaches' phenomenon: Hesiod may juxtapose different and sometimes seemingly or actually incompatible accounts or explanations of the same thing without considering such combinations problematic.[126] Hesiod's juxtaposition in the *Works and Days* of the story of Prometheus and Pandora (42–105) and his account of the succession of human races (106–201) is by far the clearest example.[127] Both episodes explain the deterioration of the human condition, but they do so through logically incompatible narratives (positing a two-stage human history and a gradual decline respectively). Hesiod neither indicates a preference nor attempts somehow to force these accounts into consistency. Indeed, he issues the following programmatic remark when he embarks on the Races episode: 'But, if you like, I will relate[128] to you another account' (ἕτερον ... λόγον, *Op*. 106). The words 'another account' (or: 'a different account') highlight the juxtaposition of the two episodes and, thereby, the absence of any attempt to effect a logical reconciliation between them. This juxtaposition and this programmatic statement could conceivably reflect epistemological modesty concerning the early events of mankind. Significantly, however, the rhetorical conceit 'if you like' accords the reader a hypothetical choice, which suggests that Hesiod takes the accounts' worth to reside in their suitability for, and impact on, their audience (nominally, Perses).[129] At this juncture, the two narratives serve Hesiod's purposes *regardless* of their incompatibility (or ultimate truth-value).

The *Theogony*, though, affords nothing like such a clear or central example. The fact that the *Moirai* are inconsistently born of both Night (*Th*. 217) and of Themis and Zeus (*Th*. 904)[130] is a marginal and seemingly unique case, which strikes me as the exception that proves the rule, throwing into sharp relief the overall coherence and consistency of Hesiod's vast, complex and grand theogonic-cosmogonic system. More difficult to assess is the import of the fact that, throughout the *Theogony*, Hesiod (like Homer), may represent the same divinity both as an

[126] Recall Versnel's 'luxurious multiplicity'; see Ch. 1.2. [127] Rowe (1983) 132–3.
[128] The precise force of ἐκκορυφώσω is unclear, see West (1978) *ad loc*.; Haubold (2010) 27, n.61; Canevaro (2015) 198. Rowe (1983) 133 rightly focuses on ἕτερον ... λόγον.
[129] Haubold (2010) 26. [130] Rowe (1983) 128.

anthropomorphised person and as what *we* would demarcate as natural phenomena (Ouranos), impulses (Eros, Eris), sensations (Pain, Hunger) or societal qualities (Lawlessness). So, for example, Might both sits by Zeus' throne (*Th*. 385–8) and is something in which Zeus is preeminent (*Th*. 49).[131] The perception that such representations embody *competing* conceptions could well aggravate our pre-existing inclination to consider anthropomorphism intrinsically unphilosophical. But the unapologetic ubiquity and unremarked juxtapositions of such dualities leave no doubt that Hesiod and Homer themselves, at any rate, treat these representations as *complementary* reflections of the same phenomenon under different aspects.[132]

What we should take from Rowe is the point that, prominently in the *Works and Day*s and possibly in the *Theogony* (although we can cite only one isolated incident), Hesiod occasionally employs logically incompatible narratives to express insights which are themselves compatible and complementary. Importantly, however, throughout Hesiod's corpus these complementary insights themselves involve not *merely* prescriptive or moralising injunctions, but also certain descriptive theological and anthropological positions.[133] In fact, the Prometheus-Pandora and Races narratives cohere not only in extolling the virtues of work and justice respectively, but also in grounding the status of work and justice as inexorable necessities of the human condition by reference to Zeus' rule over the cosmos and its human inhabitants.[134]

What merits and excludes the label 'philosophical' is inevitably a contested and elusive question. Ultimately, it is not in itself an important question for our purposes. Far more significant is the growing recognition that Hesiod warrants sympathetic consideration as a serious, sophisticated and reflective thinker.[135] Beyond that, and beyond the *general* coherence of his theogonic-cosmogonic, theological, anthropological and moral world view, it is Hesiod's *epistemological self-awareness* which is crucial for

[131] See further Lloyd (1966) 199–202; Rowe (1983) 125–9.
[132] Lloyd (1966) 202; Rowe (1983) 130. [133] Contrast Rowe (1983) 134.
[134] Following Clay (2003) 38, 126; cf. Canevaro (2015) 150–1.
[135] See esp. Clay (2003); cf. Haubold (2010); Koning (2010) 190–1; Canevaro (2015); Iribarren (forthcoming).

us and which importantly relates him to subsequent philosophical epistemology.[136] If nothing else, Hesiod, I believe, shall have earned his place as a key *initiator* of philosophical epistemology if Lloyd is right that '[p]hilosophy and science can only begin when a set of questions is substituted for a set of vaguely assumed certainties.'[137]

Nonetheless, we can afford to be specific on two pertinent respects in which Hesiod differs from Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles. First, Hesiod's epistemology accommodates nothing like critical or argumentative reasoning of the prominence and sophistication of those later thinkers. Second, the epistemological framework which Hesiod crystallises remains, on my view, sufficiently indeterminate to accommodate ambivalent vacillations between competing elaborations of its fixed principles (Chapter 2.4). By marked contrast, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles all resolve this indeterminacy into definite epistemological positions. It is another matter, though, whether this latter divergence must mark Hesiod as more or less philosophical than his successors or is altogether orthogonal to that question.

I am not, in sum, concerned to reject the generic classification of Hesiod as a 'poet' or to insist that he has been wrongly refused the title of 'philosopher'. I do not deny that we can draw broad distinctions between philosophical and non-philosophical writers in archaic Greece, either by retrojecting the classifications expressed in the later Greek philosophical tradition or by importing our own modern criteria of what counts as philosophy, even though, on both accounts, such distinctions would have to be flexible and messy at their edges, when it comes to figures like Hesiod or Pherecydes.

Be that as it may, it *is* important that we remain critical of the motivations and preoccupations which are commonly attributed *and denied* to Hesiod on the basis of our generic classification of him as a poet. The Muses' address to Hesiod, which will be our primary focus in Chapter 2, provides one important illustration of this point. It is sometimes assumed, by interpreters of otherwise

[136] Boys-Stones (2010) 32 observes Hesiod's epistemological self-awareness; contrast Hussey (1990) 19; Lesher (2008) 463; Graham (2010) 132.
[137] Lloyd (1979) 266.

diverse views, that, in order to understand why the Muses address Hesiod as they do in *Theogony* 26–8, we must explain why it should be in Hesiod's interest to have the Muses address him in this way: 'why should Hesiod *choose* to attribute a defect to his own *poetry*?'[138] It is no doubt important to consider how Hesiod constructs his poetic authority at different junctures. But I see no more reason to expect that Hesiod's epistemological reflections should be explicable in such reductively utilitarian terms than, say, Xenophanes' own disavowal of knowledge, which he likewise expresses through poetic hexametric verses (DK21 B34; Chapter 3.3). Hesiod knows nothing of an 'ancient disagreement between philosophy and poetry' (*Rep.* 10.607b1-6).

[138] Ledbetter (2003) 43, 60 (my emphases); cf. e.g. Murray (1981) 91; Bergren (1983) 82.

2

HESIODIC EPISTEMOLOGY

Alongside the Homeric poems, Hesiod offers some of the earliest surviving and most consequential writings of ancient Greece. Two great poems have come down to us, the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days*. The former treats principally of the births of gods and the divine structure (physical as well as moral) of the cosmos and its history from its beginnings and up to the current age of Zeus' reign. The latter takes the form of a protreptic addressed to Hesiod's wayward brother Perses, and covers a broad range of issues ranging from general ethical principles and the nature and implications of Zeus' just government of the world, to more particular observations of proper measures and times in the conduct of one's daily life and work.

The *Theogony* begins with the Muses on top of Mt. Helicon. The Muses dance on soft feet down the mountain, singing of the holy race of the immortal gods (*Th.* 1–21). On one occasion (αἵ νύ ποθ'), they came upon Hesiod as he was herding his sheep at the foot of the mountain and taught him beautiful song (καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν, *Th.* 22–3). In the following lines, the Muses address Hesiod in their first and last unambiguously direct speech (*Th.* 24–8):

τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον, 24
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο· 25
ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἷον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. 28

And this speech the goddesses first of all spoke to me
The Olympian Muses, daughters of Aegis-bearing Zeus:
'Shepherds of the field, base, shameful things, mere bellies:
We know how to speak many falsehoods which are like verities,[1]
And we know, whenever we wish, how to utter truths.'

[1] Or: 'realities'.

These words, which must serve as the starting and focal point for any account of Hesiod's epistemological preoccupations, have been described without exaggeration as 'one of the most enigmatic statements about poetry to be found in Greek literature'.[2] The Muses precisely do not explicate the implications of their address. Its interpretation thus becomes a challenge of reading the subtext.

We can usefully outline two primary schools of interpretation. The 'truths-only' interpretation finds in the Muses' address the assurance that, while the Muses sometimes tell falsehoods to *other* poets, Hesiod's *Theogony* will consist purely of truths. The contrast between the Muses' two types of discourse is traditionally recast as anti-Homeric polemic: 'Lügengesang ist homerisch, Wahrsang hesiodeisch.'[3] Other truths-only interpreters reject[4] or do not commit themselves to this specific identification.[5]

Before we turn to the second primary approach, we must clearly distinguish (i) the truths-only interpretation, according to which the Muses imply that they communicate only truths to Hesiod, from (ii) the compatible but distinct view that the poet acquires *knowledge* from the Muses (let us call this the 'divine knowledge' interpretation). The two claims are often conflated.[6] But (i) without (ii) comprises an entirely different understanding of the epistemological nature of Hesiod's relationship with the Muses than (i) and (ii). The Muses make a pointed *first*-person knowledge claim ('*we* know . . . *we* know'), which contrasts emphatically with the abuse they direct at their mortal addressee. We cannot take it,

[2] Pucci (1977) 8.

[3] Nietzsche (1922) 98; cf. e.g. Göttling (1843) 7; Paley (1861) *ad loc*.; Snell (1953) 138–9; Heitsch (1966) 198–9; Diller (1966) 690–1; Roloff (1970) 119, n.22; Murray (1981) 90–1; Bergren (1983) 82; Koning (2010) 304.

[4] Cornford (1952) 104–5; West (1966) 162.

[5] Jaeger (1947) 11; Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 11; Nagy (1990) 44–7; Hussey (1990) 37; Bowie (1993) 22; Morgan (2000) 21; Katz and Volk (2000) 122–3; Most (2006) xxii-xxiii, n.7; Torgerson (2006) 36; Granger (2007) 408–9; Ferella (2013) 44; Pucci (2009) 43; cf. also Pucci (1977) who, however, argues that the doubleness of the Muses' speech 'creeps into the text' despite its author (esp. 1, 12, 25, 27, 31). Canevaro (2015) 43 expresses a truths-only view but allows (n.41) that Hesiod is conscious that he could not guarantee the truth of his account in the *Theogony*.

[6] For casual ascriptions of knowledge-claims to Hesiod, see e.g. Walcot (1963) 6; Roloff (1970) 120; Murray (1981) 91; Bergren (1983) 70–1; Stoddard (2004) 42, 61; Granger (2008) 15; (2013*b*) 167; Ustinova (2009) 169.

then, that Hesiod confuses (i) the prospect of receiving truths from the Muses through divine favour with (ii) the prospect of acquiring the same power and knowledge to which they lay claim. I will argue in what follows that the divine knowledge interpretation is nowhere a viable construal of Hesiodic or, for that matter, Homeric epistemology. Homer and Hesiod deploy the vocabulary of knowledge deliberately (ἴδμεν, *Th.* 27–8; ἴστε, *Il.* 2.485). They are careful to dissociate themselves from claims for divine knowledge. Neither resorts to such claims in constructing their poetic authority. The mortal poet does not pretend to acquire the knowledge which characterises the Muses.

The alternative to the truths-only interpretation is best defined negatively as denying that Hesiod makes the categorical truth-claim posited by the truths-only interpretation. We can then further distinguish two different versions of the alternative view. One version adds the positive claim that the Muses imply that the *Theogony* does in fact involve falsehoods.[7] Another version of the alternative view – call it the 'ambiguous' interpretation – takes the Muses to leave it uncertain whether the *Theogony* comprises truths, falsehoods which are like verities, or some combination of both.[8]

We will first survey the semantic range in epic poetry of the constitutive terms of the Muses' address (Chapter 2.1). We will thus establish some important preliminary points about Hesiod's usage of these terms in *Theogony* 27–8 and defend the (traditional) translation given above. Scholars too often discuss the Muses' address in isolation from the *Theogony* as a whole. In Chapter 2.2, we will consider these verses both in their immediate context and against the broader background of Hesiod's conception of mortal and divine and male and female, and in relation to Homeric (including Hymnic) notions of poetic inspiration. I will conclude that the *Theogony* decisively supports what I called the

[7] Wilamowitz (1916) 473. A combination of this strong view with the divine knowledge interpretation is neither incoherent nor uninstantiated: a knowledgeable Hesiod could elect to include in his poetry falsehoods which are like verities. This seems to be the upshot of Stroh (1976) 96–8.

[8] Clay (1988) 328; (2003) 63; Ledbetter (2003) 40–4; Halliwell (2011) 18, n.37; cf. Wade-Gery (1949) 86; Thalmann (1984) 151–2.

'ambiguous' interpretation and develop (Chapter 2.3) a particular elaboration of it. In Chapter 2.4, however, we will address a divergent epistemological stance expressed at one juncture in the *Works and Days* (646–62) and examine its implications for our understanding of the Muses' address and of Hesiod as a theological and epistemological thinker.

Hesiod is the earliest surviving Greek author to name himself within his own text (*Th.* 22). But scholars have grown suspicious of attempts to find in the depiction of 'Hesiod' and his life-story a transparent autobiography and tend to view this depiction as designed to serve certain rhetorical or didactic purposes.[9] At no juncture will we estimate somehow the extent to which the narrating poet and his autobiography, as constructed in our text, may or may not have corresponded to the life of a historic personality.[10] The question for us is how the prominent persona of the mortal poet, *as the text discloses him to us*, construes and represents his relation to the divine and the epistemological ramifications of this relation. Again, we need not insist that Hesiod's encounter with the Muses necessarily refers to the historic event of a perceived epiphany (although it certainly could) nor, *a fortiori*, assume that in the Muses' address Hesiod transcribes verbatim what he believed to be words once spoken to him at the foot of Mt. Helicon.[11] The essential point is that, in his narration of his encounter with the Muses, the mortal poet articulates his understanding of what he construes and represents as an initial and ongoing[12] interaction with divine agents, which alone renders his poetry possible.

[9] E.g. Stoddard (2004) esp. 1–33; Nagy (1990) 47–82; Haubold (2010) 11 and *passim*; contrast Wade-Gery (1949) 84–5; Fränkel (1975*b*) 94–6.

[10] Cf. Haubold (2010) 22, n.45; Clay (2003) 3. I will, though, resist attempts to regard Hesiod as 'literary fiction'.

[11] Dodds (1951) 117, for example, postulates a historic epiphany and offers parallels; cf. Wade-Gery (1949) 85–7; Most (2006) xiii-xiv; contrast e.g. Bowie (1993) 20; Stoddard (2004) 7, 67–8. Cf. West (1966) 158–61. On the ubiquity and immense diversity of divine epiphanies throughout Greek (and Roman) antiquity, see Versnel (1987); Petridou (2015).

[12] Hesiod continues to invoke the Muses ('tell me', *Th.* 114–15).

2.1 Semantic Overview: *pseudea, alêthea, etyma, homoia*

The Muses' address turns on four pivotal concepts: *pseudea* ('falsehoods'), *alêthea* ('truths'), *etyma* ('verities' or 'realities') and *homoia* ('like' or 'equivalent to'). An overview of these terms will enable us to outline the *kinds* of domains encompassed by the Muses' address and to acquire a first insight into the interpretative predicament in which its open-endedness leaves its audience. It will also enable us to dispel contentions that this epic vocabulary was not used, like our term 'true' (or, *mutatis mutandis*, 'false'), to pick out statements which state '*p*' when it is the case that *p*.[13]

The term *pseudos* and its cognates standardly signify that an account of a present, past or future state-of-affairs is false. In *Odyssey* 14.379–87, for example, Eumaeus recounts how an Aetolian deceived him (ἐξήπαφε, 379) by stating that he had seen Odysseus in Crete and that the latter will arrive later that year and enjoins Odysseus not to curry favour through such falsehoods (ψεύδεσσι, 387).[14] The *Iliad* employs this vocabulary to identify false prophecies, i.e. divine deception (*Il.* 21.276; *Il.* 2.81; cf. *Il.* 2.348–9; also *h.Hom.* 4.562–3). Notably, we also find it predicated of genealogical and even theogonic accounts. In a Homeric hymn, the poet denounces competing traditions surrounding the location of Dionysus' birth (Drakanon, Ikaros, etc.) as falsehoods (σε λέγουσι γενέσθαι | ψευδόμενοι, 5–6), insisting instead on Mt. Nysa.[15] The closest parallel to the Muses' address is Homer's concluding remark at *Odyssey* 19.203 on Odysseus' fabrication of a Cretan autobiography (165–202): 'Speaking many falsehoods he made them like verities' (ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). Odysseus' fabrications here clearly involve biographical and genealogical falsehoods (ἐμὸν γόνον, 166). The term *pseudea* can also possess a normative and evaluative force. In *Iliad* 4.404–5, for example, we have an assessment of martial prowess and, perhaps,

[13] Morgan (2000) 21–2, for example, claims that early Greek poetry recognises no criteria of truth and falsehood except insofar as 'true' meant 'valid' and 'memorable' (misrepresenting Cole (1983), as we shall presently see).

[14] Cf. similarly *Od.* 14.124–5, 365; *Od.* 3.20, 328 (with *Od.* 3.16, 79–101; *Od.* 4.316–31); *h.Hom.* 4.369 (with 379).

[15] Cf. *Il.* 5.635–6 on Sarpedon's descent (ψευδόμενοι δέ σέ φασι Διὸς γόνον αἰγιόχοιο | εἶναι).

moral character: Stheneleus rejects as lies (μὴ ψεύδε' ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν) Agamemnon's contention that Diomedes is inferior to his father in battle (370–400).[16] We also find deceitful statements of favourable *intentions*, as when the disguised Odysseus tells Eumaeus that a Phoenician con man had convinced him to travel to Libya under false pretences (ψεύδεα βουλεύσας, *Od*. 14.296).[17] Iris' communication, which Priam insists was not false (ψεῦδος, *Il*. 24.222), included both descriptive predictions (182–7) and injunctions in accordance with Zeus' will (171–81).

In *Iliad* 4.235, Agamemnon expresses his conviction that Zeus will not give his aid to lies or, perhaps, liars (ἐπὶ ψευδέσσι). The point here is that the Trojans acted against the Greeks in defiance of their oaths. Hesiod similarly employs this terminology when delineating the divine penalties for mortal (*Op*. 282–5) and divine (*Th*. 782–806, note 783) perjury. Correspondingly, the genealogy in the *Theogony* of the gods Falsehoods – *Pseudea* – underscores their status as a threatening power. The offspring of Strife, they are siblings of, for example, Toil, Forgetfulness, Hunger, Pains, Battles, Murders and Lawlessness (*Th*. 226–32).[18] The kind, just and harmless god Nereus is without-falsehood and true (ἀψευδέα καὶ ἀληθέα, *Th*. 233–6). The calamitous Pandora, conversely, acquires from Hermes deceits (ψεύδεα), devious discourses (λόγους) and a thievish character (*Op*. 78). The phrase 'to give a lying grace with one's tongue' (ψεύδεσθαι γλώσσης χάριν, *Op*. 709) signifies making a false pretence of favour, something which is closely associated with inflicting harm (κακὸν ἔρξαι, *Op*. 708; cf. Thgn. 389–90). These passages are perfectly consistent with the statement in *Works and Days* 788–9 (whatever the authorship of these lines) that the sixth day is excellent for bearing men, since they will excel in deceits (ψεύδεα): like Odysseus, Hermes, Pandora and the Muses, such men will be on the informed side of the interaction between deceiver and deceived.

[16] Again, when Agamemnon concedes at *Il*. 9.115 that Nestor's description was not false (ψεῦδος), he endorses both the factual aspects of the latter's account of the feud surrounding Briseïs and his allocation of blame (*Il*. 9.96–113); cf. *Il*. 23.576, with 570–85, 402–41.

[17] False prophecies may overlap with this sense, as in *Il*. 2.348–9.

[18] The consequences of perjury explain the relation to Oath (*Th*. 231–2).

The term *pseudea*, then, activates a cluster of associations centred on the notion of threat and deception. The Hesiodic (and Homeric) usage of this vocabulary thus already excludes the idea that, in their address to Hesiod, the Muses are merely delineating what are, for the audience, two different but entirely unproblematic and equally valenced kinds or genres of poetic discourse.[19]

The term *alêthês* involves more, and has somewhat different emphases, than our word 'true', as Cole (1983) has shown. In epic poetry, the term refers almost exclusively to the informational content of communication. It marks communication as free from forgetfulness or inattentiveness (*lêthê*) and, therefore, as conscientiously comprehensive and devoid of irrelevant or misleading accretions.[20] It is clear and entirely consistent with Cole's analysis, however, that, to qualify as '*alêthês*', an account must exhibit also what we would call the logical property of truth.[21] When Hector's steward affirms that she speaks truths (ἀληθέα) when she reports that Andromache is present at the City Walls, she affirms, *in primis*, that Andromache is present at the City Walls (*Il*. 6.383–9).[22] The term also standardly highlights the veracity and comprehensiveness of accounts of past events.[23] References to the future are typically found only insofar as speakers truly report their favourable or hostile *intentions*,[24] although a Homeric poet describes quite generally the favourable conditions under which the divine and divinatory Thriai speak truth (ἀληθείην) to their consultants (*h.Hom*. 4.560–1). As with the epic vocabulary of falsehood, this vocabulary of truth also extends to the didactic sphere of normative prescription and ethical evaluation. Eurycleia truly identifies for Odysseus the twelve of the fifty servant girls

[19] The baggage and connotations of the term *pseudea* also invalidate the view that *Th*. 27 merely articulates something as comparatively safe and circumscribed as our modern category of literary fiction and that Hesiod can be classified as such (Bowie (1993) esp. 21, 37; Stoddard (2004) *passim*, esp. 40–2; Halliwell (2011) 14–15).

[20] Cole (1983) 7–21; cf. Palmer (2009) 89, n.107; Clay (1988) 327; (2003) 61, n.50. Hesiod himself highlights this etymologising of *alêthês* (*Th*. 233–6: Νηρέα … ἀληθέα … οὐδὲ θεμίστων λήθεται).

[21] Pace Morgan (2000) 21–2; Palmer, *loc. cit*.

[22] Cf. *Il*. 24.407–9.

[23] *h.Hom*. 2.433 (ἀληθέα πάντ', cf. 406: ἐρέω νημερτέα πάντα, 416: πάντα διίξομαι); *Od*. 7.297 with 241ff; *Od*. 16.226ff; also qualifying accounts of past conversations: *Od*. 17.122 (πᾶσαν ἀληθείην); *Od*. 16.61–6 (ἀληθέα πάντ').

[24] *Od*. 21.212–16 (ὡς ἔσεταί περ, ἀληθείην καταλέξω); *Od*. 18.342; *Od*. 17.15; cf. Cole (1983) 15–17.

guilty of shamelessness and disrespect (*Od*. 22.420–5). Nestor, after accepting Telemachus' request that he speaks the truth concerning the events of Agamemnon's murder (ἀληθές … ἀληθέα πάντ', *Od*. 3.247–54), articulates (i) a counterfactual scenario (256–61), (ii) an account of the events (262–312) and (iii) an expressly prescriptive moral (313–16).[25]

Outside the Muses' address, the only other occurrence of *alêthês* in the *Theogony* is also one of just two instances in Homer and Hesiod where the term qualifies, not speech, but a person: Nereus, we saw, is himself characterised as 'without falsehood and true' and, concomitantly, as a *kind* and *benign* god (ἤπιος … ἤπια δήνεα οἶδεν, 233–6).[26]

By contrast with *alêthês*, the term *etymos* (or, interchangeably, *etêtymos*) can unambiguously qualify either speech as true[27] or states-of-affairs and objects as real or genuine.[28] Often, though, the term could admit both readings. In *Odyssey* 19.203, we could be told that Odysseus made his many falsehoods like 'verities' or like 'realities' (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα).[29] We need not dwell on this dilemma with regard to the Muses' address. The Muses may produce falsehoods which are like 'truths' (in which case the *etyma* of line 27 would be equivalent to the 'truths' of line 28) or like 'realities', i.e. like all those aspects of the world which the Muses narrate truly and faithfully when they speak truths (*Th*. 28) and speciously when they speak falsehoods (*Th*. 27).[30]

Again, the term *etymos* demonstrates a broad and flexible range of applications. The term can signal the truth of such a proposition as 'this land is Ithaca' (*Od*. 24.258–9; cf. *Od*. 13.232–5; *h.Hom.* 3.467–8) or of the statement of the number of figs in a fig tree

[25] Cf. also *Od*. 11.507 (πᾶσαν ἀληθείην) with 510–12 (where Odysseus evaluates Neoptolemus' capacity as a deliberator).

[26] Cf. *Il*. 12.433: γυνὴ χερνῆτις ἀληθής, interpreted variously as 'honest' and 'conscientious' (Hainsworth (1993) 362) or 'careful' (Willcock (1978) 320); for these connotations, cf. also *Il*. 23.358–61. There are, finally, two obscure occurrences in the *Days*, signifying, it seems, the truths that certain days are favourable to certain actions: *Op*. 768 (by divine dispensation: ἐκ Διόθεν, 765); *Op*. 814–18.

[27] μῦθος ἐτήτυμος, *Od*. 23.62; cf. *Il*. 23.440.

[28] 'Odysseus *really did* come' (ἔτυμόν τοι | ἦλθ'), *Od*. 23.26; cf. *Il*. 13.111; *h.Hom.* 3.64–5; note ἐτήτυμος ἄγγελος (*h.Hom.* 2.46; *Il*. 22.437–9) for a 'true' messenger, i.e. one who communicates truths (ἐτήτυμα, *h.Hom.* 2.44).

[29] Cf. *Il*. 10.534; *Od*. 4.140; *h.Hom.* 2.44; *h.Hom.* 3.176; cf. Pucci (1977) 9, 35 n.8.

[30] Cf. Ferrari (1988) 57.

(ἀριθμὸς ἐτήτυμος, Hesiod, fr. 278.5 M-W). The word regularly characterises accounts of past events as true (*Od.* 14.186–90; *Od.* 23.62; *Od.* 4.645–7), but Homeric and Hesiodic poetry exhibits no unambiguous applications of the term to (accounts of) future states-of-affairs.[31] With *etymos* too we can point to contexts where specifically genealogical or biographical truths or realities are in question (κείνου μέν τοι ὅδ' υἱὸς ἐτήτυμον, *Od.* 4.157; cf. *Od.* 14. 186–7; *Od.* 24.297–8; *Od.* 1.174–6 and, again, *Od.* 19.203). And this term too may qualify as true such clearly prescriptive and evaluative judgements as 'it is no base thing to ward off destruction from one's companions when they are oppressed' (*Il.* 18.128–9; cf. *Il.* 13.111) or 'Antilochus is sensible and wise' (οὔ σ' ἔτυμόν γε φάμεν πεπνῦσθαι, *Il.* 23.440). Outside the Muses' address, the word *etymos* recurs in Hesiod's two extant poems only in a programmatic statement at the end of the proem to the *Works and Days*: 'I would tell *etêtyma* to Perses' (*Op.* 10).[32] Hesiod does not circumscribe or elucidate how much or what aspects of the subsequent poem he hopes will fall under the category of 'truths' or 'realities'. Thus, the scope and emphases of the term *etêtyma* here are as open-ended as they are in the Muses' address in the *Theogony* and equally amenable to be reassessed in the light of the scope and emphases of Hesiod's ensuing preoccupations.[33]

In some passages, the term *homoios* requires or suggests a sense of equivalence or identity. Achilles is angered whenever one man robs his (social?) equal (τὸν ὁμοῖον ... ἀμέρσαι, *Il.* 16.53) and recognises that both Patroclus and himself were fated to redden the selfsame earth (i.e. Troy: ὁμοίην γαῖαν, *Il.* 18.329).[34] We also encounter, however, a weaker and looser sense: Hera and Athena do not possess *the same* gait as doves but a *like* one (τρήρωσι πελειάσιν ἴθμαθ' ὁμοῖαι, *Il.* 5.778; cf. *h.Hom.* 3.114). Here two

[31] Penelope's theory of oneiromancy at *Od.* 19.562–7 (ἔτυμα κραίνουσι) is a possible but ambiguous case.

[32] For a discussion of this line, see Ch. 2.4.

[33] Neither Homeric nor Hesiodic Greek exhibits a shred of evidence for the view that the word *alêthea* (*Th.* 28) indicates *divine* truths and *etyma* (*Th.* 27) *human* truths (e.g. Stoddard (2004) 80–5; Tsagalis (2009) 133–4). Among numerous difficulties, this arbitrary reading generates the irresolvable problem of satisfactorily explicating why the Muses should claim or mention only the lopsided abilities to articulate divine truths and *falsehoods* like human truths.

[34] Cf. also *Op.* 114; *Od.* 2.276–7; *Il.* 5.440–2 (note ἴσ').

elements are somehow alike or similar, rather than equal or identical, with regard to their respective possession of a certain quality.[35] Hesiod's *Works and Days* offers similar if more open-ended comparisons. The warlike Bronze race is, not simply unequal or non-identical with, but indeed *nothing like* (οὐδὲν ὁμοῖον, 144) the infantile Silver race (127–55). Again, Hesiod's apocalyptic vision for the Iron race is one in which (i) a father is no longer 'like' (ὁμοίιος) his children, nor (ii) vice versa nor (iii) a guest like his host nor (iv) a companion like his companion (*Op*. 182–3). No notion of equivalence, equality or identity could make sense of all four cases. The gloss 'like-minded'[36] captures best the envisaged breakdown of familial and social affinity (cf. ὁμοφροσύνην, *Od*. 6.180–4). When, however, the adjective can coherently support either the translation 'like' or 'same', and even in many passages which do suggest a certain emphasis, we cannot assume one sense to the exclusion of the other.[37] To that extent, the term *homoios* ambiguously blurs the distinction between (i) likeness and (ii) equivalence or identity. In their address to Hesiod (ψεύδεα … ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα), the Muses may have in mind falsehoods that are somehow like truths, or falsehoods which are partially[38] equivalent to or overlapping with truths with respect to their possession of some unspecified quality or qualities, and they may convey these senses indistinctly.

The notion of deceptive speciousness is not intrinsic to the term *homoios* but it *is* conveyed by the Muses' surrounding contrast between truths (*Th*. 28) and falsehoods which are like and/or

[35] Cf. also *Il*. 10.437; *h.Hom*. 2.177–8 (χαῖται … ἄνθει ὁμοῖαι); *Od*. 6.230–1; *Od*. 23. 157–8; *Il*. 17.51–2. Heiden (2007), arguing that *homoios* only ever signifies equivalence, blankly denies the possibility that two things may be *like* or *similar to* each other with respect to their possession of some quality, restricting the notions of 'likeness' and 'similarity' to outward appearance (esp. 156 with n.11; 158 with n.15).

[36] Most (2006) *ad loc*.

[37] For example, the uninitiated do not enjoy the same *or* similar things in the afterlife (ὁμοίων | αἴσαν, *h.Hom*. 2.481–2), cf. e.g. *Od*. 2.121; *Il*. 18.120. Both likeness and equality arguably function in the formula δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ὁμοῖος (vel sim.), *Od*. 3.468; *Od*. 23.163; *Od*. 8.14; *Od*. 6.16; Hes. frr. 10a.33; 10a.49; 291.1 M-W. In many passages which indicate an emphasis on equality, a connotation of likeness seems plausible, as in *Il*. 2.553–4 (τῷ δ' οὔ πώ τις ὁμοῖος … κοσμῆσαι ἵππους).

[38] As with Odysseus' falsehoods at *Od*. 19.203 (cf. Clay (2003) 62). The word *homoia* hardly implies that the Muses' *falsehoods* (*pseudea*) are *wholly* equivalent to truths, *pace* Heiden (2007) 153, 169–72.

partially equivalent to truths (*Th*. 27), combined with the *absence* of signposts or criteria with which we might distinguish the Muses' lovely, melodious truths from their lovely, melodious falsehoods. The term *homoios* similarly acquires this force through its context when Odysseus constructs for Penelope a false autobiography which often overlaps with and resembles the truth (*Od*. 19.203) and when Aphrodite renders herself 'like (ὁμοίη) in stature and bodily form to an unwed mortal maiden' (*h.Hom.* 5.82).[39] By contrast with this remark about Aphrodite, but like Homer's remark about Odysseus' verisimilitudinous fabrications, Hesiod's Muses leave entirely unspecified and open-ended the *respects* in which one item ('falsehoods') is like and/or partially equivalent to another ('verities' or 'realities').[40]

The foregoing survey brings out, in embryonic form, core aspects of the dynamic between poet and Muses. The Muses issue an underdetermined programmatic statement, articulated through several underdetermined key concepts, and – on the semantic level as on the epistemological level – leave Hesiod, and us, to assess for ourselves all that they might *mean* by saying what they say.[41] Furthermore, the usage of the terms *pseudea* and *alêthea* elsewhere and especially in Hesiod already situates the Muses' dispensation of truths and falsehoods within the broader theological framework of the divine dispensation of good and bad. In issuing truths, the Muses recall the agency of a 'true' and benign Nereus (*Th*. 233–6). In issuing baneful (*Th*. 226–32) and specious falsehoods, they are more akin to a cunning Hermes – or, significantly, a Pandora (*Op*. 78).

The Muses' refusal to clarify or delimit the terminology of their programmatic statement invites us to reassess continually its scope and emphases as we explore the scope and emphases of the *Theogony*. Theogonic and cosmogonic states-of-affairs, the tensions and (familial) relations between the powers which structure and govern the cosmos, past and present interactions between male and female and between gods and mortals – all these domains

[39] Cf. Bryan (2012) 15–16. [40] On this point, cf. Heiden (2007) 168–9.
[41] Ledbetter (2003) 45 argues that attempts to pinpoint the Muses' falsehoods violate the rhetorical force of their unrestricted mastery of deception.

are encompassed in the prospect of comprehensive truths and specious deceptions.

I submit further, as a hypothesis the plausibility of which will be substantiated by the next two sections, that we should not overlook the attested *normative* and *evaluative* force of this vocabulary of truth and falsehood. We will see that the mortal poet and his audience do not suffer the same epistemic paralysis in assessing and accepting the *didactic* and *prescriptive* import of the *Theogony*'s accounts of, for example, the interactions between gods and mortals and between male and female agents. Furthermore, these prescriptive insights, which we *can* establish on the basis of Hesiod's inspired narratives (whatever their descriptive truth-value), inform our evaluation of the theological and epistemological implications of the Muses' address itself. In other words, we can find some daylight in the *Theogony* between prescriptive or evaluative insight and the assurance of complete, literal descriptive truth (just as we found in Hesiod's juxtaposition of the Prometheus-Pandora and Races episodes in the *Works and Days*; see Chapter 1.5).[42] Our survey in this section showed that the threatening spectre of falsehoods is one important aspect of the Muses' address. But perhaps, then, by open-endedly signalling that their falsehoods are 'like verities' or 'realities', the Muses (and Hesiod) *also* create space for descriptive falsehoods which, with respect to their possession of some unspecified quality or qualities, are nonetheless partially but importantly like, identical with or equal to genuine theogonic or theological states-of-affairs. Some falsehoods (*pseudea*), then, may share with some corresponding verities or realities (*etyma*) the quality of offering evaluative and prescriptive insight.

2.2 The Muses' Address and Divine Dispensation in Hesiod

We cannot over emphasise the textual fact that at no point do the Muses say that *to Hesiod* they will dispense only truths and never

[42] *Mutatis mutandis*, one could draw a comparison on this point with Plato's 'Noble Lie' at *Rep.* 2.382aff. (We might even find an allusion to *Th.* 27–8 in 382d2–3: ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα. Cf. Belfiore (1985); Van Noorden (2015) 135–6.) On the Noble Lie, see the discussion in Rowett (2016).

verisimilitudinous falsehoods.[43] Before narrating his encounter with them, Hesiod does advertise the aesthetic and, I suggest, didactic quality of the 'fine' song which the Muses taught him, but notably refrains from making any truth-claims (καλήν, *Th*. 22). Hesiod precedes his theogonic account itself with an extended disquisition on the value of the Muses' song and of the mortal poet's Muse-inspired song (*Th*. 36–115). Throughout, Hesiod focuses on the aesthetic qualities and the soothing and therapeutic effects of song. So, for example, when 'a poet, a servant of the Muses' (ἀοιδὸς | Μουσάων θεράπων, *Th*. 99–100) sings of gods and men, then a distraught auditor 'forgets his sorrows at once and does not remember his anxieties; for swiftly the gifts of the goddesses have turned them aside' (102–3).[44] Conspicuously – in the light of the Muses' opening address – not once does Hesiod stake a truth-claim or use veridical terminology in this sustained reflection on the nature and benefits of inspired song. In order to achieve their therapeutic and mind-transporting qualities, the poet's inspired verses do not need to be true or believed.[45] It should be emphasised, though, that the independence of the song's therapeutic value from its truth-value does not mean that the Muses' dramatic contrast between their verisimilitudinous falsehoods and their truths loses all significance. As we shall see in further detail, this contrast activates an epistemic anxiety which fits into a broader cluster of anxieties that frames the human condition. Put simply, there is a great deal in Hesiod's world and world view from which we need the soothing distractions of inspired song, and this includes our weakness and paralysis when it comes to assessing the truth-value of inspired narratives about the history and structure of this world we inhabit (*Th*. 26–8).

The goddesses descend from Zeus' altar (*Th*. 4) and topmost Helicon (7) to meet Hesiod at the foot of the mountain (23). The trajectory underscores their respective divine and mortal

[43] The question-begging paraphrase of *Th*. 28 in West (1966) 162 is symptomatic of many truths-only interpreters: 'when we choose, we can reveal the truth, and we are going to reveal it to you'. The last clause is not in the Greek. Cf. Clay (2003) 59–60.

[44] Cf. *Th*. 37 (τέρπουσι), 39–40 (αὐδή … ἡδεῖα), 40–1 (γελᾷ … ὀπὶ λειριοέσσῃ), 51 (τέρπουσι), 55 (λησμοσύνην τε κακῶν κτλ), 65 (ἐρατήν … ὅσσαν), 68 (ὀπὶ καλῇ), 96–7 (γλυκερή … αὐδή), 104 (ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν).

[45] See further Ledbetter (2003) 40–60; Halliwell (2011) 16–17.

statuses.[46] If the Muses first sang among themselves of other gods (*Th.* 11–21), they now sing to Hesiod of Hesiod (26) and of themselves (27–8). First of all (πρώτιστα, *Th.* 24) the Muses disclose and determine the nature of the poet's relation to them. Nowhere else in Hesiod can we parallel his clear demarcation of himself here from the goddesses as the auditor of *their* verses: 'And this speech the goddesses first of all spoke to me' (*Th.* 24). The Muses' address – their first and last unambiguously direct speech – thus outlines a framework of poetics and epistemology to which everything else in the *Theogony* is internal. Clay interestingly associates this 'first of all' (*Th.* 24) with the only other occurrence of this phrase in the *Theogony*: 'first of all Chasm came into being' (116). Hesiod's engagement with the question of cosmic origins requires a prior engagement with the question of epistemic origins.[47] The Muses, then, *first of all* articulate the epistemological caveats and limitations of their mediation (*Th.* 26–8) only through which can the cosmogonic 'first of all' be made available to mortals. Hesiod's deictic singular (τόνδε δέ με, *Th.* 24) contrasts with the Muses' vocative plurals: 'Shepherds of the field, base, shameful things, mere bellies' (*Th.* 26). In addressing and characterising Hesiod, the Muses address and characterise a group which he represents.[48] The designation 'shepherds', and the encounter with Hesiod as he tends his sheep, situate the human addressee between beasts and goddesses.[49] This positioning appropriately introduces and complements the contrast between mortal and divine capacities and statuses. The same hierarchy of god-man-beast prominently frames the Prometheus episode, where Zeus determines the relations between gods and men as he establishes the norms of sacrifice.[50] The Muses' abuse and Hesiod's encounter with them as a whole negotiate, furthermore, the prospect for mortals to edge some way towards either extreme. The insult 'mere bellies' rhetorically reduces the

[46] Following Σ *Th.* 23 Gregorio. [47] Building on Clay (2003) 52, 57.
[48] See similarly Demeter's words about humans to Metaneira in *h.Hom.* 2.256–7 (νήϊδες ἄνθρωποι κτλ); cf. Clay (2003) 57, n.37; Stoddard (2004) 72, n.30; Halliwell (2011) 13–14. Demeter precisely berates Metaneira's human inability to demarcate divine dispensations of 'good' (cf. *Th.* 28) and 'bad' (cf. *Th.* 27).
[49] See similarly Stoddard (2004) 75, 79. [50] Cf. R. Osborne (1997) 18.

shepherds to the bestial status of the sheep they tend.[51] The Muses also, however, enable Hesiod to produce narratives which, in their beauty and subject matter, transcend a human's independent artistic and, since they *could* be true (*Th*. 28), epistemic reach.

The Muses' assertion that they know how to inspire both truths and specious falsehoods is followed by these lines (*Th*. 29–34):

ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι, 29
καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον 30
δρέψασθαι,[52] θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν
θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,
καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν. 34

So spoke great Zeus' daughters, ready-of-speech,
And they granted me to pluck for myself a staff, a branch of luxuriant laurel,
A thing of wonder. And they breathed into me a voice
Inspired, so that I would celebrate the things that will be and were before,
And they bade me to sing of the race of the blessed ones who always are,
But always to chant of themselves first and last.

In its only Homeric occurrence, the description 'ready-of-speech' (*Th*. 29) signifies treacherous verbal trickery ('ready of speech and a thief with words', *Il*. 22.281). In emphasising the Muses' mastery of words, Hesiod cautions against a blithe lack of circumspection in assessing their statement and all its possible ramifications.

The Muses either present Hesiod with a laurel staff or grant him to pluck one for himself (*Th*. 30–1).[53] Hesiod's staff does not decide or even plausibly pertain to the question of the *Theogony*'s truth-value.[54] In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon is deceived by Zeus while holding the very ancestral and imperishable staff (*Il*. 2.46, cf. 1–38, 79–81, 85–6, 348–9) which he received through Zeus' favour (*Il*. 2.100–8). Hesiod's staff does underscore the communal and didactic authority of his poetry.[55] In addition to

[51] For the bestialising force of γαστέρες οἷον, cf. also the parallels in West (1966) *ad loc*.; Σ *Th*. 26 Gregorio; Hesych. sv. γ.190 Latte, and Epimenides' variation: DK3 B1 (Κρῆτες . . . θηρία, γαστέρες ἀργαί), cf. Paley (1861) *ad loc*.; Clay (2003) 57; Stoddard (2004) 74, 78; Tsagalis (2009) 133.

[52] Or: δρέψασαι. The dilemma is insoluble, although δρέψασθαι is the *lectio difficilior*. Cf. *Il*. 23.21.

[53] Depending on whether we read δρέψασαι or δρέψασθαι, see the preceding note.

[54] *Pace* e.g. Griffith (1983) 48–9 with n.50.

[55] Griffith (1983) 50; cf. Segal (1992) 28; Stoddard (2004) 185–6.

kings (*Il*. 1.279) and, more generally, arbitrators (*Il*. 1.234–9), a staff is elsewhere wielded by priests (*Il*. 1.14–15, 28) and diviners (*Od*. 11.90–1; Aeschylus, *Ag*. 1265) as well as heralds (*Il*. 7.277–8) and, temporarily, anyone speaking in the assembly (*Il*. 1.245–6; *Il*. 2.278–9, etc).[56] The staff would seem, then, to align Hesiod with the Muse-favoured king who, with soothing, persuasive and gifted speech, effects communal harmony and issues just decrees (*Th*. 80–92).[57] But, as we saw, our text belies the notion that Hesiod anchors this claim for societal and didactic value and authority by asserting a speculative truth-claim for the descriptive content of the *Theogony*. The proem nowhere uses veridical terminology to describe the welcome effects of poet, king or Muses.

The Muses inspire Hesiod so that he may glorify 'the things that will be and were before' (*Th*. 31–2). The phrase adopts the markers of divination. With the omission of 'things-that-are', it is identical to the scope of the Muses' own songs in *Theogony* 38 and of the *Iliad*'s description of the seer Calchas, who 'knew the things that are and the things that will be and were before' (ᾗδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 1.69–70). This echo of divination reinforces the impression, engendered by the Muses' address, that Hesiod is preoccupied here with *epistemological* concerns: what sort of access does his continued interaction with epistemically superior divinities allow the poet (and his audience) into matters which, as with divination, lie beyond human experience and independent human cognition?[58] But the use of mantic terminology offers nothing like unambiguous support for the truths-only interpretation.[59] As we shall see in detail (Chapter 3.1), while we occasionally encounter mantic knowledge claims (as of Calchas in *Il*. 1.69–70), we also find the widespread recognition that, precisely because knowledgeable divine communication must always be processed by the mortal diviner and/or consultant, mortal inferences from it are always conjectural and fallible (as of Calchas in *Il*. 2.299–300).

[56] West (1966) *ad Th*. 30.
[57] Cf. Clay (1988) 333; (2003) 73–6; Ledbetter (2003) 48; Stoddard (2004) 184–6.
[58] If nothing else, the omission in *Th*. 32 of 'things-that-are' accentuates Hesiod's focus in the *Theogony* on matters external to human experience.
[59] *Pace* Katz and Volk (2000) 122.

And, of course, the communication itself may be false. In language highly reminiscent of the Muses' address, the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* speaks of divinatory bee-maidens, the Thriai, who either wish to speak the truth or deceive when in favourable or unfavourable moods.[60] Conspicuously – and even pointedly – Hesiod's appropriation of the divinatory formula in *Theogony* 32 does not include a knowledge-claim or truth-claim, such as the claim made of Calchas' knowledge in the *Iliad*.[61]

One might identify in the use of the verb 'to be' in *Theogony* 32 a veridical expression: Hesiod is to celebrate the things that will be and were before *truly*. Finding such a veridical nuance in the line is, however, hardly obvious. The participial use of the verb 'to be' (τὰ ὄντα) for 'the truth' or 'the facts' is all but unparalleled in Homer and Hesiod. In fact, the only clear candidate is the remark about Calchas quoted above.[62] Even here, however, the verb is used primarily in an existential sense. Calchas has knowledge of the things that exist, will exist and existed in the past. If the line does convey a veridical lexical nuance – Calchas knows the things that are *as they truly are*, etc. – then this is because the verb 'knew' (ᾔδη) is an epistemic success term. The force of the verb 'to be' in line 32 is likewise existential. The subject matter of Hesiod's poem are genuinely existing objects, which will be in the future and were before. In fact, since the *Theogony* contains no prophecies about future states-of-affairs, it has been persuasively argued that the conjunction 'the things that will be and were before' most likely signifies everlasting entities: i.e. the gods themselves.[63] The next line approaches the same point in a different way, by saying that the Muses bade Hesiod to sing of (ὑμνεῖν) the race of those who always exist (γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, *Th.* 33). Hesiod is inspired so that he may sing of and celebrate the gods. Again, if *Iliad* 1.70 conveys a veridical nuance, then this is because 'knew' conveys epistemic success. The idea of 'telling of' or 'celebrating' or 'glorifying'

[60] *h.Hom.* 4.560–4. I return to this passage below.
[61] For the connections between poetry and divination, see more generally Chadwick (1942); Dodds (1951) 80–2; Cornford (1952) 76–9, 102; West (1966) *ad Th.* 32; Ustinova (2009) 168–9; cf. PW xxxiii-xxxiv; Detienne (1996) 23; Marquardt (1982) 9, n.2; Katz and Volk (2000) 124; Flower (2008) 78 (with qualifications).
[62] Cf. Kahn (1973) 350–1; see 332–3 on the general rarity of the veridical usage of εἰμί.
[63] Clay (2003) 65–7.

something cannot, however, shoulder the same load. First, even before we consider the all-important context of line 32 of the *Theogony*, there is no clear reason to think that the verb must signify for Hesiod something with veridical implications over and above the treating of a subject matter in the context of song. 'Celebrating' something can seem almost functionally equivalent to 'singing' of it and indicates the activity of bards in quite a general way (κλέα φωτῶν | ᾄσομαι ἡμιθέων ὧν κλείουσ' ἔργματ' ἀοιδοί, *h.Hom*. 32.18–19).[64] Second, and most importantly, Hesiod is of course aware – and he himself indicates later on – that songs and celebrations of gods and heroes are the bread and butter of every inspired 'poet, servant of the Muses' (*Th*. 99–101). Crucially, however, whether or not any given Muse-inspired celebration articulates such things that are or were *as they truly are or were* is precisely what Hesiod's Muses have called into question. The existing conventions of epic discourse afforded Hesiod a rich array of unmistakably veridical terms with which he could have staked clear and explicit truth-claims.[65] It is difficult to find in *Theogony* 32 what would be – after the destablishing declarations in lines 26–8 – a remarkably muted one.

One might still feel unease with the idea that the Muses could inspire a poet, only to have him celebrate the gods and even the Muses themselves through (at least in part) verisimilitudinous falsehoods. Again, however, given that celebrations of the gods are ubiquitous in Muse-inspired poetry (*Th*. 99–101), the Muses' address effectively tells us that they do so. After all, we can hardly imagine that, in *Theogony* 27, the Muses are informing us about a capacity which they possess – to articulate verisimilitudinous falsehoods – but which never manifests itself when they inspire their poets. Even aside from these textual points, however, we should not presume that it is on the topic of the gods, of all things, that the Muses can be expected to divulge complete and

[64] Halliwell (2011) 36–92 shows that the Homeric poems are not devoid of unsettled and critical reflections concerning the reliability and verifiability of the veracity of poetic discourse and the 'renown' or 'reputation' (*kleos*) it conveys. In *Il*. 2.486, the epistemic status of *kleos* is contrasted unfavourably with that of sure knowledge ('but we hear only report (*kleos*) and do not know anything'). See further Ch. 2.3.

[65] See e.g. the veridical language in *Od*. 3.254; *Od*. 21.212; *Il*. 24.373.

transparent truths. The gods can disclose or dissimulate themselves as they please, when they inspire mortals no less than when they encounter them (we may think here of the disguised Demeter and Dionysus in the *Homeric Hymns* which celebrate those gods), and the inability of humans to be certain of their footing is itself a testament to the power and glory of the gods. We must not project back onto Hesiod a preoccupation with the idea, which we find in later philosophical thinkers, that speaking falsehoods about the gods is *itself* a matter of impiety, although even there the concern is with statements which are not only false but also offensive.[66] Does it follow, then, that Hesiod is encouraging us to doubt that, for example, Zeus really did triumph over his enemies and now rules among the gods? We do not need to go that far. Although, in principle, the epistemological worries which Hesiod articulates concerning divine inspiration could ultimately encourage one to develop global questions concerning the very basis of any of our beliefs about the gods, Hesiod may well be taking as read such central facets of divine history and politics and never imagines that his audience will do otherwise. Importantly, however, we are certainly not obliged to ascribe to Hesiod this kind of thoroughgoing theological scepticism in order to maintain the interpretation that the Muses' address has the effect of leaving the poet uncertain concerning the truth-value of his verses. After all, by setting aside as presupposed these very basic facets of divine history and politics, we have hardly validated in a general way the truth of Hesiod's vast theogonic-cosmogonic and theological-cosmological accounts, let alone of some given statement or detail within his poem. We have by no means guaranteed that all that this inspired poet tells us about the history and structure of our world are, quite simply and unproblematically, truths.

In the shadow of the Muses' address, the *fact* of inspiration (*Th*. 31–2) precisely does not correspond to a guarantee of the communication of truths. Hesiod's word for 'voice' (αὐδήν) indicates a specifically *human* voice, while the qualifier 'inspired' or 'divine' (θέσπιν), conversely, signals the divine origin and status

[66] E.g. Xenoph. DK21 A12; Pl. *Lg*. 10.899d4–900b6; see further Mikalson (2010) 145–6, 158–9.

of this voice.[67] Hesiod's 'divine *human*-voice' comprises, I think, a highly apposite paradox. It is only due to the divine origin of his poetry (θέσπις) that the subsequent account *could* indeed comprise truths. That, however, Hesiod's own voice – his own authority – remains *human* (αὐδή) coheres with his lack of means to exclude the prospect of falsehoods. Hesiod's transformation through the Muses' inspiration does not amount to the acquisition of the Muses' own capacity to articulate, and to discriminate between, truths and falsehoods which lie beyond the reach of human cognition.

Hesiod's divine human-voice also raises the intractable question of the nature of the collaboration between poet and Muses involved in inspiration.[68] We would be wrong to ask here for a clear and precise demarcation between divine influence and human agency. A distinctive feature of the interaction between gods and mortals in Homer, traditionally termed 'double motivation' or 'over-determination', is that the same actions and impulses may be construed as caused simultaneously by both divine and human agencies.[69] Often, mortal heroes can perform their actions only through continuous divine interaction or 'inspiration' ('gleaming-eyed Athena breathed (ἔμπνευσε) might into him', *Il.* 10.482), but they are not thereby the gods' inactive, mindless puppets. In the *Odyssey*, the bard Phemius strikingly instantiates over-determination: 'I am self-taught (αὐτοδίδακτος) and a god breathed into my mind all kinds of lays' (*Od.* 22.347–8). We find no warrant in these words to defuse what puzzles us about them by arbitrarily isolating, say, the artistic aspects of poetic composition from its informational content and restricting inspiration to the latter.[70] Inspiration obviously extends also to the former.[71] If anything,

[67] For αὐδή, see e.g. *Od.* 5.333–5, with Clay (1974) *passim* (131 on *SVF* 2.144); cf. Nagler (1996) 143. For θέσπις, e.g. *Od.* 8.498. The 'divine human-voice' paradox of *Th.* 31–2 is observed by Clay (2003) 65 with n.65; Stoddard (2004) 86 n.55, 182.

[68] *Mutatis mutandis*, this issue will be central in our discussions of Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles.

[69] The Greeks are routed 'by Hector and father Zeus' (*Il.* 15.636–7, cf. 693–5; *Il.* 20.94; etc.); see e.g. Janko (1992) 3–4; Kearns (2004) 59, n.2 and, more generally, Dodds (1951) 1–27.

[70] Following Murray (1981) 97; Bowie (1993) 17; Segal (1992) 26–7.

[71] E.g. *Th.* 22, 104; *Od.* 8.44–5; *Od.* 17.518–20; Archil. fr. 1.2 W; Thgn. 250; etc.; cf. Lesher (1994*a*) 17; Murray (1981) 95.

the second clause seems to *expound* the first. Phemius, presumably to indicate that he does not simply mimic the poems of other minstrels, identifies *himself* and, inextricably, his association with the divine as the source of his poetry. Plato influentially resolved this problem of poetic agency by recasting the inspired poet as an entirely passive, possessed mouthpiece, lacking any understanding of what he voices.[72] Importantly, however, no clear sign of Plato's model can be found in any pre-Classical source.[73] Archaic portrayals of inspiration do not register a tension between divine influence and the poet's active agency in, say, shaping the topic, wording and internal structure of his narrative or in leading us implicitly or explicitly to reflect on those narratives. As often, we mistake at our own peril Plato's prescriptive portrayals (here, of poetic inspiration) for descriptive accounts of the common view.

Nonetheless, a widespread and important aspect of inspiration is the poet's epistemic dependence on the content provided by the Muses. Poetic invocations typically recall the structure of mantic consultations. The mortal poet sets the terms of an inquiry ('tell which one of them first came to be', *Th.* 115) and thereby delimits the possible range of the subsequent, unverifiable reply ('first of all Chasm came into being', 116).[74] With the response to the invocation (as in *Th.* 116 and following), the text offers us no means to *distinguish* the poet's voice from the Muses'. Odysseus rightly concludes that Demodocus sings with divine inspiration, on the grounds that he narrated events in Troy accurately, as though he was himself there or heard from a witness (*Od.* 8.487–91).[75]

[72] *Ion, passim*, esp. 533e5–534d4; *Ap.* 22b-c3; *Men.* 99c2-d5; *Phdr.* 245a; cf. *Lg.* 4.719c1-d1, 3.682a1–6.

[73] As Murray (1981) showed; cf. Dodds (1951) 82, 101 n.121–2; Bowie (1993) 18; Halliwell (2011) 57–9. Scholars persist in the anachronism of projecting backwards Plato's resolution, e.g. Ledbetter (2003) 8–60, esp. 53–8; Katz and Volk (2000) 127–9; Stoddard (2004) 63–7; Robbiano (2006) 68; Palmer (2013) 318.

[74] Cf. *Il.* 1.1–9 (esp. 8–9); *Il.* 2.760–70; *Il.* 11.218–22; *Il.* 14.508–12; *Il.* 16.112ff; *Od.* 1.1–10; *h.Hom.* 5.1; *h.Hom.* 9.1; *h.Hom.* 14.1–2; *h.Hom.* 17.1; *h.Hom.* 19.1; *h.Hom.* 20.1; *h.Hom.* 31.1–2; *h.Hom.* 32.1–2; *h.Hom.* 33.1; also *Il.* 5.703ff; *Il.* 8.273–6; *Il.* 11.299ff; *Il.* 16.692ff.

[75] In the light of Odysseus' remark that Demodocus recounts the events like an eyewitness, the phrase 'in order' (κατὰ κόσμον, *Od.* 8.489; cf. similarly κατὰ μοῖραν, *Od.* 8.496) could indicate, in this particular context, a descriptively true as well as a well-structured and proper account, Murray (1981) 94; Walsh (1984) 8–9; Goldhill (1991) 57–8, 68; Ledbetter (2003) 16. Still, we can agree with Halliwell (2011) 84–8 that accuracy need not be the focus of this terminology.

Odysseus' position as auditor, however, is highly unusual. His ability to *check* Demodocus' account against his own first-hand experience and knowledge of its subject matter is the exception that proves the rule. In his invocation to the Muses in *Iliad* 2.484–93, the Homeric poet expressly contrasts the Muses' independent knowledge – 'for you are goddesses and you are present and know all things' (πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα, 485) – with the ignorance of mortals: 'We hear only report (κλέος) and do not know anything' (οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, 486).[76] In one sense, the Homeric poet places himself on an epistemological par with his audience ('*we* know nothing').[77] In another sense, however, this common ignorance procures for him an authority which is difficult to contest: *we* are all ignorant, but *his* inquiries are answered by knowledgeable goddesses.[78] The Muses' address to Hesiod thus relates to and destabilises a traditional theological and epistemological attitude. By introducing and underscoring the possibility of *false* inspired poetry, Hesiod puts precise pressure on the tension (already present but more muted in Homer's invocation in *Iliad* 2) between a poet's incorrigible ignorance concerning matters which he can narrate only through inspiration and his acquiescence in the truth of his narratives.[79]

[76] One could devise different stories about the source of the knowledge of Hesiod's Muses. In the *Hymns*, for example, Hermes appears to be born with *innate* knowledge of theogonic events which precede his birth, see *h.Hom.* 4.54–9, 427–33, cf. 440–2 (ἐκ γενετῆς); note κατὰ κόσμον (433), with the preceding note above. In Hesiod himself *that* epistemological question is never clearly raised. I see no reason to burden Hesiod with the premise that the Muses know a state-of-affairs if and only if they directly experienced it (contra Heitsch (1966) 197; Clay (2003) 64, drawing on *Il.* 2.485). It would follow that the Muses' knowledge claim (*Th.* 27–8), insofar as it pertains to events preceding their own birth, is *itself* false. But nowhere in the Hesiodic corpus does *this* prospect play a discernible role. Is Hesiod, then, simply inconsistent in ascribing knowledge to the Muses? To avoid inconsistency, it is best in the first place not to import and generalise as a universal theory of (divine) knowledge the apparent association in *Il.* 2.485 between the Muses' presence in Troy and their own knowledge of the events of Troy.

[77] The ignorance of 'we mortals' and our helpless dependence (general and epistemic) on gods are themes that pervade archaic poetry, e.g. Archil. fr. 131 W; Semon. fr. 1.1–10 W (note line 4: ἃ δὴ βοτὰ ζόουσιν, οὐδὲν εἰδότες, cf. *Th.* 26); Thgn. 133–42; Simon. *PMG* 527; Sol. fr. 13.17–76; frr. 16–17 W; Pind. *O* 7.24–6; *N* 6.4–7; *N* 11.43–6; cf. Lesher (2008) 476–7 with n.1; Torgerson (2006) 32–6; Bodnár (1989) 61–3.

[78] Cf. Stoddard (2004) 89; Ledbetter (2003) 17.

[79] See along similar lines Clay (2003) 63–4.

The truths-only interpretation has been criticised for suppressing the 'unsettling threat' of the Muses' address.[80] The Muses' specification 'we know, *whenever we wish* (εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν), how to utter truths' compellingly vindicates this objection. The qualification underscores the unforeseeable capriciousness of the Muses' dispensation of truths and falsehoods.[81] Hesiod's catalogue of Hecate's dispensations of success and failure to men of different professions (kings, warriors, athletes, horsemen, seafarers, cowherds, goatherds, shepherds) repeatedly employs the same vocabulary (ᾧ δ' ἐθέλῃ, *Th*. 429; ὅν κ' ἐθέλῃσιν, *Th*. 430; οἷς κ' ἐθέλῃσι(ν), *Th*. 432, 439; θυμῷ γ' ἐθέλουσα, *Th*. 446). Hecate's 'easy exercise of arbitrary power'[82] is illustrated by her attitude to fishermen: 'Easily the glorious goddess bestows a big haul, and easily she takes it away once it appeared, if she so wishes in her heart' (ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ, *Th*. 442–3). In a sense, divine caprice is even more pronounced in the Muses' 'whenever we wish' than with Hecate: though not exclusively, Hecate is at least typically described as granting or denying favour to certain mortals rather than at certain times (*Th*. 419, 429–30, 432–3, 439). In Hesiod's animal fable, the Eagle says to the Nightingale: 'I shall make dinner of you, if I wish (αἴ κ' ἐθέλω), or I shall let you go' (*Op*. 208–9). Whatever else we make of this *ainos*, Hesiod has clearly aligned himself, *qua* poet, with the Nightingale, whom he describes as a 'bard' (ἀοιδόν, *Op*. 208). Recall, finally, the account in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, reminiscent of the Muses' address, of the mantic Thriai, who willingly speak the truth when they have feasted on honey but issue falsehoods when deprived of it (ἐθέλουσιν ἀληθείην ἀγορεύειν … ψεύδονται, *h.Hom*. 4.560–4). The dispensation of good and bad in accordance with the fluctuating volition of goddesses, the qualification 'whenever' (εὖτε) and Hesiod's inclination to picture himself in the clutches of such capricious higher powers (*Op*. 208–9) all unmistakably point to a threat and an anxiety in relation to the Muses'

[80] Ledbetter (2003) 44.
[81] Thalmann (1984) 149; Clay (1988) 328. Such qualifications typically act as 'let-out clauses', explicating why gods do not always exercise their capacities, West (1966) 163.
[82] Clay (1984) 34 and *passim*; cf. (2003) 134–6.

address of helpless dependence on the unforeseeability and fickleness of (female) divine whim.

Hecate also provides a parallel as a female divinity whose powers to affect mortal men both beneficially and malignantly are rooted in her exceptionally close association with Zeus (*Th*. 411–28, 448–52). Zeus' ascension and subsequent distribution of provinces, powers and honours (τιμαί) throughout the divine sphere is the *Theogony*'s announced theme (*Th*. 112–13) and the climax of its narrative (881–5). The proem recapitulates the same theme conjointly with the Muses' procession to Zeus (νισομένων πατέρ' εἰς ὅν· ὁ κτλ, *Th*. 71–4). We need hardly labour the point that, within Zeus' world order, the Muses, like Hecate, can possess and exercise their powers only through the sanction of Zeus, with whom they similarly enjoy an exceptionally close association.[83]

The deities of archaic poetry are, quite generally, the dispensers of both good and bad. This role is most pronounced for Zeus and for those female divinities whose powers are especially associated with Zeus' sanction, such as Hecate, the Moirai and the Muses.[84] It is within this broader theological framework that Hesiod's Muses declare their ability to dispense both truths and falsehoods. Hesiod occasionally resolves the doubleness of divine dispensation by isolating different divinities hitherto identified and tracing invariably beneficent effects to one side and invariably pernicious effects to the other.[85] Like the Homeric Sirens and the Thriai, however, the nine Muses comprise a unified divine force of the same mind (ὁμόφρονας, *Th*. 60) and would resist any attempt to isolate Muses of truth (28) from Muses of falsehood (27).

Of course, not *all* divine dispensations are capricious in the Hesiodic corpus. It is a central theme and contention of the *Works and Days* that Zeus dispenses personal and civic goods and evils in response to just and unjust behaviour. First, however,

[83] See esp. *Th*. 1–4; 25 (introducing *Th*. 26–8), 71–6; cf. 36–7, 51.

[84] Numerous examples could be cited. See, most famously, Zeus' two jars of good and bad gifts: *Il*. 24.527–33; cf. e.g. *Op*. 3–8, 166–73, 667–9. Moirai: *Th*. 904–6; cf. Sol. fr. 13. 63–4 W. Muses: *Od*. 8.63; cf. West (1966) 408.

[85] *Op*. 11–26 (on the two Strifes); *Th*. 869–80 (dividing beneficent winds from arbitrary (872), variable and deleterious winds; contrast *Op*. 643–5).

the *Theogony* and *Works and Days* differ pertinently on this point. The *Theogony* does reflect on divine dispensations of good and bad to mortals (as with Hecate) and yet shows little or no trace of this meritocratic aspect of divine dispensation. Indeed, explicit examples of the dispensation of *good* in response to *just* behaviour occur only in the *Works and Days*.[86] Gods other than Zeus play only a strikingly attenuated role in the *Works and Days*, which focuses almost to their exclusion on Zeus' justice-based interventions in human life.[87] We hear nothing, for example, of Hecate's dispensations.[88] Second, the theodicy of the *Works and Days* itself falters in a very instructive way when Hesiod moves from a universal statement of Zeus' all-seeing vigilance to reflect on his own personal predicament and relationship with the divine (*Op*. 267–73):

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμὸς καὶ πάντα νοήσας
καί νυ τάδ', αἴ κ' ἐθέλῃσ', ἐπιδέρκεται, οὐδέ ἑ λήθει
οἵην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἐέργει.
νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
εἴην μήτ' ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον
ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἕξει.
ἀλλὰ τά γ' οὔπω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

The eye of Zeus sees all things and marks all things,
And now these things too, if he so wishes, he perceives, nor does it escape him,
What kind of justice this city contains.
But, as things are, may I not myself be just among people,
Nor my son, for it is a bad thing for a man to be just,
If the more unjust is going to have greater justice.
But I do not yet fear[89] *that Zeus the Counsellor will bring these things to fruition.*

The resonant conditional 'if he so wishes' suddenly renders Zeus' perception and subsequent treatment of justice and injustice dependent on the unforeseeable and inscrutable condition of the god's mood (*Op*. 268–9). What follows leaves no doubt that the qualification reflects a crack in the theological apparatus that

[86] This poem too gives far more weight to the punishment of injustice, e.g. *Op*. 180–201, 218–24, 238–66, 282–5, 325, 333–4, etc.; in the *Theogony: Th*. 220–2, 231–2. But note *Op*. 280–1 and Zeus' rewards to the just city in *Op*. 225–37.
[87] See Clay (2003) 142–3.
[88] In Ch. 2.4, we will return to these divergences (at least in their emphases) between the two poems.
[89] Or: 'anticipate'.

underlies Hesiod's campaign to promote the just life against the unjust. Hesiod expresses a wish not to be just himself, nor to have a just son, since justice is itself an evil if the more unjust will receive greater justice (*Op.* 270–2; contrast 218). His concluding remark, that he does not yet fear or, perhaps, anticipate that Zeus will bring this scenario to ultimate fruition (*Op*. 273), does nothing to dispel the preceding crisis of confidence and, in fact, only further corroborates the overall impression of theological *ambivalence*. Most interestingly for us, Hesiod's loss of heart *itself* is expressed with the same ominous vocabulary that qualifies the Muses' dispensations of truths and falsehoods ('if he so wishes', *Op*. 268; 'whenever we wish', *Th*. 28).[90]

Hesiod describes the Muses' influence as a 'gift' (ἱερὴ δόσις, *Th*. 93–5; cf. 103–4). This description further implicates the Muses in the unsettling doubleness of divine dispensation.[91] The Olympians are formulaically 'gods, givers of good things' (δωτῆρες ἐάων, e.g. *Th*. 46, 111, 633, 664; cf. *Od*. 8.325), and divine gifts are often providential (*Op*. 320, 549; cf. *Th*. 958; *Op*. 126). As before, however, this is only one side of a variable and irresistible dispensation. In the *Iliad*, Paris states that no mortal can reject the gods' gifts even though none would accept them willingly (*Il*. 3.65–6). In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, divine gifts constitute the inexorable, grievous yoke (cf. *Th*. 26) on mortal necks which is the human condition (*h.Hom.* 2.216–17, 147–8).[92] Again, the closer we come to Hesiod's personal predicament, the more pronounced the harsh duality of divine dispensation becomes. To our own Iron Race, the gods 'give' grievous cares (*Op*. 178). Our consolation – the best we can hope for – is the admixture of good things with bad (*Op*. 179). Again, Hesiod traces his father's arrival to the place from which he himself now sings (τύιδ', *Op*. 635) to Zeus' 'gift' of poverty (637–8, cf. 717–18).

The gods' most interesting gift, however, is 'Woman' (*Theogony*) or 'Pandora' (*Works and Days*). By considering Pandora, and the issues surrounding her fabrication by the gods,

[90] Hesiod is, of course, not alone in reflecting on the tension between theodicy and Zeus' actual dispensations; see e.g. Theognis 373–82, 731–52.
[91] Following the lead of Pucci (1977) 3, 5–6 n.1, 28.
[92] Cf. *h.Hom.* 3.189–93; Thgn. 444–6; Eur. *Alc*. 1071; Sol. fr. 13.63–4 W.

we will be better positioned to pull together the strands of this analysis of the *Theogony*.

The *Theogony*'s divine politics revolve around the threat of goddesses who engineer the downfall of male patriarchs through cunning intelligence (*mêtis*). Exploiting his sexual desire (*Th*. 177), Gaia deprives Ouranos of his patriarchy and manhood through a concealed trap, using Kronos as her agent (κρύψασα λόχῳ, 174, δόλον, 175). The fickleness of female cunning is highlighted when Kronos' own overthrow is similarly credited to Gaia's trickery (*Th*. 494). Rhea, relying on Gaia's and (the emasculated) Ouranos' *mêtis* (*Th*. 471), conceals Zeus just as Gaia had concealed Kronos (*Th*. 482, cf. 174) and presents Kronos with a rock in swaddling (485). Rhea, in other words, passes off a verisimilitudinous yet specious counterfeit for the genuine article and Kronos' downfall is expressly traced to his inability to suspect or apprehend the difference between the two (*Th*. 488–91). Zeus stops the process by out-tricking, ingesting and appropriating the pregnant Mêtis herself, with whom he then devises 'both good and bad' (*Th*. 886–900). His success in retaining power is repeatedly traced to his cognitive superiority and vigilant apprehension (*Th*. 653–7, 730–1, 837–8). As an established ruler, Zeus enlists the goddess Styx to curb, through the consequences of perjury, the destabilising danger of falsehoods (ψεύδεα) within the divine sphere (*Th*. 783–805). Following his ascension, moreover, Zeus fixes under Parnasus, in 'sacred Pytho', the very same stone with which Kronos was deceived 'to be a sign (σῆμα) hereafter, a marvel (θαῦμα) for mortal human beings' (*Th*. 498–500). Zeus' gesture encapsulates what will imminently become central with Pandora. Having appropriated and neutralised divine and especially female deceptiveness within the divine sphere, Zeus *transfers* it to the mortal sphere. Delphi is a place of oracles (note σῆμα, *Th*. 500).[93] The stone is itself the instrument and symbol of female divine deception. It is itself a verisimilitudinous but specious counterfeit, which was passed off as the genuine article. We cannot but recall the Muses' own verisimilitudinous falsehoods. And this stone is

[93] For 'sacred Pytho' and Apolline divination, cf. *Od*. 8.79–81; *h.Hom.* 24.1–2; with West (1966) 303.

what Zeus presents to mortal men as the epitome of his cosmic rule and of the dynamic which governs the communication between mortal and divine.

The stories of Prometheus and Pandora form a single episode (*Th*. 535–616; *Op*. 42–105).[94] A feast in Mekone marked some type of foundational separation between gods and men: 'when gods and mortal men were separated (ἐκρίνοντο) in Mekone . . . ' (*Th*. 535–6).[95] Prometheus attempts to trick Zeus into accepting an inferior portion of the food. The ensuing action determines the norms and strictures of human life: sacrifice, work, sex and marriage, and a mixture of good and evil. Zeus' choice of the worse portion directly explains our current sacrificial relationship with the gods (*Th*. 557). Indirectly, it spells also the inexorable necessity of work by bringing about his later denial of fire to mortals (δόλου μεμνημένος αἰεί, *Th*. 562) and his concealment of the means of effortless livelihood (βίον, *Op*. 42–50). Most importantly, it is in retaliation to Prometheus' subsequent theft of fire that Zeus introduces Woman into human life, dispensing 'a beautiful evil in exchange for the good' (*Th*. 585, 570, 602). Zeus' encounter with the Titan Prometheus and the subsequent fabrication of Pandora thus frame the establishment of the relationship between mortal and divine. As an insightful scholiast observes: 'In Mekone it was decided (ἐκρίνετο) what is a god and what a human being.'[96]

Prometheus' trickery consists again in attempting to pass off a verisimilitudinous but specious counterfeit for the genuine article, concealing the bare bones with rich fat and the rich innards with skin (Διὸς νόον ἐξαπαφίσκων . . . καλύψας . . . καλύψας, *Th*. 537–41). Lines 550–2 of the *Theogony* insist that Zeus sees through the trick and chooses the worse portion deliberately. This insistence is not obviously compatible with Zeus' subsequent wrath *upon seeing* the trick (ὡς ἴδεν, *Th*. 554–5, cf. 558).[97] His position as always the master and never the victim

[94] On shifts in emphasis and the complementarity between the accounts in the two poems, see Canevaro (2015) 108–14.

[95] Clay (2003) 101–4; Vernant (1982); ἐκρίνοντο may but need not carry a legal sense, West (1966) *ad loc*.

[96] Σ *Th*. 535.1–2 Gregorio.

[97] Cf. West (1966) 321. On the inconsistencies, see Loney (2014).

of *mêtis* is, at any rate, momentarily compromised when Prometheus successfully conceals fire in a hollow fennel-stalk (λαθὼν Δία, *Op*. 52, 55; cf. *Th*. 565–9) but it is confidently vindicated both by Prometheus' ultimate punishment (*Th*. 521–5, 613–16) and, more importantly, by the mortal inheritance of their divine struggle.

Pandora 'incarnates the problem of imitation'.[98] This new Woman *is* specious verisimilitude, the deceptive *likeness* of a chaste maiden (παρθένῳ αἰδοίῃ ἴκελον, *Th*. 572; *Op*. 72). Mortal men take pleasure (τέρπωνται) in unwittingly embracing their own evil (*Op*. 58). Her unmistakable affiliation with *mêtis* is most explicit in the *Works and Days*, where, in language reminiscent of the Muses (*Th*. 27), Hermes endows her with 'deceits (*pseudea*), devious discourses and a thievish character' (*Op*. 78).[99] Pandora's attributes and adornments are throughout erotically charged.[100] Correspondingly, the gods explicitly involved in her making are predominantly those most closely associated with *mêtis* or with erotic power: the *Theogony* specifies Hephaestus and Athena, while the *Works and Days* adds Aphrodite, Hermes, the Graces, Peithô and the Hôrai. Notably, the Muses are associated with the same erotic imagery as Pandora, Aphrodite and other such threateningly female figures.[101]

Zeus' initiative and oversight is emphasised (*Th*. 570–2, 580; *Op*. 69–71, 79, 99). The *Works and Days* thus only renders explicit the already implicit status of Woman in the *Theogony* as the quintessential divine gift (Πανδώρην κτλ, *Op*. 81–2).[102] Hephaestus

[98] Bergren (1983) 75.

[99] Pandora is initiated into clever weaving (*Op*. 64), a female art rich with connotations of cunning intelligence, cf. *Od*. 13.303 (μῆτιν ὑφήνω) etc., with Murnaghan (1995) 64; Slatkin (1996) 234–5.

[100] *Th*. 570–84; *Op*. 60–82 (καλὸν εἶδος ἐπήρατον … χάριν … ὅρμους χρυσείους (cf. *h. Hom*. 6.11, of Aphrodite) κτλ).

[101] The Muses 'dance with slender feet' (*Th*. 3; cf. *Th*. 195 of Aphrodite) and bathe their 'tender skin' (*Th*. 5; cf. ἁπαλόχροος, *Op*. 519). Their golden frontlets (*Th*. 916) recall Pandora (στεφάνην χρυσέην, *Th*. 578) and 'golden Aphrodite' (*Th*. 822; *h.Hom*. 6.7–8). The erotic Graces (cf. *Th*. 907–11) and Desire (Himeros, cf. *Th*. 132, 177) neighbour the Muses (*Th*. 64; cf. *Th*. 7–8, 70) and attend Aphrodite (*Th*. 201–2; *h.Hom*. 5.61; *Od*. 8.364). The provinces of both Aphrodite (*Th*. 206) and the Muses encompass 'pleasure' (τέρψις ἀοιδῆς, *Th*. 917, cf. *Th*. 37, 78). See further Marquardt (1982) 1–3, 8–9 and, for the close association between Muses and Nymphs, Marquardt (1982) 9–10; West (1966) *ad Th*. 7, 25.

[102] Cf. *Op*. 57, 85–9 (δῶρον … Ζηνός … κακὸν θνητοῖσι); *Th*. 510–14.

unveils Woman in a congregation of all gods and men but, conspicuously, she is pronounced 'intractable' specifically for mortal men (ἀμήχανον ἀνθρώποισιν, *Th*. 588–9). She incarnates for mortal men the very kind of trick (πῆμ' ἀνδράσιν … δόλον, *Op*. 82–3) which was the undoing of an Ouranos or a Kronos (δόλον, *Th*. 175; δολωθείς, *Th*. 494). This intractableness of Woman is explicitly linked to her status as the origin of the 'destructive race' of mortal women (*Th*. 590–1) and, concomitantly, as the introducer of all types of evil and suffering into human life (*Th*. 592–9; *Op*. 90–104). Thus, even though Hesiod does not think of dissimulating cunning intelligence as the prerogative of female divinities and women, there is no question that he considers it importantly characteristic of them.[103] By ingesting Mêtis herself, Zeus appropriated and tamed the unsettling power of cunning, female deceptiveness. By creating Woman, he *transfers* this unsettling power to the mortal sphere as a necessary evil for mortal men, who are constrained by the need for assistance in their old age and for patrilineal continuity ('high-thundering Zeus set up women as an evil for mortal men etc.', *Th*. 600–12). Through this dual process, Zeus attained and stabilised his patriarchal, cosmic rule and, in the wake of Mekone, established the contrast and the relations between gods and men – or 'what is a god and what a human being'.

2.3 The *Theogony*: Conclusions

It is a textual fact that reassurances on the Muses' part nowhere expressly accompany their address at *Theogony* 26–8. Our analysis of these lines and their immediate context invalidated the prevailing dismissal of this textual fact as mere ellipsis. The Muses produce no criteria to demarcate their true (*Th*. 28) from their specious (27) melodious articulations. Such markers as the bestialising abuse which they direct against Hesiod (*Th*. 26) and Hesiod's paradoxical 'divine human-voice' (*Th*. 31–2) accentuate the poet's abiding inability to demarcate them independently. In turn, Hesiod's very recognition of both true and false inspired

[103] One interesting exception and special case is Nêmertês ('Unerring'), who 'has her father's mind' (*Th*. 262), the kind, truthful and 'unerring' Nereus (*Th*. 233–6).

poetry (*Th*. 27–8), along with such resonant markers as 'whenever we wish' (28) and 'ready-of-speech' (29), put pressure on any inspired poet who would combine an admission of personal ignorance with a simultaneous truth-claim for his verses.

We acquire a deeper understanding of the Muses' address, moreover, by analysing it within the *Theogony*'s broader theological conception of the relation between (i) mortal and divine and (ii) male and female. The intractable threat of deceit at the hands of female cunning intelligence anchors Hesiod's account of what is a god and what a human being. It forms a central part of the divine dispensation of good and bad gifts – and, ultimately, of what it means to live as a man – within Zeus' world order. Our inability to identify when the Muses grant truths and when specious counterfeits, therefore, is only one, poetic-epistemological aspect of a coherent and holistic conception of the human condition. The intractability and indispensability of the specious counterfeit which is Woman is another, parallel and similarly Zeus-sanctioned aspect of that same condition.

The *Theogony*'s narrative, by associating Gaia, Rhea and Woman with the same cunning intelligence which the Muses master, or by explaining as it does the stone under Delphi, invites us to revisit our understanding of what the Muses said to Hesiod 'first of all'. How are men to deal with Muses or, indeed, with Woman? They cannot emulate Zeus by ingesting the goddess Mêtis or enlisting Styx. But they can at least avoid the gullible unawareness of an Ouranos or a Kronos. The *Theogony* traces the downfall of male gods to their blithe acquiescence in the deceptively specious favours of cunning female goddesses. It is not credible that as sophisticated, reflective and frequently anxious a poet as Hesiod framed this very same poem by first of all acquiescing blithely in the gifts of cunning female goddesses, which they themselves caution may be true but may be deceptively specious. The upshot of this, however, is that the enterprise of pushing our understanding of the origins and governing principles of the world beyond the narrow limits of our immediate experience – of transcending, epistemically, our status as 'mere bellies' – is significantly and incorrigibly compromised. The divine origin of Hesiod's verses means that they *could* be true. But he makes no guarantees.

The Muses' address articulates a theological-epistemological framework to which the ensuing narrative is internal. That narrative, however, continually provides us with exegetical and prescriptive markers with which to revisit and enrich our understanding of their address. Importantly, Hesiod and his audience would not seem to suffer the same epistemic paralysis when drawing such exegetical and prescriptive inferences from accounts whose descriptive truth-value they are powerless to evaluate. The story of Epimetheus, for example, says that he became an evil for mortal men by unthinkingly accepting from Zeus the gift of Woman. There is an intrinsic judiciousness in the principle that one should not presuppose the kindness of a gift the nature of which one is unable to assess and the favour of whose giver one must not presume (*Th*. 511^{b}-14; cf. *Op*. 85–9). Nor, correspondingly, should one acquiesce in the truth of the Muses' gifts, whose truth-value and the truthfulness of whose dispensers at any given moment one is unable to assess. This prescriptive and didactic insight, that we must approach the Muses' gifts with caution, *is* one which we can evaluate and determine for ourselves on the basis of their address. After all, the Muses could not deceitfully misrepresent themselves to us as the type of divinities who may deceitfully misrepresent things to us while, *in fact*, never deceitfully misrepresenting things to us.

Further considerations show the explanatory appeal of Hesiod's view of divine dispensations and help explain why he should construe himself in the first place as the recipient of this divine address and approach its evaluation as he does. Given the assumption of divine management, Hesiod's theology of the often inconstant dispensation of good and bad explicates and is corroborated by (perceived) experience. We may outline a rough inferential move (without, of course, ascribing it to Hesiod as a conscious argument):

1. The gods govern the world along with its human inhabitants.
2. If a human succeeds and experiences benefits, some god(s) dispensed good to him. If a human fails and experiences harms, some god(s) dispensed bad to him.

3. Different and often the same humans both succeed and fail and experience both benefit and harm.
4. Therefore, either different or the same gods dispense both good and bad.

This universal, theological framework, in turn, supports the notion that the Muses inconstantly dispense both truths and falsehoods as a special case of the general scheme. Since, moreover, the Muses (like Hecate) give little hint that their dispensations of good and bad respond systematically to mortal merit and demerit, divine inspiration inevitably assumed the spectre of capriciousness ('whenever we wish'). The gendered aspect of the erotically charged Muses and of divine politics, in turn, trades on Hesiod's complementary perception of mortal women as worthy of suspicion, as well as on the already traditional notion of Muses – and Sirens – as female deities.[104] Finally, we may further accentuate the explanatory force of the Muses' address by granting to Hesiod the observation that different poetic accounts of the same, unknowable matters are sometimes inconsistent.[105] Given this point and, moreover, the premise that poets who sing about matters of which they are ignorant do so through inspiration,[106] it follows that not all inspired poetic narratives are true and, therefore, that the relevant gods dispense both truths and falsehoods (*Th*. 27–8).

We saw that the Muses' address destabilises certain traditional theological and epistemological attitudes towards Muse-given inspiration. Hesiod's critique did not, however, emerge *ex nihilo*. We find in the epic tradition parallel (if more partial and embryonic) attitudes towards theology, epistemology, poetry and (female) cunning intelligence. Homer's Sirens, for example, echo the Muses' anaphora 'we know . . . we know' (ἴδμεν, *Od*. 12.189–91). Furthermore, while their statement in line 186 may be true ('no one has yet sailed past here with his black ship'),

[104] Note the cunningly dissimulating, Pandora-like woman of *Op*. 373–4 who motivates a universal, prescriptive call for suspicion and wariness (*Op*. 375), with Canevaro (2015) 115–17; cf. e.g. *Th*. 590–612; *Op*. 586.

[105] This observation is most probably conveyed by *Op*. 11 ('so there was not just one birth of Strife after all': this corrects Hesiod's own previous account of Strife in *Th*. 225–32) and certainly (on the subject of Dionysus' birth-place) by *h.Hom*. 1.2–9 (ψευδόμενοι).

[106] See Ch. 2.2.

line 187 ('before, that is, he has heard etc.') slides into specious deceptiveness.[107] Menelaus recounts how Helen stood outside the Wooden Horse, *mimicking* the voices of good Greek wives (ἴσκουσ', *Od*. 4.278–9). His narrative provokes us to ask whether Helen's own preceding story, which antithetically touted her loyalty upon recognising the disguised Odysseus (*Od*. 4.238–64), might itself comprise a specious counterfeit.[108] In a manner reminiscent of Helen, Aphrodite renders herself 'like' a chaste maiden (ὁμοίη, *h.Hom.* 5.82). And we may also recall the Delian maidens, who, in their enchanting songs, know how to mimic (μιμεῖσθ' ἴσασιν) the voices of all humans (*h.Hom.* 3.156–64). In the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*, we find in Hermes a master of deceptive cunning intelligence and, simultaneously, theogonic poetry.[109] Odysseus too is both a champion of specious counterfeits and a poet-like figure.[110] Indeed, it is in reference to one of his Cretan Lies that Eumaeus expressly compares Odysseus to an enchanting poet (*Od*. 17.514–21) and in reference to another that his specious, verbal dissimulations are styled 'falsehoods … like verities' (ψεύδεα … ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, *Od*. 19.203).[111] Even as he avows that he is personally confident that Odysseus narrated his descent into the Underworld truly – and in the manner of a bard – Alcinous reflects on how the recipients of certain false narratives are powerless to assess their truth-value (ψεύδεα, *Od*. 11.363–9).[112] The *Odyssey* too thus gestures towards destabilising questions concerning the status of (inspired but) unverifiable narrations.[113]

[107] On affinities between the Sirens and Hesiod's Muses, cf. Doherty (1995) 83; Clay (2003) 60; Ledbetter (2003) 27. Both Calypso and Circe are first introduced *singing* and *weaving* (*Od*. 5.61–2; *Od*. 10.221–3); cf. Nagler (1996) 152.

[108] Cf. Goldhill (1991) 62–3. Helen's first word: ἴδμεν (interrogatively, *Od*. 4.138).

[109] Theogony: *h.Hom.* 4.54–9, 425–33, 450–5; *mêtis: passim*, note 368–86.

[110] *Od*. 11.367–9; *Od*. 21.406–9, cf. Moulton (1977) 153. Walsh (1984) 129 lists *Th*. 27–8 among later conceptions of poetry influenced by the image of deceitful Odysseus as bard-like; cf. Goldhill (1991) 67–8.

[111] The formula recurs only of Nestor (Thgn. 713–14), who delivers an extended encomium of *mêtis* in *Il*. 23.304–50. For the classic treatment of *mêtis* and its cultural currency, see Detienne and Vernant (1978).

[112] Cf. Schein (1996) 18; Slatkin (1996) 229; Walsh (1984) 20; Goldhill (1991) 47–8.

[113] On Homeric poetics and the question of truth in poetry, see further Halliwell (2011) 36–92.

2.4 Epistemological Optimism in the *Works and Days* and Final Remarks

The proem to the *Works and Days* is worth citing in full:

Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν ἀοιδῇσι κλείουσαι,
δεῦτε Δί' ἐννέπετε, σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνείουσαι,
ὅν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοί τε φατοί τε,
ῥητοί τ' ἄρρητοί τε Διὸς μεγάλοιο ἕκητι.
ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,
ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
κλῦθι ἰδὼν ἀίων τε, δίκῃ δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας
τύνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε Πέρσῃ ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

Muses from Pieria who glorify in songs
Come here and speak of Zeus, singing hymns of your father,
Through whom mortal men are alike unfamed and famed,
Unspoken of and spoken of by the will of great Zeus,
For easily he strengthens, and easily he crushes the strong,
And easily he diminishes the conspicuous and increases the inconspicuous,
And easily he straightens the crooked and withers the proud,
Zeus the high-thunderer, who dwells in the highest halls.
Hearken, watching and listening, and straighten the verdicts with justice
Yourself; but as for me, I would speak truths to Perses.[114]

Several scholars maintain that, in these lines, Hesiod denies the Muses a role, or at least a significant role, in the *Works and Days*. By contrast with the *Theogony*, the argument goes, the *Works and Days* addresses human affairs, which Hesiod can grasp and relay independently of divine mediation. In the proem, then, Hesiod establishes a division of labour. He (i) invokes the Muses to sing of Zeus (*Op*. 1–8), (ii) prays to Zeus to uphold justice (9–10) and (iii) affirms that *he* will independently tell truths to Perses (10).[115]

While we can appreciate its underlying insights, this interpretation is, as it stands, problematic. First, the verb in Hesiod's concluding statement (κε . . . μυθησαίμην) is not a future indicative but an optative. The precise force of the verb is, indeed, difficult to determine. It does not, however, commit Hesiod to a clear,

[114] Alternatively: 'let me speak truths to Perses'.
[115] Clay (2003) 76–80; (2015) 114–15; Stoddard (2004) 83–4, 146–7 n.24, 190–1; Haubold (2010) 15–16, 29–30; Palmer (2013) 319; Canevaro (2015) 10, 101.

straightforward truth-claim ('I *will* speak truths to Perses'). The (aorist) optative with κε suggests, and certainly accommodates, a softer and more tentative assertion: 'and I would speak . . . ' or 'and I should like to speak . . . '[116] This line, moreover, culminates an extended *prayer*, encompassing a sustained set of requests directed at both the Muses and Zeus (δεῦτε . . . ἐννέπετε . . . ὑμνείουσαι, *Op*. 2; κλῦθι . . . ἴθυνε, *Op*. 9).[117] The context of κε . . . μυθησαίμην, therefore, evokes also the optative's hortatory sense: 'but as for me, may I speak . . . ' or 'let me speak . . . '.[118] Hesiod's exhortation is reflexive (he is exhorting himself), but its context – an invocation of the Muses to come and sing, and a prayer to Zeus to hearken and watch over – suggests also a call for the divine favour which will facilitate his enterprise.

It remains the case, however, that, by contrast with the *Theogony*, line 10 of the *Works and Days* lays conspicuously more weight on the prospect that the ensuing narrative may comprise truths. The pronoun 'I' (*egô, Op*. 10), moreover, does place novel emphasis on the mortal poet as distinct (but not thereby separated) from the Muses. Furthermore, the *Works and Days* does indeed explore prominently certain human affairs the prescriptive *and* descriptive 'truths' of which Hesiod can work out and grasp independently.[119] The primarily didactic aspect of the 'truths' (*etêtyma*) in line 10 is accentuated by the juxtaposition with Zeus' just governing in line 9.[120] Throughout the poem, however, Hesiod explores and explains the human sphere through its determinative relationship with the *unknowable, divine* sphere. It would be an oversimplification to say that, whereas the *Theogony* deals with gods and divine history, the *Works and Days* addresses the

[116] Smyth (1972) nos.1824, 1826. Even if a straightforward truth-claim introduced the *Works and Days*, this would only have highlighted the *absence* of one introducing the *Theogony*, contra West (1966) 162.

[117] κλῦθι is standardly used for 'hear my prayer', e.g. *Il*. 1.37; *Il*. 10.278; *Od*. 4.762, etc.

[118] Smyth (1972) no.1830.

[119] This is perhaps reflected in Hesiod's ideal of the 'most excellent man (πανάριστος), who thinks of everything for himself, considering what will be better later and in the end' (*Op*. 293–4). The second best thing is to obey good advice (*Op*. 295). Canevaro (2015) emphasises the importance of this ideal for Hesiod. Still, this intellectual and ethical call for critical reflection and deliberation does not amount to a categorical cry of liberation from the need for divine aid or guidance (as Canevaro (2015) 130 herself allows). Recall also Phemius' words at *Od*. 22.347–8.

[120] Cf. *Op*. 286 (ἐσθλὰ . . . ἐρέω . . . Πέρση).

conditions of human existence and mundane affairs. While we can speak of a shift in emphasis from one to the other, both poems are interested in both gods and humans, and always treat of one with an eye to the other.[121] Accordingly, Hesiod invokes the Muses to sing, not simply of divine affairs, but precisely of *how Zeus' dispensations of success and failure determine human life and endeavour* (n.b. *Op*. 2–4).[122] That is, far from expelling or marginalising the Muses, Hesiod invokes them to approach (δεῦτε . . . ἐννέπετε . . . ὑμνείουσαι, *Op*. 2) and articulate a central aspect of the central preoccupations of the ensuing poem.[123] Hesiod indeed differentiates between Zeus' activity of just *governing* and his own activity of *singing* (τύνη· ἐγώ, *Op*. 9–10). He does not, however, dissociate his singing from divine influence or favour.

Hesiod's advice to Perses on the subject of seafaring (*Op*. 646–93) demonstrates the Muses' abiding significance in matters external to the poet's experience. More importantly, these lines, which are surprisingly often ignored in the literature on *Theogony* 27–8, convey a striking take on the Muses' address to Hesiod.

Hesiod will reveal to Perses 'the measures of the sea' (δείξω, 648) despite having no expertise in seafaring or ships (649). As though it was a tangential qualification, Hesiod recounts as the single, negligible exception to his ignorance of sailing his journey across the short distance between Aulis and Euboea to Amphidamas' funeral games. But the story of Hesiod's brief voyage serves as a foil for a swift epistemological argument (656–62): ' . . . there I declare that I gained victory with a song, and carried off a tripod with handles. This I dedicated to the Heliconian Muses, where they first set me on the path of clear-toned song (τὸ πρῶτον . . . ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς). (i) Such, then, is the extent of my experience of many-bolted ships (τόσσον . . . πεπείρημαι); (ii) yet even so I shall speak forth the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus (Ζηνὸς νόον), (iii) for (γάρ) the Muses taught me how to sing a wondrous song (ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον ἀείδειν).'

[121] See similarly Most (2006) xliii. [122] Contra Stoddard (2004) 146–7, n.24.
[123] The subject matter of the song which the Muses are invited to sing about Zeus is not, therefore, merely 'tangential' to the poem's central themes of work and justice, contra Canevaro (2015) 101. Zeus' cosmic governance and determination of the relations between gods and men are what anchors the necessity and status of work and justice (Ch. 2.2–3).

What resurfaces with this argument, in a more sophisticated elaboration, is the poet's old admission of ignorance and simultaneous truth-claim. Hesiod (i) admits inexperience in seafaring and, therefore, ignorance of the facts pertinent to an informed account of it. He then rehabilitates his account by (ii) reformulating the true object of the account as the 'mind' or 'plan' (*noos*) of Zeus, rather than seafaring itself, and by (iii) justifying ('for': γάρ) his claim that he will relay Zeus' mind by tracing his ability to sing to the Muses. (iii) supports (ii) only if the Muses' teaching enabled Hesiod, *inter alia*, to relay Zeus' mind. (ii) finally rehabilitates Hesiod's account only if 'the mind of Zeus' encompasses, under a different description, the same propositions and injunctions which would make up a proper account of 'the measures of the sea'. Specifically, 'the mind of Zeus' must presumably encompass the propositions and injunctions which make up Hesiod's own ensuing account which spans, for example, both descriptions of relatively safe and dangerous seasons (e.g. 663–5, 670–7) and such prescriptions as the advice to load a boat in springtime only with the smaller share of one's possessions (689–93).

This argument clearly embodies *a* reading, within the Hesiodic corpus – although *not* in the *Theogony* – of the Muses' initial address. Hesiod dedicated his prize where the Muses first transformed him (τὸ πρῶτον κτλ, *Op*. 658–9), i.e. where they first taught him how to sing a wondrous song (*Op*. 662). His remark refers to the same first encounter narrated in *Theogony* 22–34. If from that occasion onwards the Muses have been enabling Hesiod to give consistently *true* accounts of any matter external to his experience, then they would appear to have been infusing him with truths (*Th*. 28).[124]

The passage strikes a triumphant tone. While Hesiod's journey only underscores his lack of expertise in seafaring (οὔτε … σεσοφισμένος, *Op*. 649), his victory in that journey exemplifies

[124] *Op*. 662 (ἐδίδαξαν … ἀείδειν) in no way indicates that the Muses endowed Hesiod once and for all with an ability to sing, which he now retains *independently* of their continued favour and inspiration. The same aorist occurs in *Th*. 22 (Ἡσίοδον … ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν) where the noun, moreover, is functionally equivalent to the infinitive used in *Op*. 662; cf. *Th*. 34–5. Both in the *Theogony* (104–15) and, I argued, in the *Works and Days*, the Muses are still invoked to initiate the account.

the *poetic* expertise which compensates for his ignorance.[125] Hesiod's victory and subsequent pious dedication portrays a happy, reciprocal and cyclical relationship of divine favour followed by mortal offering. Above all, Hesiod uses unqualified future indicatives to affirm that he *will* reveal the measures of the sea and, put differently, speak the mind of Zeus (δείξω, 648; ἐρέω, 661). This epistemological triumphalism diverges from what we have seen strong evidence to maintain is the *Theogony*'s considered and more circumspect epistemological stance.

We should not explain away the break in this passage of the *Works and Days* with the *Theogony*'s position. One might insist that Hesiod nowhere makes an express truth-claim for his account of seafaring. And, indeed, he need not claim that the account comprises truths and nothing but truths. Still, the conversational implicatures of Hesiod's future indicatives, and of the overall tone of the passage, plainly amount at least to a broad truth-claim. Alternatively, one might contend that we cannot infer a global epistemological stance from Hesiod's claims about the specific topic of seafaring. But steps (i)–(iii) give a strong impression of articulating a general, programmatic statement about the poet. And why should seafaring warrant privileged optimism? The fatal stakes and cultural baggage of seafaring (one recalls Odysseus' encounters with god-sent storms) render Hesiod's self-assurance here all the more provocative and pronounced. Finally, no independent evidence supports isolating the excursus from the rest of the Hesiodic corpus as an interpolation, ancient excisions notwithstanding.[126]

If, then, one traces the mortal poet's construal of his relation to the Muses as it emerges from a synoptic consideration of the Hesiodic corpus as a whole, the resulting picture is one neither of unreflective self-assurance nor of a consistent scepticism but of epistemological *ambivalence*. Notably, parallel ambivalent vacillations between optimism and pessimism are visible both elsewhere in the *Works and Days* and, in fact, within the account of

[125] For this double reading of σεσοφισμένος, see Rosen (1990) 101–2 with n.14.

[126] Having inspired the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod*, the excursus was rejected by some commentators who saw in it an anachronistic *reference* to that later tradition, see West (1978) 319.

seafaring itself. We saw how, immediately after he affirms Zeus' all-seeing vigilance, Hesiod conveys a momentary but telling crisis of confidence in Zeus' dispensations, and so in the just life ('if he so wishes etc.', *Op*. 267–73). The intractable variability of Zeus' agency resurfaces again in *Works and Days* 483–4: 'But the mind of Aegis-bearing Zeus is different at different times (ἄλλοτε δ' ἀλλοῖος), and it is difficult for mortal men to grasp it.' This comment qualifies the reliability of Hesiod's surrounding agricultural advice.[127] A scholiast wonders how it coheres with Hesiod's self-assured claim in line 661 that he will articulate the mind of Zeus.[128] And the scholiast is quickly vindicated. Having identified a span of fifty days in which sailing is safe, Hesiod qualifies: 'unless Poseidon, the earth-shaker, or Zeus, king of the immortals, wish to destroy (εἰ δὴ μή . . . ἐθέλῃσιν ὀλέσσαι), for in them is the fulfilment of good and bad alike' (*Op*. 665–9). We are familiar by now with the theological and epistemological resonances in Hesiod of such conditions as 'unless they wish' when they qualify divine dispensations of 'good and bad alike'. With seafaring too, then, Hesiod's brief moment of self-assured optimism is swiftly subjected to the inscrutability and unforeseeability of divine volition.

We noted above that the *Theogony* shows little preoccupation with the idea of gods dispensing good and bad in accordance with mortal justice and injustice respectively. This theodicy is, however, a central theme and contention of the *Works and Days*. (We cannot, moreover, dismiss this theological divergence between the two poems as simply a matter of their dealing with different themes: at *Theogony* 429–47, for example, the catalogue of Hecate's dispensations of successes and failures of all kinds offered an obvious opportunity to trace them to mortal merit and demerit.) *If* Hesiod's break in the seafaring passage with the *Theogony*'s epistemological stance should be explained by anything more than fluctuations in the poet's hopes concerning the gods' disposition towards him, I can see no better place to look to than this theological difference between the two poems. It is possible that, by promoting and systematising the notion of *just*

[127] Cf. West (1978) *ad loc*; Canevaro (2015) 198. [128] Σ *Op*. 661a Pertusi.

dispensations of good and bad, Hesiod finally generated a theological environment which rendered at least viable the optimistic (and self-congratulatory) revaluation that *to him* the Muses, always operating with Zeus' sanction, dispense truths (i.e. good). After all, Hesiod's diatribes about justice and injustice leave no doubt that he views his own conduct as just and worthy. A connection between Zeus' just dispensations and Hesiod's epistemic predicament is arguably suggested by the close juxtaposition in the proem between (i) Hesiod's prayer to Zeus that he governs justly (*Op.* 9–10) and (ii) his hope – or implicit *request* – that he would speak truths to Perses (*Op.* 10). The epistemological tension between Hesiod's self-assured promise to relay 'the measures of the sea' or 'Zeus' mind' (646–62) and his subsequent swift reversion to the intractable unforeseeability of Zeus' storms (665–9) would then map onto what we saw is a broader theological tension which the *Works and Days* engenders by venturing systematically into problems of morality. For, even as the *Works and Days* pursues the notion that divine dispensations of good and bad correspond to mortal justice and injustice, it displays at telling junctures abiding recognitions of the variability and inscrutability of divine agency and the difficulty of maintaining this idea of theodicy in the face of experience.

Any such explanation of the seafaring passage will be necessarily speculative. And the excursus on seafaring, whether or not we deem it explicable in some such manner (and independently even of authorial considerations), is interesting for our purposes above all for its very divergence from the epistemological stance implicit in the *Theogony.* Considered side by side, the competing interpretations of the Muses' initial address to Hesiod which we encounter in the Hesiodic corpus show something important about it. They demonstrate that the primary thrust of the Muses' laconic and enigmatic address is precisely to raise but leave unresolved the urgent and treacherous question of how the poet and his audience should interpret it. In *Theogony* 26–8, the Muses articulate the fixed epistemological framework within which the poet operates, a framework in which his capacities and limitations are determined by the nature of (i) the (epistemically superior) divine, (ii) the (epistemically inferior) mortal

and (iii) the interactions between them. It is, however, essential to the Muses' address that it is indeterminate and amenable to conflicting construals. As usual with divine communication, the Muses do not linger to *converse* with Hesiod and elucidate their words. Hesiod is left to assess for himself the ramifications of their statement for his own case. The *Theogony* (along with much of the *Works and Days*) implicitly but decisively develops a cautious assessment and inscribes Hesiod's interaction with the Muses within a theological cosmos in which the goddesses' address prescribes for the male poet wary circumspection rather than blithe assurance. In *Works and Days* 646–62, conversely, we find a strikingly optimistic revaluation of the Muses' address, albeit a fleeting one, which quickly betrays a kind of theological tension and uncertainty visible also elsewhere in the poem. When we take a synoptic view of the Hesiodic corpus as a whole, we find neither an unconcerned dogmatism nor a strictly consistent scepticism, but ambivalence between competing epistemological stances. In the final analysis, what the Muses articulate for Hesiod is not an epistemological position but an epistemological framework, which identifies the problem of epistemology as the problem of understanding the nature of the interactions between mortal and divine, but which is sufficiently indeterminate to accommodate competing elaborations of its fixed principles.

The only secure sense in which the Muses render Hesiod epistemically privileged, therefore, is in enabling him to recognise in an informed and disillusioned manner the complexity of the poet's epistemic predicament and the fixed factors which determine the truth-value of his output. Crucially, far from cunningly dissimulating it, the Muses forthrightly *disclose to Hesiod* their capacity to deceive.[129] Any subsequent evaluation and revaluation of the ramifications of their words for his own case, however optimistic or pessimistic, will thus always be *informed* of – and, ultimately, haunted by – the prospect of the divine dispensation of falsehoods.

[129] Contrast the dissimulating Hermes: 'I will tell the truth (ἀληθείην ἀγορεύσω) . . . I do not know how to speak falsehoods' (οὐκ οἶδα ψεύδεσθαι, *h.Hom.* 4.368–9).

We saw that, by introducing this prospect as he does, Hesiod brings certain traditional and epistemological attitudes to a crisis point (which, moreover, the short-lived triumphalism of the seafaring passage only accentuates). We will find in Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles radically divergent ways of conversing with and moving beyond the epistemological challenge first clearly isolated by Hesiod.

3

XENOPHANES ON DIVINE DISCLOSURE AND MORTAL INQUIRY

Xenophanes of Colophon wrote his verses in the late sixth and early fifth centuries BCE. By his own account (DK21 B8, B45), Xenophanes spent most of his adult life travelling all around Greece, moving from city to city, performing his works and offering his wide-ranging reflections. Our own focus in this chapter will be his thoughts on the question of divine disclosure. We will ultimately see, though, how Xenophanes aims to locate the mortal as an epistemic as well as moral agent within a holistic and coherently conceived world order.

Cicero speaks of Xenophanes as the only one among the most ancient philosophers who, while asserting the existence of the gods, 'did away with divination from its very foundation' (*diuinationem funditus sustulit*). With the further exception of Epicurus, divination has been otherwise accepted universally (*Div.* 1.3.5 = A52). Aëtius similarly writes: 'Xenophanes and Epicurus did away with divination' (Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀναιροῦσι τὴν μαντικήν, 5.1.1 = A52). Lesher (1992), who affirms his acceptance of these reports of Xenophanes, cites favourably Dodds' evaluation of the implications of such acceptance: 'If this is true, it means that, almost alone among classical Greek thinkers, he [Xenophanes] swept aside not only the pseudo-science of reading omens but the whole deep-seated complex of ideas about inspiration.'[1] Both earlier and later commentators on Xenophanes' relation to traditional theology similarly echo Cicero's talk of a *traceless* rejection.[2]

[1] Dodds (1951) 181 (cf. Dodds (1973) 6), cited at Lesher (1992) 141, cf. 96, 114, 118, 123, 154.

[2] 'A *clean sweep* of all the elements of popular belief which were hostile to his higher standard' (Gomperz (1906) 163), 'Xenophanes *schaltet* die Götter im Einklang mit seiner Theologie *völlig aus*' (Kleingünther (1933) 41), 'the *entire framework* . . . is here *swept away*' (Hussey (1990) 19), cf. Schrödinger (1954) 68 ('clear away'); on divination: 'par

We may assume that Cicero and Aëtius are drawing on a common source. Cicero's *diuinatio* translates the Greek *mantikê* (*Div.* 1.1.1), the two doxographers use parallel verbs (*sustulit* and ἀναιροῦσι), and the association of Xenophanes and Epicurus recurs in both.[3] The extant fragments, however, contain no cognate of *mantikê* and we cannot be certain that Xenophanes himself used this vocabulary of divination. If not, the reports would most probably derive from a reading of B18 (quoted and translated in Chapter 3.2) as expressing a wholesale denial of divine disclosure. And if our common source pounced on B18 in doxographic eagerness to identify an exception to the otherwise near-universal acceptance of divination,[4] most modern scholars were all too happy to inherit from antiquity a Xenophanes who champions independent mortal inquiry against divine interferences.[5] The minority of scholars who object to this reading of B18 do not ask what the role of divine disclosure in mortal inquiry might be, or consider the implications of this role for our understanding of Xenophanes' reaction to divination.

Cicero's and Aëtius' reports invite a wholesale reconsideration of the relation between mortal and divine in Xenophanes' epistemology. We will engage with these reports most fruitfully by analysing Xenophanes' reactions to the theological and epistemological suppositions that underlie the concept of *mantikê*. Xenophanes, we will see, indeed rejected divination along with other traditional models of divine disclosure such as poetic inspiration. But he was profoundly influenced by what he rejected.

la base' (Bouché-Leclercq (1879–1882) 33); 'altogether' (Flower (2008) 8) (my emphases).

[3] The two passages give parallel accounts also of the Stoic and Peripatetic views. On the Stoics: τὰ πλεῖστα μέρη τῆς μαντικῆς ἐγκρίνουσι (5.1.1); *omnia fere illa defenderent* (*Div.* 1.3.6); on Aristotle and Dicaearchus or 'Dicaearchus the Peripatetic': τὸ κατ' ἐνθουσιασμόν . . . τοὺς ὀνείρους (5.1.4); *somniorum et furoris reliquit* (*Div.* 1.3.5).

[4] Ancient doxographers are generally eager to oppose antithetical views, cf. Mansfeld (1999*b*) 27, 30–1; Betegh (2010) 36–7. In both Cicero and ps.-Plutarch, the rejection of divination by Xenophanes and Epicurus is juxtaposed to its (variously qualified) acceptance by Plato, the Stoics, Aristotle and Dicaearchus (*Div.* 1.3.5–6; *DG* 5.1.1.4).

[5] Tellingly, Loenen (1956) 136 styles Xenophanes an 'enlightened critic' when defending the traditional reading of B18 (cf. Gomperz (1906) 163; Dodds (1973) 4–5), while Shorey (1911) 89, arguing against it, speculates that scholars have been 'misled by . . . partiality for the pre-Socratics'; more recently, cf. Curd (2002) 120–9; Lesher (2008) 468–9; Gregory (2013) 104.

What does it mean to say that Xenophanes did away with *mantikê*? What is the 'whole deep-seated complex of ideas' against which the doxographers' judgement is to be evaluated? We must not overlook the possibility of a conceptual gap between Xenophanes and his doxographers.[6] In Chapter 3.1, I delineate the central, pertinent suppositions underlying divination. While taking account of later and 'historical' evidence, we will focus primarily on the closest conceptual relatives of the later term *mantikê* in the epic tradition, a tradition against which Xenophanes situated himself so explicitly.[7] This analysis undermines the anachronistic and misleading misconception, pervasive in the literature on Xenophanes, that Greek disclosure and divination typically involved the direct transmission of truths and knowledge to passive mortal recipients. To understand Xenophanes' reactions to it, we must appreciate the role of active mortal agency and reasoning in the Greek discourse of disclosure and divination.

In the first instance, this chapter offers a new interpretation of the logic of Xenophanes' remarks about divine disclosure in B18.1. In Chapter 3.2, I argue that Xenophanes neither denies categorically the reality of divine disclosure nor acquiesces in traditional attitudes towards it. Rather, Xenophanes categorically rejects the traditional notions of disclosure and expressly supplants them with a novel alternative. In Chapter 3.3, I develop Lesher's (1983) convincing and neglected argument that Xenophanes arrives at his scepticism, i.e. the negative aspects of his epistemology, by rejecting traditional divinatory assumptions (B34). But Lesher tells only half the story. In Chapter 3.4, I argue that Xenophanes' alternative notion of disclosure underlies his positive reflections regarding what *does* lie within the scope of mortal epistemology. More speculatively, I develop two alternative interpretations of the precise notion of purposiveness underlying Xenophanean disclosure. Xenophanes most probably

[6] Not least given Cicero's preoccupation with narrowly Stoic definitions of divination (*Div.* 1.1.1, 1.5.9), and because the doxographic tradition which Cicero and Aëtius reproduce and instantiate is notoriously prone to reduce earlier thought to later categories.

[7] See especially the criticisms of Homer and Hesiod in B10–12; see also B1.21–3; B14–16; B26; B32; D.L. 9.18.20 = A1; D.L. 2.46 = A19; Timon *apud* D.L. 9.19.14 = A1; Sextus *PH* 1.224 = A35; Plut. *Reg. Apophth.* 175c = A11.

reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure radically as the view that the divine purposively facilitates all mortal experience and belief-formation as part of its intelligent direction of the cosmos and its inhabitants. It remains possible, though less likely, however, that he maintains less idiosyncratically that the divine guides particular mortals in particular circumstances.

Finally, in Chapter 3.5 we will ask how these conclusions about Xenophanes can lend further nuance to our understanding of the complexity of his engagement with the culturally and theologically dominant models of divine disclosure manifested in divination and poetic inspiration.[8] Xenophanes reacts to divinatory models of sagehood in a polemical but also appropriative manner. This reaction casts light on Xenophanes' own conception and representation of himself as a sage and on the theological, epistemological and social world view that he champions against his rivals.[9]

For Xenophanes too, as with Hesiod, understanding epistemology means understanding the nature of, and the relations between, mortal and divine. At the heart of this enterprise lies the question of disclosure. At the outset, we must not let the fact that divination inhabits the religious and intellectual margins of modern Western culture blind us to its prominence in archaic and classical Greek beliefs and practices.[10] At the end, we should resist our temptation to extend Xenophanes' iconoclastic criticisms of what might strike us as unpalatable superstitions to a wholesale denial that the divine exerts an active influence on the epistemological equation. Xenophanes' polemic against theologically dominant models of divine disclosure has indeed exercised a formative influence on his epistemological thinking. But his response to 'the whole deep-seated complex of ideas' surrounding disclosure is not a complete 'sweeping-aside' from the very foundation (*funditus*) but, in some important respects, a radical and subversive transformation.

[8] We will discuss further Xenophanes' responses to Hesiod in Ch. 6.1.

[9] In her interesting analysis of Xenophanes' opponents and addressees, Gemelli Marciano (2002) 92, n.19 surprisingly dismisses offhand the possibility of an engagement with diviners.

[10] See Flower (2008) 1–103; Johnston (2008) 1–17; cf. Burkert (2005) 29–30; Flacelière (1976) 4. For some ancient testimonies to the universality and centrality of divination in the Graeco-Roman world, see X. *Apol.* 13; Cic. *Div.* 1.1.1–1.3.5, 1.6.11–12; S.E. *M* 9.132; Oenomaus *apud* Eus. *PE* 5.27.5.

3.1 Divination

A few key points will preoccupy us here. (i) Divination presupposes the pervasive contrast between divine epistemic superiority (often, omniscience) and mortal epistemic limitations. More precisely, communication between mortal and divine presupposes an epistemological world view in which the epistemic abilities and limitations of mortals are conceived *by contrast with* and *in reference to* the superior epistemic capacities of the gods. (ii)[a] Diviners most typically form propositions concerning non-experienced states of affairs on the basis of experienced events or objects intentionally disclosed by a divinity for that purpose (omens, oracles, dreams). (ii)[b] Since mortals can attain knowledge or insight concerning these non-experienced states only on the basis of omens (or oracles or dreams), those who have the ability and the expertise to infer from them appropriately are taken to transcend the epistemic limitations of all other mortals and to approximate the epistemic state of the gods in particular and momentary respects. (iii) Such epistemic approximation to the divine is associated with a more general approximation to the divine.

Mantic disclosure typically consists in the following: the gods, knowing *p*, cause the mortal agent to perceive an object or event with the intention that an ideal observer will interpret that object or event to mean, and therefore come to believe, *p*. The gods thus *communicate p*. In Gricean terms, omens have 'non-natural meaning'. To cite Denyer, 'they mean the facts they signify, not in the way clouds mean rain, but in the way that a road sign means a bridge ahead.'[11] Underlying divine communication is the view that the gods not only facilitate human existence by maintaining our world order (e.g. celestial and seasonal processes), but are also aware of and concern themselves with particular dilemmas haunting particular mortals.[12] We may distinguish at least three senses in which the objects of divination may be non-experienced. *P* could refer to (1) an event in the past or future ('Who will win the Trojan war?', 'Were Agis' blankets and pillows stolen?'),

[11] Denyer (1985) 5.
[12] Xenophon formulates the principle explicitly: *Mem*. 1.4.15–18; *Cyr*. 1.6.46; *Symp*. 4. 47–9; cf. Flower (2008) 105–6.

(2) current facts inscrutable due to various practical limitations ('How many figs are in this fig tree?', 'Is Lysanias not the father of Annyla's unborn child?'), (3) questions entirely not amenable to autopsy ('What does Zeus will?', 'What actions incurred divine wrath and which would allay it?', 'Was the first-fruit offering to Apollo satisfactory?').[13]

Already in Homer we find the indispensability of mantic consultations 'in both public and private' (Cicero, *Div.* 1.2.3). For Achilles, divination is required to discover what course of action would end the pestilence (*Il.* 1.62–3), while Circe sends Odysseus to Teiresias, the seer (*mantis*), to learn what path he must follow to reach Ithaca (*Od.* 10.538–40). The goddess Circe uses the same words to describe the inquiry about his journey which Odysseus must put to the seer Teiresias as those which the goddess Eidothea uses to describe the inquiry about his own journey which Menelaus must put to the god Proteus.[14] The fact that the mortal Teiresias fulfils a parallel role to that of the god Proteus perhaps brings out the particularly liminal status of the dead yet fully cognitive Teiresias (*Od.* 10.490–5). But it also gestures at a similar and more general liminality, characteristic of the diviner as such. Achilles begins a reply to his omniscient mother by noting its redundancy: 'You know. Why, then, should I recount these things to you when you know all?' (*Il.* 1.365). Menelaus addresses Eidothea (the Knowing Goddess) in similar terms: 'but the gods know all things' (*Od.* 4.379). While he reserves omniscience for the divine, however, Achilles accords Calchas sure knowledge (μάντις εὖ εἰδώς, *Il.* 1.384–5) and so a certain approximation and access to this privileged state. The poet similarly ascribes to Calchas, *qua* augur, knowledge of 'the things that are and the things that will be and were before' (*Il.* 1.69–70). Later sources retain the notion that knowledgeable or omniscient gods willingly provide signs only on the basis of which mortals can gain an

[13] (1) *Il.* 2.303–30; Parke 272 no.27 (Dodona); (2) Hes. fr. 278 M-W; Parke 266 no.11 (Dodona); (3) *h.Hom.* 3.131–2; *Il.* 1.92–100; Hdt. 8.122. Chaerephon could ask the Delphic oracle: 'is any man wiser than Socrates?' (Pl. *Apol.* 21a; cf. later in Philostratus' biography of Apollonius of Tyana: 'which is the most perfect philosophy?', *VA* 8.19. 40–4).

[14] ὅς . . . ἐλεύσεαι, *Od.* 10.539–40; *Od.* 4.389–90.

insight into non-experienced states for which there is otherwise no evidence.[15] Hence, Sophocles' chorus speaks of Teiresias as 'the *mantis* in whom alone of mortals truth is implanted' (*OT* 298–9).

Side by side with the vocabulary of knowledge, however, the role of mortal agency in the extrapolation of propositions from omens precluded the construal of divination as an infallible transmission of truths. Calchas infers from the portent of a serpent devouring eight young sparrows and then their mother that the Greeks shall war for as many years and in the tenth take Troy (*Il*. 2.303–30). Odysseus stresses to the Greeks that they all witnessed the omen in question (301–2) and urges them to stay in Troy to discover *whether or not* Calchas divined (i.e. interpreted it) correctly (ὄφρα δαῶμεν | ἢ ἐτεσν Κάλχας μαντεύεται ἦε καὶ οὐκί, 299–300). Here Calchas' own consultants and supporters represent his divination as a *conjecture*, to be verified only if and when the state of affairs in question comes within the scope of their collective experience. Hence, the same chorus in Sophocles can say of Teiresias, 'the wise augur', that, while *Zeus* and *Apollo* are knowledgeable, no sure criterion (κρίσις . . . ἀληθής) can determine whether a *mantis* carries more weight than any other mortal (*OT* 484, 496–501).

We cannot determine to what extent divinations were deduced from systematic exegetic rules. It appears that interpretations of divine messages typically started from basic semiotic principles (e.g. lightning on the right is a favourable sign (*Il*. 2.353; cf. Arat. *Phain*. 1.5–6), a lobeless liver unfavourable) and were further elaborated in the light of the nature of the inquiry or circumstances.[16] In this respect, divination was practicable by any informed mortal who recognised an omen as such. In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, Cyrus' father imparts to him a working knowledge of omen-divination, so that he would not be entirely dependent on potentially deceitful *manteis*, or at a complete loss if he should ever find himself without one (1.6.2). Xenophon himself

[15] X. *Hipp*. 9.9; *Cyr*. 1.6.46. Xenophon's Socrates warns against putting to the oracle questions that can be ascertained by mortal means (*Mem*. 1.1.9; cf. *Mem*. 1.4.18: περὶ τῶν ἀδήλων ἀνθρώποις); cf. Oenomaus *apud* Eus. *PE* 5.28.2 (οὐ δίχα θεοῦ . . . εὑρίσκεται).

[16] Flower (2008) 117: 'context informs interpretation'; cf. Trampedach (2008) 223.

learned much from observing professionals at work, and speaks once of a liver-omen so clearly unfavourable that any layman would have recognised that the gods objected to the proposed plan.[17] As Flower writes: 'Xenophon clearly believes that divination is a teachable craft, and that any intelligent person can learn it.'[18] We need not be surprised, then, that, when asked to define the art of divination, the sophist, and probably diviner, Antiphon replied: 'the conjecture of an intelligent person'.[19]

Polydamas infers from an eagle flying on the left, and carrying a snake which it fails to deliver to its nest, that the Trojans shall likewise make some military advances but fail to finish the task. Though not a diviner, he avers that he interpreted as a diviner would have (ὣδέ χ' ὑποκρίναιτο θεοπρόπος, *Il.* 12.211–29).[20] In lieu of a *mantis*, Helen similarly volunteers her own augury (μαντεύσομαι), premising that the right-hand position of the eagle calls for a favourable interpretation (*Od.* 15.160–78). Perhaps less surprisingly, we find lay practitioners also in the interpretation of oracles. Themistocles argues correctly against the expert chresmologues' exegesis of the Wooden Walls oracle that, had Apollo indicated a coming defeat at Salamis, he would not have styled the island 'divine' (Hdt. 7.142.3–143.1).[21] Lysander similarly accuses the chresmologue Diopeithes of misinterpreting an oracle (οὐκ ὀρθῶς ... ὑπολαμβάνειν, Plutarch, *Lys.* 22.5–6), and argues for an alternative reading.[22] Such passages presuppose the distinction between experienced professionals, well-versed in oracle exegesis or the semiotic principles underlying mantic interpretation, and typically less able lay practitioners.

[17] *Anab.* 5.6.29; 6.1.31; cf. 6.4.15. The lay Aegisthus recognises an unfavourable liver sign at Eur. *El.* 826–32.

[18] Flower (2008) 129.

[19] ἀνθρώπου φρονίμου εἰκασμός, DK87 A9; cf. Pendrick (2002) 243. For Antiphon as a diviner and dream-interpreter, see e.g. Cic. *Div.* 2.70.144; Diog. Oen. fr. 24 Smith, with Pendrick (2002) 49–53; Flower (2008) 125–6; but see contra Gagarin (2002) 99–101; cf. Woodruff (2004) 330–1. The seer Ophioneus practised a method of divination which emphasised learning all the facts relevant to each case (Paus. 4.10.6).

[20] *Il.* 13.730–733 notwithstanding, see Flower (2008) 120, n.30 against Dillery (2005) 172–3.

[21] See Dillery (2005) 210–12; Johnston (2005*a*) 17; Harrison (2006) 140.

[22] X. *Hell.* 3.3.3; Plut. *Lys.* 22.5–6; *Ages.* 3.3–5.

In stressing mortal agency, I do not claim that divination always or even usually involved the picturesque exegetical reasoning instantiated by Calchas, Helen and Polydamas.[23] Indeed, Homeric divination is not *invariably* inferential.[24] Nor do I follow those scholars who exclude entirely the elusive notion of inspiration from Greek omen-divination or the extent to which the gods may not only disclose omens but also somehow guide certain favoured individuals in the act of interpreting them.[25] We should neither ignore Plato's and Cicero's influential dichotomy between uninspired technical divination (e.g. augury, extispicy) and inspired natural divination (dreams, ecstasy) nor mistake it for a straightforward exposition of the general view.[26] To contract work in omen-divination, Deiphonus claimed to be the son of Euenius of Apollonia, who 'acquired instantaneously an innate capacity for divination' (ἔμφυτον αὐτίκα μαντικὴν εἶχε, Herodotus, 9.92–4). Quite generally, the continual prominence of certain mantic families going back to a (mythical) eponymous ancestor who acquired his mantic capacities as a divine gift or by other supernatural means, and the widespread practice among itinerant diviners of advertising themselves by claiming descent from those families, suggest the notion that, through divine favour, some mortals are more capable mantic interpreters.[27] Compared with ecstatic possession, the decoding of divine communication primarily on the basis of observed semiotic principles is less reliant on the notion of inspiration, but does not exclude it.[28]

[23] Though note Plutarch, who, citing Theopompus (fourth century), records five such examples preceding a single confrontation (*Dion*. 24; cf. *Timol*. 8).

[24] At *Il*. 7.44–53, the seer Helenus (cf. *Il*. 6.76) somehow 'overhears' divine deliberations; cf. the seer Theoclymenus' vision at *Od*. 20.351–62. Both events are otherwise unparalleled in Homer. Theoclymenus augurs standardly at *Od*. 15.525–34.

[25] Bremmer (2008) 150 styles Greek seers 'technicians'.

[26] Pl. *Phdr*. 244b6-d5; Cic. *Div*. 1.6.11. Plato's terminology, dictated by his particular agenda, is certainly idiosyncratic: he restricts *mantikê* to 'natural' divination. Olympiodorus expounds the Platonic classification, indicating that it was not readily recognisable (διττή ἐστιν ἡ μαντικὴ παρὰ Πλάτωνι, *in Alc*. 69.21–70.4). Cicero too presents the classification as a position undertaken by *some* theorists of divination (*qui duo genera diuinationum esse dixerunt*, 1.18.34), perhaps thinking especially of the *Phaedrus*. For Cicero's interest in the *Phaedrus*, see Yunis (2011) 27.

[27] On mantic families, see Flower (2008) 37–50, 130; Dillery (2005) 174, 192; Burkert (1992) 43–6; Bremmer (2008) 134.

[28] I broadly agree with the qualified reactions to the Platonic-Ciceronian classification in Dillery (2005) 171–2 and Flower (2008) 26, 84–90. Manetti (1993) 22 adopts the classification wholesale.

Exegetical reasoning, however, reflects a broader point. Far from an infallible transmission of truths to passively recipient mortals, our sources, as early as Homer, often present divination as involving or even requiring the application of human interpretative judgement and reasoning to encoded evidence communicated by the gods.[29] The gods do not restrict their communications to a few chosen individuals. Both mantic reasoning and auxiliary inspiration, working in tandem, could extend to any lay mortal sufficiently informed of the basic semiotic principles. Helen introduces the argument for her augury as an inspired conjecture: 'I will divine, as the immortals cast it in my heart and as I think it will come to pass' (μαντεύσομαι, ὡς ἐνὶ θυμῷ | ἀθάνατοὶ βάλλουσι καὶ ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀΐω, *Od*. 15.172–3). She reasons about the omen as the gods inspire her to reason. Like any discipline such as poetry, medicine or masonry (listed alongside divination as 'public-crafts' at *Od*. 17.383–4), divination could be performed badly or by amateurs. The very fact that texts from Homer to Sophocles are anxious to represent dismissals of particular instances of divinations (rather than of divination as such) as impious and deleterious demonstrates that such dismissals were hardly inconceivable *within* the divinatory belief system.[30]

Cicero's character Quintus rightly replies to the objection that mantic predictions do not invariably come true that the same can be said of any conjectural discipline (*Div*. 1.14.24), reflecting Odysseus' construal of Calchas' divinations as conjectural. Although he speaks of 'technical' omen-divination, Quintus' insight can be extended also to the reception of oracles through fallible, interpretative reasoning, a principle analysed by Plato (*Tim*. 72a1ff) and dramatised by Euripides (*Ion* 532ff). Greek tradition abounds with the didactic tragedies of consultants who mistook oracular responses for self-evident, self-sufficient answers, assuming naively an unreflective reading. Most famously, Herodotus relates how the Lydian king, Croesus, was told by Delphic Apollo that if he marched he would destroy a great

[29] See along similar lines Vernant (1991*b*) 308; Harrison (2000) 245; Flower (2008) 13–14; Hollmann (2011) 111, n.145; Kindt (2015) 40.

[30] E.g. *Od*. 2.178–80; *Od*. 20.351ff (ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν, 358); see further Griffith (1993) 101; Flower (2008) 17, 119–22.

kingdom and mistakenly inferred that he would destroy the Persians' kingdom rather than his own (1.53). Tisamenus of Elis began his illustrious mantic career by *misinterpreting* a Delphic oracle that he would 'win the five greatest contests' as referring to athletic competitions (ἁμαρτὼν τοῦ χρηστηρίου); the Spartans correctly interpreted 'contests of war' and employed his services (Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μαθόντες, Hdt. 9.33).[31] As Robert Parker observes, the Wooden Walls oracle reshaped rather than resolved public debate: 'discussion resumed, though in appearance at a different level: no longer a problem of tactics or politics, but of philology.'[32] The integral and fallible role of mortal interpretation in the derivation of beliefs from oracles informs Heraclitus' assertion that 'the lord whose oracle is the one in Delphi neither says nor conceals but gives a sign' (DK22 B93). The god does not articulate the answers to our queries, but provides a starting point from which we can work towards answers.[33] *Mutatis mutandis*, Heraclitus' insight can be generalised to all forms of divination.[34]

Self-representations and representations of the diviner as knowledgeable probably derive from the supposition that the omen itself encodes a divinely held and thus a true proposition, coupled with avowed professional confidence or confidence in the profession. A diviner certain of the correctness of his analysis of an omen or oracle, and also perhaps of divine favour or inspiration, will be certain of the truth of the derived proposition. The phenomenon of favoured mantic individuals and families illustrates the association between epistemic and a more general approximation to the divine. The epistemic superiority of Teiresias (traditionally the father of Manto, mother of Mopsus) extended to a uniquely substantial survival in the afterlife. Sophocles' chorus,

[31] For other such Delphic traditions in Herodotus, see 1.55 (with 1.91); 1.165–7; 4.163–4; 5.43–5; 6.76–80; see further Kindt (2006); Barker (2006); Maurizio (2013) 111–13; Tor (2016).

[32] Parker (2000) 80. Fontenrose (1978) portrays the *historical* Delphic oracle as essentially a Yes/No answering service (see 233–5). Parker (2000) 80 n.14–15 counters effectively. Cultural representations of divination are anyway at least as (if not more) pertinent for our investigation.

[33] See further Tor (2016).

[34] Even lot and dice divination, see *Div.* 1.18.34; Graf (2005) 62. Cf. dream-interpretation (ὀνειροπόλον, *Il.* 1.63), practised amateurly (*Od.* 19.535ff), and fallibly (Hdt. 1.209–10); see also *Od.* 19.559ff; Aesch. *Pr.* 485–6.

when styling Teiresias the only mortal in possession of truth, describes the diviner as himself divine (τὸν θεῖον . . . μάντιν, *OT* 298). The mythical diviner Amphiaraus of the Melampodidae later became a god and was worshipped as such throughout Greece (Paus. 1.34.4). Eperastus, a historical *mantis* of the Melampodidae, described his clan in an inscription as 'equal to the divine' (ἰσοθέων, Paus. 6.17.6). The Homeric lineage of Theoclymenus illustrates the point. Mantios sired Cleitus and Polypheides. Dawn snatched away the former to live among the immortals (ἵν' ἀθανάτοισι μετείη, *Od.* 15.251), while Apollo made the latter, Theoclymenus' father, far the best *mantis* (*Od.* 15.252–3).[35] Like Teiresias, Theoclymenus' father and paternal uncle combine to express the affinity between the seer's transcendence of mortal epistemic limitations and a more general transcendence.

Cicero's formal definition of *diuinatio* as foreknowledge of future events (*Div.* 1.1.1; cf. 1.5.9) betrays the narrow focus of certain Hellenistic debates. But Cicero at once reveals the broader significance of the term when he describes divination as 'a thing . . . by which human nature can most nearly approach the power of the gods' (*res . . . quaque proxime ad deorum uim natura mortalis possit accedere*, 1.1.1).[36]

There is no question that Xenophanes expresses a contrast between divine epistemic superiority and mortal epistemic limitations, and he clearly conceives of the latter by reference to the former. In B34 (quoted and translated in Chapter 3.3), he almost certainly identifies mortal epistemic limitations by an implicit contrast with the divine, as suggested by the specification that we mortals cannot have knowledge 'about gods', and as the ancient and modern readers of the fragment agree.[37] Xenophanes' views on the cognitive dissimilarity between mortal and divine (B23) coexist

[35] On Theoclymenus' lineage, see Dillery (2005) 173–4; Flower (2008) 42.

[36] Cf. Quintus: *interpretes . . . proxime ad eorum, quos interpretantur, diuinationem uidentur accedere* (1.18.34).

[37] So Varro and Arius Didymus: *hominis est enim haec opinari, dei scire* (*apud* Aug. *Civ. Dei* 7.17); ὡς ἄρα θεὸς μὲν οἶδε τὴν ἀλήθειαν (*apud* Stob. 2.1.17 = A24); cf. Fränkel (1974) 128; Lesher (1992) 164; Barnes (1982) 139. Alcmaeon opened his treatise with a contrast between divine knowledge and human conjecture concerning (at least) non-evident matters (σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι, DK24 B1).

with the notion that the latter is cognitively superior to the former.[38] In the remainder of this chapter, I will evaluate Xenophanes' reactions to the other facets of divination – (ii)[a], (ii)[b] and (iii)[39] – which we analysed here.

3.2 Against a Notion of Disclosure

Xenophanes writes (B18):

> οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν,
> ἀλλὰ χρόνῳ ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.
>
> *Indeed gods did not from the beginning intimate*[40] *all things to mortals,*
> *But as they search in time they discover better.*

The first line of this fragment negates a claim about divine disclosure. Most scholars take it that Xenophanes categorically rejects disclosure: at no point have the gods revealed anything to mortals. Call this the 'majority' interpretation. Others think that, through the expressions 'from the beginning' and 'all things', Xenophanes allows that at *some* times the gods did reveal *some* things (at least once something). This is the 'minority' interpretation. Scholars agree, then, that the negation in B18.1 displays two markers which *could* be seen to restrict an otherwise unrestricted remark about divine disclosure, one concerning the temporal dynamic of disclosure ('from the beginning') and another concerning the quantity of disclosure ('all things'). The majority interpreters insist that these qualifiers do not, in fact, restrict the remark about divine disclosure.[41]

[38] Cognitive superiority seems to be the focus of B24, see Drozdek (2004) 146; Granger (2013*a*) 248. B25 perhaps implies omniscience (god's mind engages with 'all things'); Simplicius cites the fragment to this effect (A31.9); cf. McCoy (1989) 237–8; Curd (2013*a*) 230. See also McCoy (1989) 236 and Barnes (1982) 139 on B18 and KRS (1983) 180 on B38.

[39] For the statements which correspond to these numerals, see the opening paragraph of this section.

[40] Adopting the rendering in Lesher (1992) *ad loc*. We will presently discuss ὑπέδειξαν in detail.

[41] See the exposition in Lesher (1991) 230 of the positions that have been *and can be* taken. Majority interpreters: Gomperz (1906) 162; Kleingünther (1933) 41; Loenen (1956); Dodds (1973) 4; Lesher (1983; 1991; 1992; for further details, see Tor (2013*a*) 259 with n.41); McKirahan (1994) 68–9; Curd (2002) 129; Mogyoródi (2006) 126–7; Bryan (2012) 52–5; Granger (2013*a*) 262. Minority interpreters: Shorey (1911); Verdenius (1955); Barnes (1982) 140; Tulin (1993) 133–5; Robinson (2008) 489.

This set-up is misleading in failing to recognise that, in addition to those temporal and extensional qualifiers, Xenophanes also qualifies the *manner* in which, according to the view he rejects, the gods disclose things. The verb which Xenophanes uses – 'intimate' (*hypodeiknymi*) – is not a simple and bland term for disclosure. The *three* qualifications in B18.1, I will argue, do not restrict a rejection of divine disclosure as such. Rather, they combine to express a particular, traditional and theologically faulty notion of the nature of divine disclosure, which Xenophanes rejects. That is, I argue, the gods never disclosed anything *in the manner in which the view negated in B*18.1 *conceives of disclosure*. Contrary to the minority interpretation, then, Xenophanes does not allow that the gods did 'intimate' (*hypedeixan*) some things at some time. Contrary to the majority interpretation, he does not deny divine disclosure categorically. Rather, Xenophanes supplants the traditional understanding of disclosure with his own, alternative notion of it.

In epic poetry, the verb *deiknymi* ('show') can signify divine disclosure, but never with the prefix *hypo*.[42] In archaic and classical Greek, *hypodeiknymi* only very rarely describes divine actions towards mortals. Xenophanes' use of the verb to signify divine disclosure is, to my knowledge, unique in these periods. We should, therefore, heed the prefix in *hypedeixan*, which indicates disclosure in an indirect, cryptic and even underhand manner.[43] Xenophon (*Mem*. 4.3.13) says that the gods indirectly imply (*hypodeiknyousin*) a certain precept about proper worship (that mortals should honour them even though they cannot see them) through the discreet ways in which they quite generally benefit mortals without revealing themselves openly. Herodotus writes that god gives many mortals a glimpse (*hypodexas*) of blessedness, before ruining them utterly (1.32). The 'showing' in question here consists simply in the mortal's happiness prior to

[42] *Il*. 13.243–4; *Od*. 3.173–4; cf. *Op*. 448–51; Pind. fr. 131b M; also, Hdt. 1.209; 7.37 (προ-).

[43] On these connotations of the prefix, cf. Lesher (1991) 237, n.19; (1992) 153. Lesher himself, however, downplays the pointedness of Xenophanes' terminology, listing purported parallels. But, other than *Mem*. 4.3.13 (addressed presently), none of the other texts listed contain the verb *hypodeiknymi*; see further Tor (2013*a*) 251–2 with n.12.

calamity. Neither passage uses the verb in reference to divine communication. Xenophon, however, supports the identification of a notion of indirectness in *hypedeixan*, while Herodotus demonstrates the sinister undertones of the verb and shows that it can be naturally used to convey suspicion or even criticism in descriptions of divine behaviour.[44] Though not invariably, such connotations, as well as those of cryptic secretiveness, often characterise the prefix and other occurrences of the compound.[45] More generally, both Herodotus and Xenophon use *hypodeiknymi* in a *pointed* way in their descriptions of divine behaviour. They do not use the verb as a mere synonym for *deiknymi*.

Crucially, his terminological novelty notwithstanding, Xenophanes does employ this exceptional vocabulary to signify a notion of divine disclosure. The issue at stake is how mortals come to discover what they discover. Xenophanes regards the kind of divine intimation that he rejects as *mutually exclusive* with his prescription of temporally protracted inquiries (B18.2). Whatever else, such inquiries clearly extend for Xenophanes to the business of forming and assessing beliefs. Thus, for example, Xenophanes' observations (whether first-hand or not) about marine fossils found inland support his novel theory of the earth's past submersion (A32–3). Correspondingly, B18.1 must articulate a notion of disclosure which, whatever else, purports to offer an instant access to truths, which conflicts with the call to search for them through such temporally protracted inquiries.

The negated view conceives of disclosure as an indirect, secretive and cryptic affair. Furthermore, in this manner the gods disclosed everything (*panta*) from the beginning (*ap' archês*). Given Xenophanes' qualification of the manner of disclosure (*hypedeixan*), the markers 'from the beginning' and 'all things' do not restrict a rejection of disclosure *simpliciter*, but further qualify the particular notion of indirect, cryptic disclosure, which

[44] Cf. 'feigning virtue', Thuc. 4.86.5.

[45] LSJ, sv. ὑπό, F, III; Smyth (1972), no.1698.4; cf. e.g. *Il.* 21.44. In a scholion on Lycophron (Σ 344 Scheer), φρυκτὸν ὑποδείξας signifies Sinon's secret disclosure of a signal to the Greeks (cf. Lesher (1992) 153). In literary criticism, *hypodeiknymi* came to signify that an inexplicit poetic text indirectly implies distinctions or insights (Plut. *Mor.* 23e1; 645a5) or even elaborate philosophical doctrines (e.g. ps.-Plut. *de Hom.* 2. 1063–74, 1298–308 Kindstrand).

Xenophanes rejects. That is, Xenophanes does not severally reject the isolated claims that the gods disclosed (i) from the beginning, (ii) everything and (iii) cryptically. Rather, the qualifications (i)–(iii) combine to express a unified view of how disclosure works, i.e. the view that from the beginning gods cryptically disclosed everything, which Xenophanes rejects.

What is the target of Xenophanes' attack? Lesher suggests that Xenophanes particularly targets omen-divination.[46] We need not restrict the notion of divine disclosure negated in B18.1 to omen-divination or even to divination generally. Yet, elsewhere too Xenophanes' theological criticisms confront pervasive and authoritative traditional suppositions (B10–14) and it is very likely that B18.1 conveys – among other things – a polemical attitude to divination, the most dominant form of divine disclosure.[47] Indeed, we saw that divination involves the signification of propositions indirectly through their encryption in diverse objects or events (or, for oracles, in enigmatic pronouncements). The verb 'intimate' (*hypedeixan*), signalling a cryptic, enigmatic signification, is therefore highly apposite as a critical representation of mantic communication.

Xenophanes' cosmology coheres with a polemic against divination in his remarks about divine disclosure in B18.1. In the epic tradition, Iris the messenger (*Il.* 15.158–9; *Th.* 780–1) is standardly represented as an omen sent by Zeus (*Il.* 11.27–8; *Il.* 17.547–8). Xenophanes' assertion, 'she whom they call Iris, this thing too is by nature a cloud' (B32), is thus plausibly read as a deflationary reduction of what is commonly regarded as a portentous deity to the fleeting phenomenon of exhalation.[48] In the light of this, similar reductions of a variety of atmospheric phenomena, several related to omen-divination, could also relate to a denial that such phenomena constitute encoded divine communications.[49] There are also our

[46] Lesher (1991) 237–40.

[47] Xenophanes' use of mantic terminology in his denial of knowledge-claims in B34 (see Ch. 3.3) fits with a preoccupation with divination in B18.1.

[48] Dodds (1951) 196, n.7; Lesher (1991) 241; (1992) 139–4.

[49] Clouds in the ordinary sense (A46, B30), lightning (A45), comets, shooting stars (A44), the moon (A43), the stars (A38), St. Elmo's fire ('also those whom some call the Dioskouroi are clouds', A39); See Lesher, *loc. cit.*; KRS (1983) 174; Hussey (1990) 24; Mourelatos (1989) 282–5; (2008*b*) 135–7, 149–50; Gregory (2013) 103–4.

express reports that Xenophanes rejected divination (A52), unless they themselves derive from B18.1.

The open-ended 'all things' (*panta*, B18.1) is also instructive. The force of 'all things' or 'everything' in Xenophanes is elsewhere context-sensitive. At different junctures, '*panta*' may refer to all things (B27, if authentic) or all members of a subset of things (B29) which undergo natural processes, to everything (or perhaps every *sort* of thing) censured among mortals (B11.1[50]) and to every item in a foregoing catalogue of public honours (B2.10).[51] The gods' disclosure of 'everything' to mortals could certainly encompass divinely inspired accounts of the world which are universal in scope, such as Hesiod's *Theogony*.[52] But the indirect, cryptic disclosure of 'everything', and especially the emphatic contrast with inquiries *over time*, again point also to a preoccupation with divination. For Xenophanes, mortals must conduct *protracted* inquiries in the hope only for gradual, hard-won advances. The notion of disclosure negated in B18.1 competes with Xenophanes' call for such inquiries in B18.2 because, on this notion, gods made *everything instantly available* to humans, and so every object of human inquiry which was not already independently available to them.[53] 'All things' aptly conveys the essentially open-ended range of questions – encompassing any truth – concerning which, traditionally, the gods always communicated to mortals.

It is an important point here that the Greek phrase '*ap' archês*' signifies, not '(once) at the outset', but 'from the outset *onwards*'.[54] The symmetry of the contrast between this phrase

[50] Xenophanes' catalogue of blameworthy actions is certainly not exhaustive; Lesher (1992) *ad loc* renders 'all sorts of things'.

[51] On περὶ πάντων in B34.2, see Ch. 3.3.

[52] Koning (2010) 204.

[53] After all, even if the Greeks could often emphasise the effort and fallibility of interpretation involved in divination, it remains the case (i) that the response to one's inquiries is attained promptly (certainly by contrast with the types of prolonged, even decades-long (cf. B8) inquiries which Xenophanes prescribes in B18.2) and (ii) that individual diviners readily advanced or were ascribed confident knowledge-claims on the basis of such swift disclosures (as we saw in the previous section and will see again in the next one). In B18, Xenophanes legitimately picks up on these aspects of received notions of disclosure.

[54] As Lesher (1991) 232–3 shows; see LSJ. sv. ἀπό II; cf. Hes. *Th*. 425; Hdt. 2.50, 104, 113; Gorg. B11a.29. Classen (1996) demonstrates that Homer and Hesiod consistently use ἀρχή, especially with the prepositions ἐξ or ἀπό, in this same sense.

and Xenophanes' assertion that mortals discover better by inquiring 'over time' (χρόνῳ, B18.2) suggests that (as widely assumed) the phrase 'from the beginning onwards' qualifies the verb, 'intimate': the gods did not always ('from the beginning') intimate everything to mortals (*ap' archês . . . hypedeixan*). Conceivably, though, we could instead – or also – take 'from the beginning' to qualify 'all things'. On this reading, B18.1 says that the gods did not intimate to mortals every truth about the world from its very beginnings onwards (*ap' archês panta*). Nonetheless, the entirely open-ended and universalising phrase '*everything* from the beginning onwards' would still suggest that gods still now intimate to mortals everything, up to and including present-day and, indeed, future truths.

On either reading, the aorist tense of 'intimate' (*hypedeixan*) does not necessitate the strange view that, on some single, unique occasion, gods just *once* made a *one-off* revelation of everything to mortals, but then *ceased* making such revelations to mortals.[55] Rather, gods rendered and still render instantly available to mortals 'everything', including any truth that they wish to attain. The specification 'from the beginning onwards' most likely stresses that the gods *always* did so. Alternatively, it stresses that the scope of divine disclosure encompasses comprehensively any matter from the beginnings of cosmic history and onwards continually. Either way, the negated view, that gods intimated everything to mortals (B18.1), conflicts with Xenophanes' call for temporally protracted inquiries (B18.2) because, on this view, gods *still now* render instantly available to mortals any object of inquiry which is not independently instantly available to them.[56]

[55] Even if one did (implausibly, to my mind, and in a manner that would be difficult to square with the attested meaning of the phrase ἀπ' ἀρχῆς) maintain such a view of B18.1, this would require us only to modulate some details in my argument that, in this fragment, Xenophanes articulates and rejects a highly qualified and very particular conception of divine disclosure, which he supplants with his own alternative conception. The further point, that Xenophanes bore a critical attitude towards traditional, divinatory notions of divine disclosure, is, moreover, reflected independently also elsewhere in our evidence, as discussed in this section and the next one.

[56] We may usefully compare Xenophanes' use of the aorist in B38 (for the text, see Ch. 3.4). It would be implausible to read into this statement an elaborate and confusingly compressed deist thesis that, on some single, primordial occasion, god established mechanisms which now cause the generation of yellow honey without any further divine ministration. The fragment much more naturally conveys the view that, for as

In the light of these considerations, we may perhaps best think about Xenophanes' use of the aorist in B18.1 (and B38) as having something of a gnomic flavour. The gnomic aorist (usually translated with a present tense) expresses a general truth, on the understanding that a past occurrence can stand in for a universal and recurrent pattern, as in the following examples: 'He who reveres the daughters of Zeus who issue their voice, him they benefit (ὤνησαν) greatly and hear (ἔκλυον) as he prays' (*Il*. 9.508–9); 'but the fool realises (ἔγνω) once he has suffered' (Hesiod, *Op*. 218), 'just as a noble horse, even if he is old, does not lose heart (θυμὸν οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν) amidst dangers . . . ' (Sophocles, *El*. 25–6).[57] We may similarly find a gnomic nuance in Xenophanes B38: 'Had it not been the case that god makes (ἔφυσε) yellow honey, they would say that figs are much sweeter.'[58] In B18.1, Xenophanes also puts in his sights a general claim (which is most likely emphasised to have obtained always: *ap' archês*): 'gods intimate everything to mortals'. He subjects this claim to a denial: 'it is not the case that . . . ' (οὔτοι). A close parallel to Xenophanes' language, which also suggests the aorist's gnomic potential, demonstrates that the claim which Xenophanes negates can naturally represent a general purported truth. A poet of the *Hymns* speaks of 'the race of semi-divine heroes whose deeds gods showed [or: show] to mortals' (θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν, *h.Hom.* 31.19). The poet puts forward the general truth, that gods disclose the subject matter of heroic poetry to mortals, with an almost verbatim parallel to Xenophanes' phrase 'gods intimated [or: intimate] to mortals' (θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν, B18.1).

This close echo also reminds us, however, that we need not delimit the target of Xenophanes' criticism in B18.1 to mantic

long as there had been yellow honey, god caused the generation of yellow honey, and still now causes it. Confirmation of this (independently more plausible) interpretation is found in B25, which shows that god's intelligent and purposeful ministration of all things is an *on-going* affair (Ch. 3.4). In Hdt. 1.32, the aorist participle ὑποδέξας conveys that god gave a show of blessedness to doomed mortals, not simply once, but right up to destroying them.

[57] For the gnomic aorist, see further Smyth (1972) noo.1931–2; Goodwin (1889) noo. 154–9.

[58] Cf. n.56 above.

communication. The Homeric poet uses the usually mantic *deiknymi* to express a notion of poetic inspiration. Xenophanes, in employing the very same phrase, with the conspicuous addition of the prefix *hypo*, may thus be reacting critically also to the elusive notion of poetic inspiration, itself, as here and as we saw in Chapter 2.2, often closely associated with divination. We may conclude that, however wide a net Xenophanes casts in B18.1, the line's language, its opposition to the alternative of temporally protracted inquiries and Xenophanes' polemical cosmology and reported rejection of divination all indicate that his invective against a notion of divine disclosure here conveys a polemic against traditional, authoritative paradigms of disclosure, which prominently included mantic communication and poetic inspiration.[59]

Let us take stock. Xenophanes is thinking in B18.1 of a particular manner of divine disclosure. The line evokes traditional paradigms of disclosure to which (as we shall see further in the next section) Xenophanes bore a polemical attitude. We may thus follow the majority interpretation to an extent. Xenophanes is unlikely to have allowed that the gods do disclose cryptically and indirectly (*hypedeixan*) some things at some points in their interaction with mortals, agreeing with the negated view about the manner of disclosure, while disagreeing only about its temporal and quantitative scope. Equally, however, the central insight of the minority interpretation has been vindicated. Xenophanes carefully formulates a highly qualified view and it is implausible to return to him the same view divested of those qualifications. Rather than following standard terminology (say, θεοὶ θνητοῖσιν ἔδειξαν), Xenophanes instead chose a pointedly exceptional term for disclosure, which highlights the notions of indirect, cryptic and secretive communication. Furthermore, 'from the beginning' and 'all things' are indeed emphatic qualifications. Rejecting the view that gods disclosed everything from the beginning onwards in an indirect and cryptic manner, while a pointed critical representation

[59] Indeed, Xenophanes could conceivably also be implying that the gods did not instantly bestow whatever cultural and material prosperity we have (B18.1) and that we progress culturally and materially over time (B18.2). Lesher rejects these connotations plausibly but not conclusively, see Ch. 3.5.

of traditional conceptions of disclosure, would be a remarkably peculiar way of saying that the gods never and in no way disclosed anything to mortals. Fortunately, we have evidence, I believe, that Xenophanes did in fact formulate an alternative (B36):

ὁππόσα δὴ θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι . . .[60]

It is in fact difficult to determine whether we should translate the verb here transitively – 'however many things they have disclosed for mortals to look upon'[61] – or intransitively: 'however many things have appeared for mortals to look upon'.[62] I submit that, on either grammatical construal, these words convey the alternative notion of divine disclosure which B18.1 *independently* leads us to expect. Xenophanes' critique there calls for an alternative, which is not tainted by the characteristics of the highly qualified notion of disclosure that he rejects. The account of mortal experiences in B36 fits the bill especially because (as we shall see momentarily) it precisely *inverts* the account rejected in B18.1. With this last consideration in mind, we would still plausibly maintain that

[60] Herodian cites B36 for its instantiation of a linguistic peculiarity: shortened penultimate syllables in -σι verbs (περὶ Διχρόνων 3.2 16.17–29; *de Pros. Cathol.* 3.1 535.28–35 Lentz). Although editions of Xenophanes do not reflect this fact, B36 is also cited by the much later Georgius Choeroboscus (*in Theod*. 4.2 88.27–33 Hilgard). Georgius' examples and discussion of the same phenomenon are, however, clearly reliant on and closely echo Herodian's (or an intermediary or common source). The slightly corrupted reading πεφήνασθ' in Ms. O of Georgius leaves no question whatever that he too wrote πεφήνασιν. Mss. CV carry πεφύκασιν. The banalisation of πέφηνεν to πέφυκεν can be paralleled, see Soph. *El*. 646 and, possibly, Eur. *Phoen*. 916 (with Mastronarde (1994) 411–12). In this case, the banalisation was perhaps specifically occasioned. Georgius retains (but reorders chronologically) all of Herodian's examples, *except Od*. 7.114: ἀμφὶ δὲ δένδρεα μακρὰ πεφύκασι. A scribe ultimately responsible for the CV reading and familiar with the original discussion in Herodian – or simply highly habituated to Homer (in whom πεφήνασιν never occurs) – may, then, have reintroduced πεφύκασι under the influence of the omitted Homeric line.

[61] Similarly, Lesher (1992) 39; Barnes (1982) 140; Benitez and Tarrant (2015) 215.

[62] Similarly, DK *ad loc*.; Burnet (1930) 121; Edmonds (1931) *ad loc*.; Guthrie (1962) 397. Although we would otherwise expect the second perfect of φαίνω to carry an intransitive sense, this is at least balanced by the consideration that such a reading of B36 would leave us with ὁππόσα as a neuter nominative taking a plural verb, a very peculiar usage of ὁπ(π)όσα for which there is, to my knowledge, no parallel in extant archaic and classical Greek. A *TLG* search of all occurrences of ὁπ(π)όσα in texts up to and including Aristotle indicates that the word is far more often used in the accusative (as in *Il*. 24.7; *Od*. 14.47) and, when nominative, *invariably* takes, as one would expect, a singular verb (e.g. *h.Hom.* 2.365; Hes. fr. 204.113 M-W). In B18.1, moreover, θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν is transitive, which perhaps suggests a correspondingly transitive sense for the structurally parallel θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν.

Xenophanes is referring implicitly to the agency which underlies mortal experiences even if we followed the intransitive translation. Herodotus (9.120) offers an instructive parallel.[63] We could read the statement about Protesilaus here intransitively – 'Athenian stranger, do not fear this portent, for [sc. it] has not appeared to you (πέφηνε), but it is to me that Protesilaus of Elaeus signifies that . . . ' – or transitively: ' . . . for Protesilaus of Elaeus has not shown [sc. it] to you (πέφηνε), but it is to me that he signifies that . . . '. On either construal, the passage would still demonstrate how naturally this terminology can signify that certain appearances (ὁππόσα, B36; τὸ τέρας τοῦτο, Hdt. 9.120) have appeared to their recipients (θνητοῖσι, B36; ἐμοί, Hdt. 9.120) at the instigation of a divine power.

If we follow the transitive translation, then 'gods' is the only candidate for the missing subject. Who else could make things evident to 'mortals' (θεοὶ θνητοῖσ', B18.1)?[64] We may further support the impression that this text expresses a notion of disclosure even on the intransitive translation by raising and addressing the following question: should we read B36 as a whole as the fragment of a statement made *in propria persona*? First, we have no reason not to take B36 in this way. The polytheistic language (on the transitive translation) is certainly no obstacle, since Xenophanes undeniably uses such language positively and, anyway, our evidence does not support ascriptions of a strict monotheism to him.[65] Second, and more importantly, we do have reason to read B36 positively, for, I argue, the positive account of mortal

[63] ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, μηδὲν φοβέο τὸ τέρας τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ σοὶ πέφηνε, ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ σημαίνει ὁ ἐν Ἐλαιοῦντι Πρωτεσίλεως ὅτι κτλ.

[64] Cf. Lesher (1992) 176–7.

[65] Monotheistic construals of B23 are highly improbable syntactically, see Stokes (1971) 76–8. I take no issue with the suggestion that Xenophanes' theology is *incipiently* monotheistic insofar as it may imply a tendency towards reconceptualising the divine in the image of the 'greatest god' (B23–6, see Schofield (1997) 72–3). But – and this is the important point for us – Xenophanes uses both polytheistic and monotheistic language when speaking positively about the divine (esp. B1.24; cf. B34.2 and, more contentiously, B18, B11–12, B14–16, B23). This fact alone problematises ascriptions of full-fledged monotheism, and this is especially true of B23 itself: if Xenophanes wanted to convey strict monotheism there, then his simultaneous talk of 'gods' in the same line will have all but guaranteed that his point would be lost on an audience for whom strict monotheism was hardly already a familiar and easily identifiable concept. Xenophanes himself most probably remained vague on the numerical question. See further Tor (2013*a*) 258 n.36; Granger (2013*a*) 237–8.

experiences in B36 is a reversal of the view negated in the polemical B18.1. The verb which Xenophanes uses here (*phainô*) is a standard, bland term for divine disclosure and conveys none of the pointed undertones of the language of B18.1 (*hypedeixan*).[66] The denial that the gods intimated everything (*panta . . . thnêtois'*) is fittingly balanced by a statement concerning the limited scope of what the gods *have* disclosed (*hopposa dê thnêtoisi*). Finally, if in B18.1 Xenophanes rejects the view that the gods have always already made instantly available any and all truths about the world (*ap' archês*), his talk in B36 of *however many* things the gods have disclosed allows that the current set of disclosed things may vary. We shall see the significance of this last point when we consider Xenophanes' engagement with the possibility that our available body of evidence may change and that counter-evidence to our beliefs may be discovered (Chapter 3.4).

In B18.1, Xenophanes rejects only a very particular notion of divine disclosure with carefully qualified characteristics. In B36, he articulates a reversal of this notion of disclosure. This latter fragment, then, most likely either implies (on the intransitive translation) or refers to (on the transitive translation) an alternative notion of disclosure, which is precisely innocent of the characteristics of the rejected one. The notion of disclosure advanced in B36 (*thnêtoisi pephênasin*) supplants the one rejected in B18.1 (*thnêtois' hypedeixan*). These fragments illuminate one another. Xenophanes not only admitted divine influence over mortal inquiry but also explicitly represented that influence as a form of divine disclosure.[67] We must, then, employ more nuanced vocabulary. We cannot speak of Xenophanes' position on disclosure *simpliciter*. Rather, Xenophanes *replaces* what he takes to be the traditional view with his own, alternative conception.

[66] E.g. *Il.* 2.308, 318, 324, 353; *Il.* 4.381; *Od.* 3.173–4; *Od.* 21.413; cf. Hdt. 9.120 (πέφηνε).

[67] Scholars have disregarded B36 when discussing B18 and Xenophanes' views on divine disclosure. A stimulating exception: Barnes (1982) 140 observes, without further comment, that B18 is complemented by B36. The presumption that disclosure 'is not the sort of thing Xenophanes' god . . . does' (McKirahan (1994) 68–9) perhaps discouraged recognition that B36 may express an alternative, novel notion of disclosure. See further Tor (2013*a*) 259 with n.41 on Lesher (1983; 1991; 1992).

B18.1 is not 'a firmly negative comment . . . on the question of divine agency'.[68] It is a firm rejection of one particular conception of divine agency. It has been claimed that Xenophanes' talk of inquiries (*zêtountes*, B18.2) 'explicitly contrasts . . . with divine revelation'.[69] The false assumption that divine disclosure must conflict with mortal agency is instructively belied by the subsequent history of this very terminology of inquiry. The term *zêtêsis* and its cognates can express the instigation and facilitation of mortal inquiry through divination, sometimes signifying the consultation itself.[70] Indeed, the cognate reduplicated form of the verb (*dizêmai*) – the verb which Parmenides employs to describe his own philosophical inquiry (which involves divine disclosure prominently) – is a standard technical term in Delphic oracular responses, expressing the act of consulting Apollo.[71] Since *zêtêsis* can signify both specifically philosophical inquiry and divination,[72] it is not surprising that divine disclosure was sometimes thought to instigate and guide philosophical *zêtêsis*, as with Socrates' inquiries following Apollo's response to Chaerephon.[73]

Finally, the later grammarians offer an insight which harmonises profoundly with our earliest testimonies to Greek conceptions of divine disclosure. An etymology of *mantis* popular among them traces it to *matô* or *mô*, a verb which, they explain, is synonymous with 'to inquire' (*zêtein*). For the diviner is inquisitive (*zêtêtikos*): he is 'one who inquires into unseen and

[68] Lesher (1991) 233.

[69] Mogyoródi (2006) 126–7, 151; cf. Gomperz (1906) 162; Kleingünther (1933) 41; Dodds (1973) 4; McKirahan (1994) 68; Wardle (2006) 107; Bryan (2012) 53–4; Lesher (2013) 86–7. Shorey (1911) 89 observes that glosses of ζητοῦντες as 'searching *by themselves*' supply an αὐτοί Xenophanes never used.

[70] Note the chorus' expectation at Soph. *OT* 277–9; cf. Aesch. *Pr.* 775–6; for omen-divination: Di. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 3.70.3; Plut. *Mor.* 340c7; Paus. 3.22.12; signifying consultations: Di. Sic. *Lib*. 17.51; Di. Hal. *Ars Rhet*. 9.7.49–50; *Ant. Rom*. 12.9.1; cf. the late *Oracula Tiburtina* 58 Alexander.

[71] See Ch. 5.3, n.113.

[72] E.g. Pl. *Phd*. 66d (philosophical inquiry, cf. *Lg*. 1.631a); *Phdr.* 244c (divination).

[73] Pl. *Apol*. 22a (ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν), 23b, 29c9-d4; cf. *Crat*. 406a; *Ti*. 47a. Socrates' sign (μοι μαντική, *Apol*. 40a4–7; cf. X. *Mem*. 1.1.2–4; Pl. *Phdr.* 242c3–4) informs his argument at *Apol*. 40b3-c3; cf. X. *Apol*. 8. Plutarch (channelling Ammonius) traces philosophy to inquiry (τὸ ζητεῖν), inquiry to puzzlement, and puzzlement to Delphic Apollo (*Mor*. 385c); cf. Iambl. *apud* Stob. *Anth*. 2.2.5.11–16.

non-evident things' (ὁ τὰ ἀφανῆ καὶ ἄδηλα ζητῶν).[74] Not for nothing, ancient doxographers employ identical vocabulary to describe the domains concerning which, according to Xenophanes, we cannot have knowledge: 'of unseen things' (τῶν ἀφανέων), 'in non-evident matters' (ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις).[75] Before addressing the role of divine disclosure in Xenophanes' own inquiries into unseen and non-evident matters, we must first see how he arrives at the view, that we cannot have knowledge about such things, by criticising traditional notions of disclosure.

3.3 Setting the Limits

What will Xenophanean disclosure *not* be? Divine disclosure will not render 'everything' instantly available to mortals. It will not amount to mantic communication or poetic inspiration. Since, furthermore, Xenophanes maintains that, concerning certain matters, mortals cannot attain clear and certain knowledge, Xenophanean disclosure will not guarantee such knowledge (B34):

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

And that which is clear and certain no man has seen nor will there be anyone
Who knows about gods and what I say about all things;
For even if, in the best case, someone succeeded in speaking what has been fulfilled
Still he himself does not know; but belief is fashioned for all.

'That which is clear and certain' (*to saphes*) indicates veracity, clarity and certitude.[76] Numerous, generically heterogeneous texts associate this terminology with the knowledge, pronouncements or, once, person of the *mantis*.[77] Xenophanes' term for the object

[74] *Etymol. Mag.* 574.69–75 Gaisford; Geor. Choer. *in Theod.* 4.1 200.3–5 Hilgard; cf. Hesychius' entry for ἐρέων: μαντευσόμενος. ἐρωτήσων. ζητήσων, sv. ε.5770 Latte; also Olymp. *in Alc.* 70.1. For μαντεύομαι as 'hunt down' or 'trace out', cf. Theoc. 21.45.

[75] Epiphanius and Sextus: below, n.83.

[76] See Lesher (1992) 156–7; Tor (2013*b*) 10 with n.23; S.E. *M* 7.50; cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 1369–71.

[77] Lesher (1983) 31 cites *Il.* 12.228–9 (σάφα θυμῷ εἰδείη); *Od.* 1.202 (μάντις . . . οἰωνῶν σάφα εἰδώς) and 17.153 (οὐ σάφα οἶδεν, Theoclymenus contrasting his own divinatory

of true statements and beliefs, '*tetelesmenon*', conveys the sense 'what has come to completion' or 'fulfilment' and has its provenance in Homeric divination.[78] Diviners inquire above all into the disposition and will of the gods (e.g. *h.Hom.* 3.131–2, 539a), the fruition of whose designs is standardly expressed as their arrival at their fulfilment (*telos*).[79] The same terminology is used formulaically for the formation and fulfilment of mantic predictions.[80] In the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, 'what has been fulfilled' is invariably associated with statements about future states-of-affairs.[81] It can have the sense 'what is *to be* fulfilled'.[82] The formula 'ah, stranger, would that this word of yours might be fulfilled (τετελεσμένον εἴη)' expresses the desire to see a prediction come to pass. It is addressed twice to the seer Theoclymenus (*Od.* 15.536; *Od.* 17.163, where Theoclymenus just claimed sure, mantic knowledge (σάφα): 153–4) and once to Odysseus upon his 'prediction' of his own imminent arrival (*Od.* 19.309). In *Odyssey* 19.547, the eagle-Odysseus, undertaking the role of dream-diviner, employs the term when divining from Penelope's dream of the slaughtered geese (ὅ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται). Xenophanes appropriates and employs this Homeric notion of 'what has been fulfilled' more broadly as the object of all unknowledgeable true statements and beliefs 'about the gods and what I say about all things'.

This last phrase specifies the scope of the matters concerning which Xenophanes denies us knowledge. At this juncture, then, when formulating the essential limitations of mortal epistemology,

knowledge with Telemachus' ignorance). See further Soph. *Philoc.* 1338; *OT* 285–6, 390 (of the diviner himself); Eur. *Hipp.* 346; *TrGF* 5.483; Hdt. 7.228; playfully at Pl. *Phdr.* 242c3–6; *Rep.* 7.523a8 (cf. also *Phd.* 69d4–6; *Ti.* 72b7–c1). The rejection of divinatory knowledge-claims 'about gods' in Eur. *TrGF* 5.795 is especially reminiscent of B34 (θάκοις μαντικοῖς ἐνήμενοι | **σαφῶς** διόμνυσθ' **εἰδέναι** τὰ δαιμόνων … **θεῶν** ἐπίστασθαι **πέρι)**.

[78] As convincingly argued by Lesher (1983) 29–30; (1992) 158.

[79] Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή, *Il.* 1.5; cf. *Th.* 402–3; *Op.* 83; *h.Hom.* 4.10; *h.Hom.* 2.323.

[80] μαντεύσομαι . . . ὡς τελέεσθαι ὀΐω (*Od.* 1.200–2; *Od.* 15.172–3); τὰ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται (*Il.* 2.330; *Od.* 2.176; *Od.* 5.302; *Od.* 13.178; cf. *Il.* 14.48; *Od.* 18.271); cf. Zeus' portentous eagle (τελειότατον πετεηνῶν, *Il.* 8.247; *Il.* 24.315); note τετελεσμένον as divinely 'appointed', *h.Hom.* 4.572; cf. *Op.* 799.

[81] The most common formula (14 occurrences) is ἐρέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται (*vel sim.*), used especially for threats and promises, e.g. *Il.* 1.212; *Il.* 8.401; *Od.* 2.187; cf. *Il.* 9.310.

[82] As in the formula τελέσαι δέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, εἰ δύναμαι τελέσαι γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστίν, *Il.* 14.195–6; *Il.* 18.426–7; *Od.* 5.89–90.

Xenophanes is concerned in particular with mortal statements about non-everyday, non-pedestrian, *non-experienced* matters.[83] The phrase 'about gods' reflects this emphasis in itself. Furthermore, 'what I say about all things' is unlikely to signify *all* of Xenophanes' statements unqualifiedly, since, if 'all things' (πάντων) *includes* the gods, their separate mention becomes curious. The phrase thus more likely signifies cosmological universal generalisations[84] or, since 'all things' can refer to more than just cosmic processes (as we noted in Chapter 3.2), perhaps universal generalisations as such. Xenophanes' insistence that no mortal has 'seen' the clear and certain truth, and that even the one who possesses true belief does not himself know (αὐτός), suggests a concern with the unavailability of personal experience and cognition. Our inability to speak knowledgeably about such matters is related to our inability, in these cases, to consider directly and fully the objects of our statements or the entire body of evidence which bears on them.[85]

Mantic disclosure was a, if not *the*, culturally dominant paradigm of attaining knowledge concerning non-experienced matters[86] and, in particular, about matters involving the gods.[87] When he points out that even the hypothetical best-case-scenario of a true statement does not imply sure, personal knowledge, Xenophanes undermines what could seem the strongest case for

[83] Cf. Lesher (1991) 236; (2013) 85. Both Epiphanius and Sextus observe this emphasis: μάλιστα τῶν ἀφανέων (*Advers. Haeres*. 2.2.9 = *DG* 590); τό γε ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις (*M* 7.51). Alcmaeon DK24 B1 and the Hippocratic *On Ancient Medicine* (1) emphasise in terms that recall B34 our inability to have knowledge concerning non-evident things; see Sassi (2013) 297–8; Tor (2013*b*) 5, n.11.

[84] Gomperz (1906) 164; Barnes (1982) 139; Lesher (1992) 167–8; Mogyoródi (2006) 132–3; cf. B29 and (if authentic) B27.

[85] It does not follow that ἴδεν, εἰδώς and οὐκ οἶδε are expressions of knowledge restricted specifically to *perceptual* cognition, see further Tor (2013*a*) 262 n.53. Since τὸ σαφές expresses not an instance of truth but a generic concept of 'the truth', it is difficult to minimise the non-sensory connotations of ἴδεν, see Lesher (1983) 37; Yonezawa (1989) 433; cf. Classen (1989) 100. We need not determine whether the elliptical οἶδε refers back to τὸ σαφές (alongside ἴδεν and εἰδώς) or, less likely, introduces a second-order clause, because knowing the truth about *x* and knowing that one spoke or believes truly about *x* imply each other, as Hussey (1990) 18, n.21 observes.

[86] Interestingly, when Anytus claims to know what sort of people sophists are despite having no experience of them (ἄπειρος αὐτῶν), Socrates jokingly identifies mantic means as the only possible explanation, Pl. *Men*. 92c4–7.

[87] As in Eur. *TrGF* 5.795, n.77 above.

mantic knowledge-claims, namely divination's purported track record (cf. Plato, *Euth*. 3c (περὶ τῶν θείων); Cicero, *Div*. 1.13.23).[88] Xenophanes' criticism is further supported by the tension, inherent in the discourse of divination itself, between mantic knowledge-claims and the widespread recognition of the conjectural status of individual mantic statements (Chapter 3.1). Nonetheless, and despite Xenophanes' pointed adoption of mantic terminology in B34, here too poetic inspiration is likely also high on his agenda. Homer famously invokes Muses who *witnessed*, and are thus knowledgeable, to guide the narrative of the ignorant poet (*Il*. 2.485–6). Again, Hesiod's Muses facilitate his disquisition on seafaring precisely despite his own inexperience (*Op*. 660–2).

In B18, Xenophanes moves directly from rejecting traditional, optimistic and naive notions of disclosure (B18.1) to describing the actual epistemic predicament of mortals (B18.2). The two couplets constituting B34 display, I believe, the same structure. Xenophanes highlights matters external to mortal experience as those concerning which mortals lack knowledge, and employs mantic terminology for the objects of knowledge (*to saphes*) and true beliefs (*tetelesmenon*). These considerations (along with the parallel structure of B18) suggest that, in B34 too, Xenophanes progresses from denying a traditional and overly optimistic conception of disclosure (B34.1–2) to describing the actual predicament of mortals (B34.3–4). Xenophanes derives the essential epistemic limitations of mortals, their inability to attain knowledge concerning non-experienced matters, from his rejection of the notions of disclosure and mantic communication traditionally thought to facilitate such knowledge and to enable mortals to transcend such limitations.

The statement that no man will ever have knowledge about gods, etc. (B34.1–2) indicates a modal thesis regarding what is *possible* and *impossible* for mortals. Lesher (1983) himself recognises that

[88] Following Lesher (1983) 33. τὰ μάλιστα marks a hypothetical best-case-scenario whatever its syntax, see Lesher (1992) 158. τύχοι could suggest an element of chance (contra Yonezawa (1989) 433) but does not exclude volition pursued methodically (Fränkel (1974) 126). Cf. *h.Hom.* 4.566, describing a successful mantic consultation (αἴ κε τύχῃσι).

his interpretation of Xenophanes' scepticism leaves him with an apparently invalid inference: why should the argument that mortals cannot attain knowledge *through divine disclosure* merit the conclusion that they cannot attain it *simpliciter*? Lesher offers two explanations. First, diviners enjoyed the status of paradigm cases. Since the conditions of knowledge cannot be met in the most promising cases, they cannot be met. Second, though he denies divine disclosure categorically, Xenophanes retains the traditional premise that only through divine disclosure could mortals attain knowledge.[89] Xenophanes is, I think, unlikely to have continued to consider diviners the most promising candidates for knowledge after systematically exposing their divination as an empty illusion. Lesher's second explanation initially looks more promising. Here too, however, it is difficult to accept that Xenophanes uncritically and unreflectively took on the assumptions operative in divination concerning the conditions for the possibility of knowledge while disagreeing only about the possibility of fulfilling those conditions. Was Xenophanes unable to approach the question of knowledge except through a conceptual-theological framework of divine disclosure, which, according to Lesher, he himself repudiated categorically as fundamentally ill-conceived? These unpalatable ramifications stem from the oversimplifying assumption that Xenophanes discards disclosure altogether. Xenophanes, I submit, identifies what mortals can or cannot know through divine disclosure with what they can or cannot know *simpliciter* because he shares with those he criticises the fundamental premise that *the nature* of divine disclosure determines the manner in which, and certainty with which, mortals form propositions concerning non-experienced matters. Although he indeed arrives at his view of mortal limitations by rejecting traditional notions of disclosure, it is no accident that Xenophanes *positively* employs divinatory terminology (*to saphes, tetelesmenon*). The thrust of B34 is that, contrary to traditional theological beliefs, divine disclosure is not *such* as to make knowledge about non-experienced matters possible.

Disabused of the illusion that divine disclosure consists in the indirect intimation of everything from the beginning (B18.1), and

[89] Lesher (1983) 32–4.

is such as to bring sure and clear knowledge within mortal grasp (B34.1–2), we can now address the role of disclosure in the facilitation of mortal inquiry (B18.2) and the formation of conjectural beliefs (B34.3–4).

3.4 Divine Disclosure and Mortal Inquiry

In itself, B36 only speaks of a set of things which mortals experience: 'however many things they have disclosed [or: have appeared] for mortals to look upon'. In all likelihood, however, Xenophanes is interested in these objects of experience as objects which the gods disclosed *as evidence* and which mortals employed as such when forming beliefs and conjectures.[90] B18.1 rejects a misguided conception of disclosure and B18.2 advocates in its stead temporally protracted inquiries: 'but searching in time they discover better'. Since, then, Xenophanes advances in B36 his own conception of disclosure as a reversal of and an alternative to the one rejected in B18.1, his conception of disclosure most probably relates to the inquiries advocated in B18.2 and, therefore, to the way in which mortals form judgements and beliefs through such inquiries.[91] Xenophanes, furthermore, advances *some* notion of mortal-oriented divine action (*thnêtoisi pephênasin*, B36) to replace the one he rejects (*thnêtois' hypedeixan*, B18.1). The echo between the two phrases suggests that, in Xenophanean disclosure, the gods still in some sense act *purposively* towards mortals. Xenophanes' use of the final infinitive 'to look upon' (εἰσοράασθαι) corroborates this impression and goes some way towards sharpening the purpose in question. Standardly, such final infinitives, not only imply volition in the performance of the action signified by the finite verb, but also clarify the purpose for which that action was performed. Regularly, *x* does something to or for *y so that y* performs another action signified by the infinitive. Consider *Odyssey* 5.196–7: 'the nymph laid out before

[90] Scholars often see in B36 a connection between perception and judgement-formation, e.g. Eisenstadt (1974) 149; Lesher (1992) 178–9.

[91] Note, moreover, that φαίνω is a standard term for divine disclosure influencing mortal belief-formation; see the passages listed above, n.42.

him all kinds of nourishment to eat and drink (ἔσθειν καὶ πίνειν)'.[92] As the nymph lays out food before her guest *in order that* he will eat and drink it, so too in B36 the gods show things or (if we translate intransitively) things appear (through divine agency) for mortals *to look upon*, i.e. *in order that* they will look upon them.

The final infinitive 'to look upon' thus also supports further the impression that Xenophanean disclosure concerns belief-formation. Elsewhere in the extant fragments, we find Xenophanes employing verbs of perception to express the import of the perception in question for the formation, retention or revision of a belief or judgement: 'purple, red and greenish-yellow to behold' (ἰδέσθαι, B32), concerning the nature of the rainbow as cloud; 'the upper limit of the earth is seen (ὁρᾶται) here at our feet' (B28), concerning the finitude of the earth on this end; and, less literally, 'he would be more glorious to look upon (προσορᾶν) for his townsmen' (B2.6), concerning the perceived status of a victorious athlete. Retaining also the perceptual connotations of εἰσοράασθαι we may gloss B36 as 'however many perceptible things the gods disclosed for mortals *to consider*'.

As a thinker who is preoccupied with our inability to consider directly all the evidence which bears on matters which exceed our experience, Xenophanes is naturally concerned with the ways in which our repertoire of experiences, so to speak, influences our formation of beliefs. B38 instructively reflects this concern and offers independent evidence for divine influence on mortal perceptual experience and belief-formation:

> εἰ μὴ χλωρὸν ἔφυσε θεὸς μέλι, πολλὸν ἔφασκον
> γλύσσονα σῦκα πέλεσθαι.
>
> *If god had not made yellow honey, they would say*
> *That figs are much sweeter.*

Xenophanes' counter-factual thought-experiment shows that, if honey had not been part of the evidence available for us to consider, we would have judged differently concerning figs. In the first instance, B38 seems to caution that even some statements that

[92] Cf. e.g. *Il.* 5.775–7; *Th.* 218–19; see further Smyth (1972) noo.2008–11.

concern what we experience (say, 'honey is the sweetest food' or 'honey is very sweet'), and that appear to be grounded in a direct inspection of the entire relevant body of evidence and not to involve implications concerning what we cannot experience, do in fact involve such implications, and are therefore corrigible given the possibility of currently unknown counter-evidence.[93] Unless mortals can exclude the existence of unknown members of a class whose discovery would require a revision of current judgements concerning other members of that class (as, for example, the discovery of a substance sweeter than honey would require us to revise our current judgements concerning the relative sweetness of honey), those judgements can be asserted only conjecturally.[94] Many of our beliefs thus commit us to more than what is empirically guaranteed by our experience.[95] In this respect, B38 implies further, I think, an *a fortiori* argument: the same corrigibility would of course characterise statements about non-experienced matters, such as the statement that all growing things consist of earth and water (B29) on the basis of our observation of growing things within our experiential repertoire.

The central point for us is the following: to express a scenario in which yellow honey was never available to us as evidence, Xenophanes constructs a scenario in which *god* has never made yellow honey available to us as evidence. Xenophanes' point is that if god had not enabled *us* to taste honey, we would have formed different beliefs concerning figs and concerning sweetness: his contention is not that we might have judged differently had god not made honey in such times and places that we could not *taste* it even if he had made it. Some scholars suggest that we can ignore the theological language of B38 and that 'if god had not made yellow honey' is merely a conventional way of saying 'if honey had never existed'.[96] But they offer no parallels for this

[93] Some, not all: we can say with certainty that all the figs we have tasted thus far were less sweet than all the honey we have tasted. Still, B38 excludes the possibility that knowledge is secured for mortals concerning everything they perceive directly. Aëtius reports that Xenophanes traced the common but mistaken belief in the sun's circular orbit to misleading perceptual appearances (A41a); cf. Guthrie (1962) 397–8.

[94] Cf. Mogyoródi (2006) 139.

[95] Following McCoy (1989) 237; Mogyoródi (2006) 138.

[96] Guthrie (1962) 376; Granger (2013*a*) 266; (2013*b*) 172, n.13; Curd (2013*a*) 231, n.32.

purportedly conventional way of speaking. The assertion that god caused the growth (ἔφυσε) of honey seems, on the contrary, rather distinctive. At any rate, our discussions of other reflections in Xenophanes (B18, B36, B34) indicate that we should take the theological language of this fragment seriously. In B38, Xenophanes is not simply observing that judgements are constrained by the available evidence. The fragment reflects a broader point concerning the relation between the range of experiences with which the divine presents us and the beliefs and conjectures we form on the basis of those experiences. Had god not facilitated for any mortal the particular experiences he did, or had he facilitated different experiences in addition, that mortal's judgements might have turned out otherwise. B38 and B36 thus illuminate one another. B38 demonstrates the same preoccupation as B36 with divine facilitation of mortal perceptual experience, but, unlike the truncated B36, explicitly connects this facilitation with the formation of judgement. Again, taken in isolation, B38 shows only the influence of divine action on mortal perceptual experience and so belief-formation. B36 demonstrates that Xenophanes could conceive of this sort of divine influence as, in some sense, purposive (θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι).

Any attempt to determine more precisely what *kind* of volition the gods display towards us would be necessarily speculative. I would like to outline two possible alternatives. On the first alternative, which I tentatively favour, Xenophanes radically reconceptualises the notion of divine disclosure as the notion that the gods have purposively enabled us to perceive and consider *everything* that we perceive and consider (call this 'universal disclosure'). On the second, only *some* of the things that we experience and consider have been brought to our attention and disclosed for our consideration by the gods ('particular disclosures'). In other words, when Xenophanes speaks of 'however many things' (ὁππόσα) have been disclosed to us, is he referring to the *totality* (universal disclosure) or only to a subset (particular disclosures) of the perceptual experiences of mortals?

Let me first clarify what I mean by 'universal disclosure'. Since, as mortal agents, we are essentially limited both spatially and temporally, the range of things we can perceive and consider is

also necessarily limited. Furthermore, it is on the basis of this limited range of things that we form beliefs and conjectures about any matter, whether internal or external to our experience. According to universal disclosure, the divine determines the scope and content of the experiences included within the necessarily limited experiential repertoire of any mortal agent, intending (among whatever other purposes it has, of course) to facilitate the general discursive engagement of mortals with their surroundings and so their formation of beliefs on the basis of their experiences (πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι). B25 is pertinent here:

> ἀλλ᾽ ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει.
>
> *But without toil he shakes all things by the thought*[97] *of his mind*.

Xenophanes' specification that his supreme god possesses the psychic organs 'thought' (*phrên*) and 'mind' (*noos*), and exerts his cosmic influence *through* them, strongly indicates a notion of intelligent and purposeful cosmic governance.[98] The verb *noein* signifies the cognition of a situation, analogous in its non-inferential operation to sense-perception, as with Xenophanes' god at B24: 'Whole he sees, whole he cognises (*noei*), whole he hears.'[99] Already in our earliest sources, however, *noein* designates further a volitional reaction to the situation cognised, wherefore both the verbal and substantive forms came to signify the activity or product of planning and, from similar volitional reactions to similar situations, the disposition and character of the cognising and planning agent.[100] The ever-observant mind of

[97] Or: 'by the volition'.

[98] Cf. Drozdek (2004) 147–8; von Fritz (1974) 33–4; Warden (1971) 10; Lesher (1992) 104, 107–9. I cannot see how the issue is influenced either way by Xenophanes' image of cosmic 'shaking', from which some scholars infer that divine influence falls short of intelligent direction, e.g. Hussey (1990) 27, n.44; Granger (2013*a*) 257, 266–7. Attempts to emend κραδαίνει are arbitrary and unnecessary, see Palmer (1998) 10–11 with n.17; cf. Lesher (1992) 107. The precise relation between god's *phrên* and *noos* is unclear. φρενί is most plausibly an instrumental-locative dative, signifying the psychic organ with and in which god's mind operates; see Darcus (1978) 26; Tor (2013*a*) 267 n.66. We could conceivably relate νόου also back to πόνοιο ('without toil of mind'), but the juxtaposition of the two psychic terms would still strongly encourage us to take νόου together with φρενί as well. There is certainly no scope for divorcing somehow god's *phrên* from his *noos*. Both terms convey the same connotations of intelligence, will and purpose. In B24, οὖλος δὲ νοεῖ encapsulates god's unified mental life quite generally.

[99] Cf. *Il*. 3.396ff; *Od*. 16.160.

[100] Plan: *Il*. 4.308–9; *Od*. 2.122; disposition: *Il*.16.34–5; *Od*. 1.3; *Od*. 9.175–6.

Zeus (*Il.* 15.461) is frequently his will or plan.[101] In this respect, Zeus' superior mind not only comprehends but also moulds and fashions the pattern of events, sometimes directly affecting or determining mortal actions.[102] The *phrên* of Zeus can similarly signify his volition.[103] In a close parallel to B25, Aeschylus describes how god, remaining motionless (cf. B26), realises without toil his 'will' or 'purpose' (*phronêma, Supp.* 100–3). Most often, *phrên* is the location or instrument of cognition, emotion, deliberation and planning.[104]

Xenophanes posits a perfect correspondence between god's intelligent volition and its effortless realisation in states of affairs. Notably, Zeus' Olympus-shaking nod to Thetis in the *Iliad* (1.528–30), an oft-cited parallel to B25, indicates his considered adoption of a course of action, which will now progress to its inexorable conclusion.[105] As we saw, the fruition of divine plans is standardly expressed as their arrival at their *telos*.[106] In the light of B25, Xenophanes' talk of the object of true statements as 'what has been fulfilled' (*tetelesmenon*, B34.3) stems from a theological world-view that construes states-of-affairs as the fulfilment of divine volition. Our evidence belies Lesher's (1983) assimilation of Xenophanes' implicit view to the explicit Epicurean one, that celestial events take place without the ministration of an immortal being.[107] His statement (1992) that Xenophanes' cosmology banishes the traditional gods 'to the explanatory sidelines' is misleading.[108] Xenophanes forgoes entirely rather than sidelines the traditional, anthropomorphic gods, but *his* conception of divinity retains cosmological explanatory prominence. Nor can

[101] *Il.* 8.143; *Th.* 1002; *h.Hom.* 4.10.
[102] *Il.* 15.242; *Il.* 16.103; *Od.* 24.164; cf. Pind. *P* 5.122–3. For these features of *noos* and its cognates, and for further parallels, see von Fritz (1974) esp. 23–4, 33; Warden (1971) 3–9; Darcus (1978) 26; (1994) 107–8, 119ff; (1995) 37, 44ff.
[103] *Il.* 10.45–6; *Il.* 12.173; *Il.* 15.194; of agents other than Zeus: Soph. *Ant.* 993 (φρενός); *OC* 1182 (φρενί); cf. von Fritz (1974) 34.
[104] Zeus' deliberation and planning: *Il.* 2.3; *Il.* 16.435; of other agents: *Il.* 5.671, *Il.* 10.4, *Il.* 16.83; *Il.* 21.19; *Od.* 11.146, 204, 474; *h.Hom.* 4.66; *h.Hom.* 3.257. See further Darcus (1978) 26; (1994) 109–11; (1995) 39.
[105] Cf. Mogyoródi (2002) 283, n.140.
[106] Ch. 3.3. Note *Th.* 1002; *h.Hom.* 4.10 (μεγάλοιο Διὸς νόος ἐξετελεῖτο); *h.Hom.* 23.2; *h. Hom.* 2.323; Thgn. 142 (θεοὶ δὲ κατὰ σφέτερον πάντα τελοῦσι νόον).
[107] Lesher (1983) 28; cf. Barnes (1982) 96; Granger (2013*a*) 267.
[108] Lesher (1992) 137; also Classen (1989) 96.

I agree with Mogyoródi that Xenophanes maintains 'a categorical distinction between nature and the divine'.[109] First, god's dissimilarity cannot be categorical. For one thing, if god's physical dissimilarity (οὔτι δέμας θνητοῖσιν ὁμοίιος) meant that he *lacked* a physical body, by parity of reasoning he would also be left without a mind (οὐδὲ νόημα, B23.2).[110] Second, whatever the spatial relation between god and the natural world (if Xenophanes ever addressed this question), B38 guarantees that god facilitates directly even minute processes occurring in that world, while B25 indicates that such facilitation is exercised intelligently, purposively and universally.

God's 'growing' of honey (to render ἔφυσε, B38) is, then, one instance of the causal facilitation of such 'growing' in general. Furthermore, the class of things that 'become and grow' (ὅσα γίνοντ' ἠδὲ φύονται) consist of earth and water (B29), and we mortals too 'come into being from earth and water' (ἐκγενόμεσθα, B33). Thus, the continual emergence and preservation of particular mortal lives are also themselves part of god's intelligent cosmic governance of all things. In disclosing things for mortals to consider, the divine could display towards them the same sort of cosmic, intelligent volition which it displays in directing all natural processes, however large-scale or minute. Making possible and realising (i) the scope and content of any mortal's experiential repertoire, (ii) mortals themselves as perceptive and cognitive agents and (iii) the discursive engagement of mortals with the world around them (εἰσοράασθαι, B36) would thus be part of the divine's cosmic plan. On this interpretation, 'however many things' (ὁππόσα, B36) signifies the totality of mortal experiences. God's making of honey represents a genuine *instance* of disclosure, while mortal belief-formation and conjectural reasoning are indeed informed and constrained by the evidence which the divine resolved to disclose (B38). Xenophanes, on the universal interpretation, discards the mantic idea that a *subset* of our experiences was occasioned by the divine to encourage the formation of particular judgements. Rather, he counters, *everything* we see,

[109] Mogyoródi (2002) 264; (2006) 144–5, 150.
[110] Cleve (1965) 10; Broadie (1999) 211; cf. KRS (1983) 172; Lesher (1992) 94.

everything we experience has appeared to us (in part) for us to look upon and consider.

Importantly, it does *not* follow from this interpretation that the divine is especially concerned with mortals. B36 reflects rather that *Xenophanes* is especially concerned with this particular aspect of intelligent and purposeful divine actions, namely, the sense in which some of them purposively facilitate, among innumerable other things of course, mortal experience, perception and belief-formation (θνητοῖσι πεφήνασιν εἰσοράασθαι). By maintaining that the divine enables us to experience, and to engage with our experiences discursively, Xenophanes would of course not be suggesting that it runs the cosmos simply or especially so that mortals will have something to think about.[111]

Also pertinent here is Xenophanes' statement that 'belief is fashioned (τέτυκται) for all' (B34.4[b]). In Homer, the term 'fashioned' commonly signifies things fashioned for mortals by gods.[112] Indeed, it can indicate the lot of mortals (and also immortals) as determined by their place within a world order regulated by divine agency only through which things are (made to be) what they are. For example, Achilles must, *qua* mortal and as even Heracles did, accept his death whenever Zeus and the other immortals fulfil it (τελέσαι), if such a lot is 'fashioned' for him (τέτυκται, *Il.* 18.115–21).[113] 'From Zeus all things are fashioned' (Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται), an oft-cited Orphic slogan as old as the Derveni theogony, occurs in the context of hymns celebrating Zeus as the ruler and preserver of both cosmic events and specifically mortal existence.[114] Universal disclosure specifies a meaningful sense in which the divine indeed *fashions* opinion or opining (*dokos*) to all.

According to the alternative, 'particular disclosures' interpretation, when Xenophanes speaks of 'however many things' have

[111] I thank Patricia Curd for pressing me to clarify this point.

[112] As Lesher (1992) 159 observes.

[113] Cf. *Il.* 3.101; *h.Hom.* 5.29–32; *h.Hom.* 2.269; *Il.* 4.84 = *Il.* 19.224; *Il.*14.246; *Il.* 21.191; Hes. *Op.* 744–5, 752. Cf. the foundation of our world-order by Zeus, Poseidon and Hades: *h.Hom.* 2.86 (ἐτύχθη).

[114] *PDerv.* col.17.12 (cf. col.19.10); Pl. *Lg.* 4.715e8–716a1 with the scholiast; ps.-Ar. *Mu.* 401a25ff (ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων); Porph. *apud* Eus. *PE* 3.9.2 (μέγας ἀρχὸς ἁπάντων); for these passages, cf. Palmer (1998) 26–31 (not discussing B34.4). Classen (1989) 100 mentions the parallel.

been disclosed to us, he is referring only to a subset of our perceptual experiences. On this reading, the divine brings particular things to the consideration of some mortals (εἰσοράασθαι) in some circumstances. This will not mean that the gods communicate messages. Rather, they guide those mortals in their formation of inquisitive (ζητοῦντες, B18.2) beliefs, and perhaps also everyday ones.[115] Xenophanes could have been concerned to insist that, given the essential spatio-temporal limitations of mortals, even if *some* conjectures are based on such disclosures, they cannot support knowledge-claims (B34). We should not exclude offhand the possibility that Xenophanean deities could show such concern for individual mortals. Xenophanes asks us to *pray* for the capacity to act justly (B1.13–16), possibly signalling that the divine may aid those whose prayers it heeds to do so. His criticisms of imputations of moral transgressions to the gods (B11–12) could imply that such predications constitute category errors, but could equally suggest rather an insistence on the moral goodness of the gods for whom we should always have regard (B1.24) and to whom we should pray for the capacity to act justly.[116] The latter alternative is perhaps supported by Xenophanes' denunciations of some false theological views as *impious* and *unseemly*: it is not immediately intelligible why predications of attributes to categorically amoral and impersonal things should occasion this sense of religious offence.[117] Again, Xenophanes reportedly observed that an oath is not an equal challenge for pious and impious men, plausibly because the latter do not fear divine retribution.[118]

Nonetheless, Xenophanes emphasises the radical cognitive dissimilarity of the greatest god (B23) and questions in general

[115] God's making of honey in B38 would reflect a preoccupation with divine influence on mortal beliefs without necessarily constituting an *instance* of the disclosure spoken of in B36.

[116] Category mistake: Mogyoródi (2002) 273–4; Reiche (1971) 97–8. Moral goodness: Heidel (1943) 258; Barnes (1982) 93–4; Granger (2013*a*) 241.

[117] οὐδέ . . . ἐπιπρέπει (B26, with Lesher (1992) 112); ἀσεβοῦσιν (Ar. *Rhet*. 1399^{b}6–9 = A12); οὐ γὰρ ὅσιον (ps.-Plut. A32).

[118] Ar. *Rhet*. 1377^{a}19 = A14. See the analysis of this report in Lesher (1992) 201, n.15. Particular disclosures would still be embedded within a broader system of intelligent and purposive cosmic governance through which things are generated and preserved (as discussed above). Xenophon interestingly reflects on providence on both the particular and universal levels, *Mem*. 1.4.2–18; 4.3.11–13.

the beliefs that gods are like us in their nature, conduct and appearance (B10–16). One could reasonably insist that, Xenophanes' talk of prayers for a moral disposition notwithstanding, the cognitive dissimilarity of divinity should involve a lack of particular awareness of, or concern for, particular mortal affairs, and that the sort of god Xenophanes is comfortable postulating is consequently a more removed being than particular disclosures require. When he affirms that it is not proper for god 'to travel to different places at different times' (μετέρχεσθαι, B26), Xenophanes uses a verb of motion which connotes direct divine interference in particular mortal affairs.[119] Indeed, if Xenophanes held that gods disclose particular things to particular mortals in particular circumstances, it becomes more difficult to see what he found so objectionable about mantic communication in the first place.

Arguably, then, universal disclosure is the more probable interpretation of the notion of divine, mortal-oriented intentionality operative in Xenophanes' conception of divine disclosure.

Universal disclosure would, and particular disclosures could, influence the formation of mortal beliefs, not just concerning the natural world, but whenever a discursive engagement with observed experience plays a formative role. Xenophanes' critically digested experience of the fall of Colophon, for example, supports his contention that luxury is socially deleterious (B3). But this raises an interesting albeit irremediably speculative question: does Xenophanean disclosure influence the formation of beliefs about gods? Our evidence for Xenophanes' theological methodology is scarce. Some scholars ascribe to Xenophanes aprioristic theological reasoning and even deny that conjectures based on sense-experience play any part whatsoever.[120] Xenophanes comments that Ethiopians and Thracians fashion gods in their own divergent images (B16) and that, if horses, oxen or lions could draw, they would draw gods looking like horses, oxen or lions (B15). These

[119] E.g. *Il.* 5.456, 461.

[120] Barnes (1982) 82–99; Mogyoródi (2002) 265; (2006) 145–6. For theological reasoning in Xenophanes, cf. also McKirahan (1994) 61–2; Warren (2007) 46, 54; Granger (2013*a*) 235–6. Others suggest divine inspiration (Cleve (1965) 28–30) or mystic intuition (Jaeger (1947) 49; Nietzsche (1974) 120–1).

remarks arguably suggest suspicion towards naïve, uncritical derivations of beliefs about gods from our parochial experience of ourselves as other sentient beings. In B26, moreover, Xenophanes appears to draw inferences from some criterion of theological propriety: it is not 'proper' for god to travel (οὐδέ . . . ἐπιπρέπει). But we may wish to soften the assertion that theology proceeds without recourse to observed experience. First, positive cosmological propositions can constitute negative theological propositions. She whom they call Iris is in fact a cloud, 'purple, red and greenish-yellow to behold' (ἰδέσθαι, B32; cf. εἰσοράασθαι, B36; see also A38, A43).[121] Again, Xenophanes' use of an ethnographic insight concerning the divergent representations of the gods among the Ethiopians and Thracians (B16) shows that such empirical observations can inform his critique of anthropomorphism. Second, I see no Xenophanean reason to exclude the possibility that (purported) observed experience may positively influence our conjectures about unseen gods. For example, Xenophanes maintained that suns are generated and quenched anew each day (A33, A41). Such cosmic regularities can plausibly be taken to corroborate the belief that a divine intelligence directs those processes (B25).[122] Finally, since many of Xenophanes' theological propositions take the *via negativa* (emphasising what the gods are *not* like), the conceptual framework of his theology is intelligible only in reference to those attributes whose ascription to the gods he rejects. The gods, for example, do not wear clothing (B14) or commit adultery (B11–12). In this weak but important sense, observed experience is the basic condition of all discursive inquiry.[123]

[121] Broadie (1999) 209 argues similarly.

[122] Aristotle writes that Xenophanes formed the view that 'the One is the god' (or that 'the god is the One') 'having looked towards the whole heaven' (εἰς τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας, *Metaph*. A.5 $986^{b}21$–7 = A30). Although the view itself could hardly be Xenophanes', Aristotle may be reflecting the fact that empirical observation played a role in his theology. Palmer (1998) 5–7 persuasively argues that 'heaven' signifies here, not what Xenophanes referred to when he stated that 'the One is the god', but what he considered before arriving at that view. Cf. Aristotle *apud* S.E. *M* 9.22, tracing the belief in divine cosmic regulation to observations of well-ordered celestial motions; see also Cic. *ND* 2.37.

[123] Gábor Betegh suggests to me yet another possible interpretation of the logic of B18.1, which would also take Xenophanes to reject traditional notions of divine disclosure and to supplant them with his own alternative notion of disclosure, as I have reconstructed it

3.5 A52 Revisited: A Clean Sweep?

What can we say, then, about Xenophanes' engagements with culturally and theologically dominant models of divine disclosure? As we saw in Chapter 3.1:

(ii)[a] diviners form propositions concerning non-experienced states of affairs on the basis of experienced events or objects intentionally disclosed by a divinity for that purpose.

Diviners form fallible, conjectural beliefs by interpreting propositions that gods encode in a subset of the objects of mortal perception (omens, oracles). Not generally restricted to chosen individuals, mantic interpretation is open to any mortal informed of the fundamental semiotic or exegetical principles and capable of interpretative reasoning. Xenophanes rejected the view that the gods cryptically communicate any and every truth. He retained, however, the core principle that, by disclosing objects of experience to them, the divine purposefully enables mortals to reason out conjectures about states of affairs external to their experience, the world around them and their place within it. Xenophanes most probably reconceptualised disclosure as the purposive facilitation of mortal judgement through the facilitation of mortal experience as a whole ('universal disclosure'). If so, then divine disclosure

in Ch. 3.2–4. Perhaps with the prefix *hypo* in the exceptional and pointed term 'intimate' (*hypedeixan*) Xenophanes reflects his *own* notion of divine disclosure as opposed to traditional notions and not, as I argued in Ch. 3.2, *vice versa*. Might *hypedeixan* reflect the indirectness which arguably characterises divine disclosure on Xenophanes' own view? After all, for Xenophanes, as I reconstructed his position, the divine does not communicate truths to mortals, but, rather, purposively renders mortals able to form true beliefs about matters external to their experience by facilitating their discursive engagement with their surroundings. In B18.1, Xenophanes could be stipulating that not even in this indirect manner did the gods disclose to mortals *everything from the beginning*. This interpretation is equally and similarly non-identical with the 'minority' interpretation because it takes Xenophanes not simply to restrict the temporal and quantitative scope of divine disclosure but also to qualify the *manner* of disclosure (*hypedeixan*). Now, many of the observations in Ch. 3.2–4 concerning the language and rhetoric of B18.1, and concerning its apparent relation to other extant fragments and to certain prominent contemporary theological and epistemological attitudes, favour the particular analysis of the line's logic which I advanced above and according to which the term *hypedeixan*, in the context of B18.1, gestures towards traditional models of divine disclosure. This remains my preferred reading. But I can see nothing to exclude conclusively Betegh's ingenious alternative suggestion, which would amount to the same overall view of Xenophanes' epistemology and theology as the one I have defended in this chapter.

becomes the essential condition of all mortal belief-formation and inquiry. Less likely, the gods disclose to mortals a subset of the perceptual objects which they experience in order to guide the formation of particular beliefs in life and inquiry ('particular disclosures').

A case in point: on the basis of marine fossils found inland, Xenophanes conjectured that the earth was submerged in the distant past and will be again in the future (A32–3).[124] Herodotus shows that even here Xenophanes advances on what would fall naturally within the epistemic reach of mantic communication. Onomacritus, he writes, would have succeeded in falsely ascribing to the ancient Musaeus an oracle stating that the islands lying off Lemnos would disappear under the sea had he not been caught red-handed in the act of interpolation (7.6). Within the framework of his theology, Xenophanes' conjectures about the earth are in effect propositions about the content of divine volition, which will later be realised in states-of-affairs ('by the thought of his mind', B25; 'what has been fulfilled', B34). If in B36 Xenophanes was gesturing at the more familiar idea that the gods may guide certain mortal inquirers, then the discovery of marine fossils would be a prime candidate for an instance of such disclosure. More probably, however, it is in the sense that a purposive divine intelligence enabled and governed his existence as a perceptive and discursive agent, and determined the scope and content of his experiential repertoire, that Xenophanes would maintain that the fossils he observed, like the honey he tasted, were disclosed for his consideration by the gods.

Xenophanes does not endorse some modified form of the art of deciphering divine messages. Rather than messages, the gods disclose evidence. Xenophanes advances his conception of divine disclosure *against* the traditional one and we should not downplay the differences between the two. Although divination never marginalised mortal agency and reasoning, Xenophanes lays revolutionary emphasis on our role in expanding the available body of

[124] For a rigorous and sympathetic account of Xenophanes as a serious natural philosopher, see Mourelatos (2008*d*).

evidence by pursuing temporally protracted inquiries, rather than by decoding entrails or birds.

(ii)[b] Since mortals can attain knowledge or insight concerning these non-experienced states only on the basis of omens, expert and able diviners are taken to transcend the epistemic limitations of all other mortals and to approximate the epistemic state of the gods in particular and momentary respects.

Like his opponents, Xenophanes takes it that the nature of divine disclosure determines the epistemic potential of mortals. But, whereas divination and poetic inspiration enable those individuals who experience them to transcend the limitations of other mortals, Xenophanes most probably rendered disclosure the fundamental condition of all mortal discursive activity (universal disclosure). On any interpretation, Xenophanes recognises that like any man (ἀνήρ), past or future, divine disclosure does not place him in a position to claim knowledge (B34).[125] B35 appears to offer us an insight into Xenophanes' reflections on his own epistemic predicament:

ταῦτα δεδόξασθαι μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι . . .

Let these things be believed as like the truths . . .

Since Plutarch (*Mor.* 746b) cites the fragment when exhorting a bashful companion to state his opinions outright, adding that Ammonius habitually cited it to the same effect, 'these things' (ταῦτα) is best read as referring to views which Xenophanes himself endorses as instances of belief (*dokos*, B34.4).[126] The subject matter of these views is presumably coextensive with the range of things about which mortals are restricted to opining ('about gods etc', B34.2).[127] The crux lies in assessing the further sense in which Xenophanes qualifies his endorsement of his views with the loaded phrase 'as like the truths' (ἐοικότα τοῖς

[125] We certainly cannot take B34 to identify the limitations of every mortal, past *or* future (!), except Xenophanes, *pace* Snell (1953) 140–5; Cleve (1965) 27–30; Yonezawa (1989) 433; Wiesner (1997) 22; Drozdek (2004) 152; Gemelli Marciano (2002) 93–4. Xenophanes traces the epistemic limitations of mortals to their essential spatio-temporal limitations (Ch. 3.3). He indicates no exceptions to the principle that 'belief' is allotted *to all* (ἐπὶ πᾶσι, B34.4); see further Lesher (1992) 167; Mogyoródi (2006) 150, n.88.

[126] Cf. Bryan (2012) 16–17.

[127] Barnes (1982) 140; Lesher (1992) 175; Bryan (2012) 17.

ἐτύμοισι). Most persuasively, Bryan argues that Xenophanes is endorsing his beliefs as apparently similar to truths, where this apparent similarity could mean that his beliefs *are* true,[128] but qualifies his endorsement with the warning that this similarity could also be specious.[129] After all, Xenophanes allows that mortal beliefs can be completely true (B34.3). In B35, then, he should accommodate the possibility that his views are true. Excluding this possibility, and determining in advance that his views can only ever merely resemble the truth but fall short of it, would be to imply equally unwarranted conviction about their truth-value as making a knowledge-claim. But Xenophanes offers a *qualified* endorsement. His views are an instance of corrigible belief. It was precisely its qualified nature that rendered the phrase so appealing for Ammonius as an encouragement to one's bashful interlocutors to do all a mortal can, that is, to recommend one's speculative views forthrightly as fallible candidates for truth.

Side-by-side with this epistemological self-awareness, however, Xenophanes is not bashful about contrasting himself favourably with his peers. Xenophanes questions beliefs which mortals hold quite generally: 'but the mortals (οἱ βροτοί) believe that gods are born etc' (B14). The definite article creates the impression that this belief is held universally among mortals, excepting Xenophanes himself.[130] Xenophanes decries how 'all (πάντες) have learned according to Homer' (B10), again suggesting his unique exclusion from a universal consensus. Quite generally, the Xenophanes who emerges from our sources is one urgently aware of the preferability of his own views to the deeply and disastrously misguided authorities, beliefs and values of his contemporaries. In the surviving evidence alone, his invectives cover anthropomorphism, divination, knowledge-claims, poetic myths ('the fabrications of older generations', B1.22), the social veneration of athletes (B2), luxury (B3), stinginess (B21) and metempsychosis (B7); his targets include

[128] Cf. *Il.* 3.170: Agamemnon looks like a king (ἔοικε).

[129] Cf. *Il.* 3.219: Odysseus looks like a fool (ἐοικώς). See further Bryan (2012) 6–57. For the translation 'truths', see Bryan (2012) 25–6. We could, *mutatis mutandis*, interpret similarly the programmatic thrust of B35 while glossing ἐτύμοισι as 'realities'. On the term *etymos*, see Ch. 2.1.

[130] Yonezawa (1989) 435–6; cf. also Aikin (2016) 173–4.

mortals quite generally (B14; cf. B16 on Ethiopians, Thracians and (implicitly) Greeks), Homer and Hesiod (B11–12), Olympic victors (B2), Colophonians (B3), Simonides (B21), Pythagoras (B7) and Epimenides (A1).[131] Xenophanes is hardly coy about advertising his intellectual services and highlighting his subversive iconoclasm: 'Our wisdom is better than the strength of men and horses; but these customs are quite arbitrary; nor is it just to prefer strength to this good wisdom' (B2.11–14).

Xenophanes' sense of superiority most probably derives at least in part from his revolutionary recognition of the epistemological limitations all mortals share and from a lifetime of inquiry informed by this recognition. Disabused of theological fantasies and informed of the pitfalls haunting mortal belief-formation, Xenophanes developed his cosmological, theological and socio-moral world view through a lifetime of intellectual inquiry to which he himself bears witness: 'already there are seven and sixty years tossing about my thought throughout the land of Greece' (B8). The *Odyssey* features prominently the idea that learning and wisdom are expanded through wandering. This idea became a central methodological tenet among proponents of Ionian 'inquiry' (*historiê*).[132] Xenophanes' principle 'as they search in time they discover better' (B18.2) is instantiated most dramatically by his observations of marine fossils found inland, which support his novel conjectures about the earth's past and future submersions (A32–3) and, perhaps, the preferability of these conjectures to Anaximander's theory of the earth's desiccation (DK12 A27).[133] The critical expansion of our experiential repertoire may conclusively falsify a previously held belief (e.g. 'figs are the sweetest substance') or inconclusively justify the formation or retention of conjectures by assessing them against

[131] We should possibly include also Bacchanals (B17) and Thales (D.L. 9.18.11 = A1), cf. Yonezawa (1989) 434–5; Gemelli Marciano (2002) 90–6.

[132] Esp. *Od.* 1.1–4. Ionian inquiry: e.g. Hdt. 1.30 (. . . φιλοσοφέων γῆν πολλὴν); 4.76 (. . . γῆν πολλήν . . . σοφίην πολλήν); Hecataeus is styled 'a well-travelled man' (ἀνὴρ πολυπλανής, *BNJ* 1 T12a); cf. Democ. DK68 B299.6–8; B68; D.L. 1.43–4; see further Montiglio (2000) 88–90; (2005) 100–1, 123–46.

[133] For the contrast with Anaximander, cf. Mogyoródi (2006) 134, n.40; cf. KRS (1983) 177–8.

an ever-growing body of evidence.[134] Mortals who reason from divinely encoded messages which are not there, who acquiesce in delusions of poetic inspiration, or who form beliefs on the basis of their parochial experiential repertoire blithely and uncritically, are much more liable to go astray.

It is sometimes thought that, by saying that mortals discover better as they search in time, Xenophanes indicates (in part) an idea of gradual social and cultural progress. Lesher argues plausibly, though not conclusively, against this interpretation (he observes that Xenophanes is acutely aware of socially destructive practices, developments and authorities: B1–3; B10–12).[135] Be that as it may, Xenophanes does claim the skill *(sophiê)* to engender lawfulness (*eunomiê*) and economic prosperity in the city (B2), i.e. to effect socio-political improvement. This claim does not rest on one isolated branch of his teaching. Xenophanes' ethical reflections on Colophon's fall, for example, support his contention that luxury is socially deleterious (B3). In turn, his cosmological and theological world view exposes well-heeded authorities, from Homer and Hesiod to diviners and other self-styled religious experts, as charlatans who advocate often deleterious counsel backed by ill-conceived notions of divine disclosure. Xenophanes' critiques of poetic representations of divinities as creatures liable to stasis (B1.21–3) and lawlessness (B12) are one reflection of his encouragement of civic lawfulness.[136] Conceptions of the gods as human-like and, therefore, lawless are apt to engender lawlessness in the mortal sphere.[137] We are left with Xenophanes as a holistic reformer, who engenders civic lawfulness and prosperity by spreading a particular world view,

[134] Cf. Reiche (1971) 88; Darcus (1978) 39, n.58; Warren (2007) 53. Lesher's reading of ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον as a better *method* of discovering (i.e. Ionian *historiê*: Lesher (1991) 244–6; (1992) 153) highlights a likely connotation, but it is implausible to exclude a corresponding notion of improved *results*.

[135] Lesher (1991) 231–7; (1992) 151–2; cf. Schäfer (1996) 124–7.

[136] Note B1.23: 'in these [sc. narratives] there is nothing beneficial (χρηστόν)'. See further Lesher (1992) 61; cf. Bowra (1953*a*) 10–11. Aristotle reports that Xenophanes criticised (unidentified) poetic narratives as neither true nor beneficial, *Poet.* 1460^{b}10–11, 1460^{b}35–1461^{a}1 (οὔτε βέλτιον οὕτω λέγειν οὔτ' ἀληθῆ).

[137] See Warren (2013) on Xenophanes' attitude to the ethical consequences of pious and impious beliefs about gods; cf. also Broadie (1999) 209–10; Mogyoródi (2002) 277–8; Hedrick (2007) 286; Aikin (2014) 7.

which spans theology, epistemology, cosmology and socio-moral reflection, and which locates the mortal as a moral and discursive agent within a divinely governed and disclosed world order.

The diviner transcends mortal epistemic limitations. Xenophanes' self-conscious intellectual superiority favours the conclusion that, for him, the gulf between mortal belief and divine knowledge is qualitatively unbridgeable but quantitatively fluid. Our conjectural beliefs about the world around us and our place within it are forever corrigible. Still, continual empirical inquiry, informed by a recognition of the true nature of divine disclosure, allows mortals to evaluate increasingly grounded conjectures against an ever-growing body of evidence. God is epistemically superior to us at least in part because he cognises all things directly and synoptically (B25, B34; cf. B24). Mortal inquiries, then, bring us ever closer (but never close) to divine knowledge. In Xenophanes' own prosaic example, the more sweet substances we experience, the closer our conjectures approach a true judgement which is informed by the direct cognition of all sweet substances.

Philo carelessly assimilates Xenophanes to Parmenides and Empedocles as mortals who claimed to be 'divine men' (*diuini uiri*). Rather, says Philo, by devoting their lives to the contemplation of nature and pious praise of the gods, these three philosophers attained the height of mortal excellence, but nothing higher (*optimi quidem uiri*, A26). Philo, I conclude, prescribes for Xenophanes the very conception of his intellectual superiority that Xenophanes himself in fact developed. Philo's false ascription to Xenophanes of a claim for divine status brings us to one last feature of divination:

(iii) Such epistemic approximation to the divine is associated with a more general approximation to the divine.

Xenophanes' insistence on an irreducible dissimilarity between mortal and divine (B23) implies a categorical rejection of ideas of deification and god-like men, as exemplified in Teiresias' substantial survival in the afterlife or the seer Theoclymenus' family-tree (Chapter 3.1). In all four versions of a floating anecdote, Xenophanes urges people who consult him about a question of

cult practice to decide whether they believe that a liminal figure (Leucothea, Osiris) is mortal or divine, and to regulate their ritual accordingly: they should either mourn for or sacrifice to this figure, but not both (A13). Whatever the historicity of this tradition, it reflects something of the thinker with whom it became associated. Xenophanes rejects the malleability which characterises the boundary between mortal and divine in Greek religious thought.[138]

There is, I believe, some evidence that Xenophanes explicitly reacted to this phenomenon. Greek tradition accorded extraordinary longevity to Epimenides, an itinerant religious expert who, as a divine man, performed mantic services for cities.[139] Diogenes remarks that Xenophanes mentioned the rumour that Epimenides lived to be 154 years old (1.111 = B20). Elsewhere, Diogenes writes that Xenophanes criticised Epimenides, and then *immediately* proceeds to speak of Xenophanes' own, less fantastic longevity (καθάψασθαι δὲ καὶ Ἐπιμενίδου, μακροβιώτατός τε γέγονεν), citing the philosopher's own estimation of his age at 92 (9.18–19 = B8). The order of Diogenes' exposition suggests that Xenophanes' remark about Epimenides' reported longevity was incredulous, and, indeed, may indicate that Xenophanes presented his own careful estimation of his age ('if indeed I know how to speak truly concerning these things', B8.4) as a reaction against the hyperbolic traditions surrounding Epimenides. Empedocles speaks of a sage who can recall ten and twenty lifetimes (DK31 B129). Porphyry, citing the fragment, identifies the anonymous sage as Pythagoras (*VP* 30). Whether or not we accept this identification, it is plausible that Xenophanes' derision of Pythagorean metempsychosis (B7) reflects a critical reaction to the same conception of sagehood, which Empedocles later adopts and develops, and which associated wisdom with the ability to transcend the limits of a solitary, observed mortal life.[140]

[138] See also Broadie (1999) 211; Warren (2013): 310–11.

[139] For the label ἀνὴρ θεῖος, see Pl. *Lg.* 1.642d5. Epimenides' purifications (ps.-Ar. *Ath.* 1; Plut. *Sol.* 12; D.L. 1.110) fall squarely within traditional mantic expertise, see Flower (2008) 27; Dillery (2005) 181–2; Burkert (1992) 42–3. Epimenides is ascribed prognostications (D.L. 1.114–15), verse oracles (Paul *Ep.Tit.* 1.12) and the label 'chresmologue' (Σ Luc. 25.6.1 Rabe).

[140] Later tradition has Epimenides too recall his many incarnations (D.L. 1.114). On Empedocles, see Ch. 6.2.

Xenophanes had excellent epistemological reasons to retain the basic and ubiquitous association of sagehood with longevity, as exemplified most iconically by the old and wise Nestor and as reflected in the formula 'I was born earlier and I know more.'[141] Xenophanes' preoccupation with his longevity is reflected also in the ancient testimonia.[142] Unsurprisingly, then, Xenophanes (a) comments on his own advanced old age (B8), (b) reflects on the physical weakness of old men (B9, B1.17–18) and (c) criticises the conventional preference of physical strength to his wisdom (B2.14). Most importantly, Xenophanes embeds his representation of himself as an itinerant sage in a calculation of his longevity, setting the number at 92, with 67 years of active inquiry. Both the relatively sober number (in comparison, at any rate, with the tradition about Epimenides to which he may be reacting), and Xenophanes' careful qualification of his estimation ('if indeed I know how to speak truly concerning these things'), are not emphasised *despite* his claims for sagehood. Rather, Xenophanes illustrates the disillusioned nature of his sagehood – a sagehood to which he lays claim not least on the basis of his disillusioned rethinking of divine disclosure and mortal epistemology.

As Lloyd has argued, the emergence of the *polis* was accompanied by an explosion of diverse 'wise men' figures in the seventh and sixth centuries, answering a growing need for 'both what *we* should call political, and religious and intellectual, leadership'.[143] It is against this background that we should evaluate Xenophanes' conception and representation of his own sagehood. The elegy which contained his satirical derision of Pythagorean metempsychosis began with the words: 'Now I will come to yet another account, and I will show the way' (νῦν αὖτ' ἄλλον ἔπειμι λόγον, δείξω δὲ κέλευθον, Diogenes Laertius, 8.36 = B7). This magisterial and, indeed, divinatory programmatic statement may be parodying

[141] πρότερος γενόμην καὶ πλείονα οἶδα (*vel sim.*), *Il.* 21.440; *Il.* 13.355; *Il.* 19.219; also, *Il.* 3.108–10; cf. Haubold (2010) 16, n.18.

[142] In addition to Diogenes Laertius (9.18–19), Phalerum in his *On Old Age* and Panaetius both recorded a tradition that Xenophanes, like Anaxagoras, outlived his sons (*apud* D.L. 9.20.9). Ps.-Lucian, perhaps miscalculating B8, puts his death at 91 (A6), Censorinus at more than 100 (A7). Timon traces Xenophanes' failure to achieve full-fledged scepticism to his senility (πρεσβυγενὴς ἔτ' ἐών, A35).

[143] Lloyd (1979) 249; cf. Dillery (2005) 183.

the rhetoric of the thinkers and doctrines subsequently criticised.[144] But, however satirically, Xenophanes appropriates the authority of those claimants for sagehood whom he lampoons and with whom he must vie for the same social and intellectual territory.

The most familiar incarnation of divination for Xenophanes would undoubtedly have been those itinerant diviners, 'migrant charismatic specialists' as Burkert styles them, who travelled the Greek world from South Italy to Asia Minor.[145] Never simply relieving academic curiosity about the future, they invariably furnished counsel about any matter public and private.[146] Moving from city to city, providing an autonomous authority external to local civic institutions, they forever remained outsiders for the communities they counselled.[147] The influence of these practitioners, representing 'the intellectual elite of the time',[148] extended, as Plato later complained, from individual consultants to 'entire households and cities' (ὅλας οἰκίας καὶ πόλεις, *Lg*. 10.909b; *Rep*. 2.364e). As Dillery puts it, '[t]he independent religious expert … was always precisely that, independent … he seems always positioned outside the political structure of the state, essential to but also separate from the governance of the *polis*'.[149] Xenophanes spent a lifetime 'tossing about' his thoughts, counsels and authority (φροντίς) throughout Greece (B8). His journeys, he emphasises, take him 'from city to city' (B45) and his wisdom benefits the community of the *polis* as a whole (πόλις … πόλει … πόλιος, B2.19–22). Xenophanes was an itinerant sage counselling cities on anything from the use of perfume (B3) or wine (B5), to the nature of the gods and divine

[144] φράζεο δ' ἀνέρα μάντιν ὑφηγητῆρα κελεύθου, *Anth. Graec*. 14.114.7 Beckby; for diviners or the divine showing the 'way' see also *Od*. 10.538–9; *Od*. 4.389–90; PW 218.5; PW 374.9; Ennius *apud* Cic. *Div*. 1.58.132; cf. also *Op*. 648; Parm. DK28 B2. 1–2; *Anth. Graec*. 9.80 Beckby; PW 380.3; PW 517.2; *Od*. 5.237–41.

[145] Burkert (1992) 42; Flower (2008) 29–37.

[146] Halliday (1913) 42; Parker (2000) 77; Flower (2008) 75–6. Greek terminology for divination exemplifies its purported usefulness: χράω, χρῆσις, χρῆμα (Emp. DK31 B115.1), χρηστήριος, χρήστης κτλ. Cf. X. *Mem*. 4.3.12 (τὰ συμφέροντα … ᾗ ἂν ἄριστα γίγνοιτο); *h.Hom*. 3.287–93 (νημερτέα βουλήν … χρέων).

[147] Eumaeus includes the diviner (*mantis*) in a list of 'public workers' whom one would invite to one's house though a complete stranger, *Od*. 17.382–5; cf. *Od*. 1.415–16; *Od*. 9.508–10; Aesch. *Ch*. 32. See further Dillery (2005) esp. 176–8, 223; Vernant (1991*b*) 305.

[148] Burkert (1992) 42.

[149] Dillery (2005) 184, 224–5; Flower (2008) 58–9.

disclosure, attempting to engender prosperity and lawfulness (B2.19–22).[150] Less immediate factors too made a social and intellectual confrontation with divination and its models of sagehood inevitable. The various types of divination practised in Greece were rather recent Eastern importations.[151] Xenophanes was haunted by the fall of his Ionian city to 'the Mede' (B22), and associated it with the corrupting cultural influence of the East (B3 with Theopompus *apud* Athenaeus 12.526c). By appropriating and radically transforming the discourse of divination, Xenophanes instantiates a broad phenomenon in Greek interactions with Eastern paradigms, practices, crafts and ideas.[152] Furthermore, Greek tradition, consistently and as early as the sixth century, located the archetypal mantic contest between Mopsus and Teiresias at Xenophanes' native Colophon.[153] Indeed, local traditions considered Mopsus a founding figure.[154] We can only wonder whether and how Xenophanes treated these traditions in a poem about the founding of Colophon (Diogenes Laertius, 9.20 = A1). We may conclude, however, that the sociopolitical context of his philosophical activity all but constrained this subversive iconoclast to form his conception of mortal epistemology in general, and of his own sagehood in particular, in response to such divine men and their divination. Whatever else, Xenophanes' response was not a clean sweep from the very foundation.

[150] Engendering lawfulness (*eunomiê*): later Greek tradition has Delphic Apollo impart this skill to Lycurgus, PW 216.

[151] Burkert (1992) 41–87 (dating the 'orientalising period' to 750–650); Flower (2008) 24–5 (between the eighth and sixth centuries); cf. West (1997) 46–51.

[152] Burkert (1992) *passim*; R. Osborne (1997) 11–16.

[153] See ps.-Proclus' *argumentum* to the *Nostoi, Chr.* 277ff; cf. Hes. fr. 278 M-W (note Strabo: *de Colophone disserens*); Lycoph. 424–30 with Σ Lycoph. 424–7 Scheer (ἐρίζοντα περὶ τῆς μαντικῆς); Callisthenes (or Callinos) *apud* Strab. 14.4.3; Apollod. *Ep*. 6.2–4 (περὶ μαντικῆς ἤρισε); Σ Dion. Perieg. 850 Müller (μαντικῇ νικηθείς). The tradition and the evidence are discussed by Bremmer (2006) 140, with n.37.

[154] Paus. 7.3.2.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTERS ON PARMENIDES

Our evidence for Parmenides all derives from a single Hexametric poem. As we noted in Chapter 1.1, Parmenides' poem opened with a proem, which narrated the chariot ride of a youth – a *kouros* – towards a goddess, who acts as the sole speaker for the remainder of the poem. After welcoming the *kouros*, the goddess describes the programme of study to follow (DK28 B1.28^{b}-30):

> χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι 28
> ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
> ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 30
>
> *And it is right for you to learn all things*,
> *Both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality*,[1]
> *And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no real trust.*

These two aspects of the *kouros*' programme of study correspond to two rather distinct accounts that the goddess proceeds to issue, and to which scholars typically refer as the two parts of Parmenides' poem. In the first part, the goddess expounds the nature of 'what-is' (*to eon*). We learn that what-is is ungenerated, imperishable, changeless, motionless, unified and homogeneous. The goddess glosses the subject matter of this component of the *kouros*' programme of study as 'the unshaken heart of reality (*alêtheiês*)'. We will follow the practice of referring to this part of the poem as '*Alêtheia*' (B2-B8.51^{a}). After concluding her account of what-is as ungenerated, changeless, homogeneous, etc., the goddess – surprisingly – proceeds to develop a comprehensive and systematic cosmology, based on the two opposite principles 'Light' and 'Night'. Here the goddess expounded the origin and nature of the ordered world, of celestial bodies, of gods and humans. This second part of the poem corresponds to the 'beliefs (*doxas*) of mortals' in the *kouros*'

[1] Alternatively: 'trustworthy' or 'persuasive' reality (εὐπειθέος). Palmer (2009) 378–80 convincingly defends the reading εὐκυκλέος.

programme of study. We will follow the standard practice of referring to it as '*Doxa*' (B8.51^{b}-B19). By a 'Doxastic thing', I will refer to any item which is characterised by any of the attributes denied to what-is in B8, such as mobility or having-come-into-being, and which theories advanced in *Doxa* take as their subject matter (e.g. stars, people, embryos). Why this second part is there, and what its status is, are two of the central and most difficult questions with which Parmenides' poem confronts us.

In the first part of the poem, then, Parmenides aligns what-is with *alêtheiê*, and this term is understood as something like ultimate or fundamental reality. The goddess, as we saw, describes the subject matter of the first part as 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded *alêtheiê*' (B1.29). This gloss both foreshadows the alignment of what-is with *alêtheiê* and already indicates that Parmenides employs the term to signify, not so much a logical property of thought or speech ('truth'), but a core, ultimate or fundamental reality: what-is is the unshaken *heart* of reality (*alêtheiê)*. The goddess's words in B8.50–1 confirm both points:

> ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
> ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης.
>
> *Here I conclude for you the trustworthy account and understanding*
> *Concerning true reality.*

The goddess here uses *alêtheiê* to refer to the subject matter of her immediately preceding account and contemplation, i.e. to what-is and the properties deduced for it in B8. She does not use this terminology to qualify the account and contemplation themselves as 'true' (although we can allow, as secondary connotations of this terminology, 'truth' and 'what is true' insofar as these typify true accounts of the true nature of ultimate reality).[2] In another indication that he is aligning or even identifying what-is and *alêtheiê*, Parmenides later describes also what-is as 'unshaken' (ἀτρεμές, B8.4), just as he had earlier described the heart of *alêtheiê* (B1.29).

[2] Note further B1.30; B8.28 (πίστις ἀληθής: 'true conviction', i.e. *real* or *genuine* conviction); again, B8.17–18 ('for it is not a real (ἀληθής) way'). On the semantics of ἀληθείη and ἀληθής in Parmenides, I follow Palmer (2009) 89–93; Coxon (2009) 282–3; Cole (1983) 25–6.

Since Parmenides himself advertises that *Alêtheia* provides knowledge of 'the heart of reality', and given also the revolutionary nature and subsequent influence of the ontology of *Alêtheia*, it is unsurprising that commentators have in the past tended to privilege *Alêtheia* while marginalising the poem's other aspects. Much recent work on Parmenides, however, has sought to correct this traditional attitude and to insist on the centrality and significance of *Doxa* (Chapter 4.1). And indeed, we must recognise the limitations of the tendency to privilege *Alêtheia* at the expense of the poem's other aspects for one who wonders how Parmenides might have recommended his philosophy to his audience as *viable*. The Epicurean polemicist Colotes contended that Parmenides' ontology left no room for our own lives to take place. Although Plutarch rightly rebukes Colotes for ignoring Parmenides' scientific inquiries (Chapter 4.1), it is difficult to fault Colotes for complaining that Parmenides did not himself clarify just how *Alêtheia*'s account of true reality as homogeneous and unchanging coheres with the heterogeneous multiplicity which surrounds us and which we ourselves comprise (*apud* Plutarch, *Mor.* 1113–14). We must neither ignore *Alêtheia*'s ontology when considering other aspects of Parmenides' thought nor wholly subject them to it. We should neither marginalise *Doxa* nor suppress the fact that Parmenides' abiding preoccupation with Doxastic things – whose qualities are incompatible with those which are deduced for 'what-is' (*to eon*) or 'reality' (*alêtheiê*) – and with beliefs in which, in *some* sense, there is no 'real trust', is a problem which requires an explanation. Parmenides does not himself affirm, deny or explicate in an express or direct way the consistency between *Alêtheia*'s contention that what-is is homogeneous and unchanging and the presence of its human audience, which comprises differentiated, mortal beings. Even if *Alêtheia* does not, *pace* Colotes, exclude the presence of its audience, and even if Parmenides never thought otherwise, it seems plausible that the viability of Parmenides' philosophy *for* such a heterogeneous audience was significantly anchored, as the proem suggests, in the epistemic transformation promised for the mortal subject as related to an encounter with the divine, and not predominantly, let alone

exclusively, in the description itself of what-is as homogeneous and unchanging.[3]

The bias that philosophers before Socrates tended to ignore the philosophising subject informed the development of the very category 'pre-Socratic'. In 1996, Anthony Long argued that work on the early Greek philosophers 'has yet to take proper measure of their attention to philosophical methodology, second-order inquiry, mind, and the relation of the knower to the known'.[4] In particular, Long highlights three features of Peripatetic doxography which still exert a strong influence over modern scholarship: 1. the suppression of statements about the divine; 2. the assimilation of thinking or mind to sense-perception (*aisthêsis*); 3. the assumption that early Greek philosophers marginalised second-order, methodological questions and construed their project as describing a world external to themselves which did not include the observer in the materials investigated.[5] We still have a way to go in redressing the blind spots which Long had diagnosed. The following study of Parmenides will address throughout all three points. It will prove important, however, to maintain a clear distinction between different (though not, of course, unrelated) lines of inquiry and interpretation. When we explore below the epistemological and religious aspects of Parmenides' poem, and attempt to shed some new light through this investigation on the poem's structure and appeal, we will not expect *thereby* to have disposed of the ontological paradox rightly highlighted by Colotes.

In a way, the question 'how can mortals cognise what-is?' is both inherently paradoxical (at least *prima facie*) and textually justified. As we shall see, the account in *Alêtheia* relies on the distinction – or '*krisis*' – between 'is' and 'is not'. It is through a very different kind of *krisis* that the account in *Doxa* is structured, one between Light and Night as two opposite elements. *Alêtheia*'s concept of what-is

[3] In regarding Parmenides' text as performative and transformative I agree with Kingsley (1999) e.g. 122, 144, 163; Gemelli Marciano (2008) and (2013); Robbiano (2006), and Ranzato (2015); cf. Long (1999) 13; contrast Laks (2003) 29 ('une connaissance purement théorique'). Cf. more generally Hadot (1995) 64: 'the work [of the ancient philosopher] . . . is written not so much to inform the reader of a doctrinal content but to form him.'

[4] Long (1996) 127–8; followed by Robbiano (2006) 17–18; cf. Curd (1998) 35.

[5] Long (1996) 128–9.

cannot be conveyed through the contrast that underpins *Doxa*. The contrast between Light and Night, each of which both is (itself) and is not (its counterpart), may account for stars and embryos, but precisely cannot account for the homogeneous what-is, which strictly *is* and in no way *is not*. Equally, *Alêtheia*'s structuring contrast cannot express items like 'mortals'. *Alêtheia*, by privileging exclusively the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not' as the contrast that should inform our understanding of ultimate reality (B8.15–16[a]), while retaining 'is' and discarding 'is not', points us towards a demarcation that can convey only the homogeneous, unchanging and immobile what-is. Mortals are generated, perishable, mobile and heterogeneous: they are, essentially, Doxastic things. The question 'how can mortals cognise what-is?' thus straddles the conceptual frameworks that underpin the two parts of the poem. It is itself inexpressible both in terms of the structuring contrast of *Alêtheia* (which could not by itself articulate the idea of 'mortals') and within that of *Doxa* (which could not articulate 'what-is').

At the same time, it is a question that Parmenides himself raises. The programmatic description of the ensuing poem with which we started (B1.28[b]-30) takes the form of a conversation between a goddess and, emphatically, a mortal. We could not articulate the notion of a mortal, or the distinction between mortals and a goddess, in terms of *Alêtheia*'s structuring contrast between 'is' and 'is not'. But Parmenides' narrative framework makes it very clear that Doxastic opinions are specifically those of mortals (βροτῶν δόξας, B1.30). The goddess, conversely, possesses knowledge of *Alêtheia*. And yet, the *mortal* agent, to whom the goddess speaks, must also attain this knowledge (B1.29). In a sense, Parmenides could hardly avoid asking how a mortal could cognise what-is. He could not have formulated his second-order, programmatic reflections from *within* the conceptual framework of *Alêtheia*'s contrast between 'is' and 'is not'. Within this conceptual framework, which is capable only of articulating the homogeneous what-is and (perhaps) its self-knowledge, we can no longer discuss the efforts of mortal agents, like Parmenides and ourselves, to come to know this thing.[6]

[6] The echoes (if not perfect continuities) in imagery between *Doxa* and the proem, convincingly analysed by Laks (2003), underscore further that the introductory encounter

Unless we maintain either that there is not even a *prima facie* tension between *Alêtheia*'s account of ultimate reality and the manifest presence of Doxastic things or that Doxastic things can be coherently explained away as 'illusions' (I will reject both of those positions), we must recognise that *Alêtheia*'s ontology does confront us with a puzzle concerning the precise ontological status of Doxastic things. This does not mean, however, that any inquiry into any aspect of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem will have to begin from this puzzle, frame its interpretation around it or rely on any one particular resolution of it.

We may distinguish three different questions concerning the two parts of Parmenides' poem. First, an 'aetiological question': *Why* did Parmenides write and include *Doxa*? Why is the second part there? Second, an 'epistemological question': what are the ways in which the mortal agent, to whom the goddess speaks, *can* think and what are the ways in which he *must* think? To clarify, *Alêtheia* and *Doxa* discuss different kinds of objects, what-is and Doxastic things (humans, stars, etc.) respectively. Since Parmenides included both parts, he must consider thoughts about both kinds of objects ultimately possible for the mortal agent. But is thought concerning any kind of object unavoidably necessary for the mortal? Does the mortal's ability to cognise a different kind of object then become a problem which requires an explanation? Third, an 'ontological question': given the doctrine of *Alêtheia*, what precisely is the status of Doxastic things? What is the nature of the relation between what-is and Doxastic things?

Those commentators who address the aetiological question generally consider one's view on it a consequence of one's view on the ontological question (Chapter 4.1). In the following chapters, we will explore a different route with a different focus, addressing first and foremost the aetiological and epistemological questions in relation to one another. We will consider as interrelated matters Parmenides' impetus and rationale for developing and including

between the goddess and the *kouros* takes place without the framework of *Alêtheia*. In particular, by locating the journey where the recurrent succession of Day and Night is regulated (B1.11–14), Parmenides recalls the dualist, cosmological conception of Light and Night as the two equal constitutive elements (B9.3–4). See Laks (2003) 17–18; cf. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 13, 40; Coxon (2009) 15.

Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to the investigations in *Doxa* and to those in *Alêtheia*, and the role of the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. In this way, we will pursue a complementary but different perspective on the problem of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem.[7] This is not to suggest, of course, that considerations of *Alêtheia*'s account of what-is – or 'the heart of reality' – should or could be ignored when pursuing either the epistemological or the aetiological questions. My suggestion will be, rather, that we can usefully elucidate and investigate those questions in relation to one another, while postponing a focused discussion of what I labelled the 'ontological question' until a later stage in the argument, and while insisting only on certain limited but important points in relation to this latter question and otherwise retaining a, to some degree, open-ended and flexible attitude towards it.

In Chapter 4, we will see that, according to Parmenides, the type of thinking which underpins *Doxa* is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect of mortal life. This conclusion will best position us to answer the aetiological question and explain why Parmenides wrote and included *Doxa*. In Chapter 5, however, we will find that the mortal agent is nonetheless capable of sustaining the qualitatively different thinking of *Alêtheia* by momentarily coming to think with – or as – his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul.[8]

[7] I will disagree, then, with the view of Bryan (2012) 100–4 that Parmenides' epistemology is object-centred and not subject-centred. On my account, preoccupations with both the subjects and the objects of knowledge and belief play important roles in his epistemology.

[8] My conclusions in Ch. 5 concerning the conception and function of soul in Parmenides run counter to the claim, which one sometimes encounters (e.g. Sassi (2016) 453), that notions of the soul as the principle not only of life but also of knowledge and understanding were only finally formed in the second half of the fifth century. In fact, however, we do not need Parmenides to establish this historical point. His rough contemporary Heraclitus describes the ideal soul as 'wisest' (DK22 B118; see further Schofield (1991); Betegh (2007); (2009), and cf. Sassi herself (2016) 453, n.5). Indeed, this idea did not emerge *ex nihilo*. The conception of soul as the locus of emotional and cognitive as well as vital functions is arguably suggested by the still earlier Pythagorean notion that the soul preserves across successive incarnations a person's essential identity (ψυχή, Xenoph. DK21 B7), and, in some special cases, their memories (Emped. DK31 B129, with Burkert (1972) 138–9 for further sources). In fact, the idea that, after death, the soul (ψυχή) retains some consciousness, memories and even an awareness of events in the world of the living is evident already in Homer (Homeric assertions about the mindless and powerless dead notwithstanding), e.g. *Il.* 23.64–107 (cf. *Il.* 24.592–5); *Od.* 11. 543–64, with Edmonds (2013) 252–67.

This will explain how Parmenides was also able to sustain the non-mortal, divine thought, which underpins *Alêtheia*, and to come to understand what-is. In Chapter 5.5, we will return, in the light of those foregoing discussions, to the 'ontological question'.

It is Parmenides' goddess who, through her disclosure and guidance, enables the mortal *kouros* to come to think with or as his divine soul, and to sustain a higher-than-human, divine thought. In 1945, Louis Gernet offered an important insight, which has often been obscured in later scholarship: a broad spectrum extends between taking Parmenides to offer the 'literal' report of an actual chariot ride to a goddess and reducing his account to 'mere imagery', divested of any reference to an encounter with the divine.[9] What follows will aim to elucidate the sense in which Parmenides' postulation of an epistemically significant interaction[10] with a divine power (but not thereby an actual chariot ride) is integral to his understanding of his acquisition of knowledge and required by his epistemology. On the interpretation defended below, argumentative reasoning and divine disclosure play complementary and equally indispensable roles in Parmenides' thought.[11]

[9] Gernet (1981; orig. 1945) 354.
[10] For this terminology, see the introduction to this book.
[11] Esp. Ch. 5.4. On the primary scholarly responses to Parmenides' goddess, see Ch. 1.1.

4

WHY DID PARMENIDES WRITE *DOXA*?

4.1 Approaches to the Aetiological Question

Those who addressed the aetiological question (why is *Doxa* there?) have generally considered one's view of it a consequence of one's position on the ontological question (what is the status of Doxastic things?). In the past, scholars tended to relegate Doxastic things to the status of mere appearances or illusions and, consequently, typically minimised the significance of Parmenides' cosmology, most often reducing *Doxa* to a dialectical exercise. Owen (1960), for example, had influentially explained *Doxa* as a 'wholly dialectical' device, which aimed only to analyse and caution against the flawed presuppositions of all cosmological theories.[1] *Doxa* thus became merely an 'exemplar . . . of all erroneous systems'[2] or 'a case-study in self-deception, indecisiveness and confusion'.[3] Many commentators maintain that the goddess develops and exposes as false the best or most plausible cosmology in order to equip Parmenides with an exemplar against which all other cosmologies are, *a fortiori*, flawed. *Doxa* thus inoculates Parmenides against the temptations of cosmology as such.[4]

On the assumption, which I share, that the goddess represents *Doxa* as the best possible account of Doxastic things, she indeed implies that even the best cosmology could never constitute an

[1] Owen (1960) 89; cf. Tarán (1965) 227–8, 267; Furth (1974) 249; Cosgrove (2014) 15–18, 25–6.

[2] Long (1975) 83.

[3] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 260, reflecting his views in 1970. Mourelatos (2008*a*) xxxvii–xlii criticises his *Route* (1970) for being 'too dismissive of the scientific content' of *Doxa*.

[4] Long (1975) 83, 96–7; de Rijk (1983) 46–7; Gallop (1984) 23, Barnes (1982) 157; Inwood (2001) 25; Trépanier (2004) 131–7; Warren (2007) 100–1; Miller (2011) 56; Bryan (2012) 110–13; Wedin (2014) 63, n.89. Gregory (2014) speculates that the dialectical and inoculative (23, 26, 45) point of *Doxa* is rather that there can be no sufficient reason to prefer one complete cosmology over another.

account of the unshaken heart of ultimate reality. Nonetheless, the scope and nature of Parmenides' cosmological investigations undermine these dialectical responses to the aetiological question. The goddess had concluded in *Alêtheia* her critical demonstrations that processes like coming-to-be and change do not typify what-is. Both direct and indirect evidence indicates that what followed in *Doxa* was an extended and detailed exposition, thoroughly positive in tone, of diverse scientific theories, spanning, among other things, universal cosmology (DK28 B9, B12; A37), cosmogony (B10–11), astronomy (B10–11; B14–15; A40a), geography (A44a; B15a), theogony (B13), anthropogony (Diogenes Laertius, 9.22, A53), embryology (B18; A53–4) and human physiology and cognition (A46 = B16, A46a-b, A52). Parmenides' very general description of the subject matter of *Doxa* as 'the beliefs of mortals' (B1.30, B8.51) bespeaks the broad scope of the cosmology. Indeed, the goddess's programme of study for the youth encompasses 'all things' (B1.28^{b}). An indication of purported exhaustiveness also seems implicit in her promise to Parmenides that she will issue to him such an account of the ordering of things (*diakosmos*) that, henceforth, *no* judgement of mortals will ever surpass him (B8.60–1). The conclusion to *Doxa* (B19, quoted in Chapter 4.4) may give the impression that the cosmology has now (directly or indirectly) accounted for all that humans have marked out with a name and which involves the perceptible processes of becoming, persisting for a time and then perishing.[5] Plutarch instructively rebukes Colotes for implausibly marginalising the sheer scope of Parmenides' scientific inquiries and the thoroughness with which he pursued them (*Mor.* 1114b-c):

> *For he* [sc. Parmenides] *also said many things about the earth and about the heavens and about the sun and about the moon and about the stars, and he related the generation of humans; and, as an ancient man working in natural philosophy and putting together his own treatise rather than plundering another's, he left nothing unspoken of all the principle topics* (οὐδὲν ἄρρητον . . . τῶν κυρίων παρῆκεν).

[5] Coxon (2009) 387 takes τάδε (B19.1) to refer to all natural substances (except the two basic elements) but adds that ἔφυ and τραφέντα (B19.1–2) suggest a primary concern with living things. This may be right, at least of this concluding juncture in *Doxa*, although Parmenides uses ἔφυ also of the heavens (B10.5–6).

Recent work on Parmenides has, moreover, given us a better appreciation of the involved, sophisticated, innovative and insightful nature of his scientific inquiries, most notably (but not only) his astronomy.[6] It strains credulity to suppose that, in developing such systematic, ambitious and specific cosmological accounts, Parmenides' sole or even primary motivation was simply to construct 'an exemplar of all erroneous systems' or merely to exemplify an entirely general metaphysical confusion.[7] Nor is it clear what the dialectical or inoculative benefit consists in. In *Doxa*, the goddess presented particular, concrete theories concerning, say, the source of the moon's light (B14–15; A42) or the embryological processes by which children become similar to one parent or the other (A54). By elaborating these theories, and adding thereby nothing to *Alêtheia*'s remarks about such processes as motion and coming-to-be, the goddess perhaps deters Parmenides from rival astronomical and embryological accounts, but she does not *thereby* inoculate him against astronomical and embryological accounts as such, nor, again, does she *thereby* display an entirely general critique of cosmology as such.[8]

Other commentators have sought to identify a more strictly 'pragmatic' motivation for *Doxa*, seeing the cosmology as an attempt to produce a somehow 'useful' account of our heterogeneous surroundings. It has been suggested that Parmenides' motivation for devising *Doxa*'s theories is of the same sort as the motivation for designing a chariot axle that did not screech or for growing superior olives.[9] The pragmatic interpretation is,

[6] Graham (2006) 179–82; (2013*a*) 85–108; Mourelatos (2011); Cerri (2011); Casertano (2011) 21–49; Journée (2012); Mansfeld (2015); cf. Kraus (2013) 489–96. Kurfess (2016) 31–7 underplays both the strength and the diversity of our evidence for a wide-ranging cosmological ambition on Parmenides' part. That readers like Colotes could still interpret Parmenides as denying wholesale the world of change and differentiation, and criticise him for doing so, is hardly surprising in the light of his rejection of such things with respect to 'what-is' in *Alêtheia* and of his own pejorative remarks (discussed anon) about *Doxa*.

[7] For the observation that *Doxa*'s scope itself renders dialectical readings implausible, cf. Clark (1969) 24; Nehamas (2002) 57, n.46. Although Curd (1998) makes this point (12–13), she is vulnerable to her own objection. While she identifies the error of *Doxa* as its initial postulation of enantiomorphic opposites (110), she denies that Parmenides thought such an error necessary for cosmology (6, 100). Why, then, did Parmenides not produce a cosmology free of this error? Cf. Nehamas (2002) 61.

[8] Contra Cosgrove (2014) 17–18, 21.

[9] Cosgrove (2014) 20–1, 25–6: *Doxa*'s theories are 'worth their pragmatic value or utility to mortals, but . . . that is all'. For Cosgrove, *Doxa*'s accounts have no cosmological, scientific or philosophical status whatsoever.

however, implausible on this narrow construal of utility. *Doxa* is hardly limited to resolving or addressing everyday or concrete difficulties. Parmenides was evidently motivated to develop in *Doxa* numerous and various speculative theories, without feeling the need to specify the pragmatic value of those theories or to identify practical applications for them, even when it is far from clear that there could be any such practical applications or what they might be. In B10, moreover, the goddess herself presents *Doxa*'s astronomy as the pursuit of a kind of *knowledge*:

εἴσῃ δ' αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ' ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα 1
σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο
λαμπάδος ἔργ' ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,
ἔργα τε κύκλωπος **πεύσῃ** περίφοιτα σελήνης
καὶ φύσιν, **εἰδήσεις** δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα 5
ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ' ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη
πείρατ' ἔχειν ἄστρων. 7

You shall know *the nature of aether and all the signs in the aether*
And, of the pure torch of the shining sun,
Its unseen[10] *works and whence they came to be,*
And ***you shall find out about*** *the wandering works of the round-eyed moon*
And her nature, and ***you shall know*** *also the surrounding heaven*
Whence it grew and how Necessity led it and fettered it in shackles
To hold the limits of the stars.[11]

On a broader understanding of utility, however, the pragmatic interpretation would be in itself insufficient and incomplete. If it is not just a matter of utility narrowly construed, then *why* should we desire or benefit from even the best possible version of a type of inquiry which Parmenides frames in unmistakably pejorative terms as, in *some* sense, without 'real trust' (B1.30) and 'deceptive' (B8.52)? *Why* are we not better off simply abandoning *Doxa*'s cosmological speculations about the origin and nature of the heterogeneous surroundings in which our mortal lives take place for ontological contemplation of the nature of what-is, even after and in the light of *Alêtheia*?[12] Biographical explanations,

[10] Or: 'unseen-making', with Mourelatos (2011) 170–4.
[11] Contrast Cosgrove (2014) 20–1, 24: *Doxa* is not a cognitive enterprise.
[12] For another expression of the pragmatic approach, see Minar (1949) 44, 49–50, 55; cf. similar suggestions in Inwood (2001) 25, n.50; Coxon (2009) 352; Hussey (1990) 30; Robbiano (2006) 210; also Detienne (1996) 133.

such as Nietzsche's ascription of *Alêtheia* and *Doxa* to different stages in Parmenides' life, are fanciful and fail to explain the inclusion of both parts in the 'final edition' (B1.28^{b}-30).[13]

Doxa has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years. There is a growing interest in the substance of *Doxa*'s theories and a greater awareness of the important position that Parmenides' cosmology occupied in his poem. An increasingly dominant view maintains that *Doxa*'s theories represent Parmenides' *own views* of Doxastic things and are intended to describe such things correctly.[14] I will follow and defend this position below (in particular, Chapter 4.4). It would be a fundamental mistake, however, to assume that, once we take it that Parmenides allows that *Doxa* accounts correctly for Doxastic things, or once we respond to the ontological question with our particular preferred way of explicating the precise status of Doxastic things and the manner in which they relate to what-is, then the need to explain why *Doxa* is there in the first place vanishes. Crucially, a resolution to the ontological question will not of itself constitute a resolution to the aetiological question. The reason for this is that Parmenides himself emphatically frames *Doxa* in a pejorative way. Even as the goddess decrees that Parmenides must also learn the beliefs of mortals (βροτῶν δόξας), she indicates that – in *some* sense – those beliefs lack 'real trust' (πίστις ἀληθής, B1.30). When the goddess introduces her cosmology, she indicates that – in *some* sense – her account, or the 'order' of her words, is 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν, B8.51^{b}-2). Furthermore, Parmenides, we noted, aligns what-is, as the subject matter of the first part of the poem, with the 'unshaken heart of well-rounded reality' (*alêtheiê*).

[13] Nietzsche (1974) 114–15; for a similar criticism, see Cosgrove (2014) 10–11. Mackenzie (1982) argues that the two parts *jointly* form a dialectical dilemma: *Alêtheia* preserves reason but rules out the existence of reasoners, whereas *Doxa* preserves them but irrationally (7–9). It is difficult to square this view of Parmenides as a self-consciously 'working philosopher' (9) with the clear axiological asymmetry between the two parts and with Parmenides' conclusive dogmatism (πάντα, B1.28). Furthermore, if Parmenides is aware that he is both premising and refuting the existence of multiple reasoners in *Alêtheia* (1–3, 8), should he still consider its argumentation rationally sound?

[14] See (with reflections on recent developments) Palmer (2009) 162; Bredlow (2011) 221–2; Mansfeld (2015). Nearly every contribution in Cordero (2011*a*) adopts this position. For some earlier expressions of it, see Nehamas (2002) 56–60; Coxon (2009) 342; Cornford (1933) 97–8, 110–11. See further Kraus (2013) 481–2 for a survey of modern attitudes towards *Doxa*.

Now, it is by no means obvious what the deceptiveness of the goddess's account amounts to. Significantly, she never describes the account as false. As we shall see in Chapter 4.4, *Doxa*'s theories are not deceptive in the particular ways in which they account for the origins, natures and behaviours of their particular objects of inquiry (e.g. in the way in which *Doxa*'s embryology explains embryos). Indeed, we already saw how, in an important set of programmatic remarks, the goddess promises the *kouros* knowledge of celestial bodies and processes (B10). *Doxa*'s deceptiveness, I will argue, relates rather to the way in which the ignorant mortals, who are not privy to the account of what-is in *Alêtheia*, are prone to mistake the cosmology for an account that gets at and discloses, not merely the natures of Doxastic things and processes, but the nature of ultimate reality. The *kouros*, who learns *Doxa* after and in the light of *Alêtheia*, is therefore in a privileged position to recognise *Doxa*'s deceptiveness and to avoid this mistake.

In sum, then, even though Parmenides never pronounces *Doxa*'s theories false *of Doxastic things*, he nonetheless emphatically relegates *Doxa*'s investigations to a decidedly inferior status. *Doxa*'s theories precisely do not and could not capture what-is: 'the unshaken heart of reality', the core, ultimate and fundamental nature of reality, to which the first part of the poem is devoted. They lack 'real trust'. Our text itself, then, pointedly raises the aetiological question. If knowledge of the unshaken heart of reality is available to Parmenides, then why is it right for him and incumbent upon him (χρεὼ δέ σε, B1.28) to learn also these pejoratively framed mortal beliefs (B1.29–30)? Even if *Doxa* is the best possible account of Doxastic things, why should Parmenides pursue all these systematic and painstaking investigations into the nature of Doxastic things – investigations which *he himself* so emphatically frames as inferior – after attaining the knowledge of the heart of reality in *Alêtheia*? As Sedley writes, 'Why join in the game?'[15]

[15] Sedley (1999*a*) 123. Even if, then, we read ὡς at B8.61 as final rather than causal, this will hardly resolve the aetiological question, since we would still ask ourselves why Parmenides should wish to join this mortal race in the first place; see further Ch. 4.5. We could only *explain away* the aetiological question by trying to deny the (undeniable) point that the goddess's pejorative comments do in fact refer to Parmenides' cosmology. Against attempts to do so in Thanassas (2006), (2011) 300–1, and Cordero (2011*b*), see Tor (2015) 7–8, n.16.

We will approach the aetiological question from a different direction. In order to do so, we will begin by considering Parmenides' theory of human cognition.

4.2 Parmenides' Theory of Human Cognition

The key texts for us in this section will be Parmenides B16 and its doxographic context. We will see that Parmenides advanced a particular theory of human cognition. The basic features of this theory will be the following. Our bodies consist of fluctuating mixtures of the two fundamental, opposite elements, Hot and Cold (or 'Light' and 'Night', 'Rare' and 'Dense', etc.). By the Hot in us we cognise Hot, and by the Cold in us we cognise Cold. Our cognition is determined at each moment by the fluctuating combinations of these elements of which we consist. What our body cognises at any moment are its own or other instances of these elements.

We owe our knowledge of B16 above all to Aristotle's follower, Theophrastus, who, in his *On the Senses*, cites the lines and offers an invaluable commentary. Theophrastus begins his treatise with the suggestion that, concerning sense-perception, previous philosophers can be divided into two camps (*Sens*. 1–2). The first group (Parmenides, Empedocles, Plato) subscribed to the principle that perception is of like by like (τῷ ὁμοίῳ, e.g. hot by hot). The second group (Anaxagoras, Heraclitus) maintained, by contrast, that unlike perceives unlike (τῷ ἐναντίῳ). Here is the beginning of Theophrastus' exposition of the like-by-like camp, and his discussion of Parmenides B16 in its entirety (*Sens*. 2.5–4.8 = A46):

περὶ ἑκάστης δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι σχεδὸν ἀπολείπουσιν, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ πειρᾶται καὶ ταύτας ἀνάγειν εἰς τὴν ὁμοιότητα. **(3)** Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως οὐδὲν ἀφώρικεν ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον ἐστὶν ἡ γνῶσις. ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπεραίρῃ τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν· βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμόν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην δεῖσθαί τινος συμμετρίας·

[Parmenides B16: cited below]

(4) τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει· διὸ καὶ τὴν μνήμην καὶ τὴν λήθην ἀπὸ τούτων γίνεσθαι διὰ τῆς κράσεως· ἂν δ' ἰσάζωσι τῇ μίξει, πότερον ἔσται φρονεῖν ἢ οὔ, καὶ τίς ἡ διάθεσις, οὐδὲν ἔτι διώρικεν. ὅτι δὲ καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καθ' αὑτὸ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, φανερὸν ἐν οἷς φησι τὸν νεκρὸν φωτὸς μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς

οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σιωπῆς καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ἀποτέμνεσθαι τῇ φάσει τὰ συμβαίνοντα δυσχερῆ διὰ τὴν ὑπόληψιν.

Concerning each of the individual [senses]*, the others more or less omit* [discussion]*, but Empedocles attempts to refer these too to likeness.* **(3)** *Parmenides determined nothing, saying only that there are two elements and our knowledge depends on that which exceeds. Thought varies according to whether the hot or the cold predominates; but a better and purer thought is the one through the hot; yet even such thought requires a certain fit.*

[Parmenides B16]

(4) *For he speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same thing. Consequently, both remembering and forgetting also result from the mixture of these. But if there should occur an exact equality in the mixture, he does not determine whether or not there would be cognition or what the general state would be. But it is clear that he attributes perception also to the opposite* [sc. element] *by itself from that passage in which he says that a corpse, because of the departure of the fire, does not perceive light, heat and sound, but does perceive cold and silence and the other opposites. And, in general, everything that is has some knowledge. So, in this way, he seems to cut off by mere assertion the unattractive consequences of his conception.*

Throughout this passage, Theophrastus uses cognitive and perceptual language interchangeably. Indeed, he seems to try and justify this practice by asserting that Parmenides himself 'speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same thing'. We will discuss in Chapter 4.3 the relation between the cognitive and perceptual language in B16 and in Theophrastus' commentary. For now, I will follow Theophrastus' practice and use both sorts of terms interchangeably.

Who are 'the others' in the opening sentence (οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, *Sens.* 2.6) and what, precisely, did Parmenides fail to determine? Theophrastus is very unlikely to be stating that *all* his predecessors, with the single exception of Empedocles, failed to treat the specific mechanisms of the different senses (περὶ ἑκάστης κτλ). If we look at his own subsequent accounts in *On the Senses*, this would be false of Alcmaeon, Anaxagoras, Diogenes and Democritus. 'The others', therefore, must refer only to the other members of the like-by-like party, i.e. Plato and Parmenides. This reading is further supported by the comment that Empedocles attempts to refer the specific mechanisms of different senses 'to likeness' (εἰς τὴν ὁμοιότητα), which indicates that, having introduced both the like-by-like and the unlike-by-unlike parties,

Theophrastus has now already embarked on his discussion of the former. This interpretation also makes good sense of the qualification that 'the others' omitted discussion 'more or less' (σχεδὸν ἀπολείπουσιν) since Plato, on Theophrastus' account, did address some specific sensory mechanisms, but only those of hearing and sight (*Sens*. 5ff). Our reading of this opening sentence concerning the like-by-like party determines in turn our construal of the next sentence (linked to it with γάρ). What Parmenides failed to determine are the specific mechanisms of the different senses. The following qualification, 'saying only that . . . ' (ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι), thus represents what Theophrastus took to be the closest that Parmenides did come, despite failing to address the specific sensory mechanisms, to accounting for the diversity of our sensory experiences: there are two elements and our cognition (γνῶσις) depends on that which exceeds.[16]

That Theophrastus indeed takes this feature of Parmenides' theory to explain perceptual-cognitive variations is confirmed by statement (i) in the next three, difficult statements (*Sens*. 3.3–5): (i) 'Thought varies according to whether the hot or the cold predominates; (ii) but a better and purer thought is the one through the hot; (iii) yet even such thought requires a certain *symmetria*.' The key question in interpreting these remarks is whether *symmetria* signifies here a 'proportion' (between Hot and Cold) or rather an 'appropriate measure' or 'fit' (between Hot as subject of perception and Hot as object of perception). We may distinguish two alternative interpretations. If we translate '*symmetria*' as 'proportion', the thrust of the remarks will be as follows. (i) Thought varies according to whether the Hot or the Cold predominates, and (ii) a thought in which Hot predominates is better than one in which Cold predominates; (iii) nonetheless, even a thought in which Hot predominates requires *some* proportion of Cold. The implication would be that, for there to be any thought at all, there must be a mixture of both Hot and Cold.[17] On the translation

[16] This analysis of *Sens*. 2.5–3.3 follows the lead of Laks (1990) 10–12 and Stratton (1917) 157, n.4.

[17] E.g. Tarán (1965) 257; for *symmetria* as 'proportion', cf. also Verdenius (1964) 10; Hershbell (1983) 46; Andriopoulos (1975) 558; KRS (1983) 261; Coxon (2009) 377, 380–1.

'fit', the thought will run as follows. (i) In every instance of a thought in which both elements are involved, thought varies according to whether the Hot or the Cold predominates; (ii) thought through Hot is better than thought through Cold. That is, perception of Hot through Hot is a better kind of perceptual-cognitive act than the perception of Cold through Cold; (iii) nonetheless, even thought through Hot, although superior in various ways, still requires a certain *fit* or *appropriate measure* between the subject and object of perception. That is, perception through Hot is similarly limited in its perceptual objects only to what *matches* the Hot, i.e. what is *like* the Hot, i.e. Hot.[18]

Several factors speak strongly in favour of the construal 'fit' or 'appropriate measure' and the interpretation based on this construal. First, *symmetria* is a recurrent technical term in *On the Senses* and invariably signifies, not a proportion between the constitutive elements of a mixture, but that an organ of perception is commensurable with its object and therefore adequately receptive of it (as, for example, in Empedocles' theory of perception through pores).[19] Second, it is difficult to see how the words 'the thought *through* the Hot' (τὴν διὰ τὸ θερμόν, *Sens*. 3.4) could conceivably describe a thought in which Hot predominates over Cold but in which both elements are involved. Conversely, this expression naturally signifies the thought of Hot *through* Hot. Most conclusively, Theophrastus offers his remarks on the perception of corpses explicitly in order to make the point that each element perceives by itself and independently of the other: 'But it is clear that he attributes perception also to the opposite [sc. element] by itself from that passage in which he says that a corpse,

[18] So Fränkel (1975*a*) 17; Laks (1990) 14–16. As Laks (1990) 14 observes, the two readings imply slightly different punctuations. The reading based on the construal 'proportion', would closely connect (i) and (ii), separating διάνοιαν from βελτίω with a comma. Conversely, the reading based on the translation 'fit', construes (i) and (ii) as less immediately connected, separating them with a raised comma. But this latter reading does not *implausibly* dissociate (i) the remarks about variation from (ii) the superiority of Hot. The proposition that the thought of Hot through Hot is better than the thought of Cold through Cold implies the superiority of a compound cognitive act, which involves both elements but in which the perception of Hot through Hot preponderates, to compound cognitive acts in which the thought of Cold predominates.

[19] See *Sens*. 12.4; 12.7; 13.3; 14.5; 15.5, 8; 32.6; 35.8; 46.3; similarly, Pl. *Meno* 76d4 (on Empedocles). Cf. Stratton (1917) 157–8, n.5; Fränkel (1975*a*) 17; Laks (1990) 14–16.

because of the departure of the fire, does not perceive light, heat and sound, but does perceive cold and silence and the other opposites' (*Sens*. 4.4–6). The Cold corpse can only perceive Cold things.[20] The words '*also* to the opposite' (καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ) indicate that Hot too is, of course, likewise perceived through the Hot by itself. When, therefore, Theophrastus writes that even the thought through the Hot requires a certain *symmetria*, he is not stating – in direct contradiction to his own remarks about the corpse passage – that, for any cognition to occur, there must be some proportion of both Hot and Cold in the subject. Rather, he is stating that even the superior thought of Hot through Hot is limited by the basic like-by-like requirement for a kind of match or fit between subject and objects of perceptual reception. A mixture of both elements, therefore, is not necessary for *any* sort of perception to occur. Nonetheless, although mixtures of both elements are not essential for perception as such, they do *characterise* the cognition of living humans, who comprise both elements. While by the Hot in us we independently perceive Hot and by the Cold we independently perceive Cold, different mixtures of both elements in the human agent produce different compound acts, which involve both the perception of Hot (through Hot) and the perception of Cold (through Cold). So, when it comes to our perception of a compound object which itself comprises some combination of both elements (this tree, this human), it is the simultaneous

[20] Laks takes B9.3–4 to indicate that every Doxastic thing consists of both elements. He infers that, while corpses *illustrate* the principle that each element perceives independently of the other, they do not provide an actual *instance* of pure Cold perceiving pure Cold, but rather a mixture in which Cold very strongly outweighs Hot; see Laks (1990) 12–13; cf. Andriopoulos (1975) 558. Laks' conclusion could conceivably be right, but his premise is false. B9.3–4 indicates that the *totality* of things is full of Light and Night in equal measure. πᾶν cannot signify *each* Doxastic thing, for then each Doxastic thing would be full of Light and Night *in equal measure*. But in many things the two are mixed unequally; cf. Tarán (1965) 162. The term ἔκλειψις seems to suggest a simple rather than an almost complete departure (cf. e.g. Hdt. 6.25; 7.37; Strab. 9.5.12). Corpses thus most probably offer an actual instance of pure Cold perceiving pure Cold, as assumed by Mansfeld (1996) 173–4; Finkelberg (1986) 405–6. It might be argued on phenomenal grounds that some vestiges of Light must linger in and around the corpse, since it is not, after all, a *supremely* cold and heavy (let alone dark) object. But this objection may not have occurred to Parmenides. At any rate, the significant point is indeed the illustrative one: the Cold in the corpse is perceptive of Cold things, and to whatever extent – whether totally or very largely – the corpse is now devoid of Hot, it is no longer perceptive of Hot things.

occurrence in our frame of our perception of Hot in it through the Hot in us, and of Cold in it through the Cold in us, that yields our complex sensory experience of the object.[21]

If, then, we cognise through each element by itself and independently of the other, and if every Doxastic thing comprises Hot, Cold or some combination of both, then it would seem to follow that each thing possesses the means of cognition. Theophrastus in fact records this corollary: 'And, in general, everything that is has some knowledge' (*Sens*. 4.6–7). It is impossible to determine whether this is a view which Theophrastus found expressed in Parmenides (as, indeed, it was in Empedocles: DK31 B110.10), or his own interpretative inference. At any rate, the inference seems warranted. And so, if we were initially struck by the view that the corpse remains to a certain degree perceptive and cognisant, we can now see that such a view is not so surprising in a world in which everything possesses some form or measure of cognition.

I follow, then, the construal of *symmetria* as 'fit' or 'appropriate measure' and will proceed below on the assumption that humans are taken to perceive through each element by itself and independently of the other. This point, though, is in fact less crucial for our

[21] Theophrastus' remark that Parmenides did not determine whether, in the case of an equal mixture, there will be cognition of any kind or what the (or its) general disposition would be (*Sens*. 4.2–3) is the strongest *prima facie* evidence in favour of the competing construal. If cognition does not necessitate a proportion of both elements, then why should the prospect of an equal mixture pose any puzzles? The objection is not, however, compelling. While each element cognises by itself, every case of human cognition is nonetheless characterised by different mixtures of both elements. Parmenides traced variations in human cognition to different relations of predominance (*Sens*. 3.2–3) and drew hierarchical distinctions between acts of cognition in which Hot predominates and those in which Cold predominates. On this basis, Theophrastus could legitimately wonder what kind of cognition or condition, if any, an equal mixture of Hot and Cold would produce in living humans, who essentially consist of *both* elements. Theophrastus voices this query immediately after commenting on Parmenides' view that memory and forgetfulness derive from mixtures of the elements (διὰ τῆς κράσεως, *Sens*. 4.2), memory most probably involving a preponderance of Hot and forgetfulness one of Cold (especially given the reports that Parmenides traced sleep and old age to a deficiency in fire, A46a–b). Theophrastus' puzzle, then, offers no compelling evidence for the construal of *symmetria* as 'proportion' (against which we listed a number of weighty considerations) and for the consequent competing interpretation of his statements in *Sens*. 3. 3–5, which would conflict directly with his comments on the perception of corpses (as discussed above).

purposes and, *mutatis mutandis*, our discussion below of the cognition of living humans could be formulated in terms of the competing interpretation of *symmetria*. Far more important for us is the fact that Theophrastus' paraphrase of the lost passage about the perception of corpses confirms two of his assertions. First, it confirms that Parmenides adopted the principle that like perceives like.[22] Second, it confirms that Parmenides regarded the cosmological elements as that by which we perceive. Theophrastus appears to work from a first-hand acquaintance with the original passage (ἐν οἷς φησι, *Sens*. 4.4) and, whatever general view we hold of his credentials as a doxographer, could not have possibly fabricated the very *specific* position that Cold corpses perceive or cognise Cold things but not Hot things. The *systoichia* of light, heat and sound as contrasted with cold, silence 'and the opposites' betrays the misleadingly oversimplified nature of Theophrastus' terminology of Hot and Cold (retained below for convenience), familiar from the Peripatetic doxography of Parmenides elsewhere. Parmenides, it seems, employs different adjectives and labels to bring out different perceptual aspects of the opposition between the two Doxastic elements (Light/Night, Light/Heavy, Rare/Dense, etc., see B8. 56–9, cited in Chapter 4.3). The catalogue of what the Cold corpse can and cannot perceive indicates that, for Parmenides, through each Doxastic element we perceive other instantiations of that element in all its perceptual aspects (Light: bright/light/hot/rare, etc.; Night: dark/heavy/cold/dense, etc.).

With this background in mind, we can turn to B16 itself. We may usefully divide the fragment into three components:

[22] Bredlow (2011), 235–6 indirectly supports the historical plausibility of Theophrastus' ascription of a like-by-like position to Parmenides by noting various earlier and near-contemporary parallels. The eyes not only perceive light but are themselves 'brilliant' or 'sparkling' (ὄσσε φαεινώ, *Il*. 13.3, 7; φαεινά, *Il*. 13.435) and 'fiery' (*Il*. 12.466; *Il*. 13.474; *Od*. 4.662; *Od*. 19.446; cf. Emped. DK31 B84). Helios is at once the cosmic source of light and himself all-seeing, *Il*. 3.277; *Od*. 11.109; *Od*. 12.323; καταδέρκεται ἀκτίνεσσιν, *Od*. 11.16; cf. *h.Hom*. 2.70; φάος εἰσοράασθαι ('a light for seeing'), *Il*. 14.345. Empedocles adopts the like-by-like principle of perception (DK31 B109). We also encounter the notion that like attracts to like explaining, for example, the body's absorption of food or drugs (*Nat. Hom.* 6; *Morb.* 4.2–3), the behaviour of fire (Emped. DK31 B62.6) and the movement of atoms (D.L. 9.31 = DK67 A1; DK68 A128). Cf. more generally *Od*. 17.218 (ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ἐς τὸν ὁμοῖον).

> **(i)** ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ'[23] ἔχει κρᾶσις[24] μελέων πολυπλάγκτων,[25]
> τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν·[26] **(ii)** τὸ γὰρ αὐτό
> ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν
> καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· **(iii)** τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.
>
> **(i)** *For as on each occasion is the mixture of much-wandering limbs, so is mind present to humans;* **(ii)** *for, in all humans and in each, that which cognises is the same thing, namely the nature of the limbs;*[27] **(iii)** *for the full is thought.*

(i) This statement expresses a physiological theory of human cognition. Different mixtures in our frame determine in each instance the state of our mind (ὡς . . . τὼς νόος ἀνθρώποισι). The term 'limbs' (μελέων), especially since in (ii) Parmenides speaks of the human frame (μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισι), probably refers to the human frame as a whole rather than *directly* to the two cosmic elements.[28] Nonetheless, since the doxographic context, as analysed above, renders it beyond doubt that the mixture in question is of the two elements (δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν κτλ, *Sens*. 3.2), the 'mixture of our limbs' (or 'frame') would still indirectly signify the particular compound of Hot and Cold of which our frame consists at any given moment.[29] Again, different mixtures of the Hot in us (by which we perceive Hot) and the Cold in us (by which we perceive Cold) produce different compound cognitive acts.

(iii) I have translated *pleon* as 'full'. An alternative translation is 'more'. Does (iii), then, state that 'the full' or 'the more' is thought?

[23] Preserved by Theophrastus and the two oldest mss. of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. ἑκάστῳ (A^b) and ἕκαστος (E^2) cannot be conclusively excluded, although, as Coxon (2009) 378 argues, the former seems a corruption of ἑκάστοτ' and the latter a later correction; cf. Heitsch (1974) 191; Verdenius (1964) 6; Tarán (1965) 169.

[24] Retaining the manuscripts' κρᾶσιν and postulating some implicit subject (e.g. νόος or τις) would yield the same overall sense (as Heitsch observes (1974) 191) but involve an unusual use of ἔχει (Mourelatos (2008*a*) 253; cf. Fränkel (1975) 16; Verdenius (1964) 14).

[25] Over Aristotle's all but unparalleled and awkward πολυκάμπτων, following Mansfeld (1996) 162–3, n.17; Coxon (2009) 378; Verdenius (1964) 7–8; Tarán (1965) 170.

[26] Over Aristotle's unmetrical παρίσταται, prompted by his immediately preceding citation of Empedocles' παρίσταται (*Metaph*. Γ.5 1009^b20, 23), cf. Fränkel (1975) 16; Tarán (1965) 170; Heitsch (1974) 191–2; Coxon (2009) 379.

[27] Or: 'The nature of the limbs is the same as that which it cognises.'

[28] Verdenius (1964) 7; (1949) 126; cf. Fränkel (1975*a*) 16; Tarán (1965) 170; Coxon (2009) 378; Sider and Johnstone (1986) 22; Vlastos (1946) 66, n.4; contra: Laks (1990) 6, n.15. For μέλεα or γυῖα signifying the living mortal's frame as a whole, see *Il*. 17.211; *Od*. 6.140; *Od*. 10.363; *Od*. 13.432; Pind. *P* 4.48; fr. 131.3 M; Aesch. *Pers*. 991; cf. Fränkel (1975*a*) 16; Tarán (1965) 170.

[29] Cf. Verdenius (1964) 20.

There is a simple but compelling reason to reject 'more'. By identifying thought with whichever element exceeds, Parmenides would be denying the lesser element any influence whatsoever on any given mortal thought (*noêma*), even when the elements are almost evenly mixed in the frame.[30] But in (i) it is particular *mixtures* of both elements which determine the state of our mind (*noos*).[31] 'The full', then, is thought. B9.3–4 further supports this reading and suggests that the 'fullness' in question is, as implied independently by (i), of the two elements: 'All is full (*pleon*) of light and unseen night together, of both in equal measure.' The totality of Doxastic things is 'full' of both elements in equal measure. It seems impossible to determine to what extent, if any, Parmenides clarified further the nature of the 'fullness' to which he refers in (iii). The thought may have gone no further than the following. By Hot and Cold we cognise Hot and Cold respectively; furthermore, as living mortals we comprise both elements; thus, our thought is 'the full', i.e. the sum of Hot and Cold of which we consist as it encounters, receives and so cognises Hot (cf. *Sens*. 4.5–6: 'light, heat, sound', etc.) and Cold ('cold, silence and the opposites') from without. There is, then, no reason to ascribe to Parmenides anything like the Empedoclean theory of perception-through-pores in order to make sense of the translation 'full'.[32] Nonetheless, an interpretation of *to pleon* as 'the full' may well underlie Theophrastus' talk of 'fit' or 'commensurability' (*symmetria*) between the Parmenidean subject and objects of perception.[33] Theophrastus repeatedly uses

[30] This last point renders it implausible to defend 'more' by importing into (iii) – as Hussey (2006) 28 suggests – the Anaxagorean principle (DK59 B12) that the predominating elements in a mixture determine its appearance. In the context of Parmenides' statement in (iii) – 'the πλέον is thought' – the implication would be that, even when the ratio is very close (e.g. when there is just a *little* bit more Hot than Cold in the frame), the thought would be Hot and of Hot and in no way Cold or of Cold.

[31] Following Tarán (1965) 256–7; see further the arguments in Mansfeld (1964) 191–2; Laks (1990) 7–8; Kraus (2013), 494–5. Opting for 'more': Heitsch (1974) 198; Coxon (2009) 380–1; Andriopoulos (1975) 555; Long (1996) 147, n.35. As Laks (1990) 7–8 n.19 argues, νόημα most probably signifies a concrete instance of thinking; cf. also Tarán (1965) 254.

[32] *Pace* Bredlow (2011) 241–2.

[33] Given the interpretation of *Sens*. 1–3 and of *symmetria* followed above, Theophrastus' words κατὰ τὸ ὑπερβάλλον … τὴν διάνοιαν (*Sens*. 3.2–4) are *not* a gloss of B16.4 implying that he read πλέον as 'more'; following Laks (1990) 6; contra e.g. Verdenius (1964) 17, n.3; Tarán (1965) 257–8, 262; Coxon (2009) 380–1); Kraus (2013) 494; cf. n.21 above.

symmetria in reference to Empedocles' theory of perception through pores (*Sens*. 12.4; 12.7; 13.3; 14.5; 15.5, 8). His application of the term here suggests that he saw Parmenides as anticipating, in a more obscure and embryonic manner, Empedocles' conception of cognition as a state in which like is filled by like.[34] If Theophrastus did entertain such a view about the relation between Parmenides' and Empedocles' theories, it would seem to be a hermeneutically and historically plausible one. Empedocles' theory of pores explicitly postulates the perception of like-by-like ('by earth we see earth; by water – water etc.', DK31 B109) and could have aimed in part to explicate Parmenides' less developed and murkier notion of 'the full'.

These considerations notwithstanding, the word *pleon* itself is indeed ambiguous. The sense 'more' could play a role as an underlying, secondary connotation. While the primary thrust of the term would be to indicate a fullness and a filling in the sense analysed above, the word could perhaps also serve to put us in mind of the general point that the predominance of one element or the other shapes the state and quality of our thoughts (which are themselves conceptualised as a process of being filled).[35]

(ii) The expression 'the nature of the limbs' or 'of the frame' (μελέων φύσις) in (ii) recalls the 'mixture of limbs' (κρᾶσις μελέων) in (i). This parallel indicates that 'nature' (φύσις) in (ii) should be construed as the frame's constitution or character consisting, as in (i), in a combination of Hot and Cold.[36] We may distinguish three primary, grammatically viable readings of (ii):

[34] Cf. Laks (1990) 16–18, who observes also that Aëtius goes as far as ascribing to Parmenides (alongside Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus) a full-fledged theory of pores (παρὰ τὰς συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων, A47), which offers precisely the sort of account of different particular perceptions which (the no doubt better informed) Theophrastus had complained Parmenides failed to offer.

[35] Hussey (2006) 29 suggests that both senses, 'the full' and 'the more', could be at play in B16.4.

[36] Following Mourelatos (2008*a*) 254; cf. Hershbell (1983) 49. The sense is attested as early as *Od*. 10.302–3 (πόρε φάρμακον . . . καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε) and paralleled in B10.1 (αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν) and B10.4–5 (ἔργα . . . σελήνης καὶ φύσιν); cf. Verdenius (1964) 15, n.5; Curd (1998) 42ff.

(ii)[a] *For, in all humans and in each, that which cognises is the same thing, namely the nature of the limbs* (construing ὅπερ as subject of ἔστιν and φρονέει, μελέων φύσις as in apposition with it)

(ii)[b] *. . . the nature of the limbs is the same as that which it cognises* (μελέων φύσις as the subject of both ἔστιν and φρονέει with αὐτό as its predicate, ὅπερ as accusative)

(ii)[c] *. . . it is the same thing which the nature of the limbs cognises* (αὐτό as subject of ἔστιν, ὅπερ as accusative, μελέων φύσις as subject of φρονέει).[37]

Our primary criterion for choosing between (ii)[a-c] must be how well each reading explicates the logical structure of the three statements which constitute B16. Statement (ii) begins with 'for' (γάρ). Thus, (ii) should ideally justify or imply (i), i.e. the proposition that different mixtures of Hot and Cold in our frame determine the state of our cognition. Statement (iii) likewise begins with 'for'. Thus, (ii) in turn should ideally be justified or implied by the more obscure, and therefore less helpful, (iii): 'the full is thought'.[38]

(i) indeed follows from (ii)[a]. The proposition that mixtures of Hot and Cold in our frame determine at any moment the state of our cognition follows from the proposition that the nature of our frame is what cognises, given that the nature of our frame is itself nothing more than its current mixture of Hot and Cold (by which we cognise Hot and Cold respectively). We might worry that (ii)[a] comes closer to *repeating* than to *justifying* (i).[39] But (ii)[a] does seem to *explain* (i), in a manner which sufficiently accounts for what may well be a rather cavalier 'for'. We can think of (ii)[a] as articulating the constant principle that underlies all particular instances of cognition. The reason that, as (i) states, any particular instance of human cognition (ἑκάστοτε) is determined by the current mixture of Hot and Cold in our frame is, as (ii)[a] explains, that, invariably, the current constitution of our frame is what cognises. Furthermore, we can see how (ii)[a] would follow from

[37] E.g. (ii)[a]: DK, *ad loc*; KRS (1983) 261; (ii)[b]: Fränkel (1975*a*) 42, n.53, cf. 16; Vlastos (1946) 66; Kahn (1969) 722; Laks (1990) 7; (ii)[c]: Tarán (1965) 256; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 253; Hershbell (1983) 49. On the syntactic proposals in Bredlow (2011) 243–5, see Tor (2015) 10 (n.21), 13 (n.31).

[38] Minimally, the three statements must cohere: (ii) cannot *conflict* with (i); contra Robbiano (2006) 131, n.356.

[39] So Verdenius (1964) 14.

(iii). If thought is identified with the state in which the Hot and Cold of which we consist within are filled by, and so cognise, Hot and Cold from without, then the sum of Hot and Cold within us, i.e. the nature of our frame, will indeed be what cognises.

(ii)[b] explicitly formulates the principle that like perceives like. The term 'the same' (τὸ αὐτό) will presumably signify here qualitative rather than numerical identity, identifying the subject and object of perception as the same *kind* of thing (e.g. Hot).[40] Again, we can see how (ii)[b] could imply (i). If the nature of our frame is qualitatively the same as the objects which it perceives, then different mixtures of Hot and Cold in our frame will indeed produce different cognitions (e.g. the more Hot we have the more or better able we will be to perceive things rich in Hot). And again, (ii)[b] *could* be taken to follow from (iii). If, as (iii) states, thought is a state in which like is filled by like, then, as (ii)[b] states, the Hot and Cold of which our frame consists are indeed qualitatively the same as what our frame thinks.[41]

Reading (ii)[c] is untenable. Proposition (i) could not follow from proposition (ii)[c]. The proposition that different mixtures of Hot and Cold in our frame determine the state of our cognition could not follow from the proposition that each and every mortal cognises *the same thing*. Indeed, the two statements are inconsistent. Since *different* mixtures produce *different* cognitions, and since our mixtures fluctuate – 'on each occasion' (ἑκάστοτ', B16.1), 'the thought varies' (ἄλλην γίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν, *Sens*. 3.3–4) – it is not the case that each and every mortal cognises the same thing.[42]

[40] Vlastos (1946) 66–7 implies the qualitative reading. Verdenius (1964) 18 insists on numerical identity, but this undermines the capacity of any Doxastic thing to cognise any *other* Doxastic thing and, indeed, any distinction between subjects and objects of cognition, such as living humans and the sounds they perceive (*Sens*. 4.4–6).

[41] One worry (though by no means a decisive one) is that (ii)[b] requires a slightly unusual application of the formula ὁ αὐτὸς ὅσπερ, which is typically used to express different statements about one and the same object, as in (ii)[a] and (ii)[c], rather than to identify distinct objects or concepts with each other, as in (ii)[b]. See e.g. *Od*. 8.107: ἦρχε δὲ τῷ αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἣν περ οἱ ἄλλοι. See further Heitsch (1974) 197; Coxon (2009) 380.

[42] Tarán (1965) 258, 261 explains that, whenever a given mixture is present in the body, the same thought would result. All that (ii)[c] states, however, is 'all mortals think the same thing', not '*whenever mortals have the same mixture*, then they all think the same thing'. The qualification 'whenever . . . mixture' assumed by Tarán jars with the universalising καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί and is simply not found in our text (it certainly cannot be supplied

Readings (ii)[a] and (ii)[b], then, are grammatically and logically viable. It is difficult to choose between them. Indeed, perhaps we should not choose. It may well be the case that the notable syntactic ambiguity in B16.2[a]-4[b] (is ὅπερ subject or object?) is deliberate and that both senses are in play.[43] (ii)[a] tells us: it is the same thing that thinks in all humans, i.e. the mixture of Light and Night which is the nature of the limbs. (ii)[b] tells us: this thinking mechanism is itself the same as what it thinks, i.e. other tokens and compounds of Light and Night.

Indeed, whether we opt for translation (ii)[a] or translation (ii)[b], both of those propositions will in fact be true according to Parmenides' theory of human cognition, as we reconstructed this theory *before* we raised the question of the interpretation of these particular lines (B16.2[b]-4[a]). Let us recapitulate the key features of this theory of cognition. We consist of fluctuating mixtures of Hot and Cold. By the Hot and Cold within us we cognise Hot and Cold respectively. Our cognition is determined at each moment by the combinations of Hot and Cold of which our mortal bodies consist. What the mortal body cognises at any moment are its own or other instances of these elements (its cognitive engagement with which is described as a state of fullness).[44]

from (i), which itself needs to follow from (ii) rather than imply it). Hershbell (1983) esp. 50 (followed by Gallop (1984) 87; Robbiano (2006) 131–2) accepts reading (ii)[c], interprets πλέον as a reference to what-is and locates B16 in *Alêtheia*. Both Theophrastus' commentary (note esp. δυοῖν ὄντοιν στοιχείοιν (*Sens*. 3.2) and his discussion of corpses), and the references to mixture and the human body within B16 itself, secure its Doxastic provenance. For a detailed refutation of Hershbell's proposal, see Andriopoulos (1975) esp. 556–7; cf. Laks (1990) 3, n.9. Although 'the full', like so many other aspects of *Doxa, echoes* descriptions of what-is in *Alêtheia* (as discussed by Mourelatos (2008*a*) 254–9), it cannot *refer* to what-is in any straightforward manner.

[43] Cf. Hussey (2006) 29 for the suggestion that the syntactic ambiguity of B16.2[b]-4[a] is deliberate.

[44] Hussey (2006) advances the novel suggestion that B16 describes, not our mind's direct cognitive-and-perceptual contact with external objects, but rather its engagement with scale-models which are internal to the mind, made out of the same materials (Light and Night) and (at least in the case of perception) causally generated by the outside world, which they represent. Hussey's arguments for this intriguing view are not compelling, but, at any rate, nothing much hangs for us on whether or not we entertain it. In either case, our physiological makeup determines what things, and what sort of things, we perceive-and-cognise (recall the corpse passage: light, heat, sound, darkness, cold, silence, etc.), whether our cognitive engagement with such things is direct or mediated via internal scale-models.

Three points bear further emphasis. First, B16 pointedly describes the cognition of *humans* (ἀνθρώποισι … ἀνθρώποισι, B16.2–3). As Karl Reinhardt remarked: 'Coming from the goddess's lips, how studied is the emphasis on *human* knowledge!'[45] Second, B16 is a *universalising* account of human cognition ('as on each occasion … in all humans and in each … '). It nowhere indicates any room for exceptions. It describes all, not some, acts of human cognition. Third, and relatedly, human cognition of Hot and Cold is, on this theory, passively determined by the deliverances of physiological mechanisms. As on each occasion is the mixture of their limbs, so is mind simply present to humans (ὡς … παρέστηκεν, B16.1–2[a]). The poetic models which B16 famously echoes[46] underscore this point:

> τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων,
> οἷον ἐπ' ἦμαρ ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.
>
> *For such is the mind of humans upon the earth*
> *As the day which the father of gods and humans brings upon them.*
>
> (*Od.* 18.136–7)

> τοῖος ἀνθρώποισι θυμός …
> γίνεται θνητοῖς, ὁποίην Ζεὺς ἐφ' ἡμέρην ἄγῃ.
>
> *Such … for mortal humans the mind*
> *Becomes, as the day which Zeus brings upon them.*
>
> (Archilochus, fr. 131 W)

These passages, like B16.1–2[a], establish a causal relation between certain conditioning factors and the human mind as conditioned by them.[47] Although Parmenides diverges from the other poets by conspicuously omitting any mention of divine ministration, he similarly underscores the passive determination of, again, specifically *human* thought.[48] According to B16, for the *human* mind (*noos*), cognition (*noos*) of Hot and Cold, and by Hot and Cold, is something that just happens.

[45] Reinhardt (1974; orig. 1916) 307.
[46] See Fränkel (1975) 15; cf. e.g. Verdenius (1964) 27; Tarán (1965) 253; Heitsch (1974) 194–5; Coxon (2009) 95, 378–9; Kraus (2013) 494.
[47] Heitsch (1974) 195.
[48] On the point concerning the passive determination of thinking expressed in B16, cf. Coxon (2009) 380 ('a function of physical temperament'); Mourelatos (2008*a*) 225–6; Heitsch (1974) 194; KRS (1983) 262; Laks (1990) 12.

4.3 Cognition, *krisis*, Sense-Perception

In this section, we will consider how the type of thinking which Parmenides identifies as a physiological necessity for the human mind relates to the type of thinking which underpins the cosmology of *Doxa*.

The cognitive language which Parmenides uses in B16 (*noos, phroneei, noêma*) indicates that the fragment expounds the physiological mechanisms that determine the kinds of things of which we are aware, as well as our thoughts and judgements with regard to such things. The term *noein* and its cognates signify, *not* merely 'thought' without involving what we would call a belief component, but rather the apprehension of a situation, object or person in a way that implies the formation of a judgement or judgements with regard to them. To give two of countless possible illustrations, in the *Iliad* Helen recognises that the neck of the disguised Aphrodite is that of a deity (ἐνόησε θεᾶς . . . δειρήν, *Il*. 3.396ff), while Talthybius judges that the man before him is Machaon (τὸν δὲ νόησεν κτλ, *Il*. 4.200).[49] The term *phroneei* in B16.3 must signify the function of the mind (*noos*) and is here, as often, almost synonymous with the Greek verb *gignôskein* ('cognise', 'recognise'; cf. ἡ γνῶσις, *Sens*. 3.3; τινὰ γνῶσιν, *Sens*. 4.7), as in the Homeric formula: 'I understand (*ginôskô*), I comprehend (*phroneô*); you bid these things to someone who realises (*noeonti*)', where the three verbs serve as functional equivalents.[50] Now, by Parmenides' time, an erring mind (*noos*) was by no means an incoherent notion. Hesiod, for example, can speak of profit or women deceiving one's mind (*Op*. 323, 373), warn against actions which people undertake 'in the ignorance of their mind' (ἀιδρείῃσι νόοιο, *Op*. 685) and even narrate Prometheus' deception of Zeus' mind (*Th*. 537).[51] Aristotle's offhand ascription to Parmenides on the basis of B16 (and to various other thinkers on the basis of equally uncompelling citations) of

[49] See further the discussion of *noos* and *noein* in Ch. 3.4; note also von Fritz (1974) esp. 23–4, 33; Warden (1971) 3–4; Darcus-Sullivan (1994) 108.

[50] *Od*. 16.136; cf. Verdenius (1964) 16.

[51] See further von Fritz (1974) 29; cf. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 175–6. On the use of *noein* and its cognates with regard to what-is as compared to their use in B16 and of erring mortals, see Ch. 5.5.2.

the view that *all* our impressions must be true (*Metaph*. Γ.5 1009^{b} 13–15) is thus quite unmotivated. The important point for us, however, is that *noos* is always a faculty which, whether successfully or not, attempts to cognise correctly a given object or state of affairs (rather than merely 'think' or 'perceive'). In sum, what we get in B16 is a theory, not merely of sensory perceptions that involve no belief component, but, again, of the factors which determine the kinds of things of which mortals are aware, as well as their thoughts and judgements with regard to those things. This is what I mean by saying that B16 is a theory of (human) cognition.[52]

Throughout the poem, Parmenides makes pivotal and calculated use of the term *krisis* and its cognates. The term encompasses both dichotomies and judgements made on their basis.[53] Whereas *Alêtheia* is framed by one kind of dichotomy, between 'is' and 'is not' or 'what-is' and 'what-is-not', *Doxa* is framed by a very different one, between 'Light and Night' (or: 'Hot' and 'Cold', 'Rare' and 'Dense', etc.). Parmenides' use of the term *krisis*, and especially his contrast between the *krisis* of *Alêtheia* and the *krisis* of *Doxa*, are important for our purposes. By considering how the goddess introduces the Doxastic *krisis*, and how it relates to the *krisis* of *Alêtheia*, we may both sharpen our account of the kind of cognition ascribed to the mortal mind in B16 and further elucidate the fragment's import for the epistemological question. After the goddess criticises the mental habits of the wayward mortals (B7.3–5^{a}), she issues a positive injunction to the *kouros* (B7.5–6):

> κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
> ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.
>
> *But judge by reasoning the much-contested examination*
> *Spoken by me.*

The judgement or discrimination – *krinai* – which the goddess prescribes here can only align with the contrast, the *krisis*, between

[52] Parmenides' use of this cognitive language in B16 thus invalidates Vlastos' claim, (1946) 67, that B16 expresses a theory strictly of non-cognitive sense-perception.
[53] Separation and selection: e.g. *Il*. 2.362; *Il*. 6.188; *Il*. 9.521; *Il*. 11.697; *Il*. 5.501. Judgements: e.g. *Il*. 16.387; cf. Kahn (1973) 382.

'is' and 'is not', which expressly frames the argumentation about what-is in *Alêtheia* (B8.15–16):

ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ' ἔστιν·
ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν.

But the discrimination concerning these matters lies in this:
[It] *is or* [it] *is not.*

The 'account' or 'reasoning' (*logos*) which the goddess prescribes for the *kouros* thus presumably looks forward to the tightly structured system of deductive arguments in B8, which are based on this *krisis* and through which the goddess concludes that what-is is ungenerated, imperishable, changeless, motionless and homogeneous.

When she introduces *Doxa*, the goddess traces mortal beliefs to a pointedly different *krisis*, one between two elemental opposites with respect to their perceptual form (B8.50–9):

ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.
μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν·
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν – ἐν ᾧ πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν –
ἀντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ' ἔθεντο
χωρὶς ἀπ' ἀλλήλων, τῇ μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ,
ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ' ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωὐτόν,
τῷ δ' ἑτέρῳ μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ' αὐτό
τἀντία νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε.

Here I conclude for you the trustworthy account and understanding
Concerning true reality; from this point on learn mortal opinions,
Hearing the deceptive order of my words.
For they resolved to name two forms
Of which just one may not be named – this is where they have gone astray –
And they distinguished opposites in accordance with their body,[54] *and they set signs*
Apart from each other. To one, the aethereal fire of flame:
It is gentle, very light-weight, everywhere the same as itself,
But not the same as the other. And that other again is in itself
Just the opposite: dark[55] *night, a dense body and heavy.*

[54] δέμας is used of living bodies or bodies regarded as alive (Coxon (2009) 346). It indicates a thing's concrete, perceptual aspects: the daughter of Chryses is not inferior to Clytaemnestra οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυήν (*Il.* 1.115).

[55] The immediate context calls for this translation, but the term ἀδαῆ also suggests ignorance. Night is 'ignorant' inasmuch as it allows only the much inferior and dull

We discuss the sense in which the goddess's account of *Doxa* is 'deceptive' in Chapter 4.4. Our focus here is on the nature of *Doxa*'s *krisis* and how the demarcation between Light and Night relates and compares to the demarcation between 'is' and 'is not'.

Aristotle aligns (τάττει, *Metaph*. A.5 $986^{b}33$–$987^{a}2$) and even identifies (*GC* 1.3 $318^{b}6$–7) Light with what-is and Night with what-is-not. Identifying either element with what-is is untenable because both possess properties which are incompatible with the properties of what-is.[56] Light, for example, is mobile (B12.2) while what-is is immobile (B8.26, cf. B8.41). The mixtures in which both elements participate (e.g. B16.1) are quite foreign to the static homogeneity of what-is. Nor can we even align either Doxastic element with what-is or what-is-not. Parmenides emphatically highlights their *equality* (all is full of both elements 'in equal measure', B9.4).[57] There is nothing negative or privative about Night as contrasted with Light (or vice versa). Night, for example, is heavier and denser than Light, which is also, for its part, characterised by some measure of weight and density (B8. 57–9). Both elements, therefore, constitute equally *positive* things, and neither can be asymmetrically aligned with what-is-not.[58]

This, in turn, raises a more significant point. All such alignments obscure the qualitative difference between the distinction made by *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* (is / is not, what-is/what-is-not) and the distinction made by *Doxa*'s *krisis* (Light/Night, or Hot/Cold, etc.).[59] On any reading, *Alêtheia* does not establish what-is-not as an equally positive counterpart to what-is. Parmenides stresses the equality of what-is with itself and the stable self-sufficiency of its identity: 'for it is equal with itself in every direction' (B8.49), 'remaining the same and in the same by itself it lies' (B8.29). By contrast, the two Doxastic elements are precisely equal *with*

cognition of Cold through Cold, and its preponderance brings about a general deterioration in one's mental faculties; see further Ch. 5.2, with n.69.

[56] Clark (1969) 26.

[57] See similarly Long (1975) 90; Kraus (2013) 487–8; Verdenius (1964) 62; Minar (1949) 52; Cornford (1933) 108.

[58] The superior vitality and mental vigour of Hot and, in general, the axiological nature of the contrast between the two elements may explain Aristotle's alignment, but they do not warrant it.

[59] In highlighting the *qualitative* difference between the two *kriseis*, I follow and develop Mansfeld (1964) 86–91, 133; cf. also Kraus (2013) 489.

each other and the identity of each with itself is pointedly qualified by its demarcation from its counterpart: 'everywhere the same as itself, but not the same as the other' (B8.57–8).[60] Parmenides' juxtapositions of contrary attributes (Light/Night, Light/Heavy, Rare/Dense, etc., B8.56–9) characterise the elements of *Doxa* as enantiomorphic opposites, each one being what the other is not.[61] Light, therefore, *is* hot, light, rarefied etc. and *is not* cold, dark, heavy, dense etc. The opposite is the case for Night. The *krisis* of *Alêtheia*, therefore, maintains a distinction between 'is' and 'is not', and aligns the homogeneous what-is entirely with 'is' and in no way with 'is not'. Conversely, the Doxastic *krisis* transgresses the distinction between 'is' and 'is not' by positing two elements, each of which simultaneously *is* (itself) and *is not* (the other): 'being and not-being' (εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, B8.40), and again: 'everywhere the same as itself, but not the same as the other' (τωὐτόν . . . μὴ τωὐτόν, B8.57–8). *Doxa*'s *krisis* demarcates two equal, elemental opposites. It precisely fails to sustain the separation between 'is' and 'is not'. We see here, importantly, that *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* and *Doxa*'s *krisis* are competing in the sense that we could not maintain, and think in terms of, both sorts of demarcations at the same time. The Doxastic contrast between Light and Night – both of which are retained in the cosmology and each of which *is* itself and *is not* the other – transgresses *Alêtheia*'s *krisis*, which separates 'is' from 'is not', only *one* of which is retained ('is') and characterises what-is. When we think in terms of *Doxa*'s *krisis*, we cannot at the same time think in terms of *Alêtheia*'s *krisis*.

The context of Simplicius' citation of B8.53–9 is instructive (*in Ph.* 9.30.20–31.7 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 204). Simplicius reports that as the 'elemental principles of things that are generated' Parmenides posited an opposition (*antithesis*), which was glossed interchangeably with the pairs Light/Darkness, Fire/Earth, Rare/Dense, the Same/Other (9.30.20–2). Simplicius cites in addition a prose notation which he found in his copy of the poem: 'And

[60] This phrase clearly applies symmetrically to both Doxastic elements (n.b. ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κτλ, B8.58–9), and cannot be seen as attributing specifically to Light one of the properties of what-is, *pace* Kahn (2009) 216.

[61] Cf. Curd (1998) 107–8; Nehamas (2002) 55, n.43.

indeed in between the verses a short passage in prose is inserted as though by Parmenides himself. It reads as follows: "To this are applied the rare and the hot and the light and the soft and the light-weight, but to the dense are named the cold and darkness and the hard and the heavy. For these things are demarcated in either way each from the other"' (ταῦτα γὰρ ἀπεκρίθη ἑκατέρως ἑκάτερα, 9.31.3–7). This catalogue of opposites is closely reminiscent of Parmenides' own juxtapositions of contrary attributes in B8.56–9. Whether or not the specific terms that the author of the prose notation highlights all derive from Parmenides himself, he expresses an incisive insight into the conceptual basis of *Doxa*'s elemental cosmology. As Simplicius writes, Parmenides 'clearly posited two antithetical elements' (ἀντίθετα δύο στοιχεῖα, 9.31.7) and, as the annotator concludes, 'these things are demarcated (ἀπεκρίθη) in either way each from the other (ἑκατέρως ἑκάτερα)'. The essence of *Doxa* does not lie in any one aspect of the opposition between the two elements ('Light/Night', or 'Hot/Cold', etc.). It lies, rather, in the nature of the Doxastic *krisis* itself. That is, it lies in the demarcation between the two equal enantiomorphic elements – on the basis of (all) their sensible aspects (δέμας, B8.55) – each of which elements essentially both is (itself) and is not (the other).

With this account of *Doxa*'s *krisis* in place, we can take a closer look at the difficult lines B8.53–5 (cited above). We will return in Chapter 4.4 to the voluntariness which Parmenides associates with mortal naming ('they resolved to name two forms'). Our focus here is on Parmenides' subsequent remarks on this action. The translation of B8.54[a] is controversial. Most commentators translate 'one of which must not be named' and take the implied subtext to be '[sc. while it is right to name the other]'. This construal draws on Aristotle's alignment of Light with what-is and Night with what-is-not. Thus the name 'Night' is to be discarded and 'Light' retained.[62] We saw, however, that this Aristotelian alignment is fundamentally ill-conceived.

[62] E.g. Patin (1899) 591–4; Vlastos (1946) 74; Woodbury (1986) 11 n.26; Kahn (2009) 216–17; cf. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 85–7. Others align Night with what-is: Popper (1992) 12–16; Sedley (1999*a*) 124. Against the attempt in Long (1975) 90–1 to reject the

An alternative rendering, then, is: 'of which just one may not be named [sc. without the other]'. We might worry that this construal will be incoherent as a criticism of the mortals, who *do* name both elements and not just one without the other.[63] Coxon (2009) follows this translation, but avoids the incoherence by construing 'this is where they have gone astray' as the mortals' *own* criticism (endorsed by Parmenides) of cosmologies which are based on a single element.[64] Coxon's interpretation entails, however, that while 'they resolved' in B8.53 and 'they distinguished' in B8.55 have the same subject (the mortals), the words 'they have gone astray' in B8.54 suddenly refer to a different 'they' (the monistic cosmologists whom the mortals criticise). But there is no textual support for such an abrupt and confusing shift in subject.[65] Philosophical denunciations, moreover, are for the goddess to utter, not the mortals. I would retain this construal but interpret the phrase, not as *itself* criticising the mortals, but as an analysis of what we found above (independently of this line) to be the essential relation between the two opposites of *Doxa*'s *krisis* (each of which essentially both is itself and is not the other), as contrasted with the *krisis* of *Alêtheia*. By contrast with the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not', in which one element is retained ('is') and the other rejected ('is not'), one cannot postulate *one* Doxastic element but *deny* its counterpart. If there is Light, there must also be Night, and *vice versa*. 'Doxastic monism' is a contradiction in terms. The phrase 'of which just one may not be named [sc. without the other]' is the goddess's analysis of the nature of the Doxastic *krisis*. The words 'this is where they have gone astray' is her parenthetical denunciation of the mortals, which is evoked by that analysis but pertains to the entire sequence as a whole: *they resolved to name two forms, of which just one* (*without the other*) *may not be named (unlike 'is' and 'is not', one of which must be retained ('is') and the other discarded ('is not'): naming opposites*

Aristotelian alignment but retain the translation, see Guthrie (1965) 53, n.3; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 220, with n.71.

[63] So Schofield, see KRS (1983) 256, n.1; contrast KR, *ad loc.*; for the construal, see e.g. Verdenius (1964) 62; Clark (1969) 26.

[64] Coxon (2009) 80, 344–5; cf. Verdenius (1964) 62; Nehamas (2002) 62.

[65] Following Mourelatos (2008*a*) 82ff.

in accordance with this other kind of krisis is where they went wrong) and they distinguished opposites in accordance with their perceptual form (ἐκρίναντο δέμας).[66]

It is because the mortals fail in this manner to sustain the discrimination in *Alêtheia* between 'is' and 'is not', only by means of which can one come to understand the true nature of what-is, that the goddess describes them as 'undiscriminating hordes' (ἄκριτα φῦλα, B6.7). There is an unmistakable hierarchy between the *krisis* of *Alêtheia* and the *krisis* of *Doxa*.

As Alexander Mourelatos has emphasised, the modal language which Parmenides uses here and elsewhere ('may not', οὐ χρεών) suggests a normative necessity, a 'right, due or proper necessity', rather than blind inexorability.[67] In this particular case, of course, the substantive term χρεών applies to the articulation of the Doxastic forms itself rather than directly to intelligent agents who may *choose* to act in accordance with or in defiance of such a normative injunction.[68] As such, the term indicates here an intrasystematic normative necessity. Given the essential nature of the Doxastic *krisis*, and given the interdependence of the two enantiomorphic elements Light and Night, the attempt to posit only one element of the distinction without the other would be an inappropriate normative error as well as a conceptual confusion.

What, finally, of the relation between sensory perception on the one hand and *Doxa*'s *krisis* and the theory of human cognition in B16 on the other hand? After Theophrastus cites B16, his first remark – apparently in reference to the fragment as a whole – is: 'For he [sc. Parmenides] speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same thing' (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει, *Sens*. 4.1). Must we assent to the assessment that 'on *any* interpretation this last remark is thick-headed?'[69]

Aristotle's treatment of Parmenides B16 in *Metaphysics Gamma* (5 $1009^{b}12$–$1010^{a}3$) no doubt underlies Theophrastus'

[66] On this reading, then, τῶν . . . εἰσίν smoothly links μορφάς . . . ὀνομάζειν with ἀντία . . . δέμας as a coherent progression. This, coupled with its suitability as an analysis of the Doxastic *krisis*, justifies its adoption over Cornford's 'not so much as one of which should be named', (1933) 109, which, as Clark (1969) 26 observes, renders the remark 'this is where they have gone astray' awkwardly redundant.

[67] Mourelatos (2008*a*) xxxi, 277–8; cf. Robbiano (2006) 74–5; Fränkel (1975*a*) 27.

[68] For the distinction, cf. Robbiano (2006) 278.

[69] Vlastos (1946) 71, n.38.

statement and could well be what motivated him to include B16 in his *On the Senses* in the first place. In this part of *Metaphysics Gamma*, Aristotle is surveying attitudes which, he claims, misled past thinkers into questioning or undermining the law of non-contradiction. In this passage ($1009^{b}12$–$1010^{a}7$), Aristotle criticises what he represents as a widespread, ancient conception of sense-perception. Here is the key statement ($1009^{b}12$–15):

ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν.

In general, it is because they assume that sense-perception is cognition, and that it is an alteration, that they say that what appears to our senses must be true.

For Aristotle, then, this ancient conception took sense-perception to be knowledge and drew the objectionable conclusion that all impressions derived from sense-perception must be true. Aristotle proceeds to cite or paraphrase statements from Empedocles, Parmenides, Anaxagoras and Homer in order to implicate them in this alleged conception. None of the statements which Aristotle mobilises, however, contain any language which clearly signifies sense-perception. Aristotle cites Empedocles B106 and B108 (for the texts, see Chapter 6.2) to show that, according to Empedocles, changes in our physical disposition cause changes in our knowledge ($1009^{b}17$–21). He then cites Parmenides B16, remarking only: 'Parmenides too proclaims in the same way' ($1009^{b}21$–5). A Homeric description of a concussed Hector as 'other-thinking' or 'other-cognising' (ἀλλοφρονέοντα) is tenuously taken to imply the view that even the delirious (literally, 'those-who-cognise-besides' or 'think-besides': τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας) still cognise (φρονοῦντας) and, therefore, to imply the same conception of sense-perception. And, if Homer thinks that both the delirious and the non-delirious cognise, then, according to him, things must be both one way and the other way simultaneously (1009^{b} 28–33), so that Homer too undermines the law of non-contradiction. Anaxagoras is implicated in this same conception simply on the basis of a reported remark to his companions that things would be for them such as they take them to be ($1009^{b}25$–8).

Most strikingly, Aristotle identifies the assumption that 'the things-which-are' (*ta onta*) are, exclusively, perceptible (*aisthêta*) as what propelled all these thinkers to adopt the conception of sense-perception which he criticises (1010^{a}1–3). In the passage cited above, Aristotle only states that these early thinkers assumed that sense perception is cognition (the definite article in τὴν αἴσθησιν indicates that φρόνησιν is the predicate). And yet, Aristotle's diagnosis here, that these thinkers recognised only perceptible objects in their ontology, suggests that they recognised no form of knowledge or thinking *other* than sense-perception and, therefore, committed themselves to the view that all knowledge is sensory knowledge and that all impressions are true, thereby leaving no room for error. And indeed, when Aristotle reprises and develops this discussion in *On the Soul* (3.3), he has the early thinkers *identify* cognition or knowledge and sense-perception: 'Indeed the ancients say that cognising and perceiving are the same thing' (οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, 427^{a}21–2). His concern here is precisely that 'the ancients' thus left no conceptual space for error: 'yet they should have accounted at the same time also for being mistaken' (427^{a}29–^{b}1). Aristotle himself, after all, maintains that 'sense-perception of the appropriate objects of sense is always true' (ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ ἀληθής, 427^{b} 11–12). It is in part for this reason that he is concerned to demarcate perception from other mental activities, in which error *can* reside (427^{b}6–11):

ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν ζῴων. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς – τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς τἀναντία τούτων – οὐδὲ τοῦτό ἐστι ταὐτὸ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι.

It is evident that perceiving and cognising are not the same thing – for all animals have a share of the former, but only a few of the latter. And neither is the activity of the mind, in which there is 'correctly' and 'incorrectly' – 'correctly' being cognition and knowledge and true opinion, and 'incorrectly' being the opposite of these things – neither is this the same thing as perceiving.

Aristotle's contention in *Metaphysics Gamma* 5 and *On the Soul* 3.3, then, is that his early predecessors failed to make this sort of

demarcation. He aligns Parmenides, on the basis of B16, with an alleged ancient failure to think about cognition and objects of cognition other than in terms of sense-perception, so that our cognitive engagement with the world becomes nothing more than the direct, inerrant function of changes in our physical disposition. It is especially difficult to square Aristotle's ascription to Parmenides of the view that the things-which-are are exclusively perceptible with his own earlier distinction between, on the one hand, Parmenides' concept of what-is (*to on*) as One and, on the other hand, Parmenides' concept of plurality as based on sense-perception (τὸ ἓν μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον πλείω δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, *Metaph*. A.5 $986^{b}26$–34). Elsewhere, Aristotle even appears to associate Parmenides with those who 'going beyond sense-perception (*aisthêsis*) and disregarding it on the grounds that one should follow reason (*logos*), declared that the All is one and unmoved' (*GC* 1.8 $325^{a}13$ff).[70] Perhaps, then, when Aristotle includes Parmenides among those who admitted only perceptible objects in their ontology, he has in mind strictly the author of *Doxa*.

Parmenides, as we noted, uses cognitive rather than perceptual language in B16. Were Aristotle and Theophrastus, then, simply wrong to see him as assimilating sense-perception and cognition? Provided that, again, when interpreting B16 they mean by 'Parmenides' the author of *Doxa* – and both Aristotle and Theophrastus were sensitive to the distinction between the two parts of the poem[71] – the answer would seem to be more complicated. First, the lost passage that dealt with the ability of corpses to experience cold and silence, and their inability to experience sound, heat and warmth, indicates that the theory covers also what falls under 'sense-perception'. Second, the two sensible elements of *Doxa* (Light/Night, Hot/Cold, Rare/Dense, Lightweight/Heavy, etc.) – discriminated in accordance with their sensible aspects (ἐκρίναντο δέμας, B8.55) – are both that by which we humans cognise and what we cognise. The things by which and of which humans *qua* humans are fundamentally aware are therefore, in

[70] Laks (1999) 257–8 observes these tensions. On the related Peripatetic statements – or complaints – that Parmenides 'identified soul and mind', see Ch. 5.2.

[71] See Ch. 4.5; cf. Mansfeld (1996) 166, 174–5; Coxon (2009) 381.

a way, perceptual. Finally, the goddess associates an uncritical use of sensory experiences with the mental habits of the mortals whom she criticises in *Alêtheia* (B7.3–6):

> μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω, 3
> νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχήεσσαν ἀκουήν
> καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον 5
> ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.
>
> *Nor let habit born of long experience force you along this way,*
> *To wield an aimless eye and echoing ear*
> *And tongue, but judge by reasoning the much-contested examination*
> *Spoken by me.*

The references to 'eye', 'ear' and 'tongue' clearly connote sensory experiences. Since the goddess's warnings here elaborate her injunction to withstand the mortal 'habit' (ἔθος), however, she may well target more broadly also the assumptions and categories which structure the mortal world view. Her reference to the 'tongue' (γλῶσσαν), in particular, could suggest a language, which is structured by terms such as 'perish' and 'locomote' (we will discuss the importance of mortal 'naming' in Chapter 4.4).[72] The goddess associates an uncritical and unreflective acquiescence in sensory experiences with the mortals' misguided world view. Her description of the wayward mortals as 'at once deaf and blind' (κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοί τε, B6.7) plays with this theme, recasting the mortals' unreflective use of sight and hearing as a kind of figurative blindness and deafness. Parmenides creatively appropriates here a common Greek *topos* of associating the *loss* of sensory capacities with the attainment of extraordinary wisdom or skill and of recasting literal blindness as figurative sight. We may think of the blind poet Demodocus (the Muse 'deprived him of his eyes, but gave him sweet song', *Od*. 8.63–4) and of the blind Teiresias whose mind (*phrenes*) and understanding (*noos*) were steadfast even in death (*Od*. 10.493; cf. *Od*. 12.267). In her description of the wayward mortals as deaf and blind, the goddess gives us the other side of the coin, recasting literal sight and hearing as figurative blindness and deafness. We find similar rhetorical moves in Epicharmus' adage that 'the mind

[72] See Mansfeld (1999), 331–3. But I cannot accept Mansfeld's negative contention – followed by Robbiano (2006) 97–8; Bredlow (2011) 232–3 – that with 'eye', 'ear' and 'tongue' Parmenides in no way connotes sensory experiences.

(*nous*) sees and the mind hears; everything else is deaf and blind' (κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά, DK23 B12) and in Prometheus' remarks on the state of mortals prior to his blessings: 'seeing they saw in vein, hearing they did not hearken' (βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην, κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, Aeschylus, *Pr.* 447–8).[73]

Now, none of these points mean that Parmenides categorically denigrates sensory experiences. Perceptual observations permeate *Doxa*'s accounts and are essential for our understanding of the origins, natures and behaviours of Doxastic things and processes. But perceptual observations are not the means by which one arrives at knowledge of what-is, of the unshaken heart of reality.[74] If we acquiesce in our sensory experiences uncritically and unreflectively (if we apply an 'aimless eye' or an 'echoing ear'), then such experiences will fortify further the entrenched habits of mortal thinking and lead us away from such knowledge. Again, none of the points made above imply that Parmenides himself elaborated a theory, or even clearly isolated the category, of 'sense-perception' as such.[75] We need not even interpret Theophrastus (or Aristotle, for that matter) as asserting otherwise, the title of his *On the Senses* notwithstanding. Theophrastus' remark, 'for he speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same thing' (*Sens.* 4.1), can be taken to indicate his own exegetical analysis of B16: *Parmenides does not demarcate here what we, as Peripatetics, would distinguish as (i) the perceptual activities of the soul and (ii) the cognitive activities of that distinct part of the soul, the mind.*[76]

Let us take stock. Parmenides identifies as the essence and conceptual basis of *Doxa*'s cosmology a demarcation, or *krisis*, between

[73] See also Herac. DK22 B34. Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrranus* is the *locus classicus* for this conceptual dynamic of sight and blindness, see Goldhill (1986). Note also the blind seer Euenius of Apollonia in Hdt. 9.92–4. For blind seers and poets, see further Ustinova (2009) 168–76; Petridou (2015) 214–16. On the complex and diverse associations between sight, blindness, insight, ignorance, transgression and punishment in Greek literature and art, see Coo (2016). For divination as figurative 'sight', cf. also Aesch. *Pr.* 499 ('I opened their eyes': ἐξωμμάτωσα). For figurative 'blindness' as the inability to divine, see e.g. Plato *Tim.* 72b9-c1 (τυφλόν) and, echoing Epicharmus' adage, Plut. *de Soll. Animal.* 975b11 (κωφὰ πάντα καὶ τυφλὰ τῆς προνοίας).

[74] On this point, see similarly Frère (2011), 140, 144–5; cf. Laks (1999) 261–2.

[75] Something which Mansfeld (1999) 342–4 rightly questions.

[76] For λέγειν ὡς in the sense of 'regard as', cf. Aesch. *Ag.* 672 (λέγουσιν ἡμᾶς ὡς ὀλωλότας). See along similar lines Verdenius (1964) 16; cf. also Mansfeld (1964) 172; Laks (1999) 256.

two enantiomorphic elements with respect to their perceptual features (δέμας). By a brute, physiological necessity, human cognition functions in accordance with this very same *krisis*. Conversely, *Alêtheia*'s argumentation and its concept of the homogeneous what-is is framed by the qualitatively different *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not'. We could not maintain and think in terms of both sorts of demarcations (*kriseis*) at one and the same time.

The human mind is analysed in terms of mixtures between Hot and Cold and in accordance with the principle of like-by-like. Cognition of, and in terms of, the two enantiomorphic elements occurs in the human mind passively and ineluctably. The tendency of mortals to think in accordance with the Doxastic *krisis*, to recognise Doxastic things and form first-order judgements with respect to them (e.g. 'this person moves', 'this corpse is cold'), is a function of the very constitution of their cognitive apparatus. Consisting of Hot and Cold, we think Hot and Cold and in terms of Hot and Cold (Light and Night, Rare and Dense, Lightweight and Heavy, etc.). 'Perception' in *Doxa* is thus not merely of sensible qualities narrowly construed, but of cosmic principles and elements. In perceiving trees and humans, what we perceive are the elements of which they consist; one does not simply feel warm, one perceives mixtures of Hot and Cold.[77]

In B16, Parmenides thus identifies, and couches in a cognitive theory, what at bottom may seem a rather plausible insight: the human mind cannot avoid experiencing, recognising and generating judgements with regard to a multiplicity of heterogeneous things, which display such perceptual processes as generation and locomotion. Parmenides could no more simply *discard* such judgements than he could permanently *switch off* such experiences.

4.4 Ineluctability and Volition in the Mortal's Relation to *Doxa*

It is, then, an ineluctable necessity for the human mind to think in terms of the same contrasts between sensory opposites which underpin also the cosmology of *Doxa*. But what follows from

[77] For this last point, cf. von Fritz (1974) 50–1.

this? What precisely is up to the mortal and what is not up to him? No simple inference can be made from the unavoidability of Doxastic cognition for the human mind to Parmenides' motivations for the composition and inclusion of *Doxa*. Our evidence presents us with a complex mixture of implications. The goddess not only emphasises the epistemic ineluctability of Doxastic thought for all humans, but also encourages the *kouros* precisely to keep his guard from such thought. I do not suggest that Parmenides' conception of the ineluctability of Doxastic cognition for the mortal *qua* mortal led him simply to acquiesce in such cognition uncritically and unqualifiedly. I suggest, rather, that this conception best explains why and how Parmenides *both* develops and advances his theories of Doxastic things as accounts of Doxastic things *and* keeps those theories at arm's length. Put differently, it best explains why the *kouros* must learn also mortal beliefs (βροτῶν δόξας), but after and in the light of *Alêtheia*. To establish this explanation, we must explore further the ways in which the mortal's relation to Doxastic thought is and is not up to him.

The recurrent image of wandering in Parmenides further accentuates the problem. The human mind is associated with a 'wandering' frame: 'As on each occasion is the mixture of much-wandering limbs (μελέων πολυπλάγκτων), so is mind present to humans' (B16.1–2). This image closely recalls the wandering mind of the wandering mortals berated by the goddess (B6.4–6):

> ἦν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
> πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
> στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλαγκτὸν νόον.
>
> [The way] *on which indeed mortals, knowing nothing*,
> *Wander, double-headed; for helplessness in their*
> *Breasts directs their wandering mind.*

We may recall also the goddess's remark that the mortals have 'gone astray' (πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν, B8.54).[78] As Mourelatos (2008*a*) has taught us, we must not dismiss such verbal echoes

[78] Cf. *Od*. 20.195: 'the gods bring to misery far-wandering men' (πολυπλάγκτους ἀνθρώπους). The connection between the images of wandering in B6, B8.54 and B16 has long been observed, see e.g. Reinhardt (1974) 307; Fränkel (1975*a*) 17–18; Vlastos (1946) 69; Verdenius (1964) 7–8; Long (1996) 147; Torgerson (2006) 28.

as accidental. In this case, the recurrent image of wandering impels us to ask how, and in what sense, the *kouros* can avoid the mortal wandering criticised by the goddess. After all, it is precisely the same kind of inconstant, helpless wandering cognition, which B16 pronounces a physiological fact for the human mind, that characterises in *Alêtheia* also the human mind whose example the goddess exhorts the *kouros*, and vicariously his audience, to avoid. The goddess nowhere qualifies her recurrent references to 'mortals' (B6.4; B1.30; B8.39, 51–5; B16.2–3; B19.3). Her remarks in B6.4–6 refer to mortals in quite a general way and not to some very particular, small subset of mortals. This is confirmed by her emphasis in B16 that her analysis of the human mind, as determined by the varying mixtures of its much-wandering limbs, pertains universally to every human agent on every occasion of human thinking: 'as on each occasion (ὡς γὰρ ἑκάστοτ') ... in all humans and in each' (καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί, B16.1, 4).[79] In what sense, then, can the *kouros* avoid the error of human 'wandering'? To what extent and in what respect is the mortal's relation to Doxastic cognition up to him?

In *Alêtheia*, the goddess denies that such features as coming-to-be, perishing, locomotion and heterogeneous differentiation characterise what-is, the unshaken heart of reality (B8.3–7, 21 (γένεσις ... ὄλεθρος), 26–8, 41). But such phenomena and processes are built into the very idea of 'mortals'. The notion of mortals involves processes and properties like coming-to-be and heterogeneous differentiation no less than any supposition about such processes and properties that may be affirmed by mortals. One thing which we cannot say, then, is that the mortals make a deliberate and avoidable choice to experience and recognise a heterogeneous plurality of things, which come into being and perish. The processes of differentiation, coming-into-being and

[79] Parmenides' language in B6 echoes remarks in Theognis, again on mortals in general (139–41): ' ... the constraints of grievous helplessness (πείρατ' ἀμηχανίης) hold one back. But we humans have vein thoughts, knowing nothing (μάταια νομίζομεν, εἰδότες οὐδέν)'; for the reminiscence, see Torgerson (2006) 33. For the view that B6 refers to mortals in a general way, see further Reinhardt (1974) 301; Jaeger (1947) 101; Guthrie (1965) 23–4; Montiglio (2000) 149; Nehamas (2002) 56 (arguing persuasively against identifying Heraclitus as the goddess's target), contra e.g. Nietzsche (1974) 122; Coxon (2009) 300, 381–2; Dueso (2011) 282; Frère (2011); Miller (2011) 45.

perishing are logically prior to the very possibility of *mortals* choosing to do anything at all. Nor, moreover, could the mortals' deliberate and avoidable error be a choice to think in terms of *Doxa*'s principles or to form first-order judgements over others (e.g. 'this corpse is cold and not warm') with respect to the many things which they experience and recognise. As we saw, Parmenides' theory of human cognition renders not only the experience and recognition of heterogeneous plural things, but also the adoption and generation of judgements with respect to them, a passive function of a physiological apparatus that characterises each and every mortal agent.

We must address at this point an objection which would no doubt be raised against this last claim. The objection runs as follows. Since the theory of human cognition adumbrated in B16 comes from *Doxa*, it is deceptive and therefore should not worry us in the first place regarding its implication that mortal cognitive agents must think in terms of *Doxa*'s principles and generate and maintain judgements with regard to heterogeneous things.[80]

We can begin to address this objection by taking a closer look at the goddess's characterisation of *Doxa* as 'deceptive' and at some of her other programmatic comments with regard to the cosmology. The goddess introduces *Doxa* pointedly after, and in the light of, the conclusion of her ontological arguments in B8 concerning the properties of what-is (B8.50–2):

> ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα 50
> ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
> μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων. 52
>
> *Here I conclude for you the trustworthy account and understanding*
> *Concerning true reality; from this point on learn mortal opinions,*
> *Hearing the deceptive order of my words.*

The deceptiveness of the goddess's cosmological account (ἀπατηλόν), then, is contrasted, not with alternative accounts of the same things (mortals, stars, etc.), but with the account of what-is in *Alêtheia*. Through this contrast, the goddess implies that, having learned the account in *Alêtheia*, the *kouros* is now in a position to recognise the ensuing deceptiveness. This again

[80] For examples of such attitudes to B16, see Ch. 5.1.

indicates that the following cosmological theories are deceptive, not in their *internal* details, e.g. in the way in which *Doxa*'s embryology describes and explains embryos – for why should the *kouros* be placed any better to recognise that sort of deceptiveness? – but rather in their potential to mislead wayward mortals, who are ignorant of the account of what-is adumbrated in *Alêtheia*, into mistaking them for accounts which get at and disclose the nature of ultimate reality. As we shall presently see in detail, mortals are misled in just this way when, in their ignorance of 'the unshaken heart of reality', they think that categories like coming-to-be, perishing and locomotion capture reality (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, B8.39). As Nehamas puts it: 'The *Doxa* is deceptive not because of its specific contents but because of the way its contents have been (and are likely to be) interpreted.'[81] Again, it is because *Doxa*'s theories are essentially incapable of disclosing the unshaken heart of reality (*alêtheiês*, B1.29) – i.e. what-is and its properties – that they can be said to lack *true* or *real* trust (*pistis alêthês*, B1.30). In relation to this lack of 'real trust' in *Doxa*'s accounts, we may also advance a further consideration. The changeable and untidy things and processes which constitute the proper objects of the cosmological inquiries in *Doxa* simply do not allow for the same sort of firm and steadfast apprehension which *is* afforded by the markedly distinct, deductive arguments in *Alêtheia* concerning the nature and properties of the unshaken heart of reality. The cosmological inquiries into the origins, natures and behaviours of, for example, stars and mortals do not lend themselves in the same way to the sheer, pure reliability and steadfastness of apprehension to which the deductive study of what-is does lend itself.[82]

Neither in her remark on the deceptiveness of *Doxa* nor in her comment on 'real trust' does the goddess undermine the status of *Doxa*'s cosmological accounts *as accounts of Doxastic things and processes*. In fact, the goddess confirms this status in another important, programmatic statement. As we already had occasion to note (Chapter 4.1), the goddess promises the *kouros*, thrice

[81] Nehamas (2002) 59; cf. similarly Johansen (2016) 20.
[82] With this last point concerning the absence of πίστις ἀληθής in *Doxa*'s accounts, I follow Palmer (2009) 92, 167–75.

within five lines, knowledge of Doxastic things and processes: 'you will know … you will learn … you will know' (εἴσῃ … πεύσῃ … εἰδήσεις, B10). The goddess tells the *kouros* that he will come to know and understand the nature of aether, the celestial bodies, the functions of the sun and their source, the nature, motions and functions of the moon, the source of the heaven, and how necessity constrained it to hold the limits of the stars.[83] The programmatic employment of epistemic vocabulary with respect to Doxastic things reflects the assumption that accounts pertaining to such things can describe them correctly or incorrectly and, furthermore, that the accounts advanced in *Doxa* do so correctly.[84] The cosmology in the second part of the poem is intended to expound correctly the origins, natures and behaviours of the multiple and heterogeneous things and processes that serve as its objects of inquiry by tracing those things and processes to (interactions between) the two constitutive principles which underlie them. Thus, for example, the proposition that the moon's light is a reflection of the sun's (B14–15) accounts for the moon and the source of its light correctly, in a way that competing accounts, e.g. the proposition that the moon is a ring of fire (Anaximander, DK12 A11.5) or an incandescent disk of air (Anaximenes, DK13 A7.4), do not. B10 thus corroborates the foregoing interpretation of the deceptiveness of *Doxa* and confirms what is already suggested independently by the comprehensive scope, the systematic nature and the detail of Parmenides' cosmological inquiries (see Chapter 4.1) and what is generally assumed in the ancient doxography: *Doxa* represents Parmenides' *own views* of Doxastic things. As the late ancient commentator John Philoponus rightly insists: 'for also in the sections pertaining to opinion (ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν), he wrote what seemed the case *to him*' (τὰ αὐτῷ δοκοῦντα ἔγραφεν, *in Ph.* 16.22.6–7 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 193).

Let us consider, lastly, the goddess's final introductory remarks on *Doxa* (B8.60–1):

[83] From DK onwards, most editors consider B10 part of the introduction to *Doxa*. Laks (2003) 17, n.32 rightly observes that, equally, it could have followed B1 as part of the goddess's initial programmatic introduction of both parts of the poem.

[84] See similarly Vlastos (2008) 376–7; cf. Guthrie (1965) 51; Palmer (2009) 180.

τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ.

This ordering of things, eoikota and entire [or: *entirely eoikota*], *I relate to you*, *So that no judgement of mortals will ever overtake you.*

The term which I rendered 'overtake' (παρελάσσῃ) derives from the Homeric vocabulary for chariot races. It signifies, not merely the notion of passing by, but of driving past one in a race.[85] The goddess promises the *kouros* that no mortal judgement will 'outstrip' him after he learns the cosmology which follows.[86] *Doxa*'s cosmology endows the *kouros* with a systematic knowledge and understanding of every aspect of the changing and heterogeneous plurality in which mortal life takes place, spanning, in its comprehensive scope, universal cosmology, cosmogony, astronomy, geography, theogony, anthropogony, reproduction, embryology, cognition, etc. (recall Chapter 4.1). It is the best possible, unsurpassable account of all such subjects of inquiry. More difficult is the goddess's description of *Doxa*'s cosmic order (διάκοσμον) as '*eoikota*' or '*eoikota* in its entirety' (ἐοικότα πάντα). The adjective is tantalisingly ambiguous and has been variously taken to mean, among other things, 'accurate', 'appropriate', 'fitting', 'plausible' and 'specious'. After a comprehensive discussion, Bryan concludes that, in our analysis of this term, we must allow for the interrelation of different senses on different levels of interpretation.[87] We can accommodate this semantic insight concerning *eoikota* and relate the term to the interpretation of *Doxa* which we established above on the basis of other evidence. *Doxa*'s cosmology can be entirely accurate and appropriate, insofar as it correctly expounds the natures of Doxastic things and affords one an understanding of such things. But it is also misleading or treacherous in its appearance precisely in the same respect that it is 'deceptive', i.e. insofar as it is liable to be mistaken by ignorant mortals for an account which gets at and discloses the nature of fundamental reality.

[85] Cf. *Il.* 23.382 (παρέλασσ'), 638 (παρήλασαν).
[86] I will suggest in Ch. 4.5 that, by 'judgement of mortals', the goddess refers here, not to any judgement formed by a mortal, but to a kind of judgement which is distinctive of mortal cognition.
[87] Bryan (2012) 58–113.

In sum, we can meet and defuse the objection that, since the theory of human cognition in B16 comes from *Doxa*, it is 'deceptive' and, therefore, should have no bearing on our understanding of Parmenides as a mortal cognitive agent. This theory of human cognition is, in fact, one component of a comprehensive and systematic cosmology, which is intended to endow the *kouros* with knowledge and understanding of the origins, natures and behaviours of Doxastic things and processes. Above all, however, the objection is vacuous because the theory of mortal cognition advanced in B16 is no more or less 'deceptive' than the very notion of Parmenides as a *mortal* cognitive agent (and, therefore, as a thing which essentially involves coming-into-being, perishing, locomotion and internal differentiation), to whom the goddess speaks *as* a mortal cognitive agent, and whose knowledge and beliefs we are trying to explain.

We thus return to the question with which we began this section: in what sense *can* the *kouros* avoid the error of human wandering and human cognition? The human activity of 'naming' discloses an illuminating sense in which the relation of the criticised mortals to *Doxa* involves an active and avoidable act of assent over and above the inexorable deliverances of physiological mechanisms. When introducing *Doxa*, the goddess states that the mortals *resolved* to name the two Doxastic elements (κατέθεντο … ὀνομάζειν) and she represents this action as an avoidable error ('this is where they have gone astray', B8.53–4). Furthermore, she concludes *Doxa* (see Simplicius, *in Cael*. 7.558.8) with the following words (B19):

οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυν ἔασι 1
καὶ μετέπειτ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα·
τοῖς δ' ὄνομ' ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ' ἐπίσημον ἑκάστῳ. 3

In this way, then, in accordance with belief, all these things grew and now are
And hereafter from this point they will end once they received their sustenance;
And upon them humans laid down a name, a mark to each one.

The goddess concludes the cosmology with a summary of suppositions, which are held with regard to Doxastic things, and with the closely related assertion that mortals have laid down a name distinguishing each one. 'Naming' the two Doxastic elements

and each Doxastic thing is, then, identified as the fundamental mortal error (B8.54) and associated with an index of Doxastic suppositions (B19). It is clear, therefore, that with the term 'naming' (*onomazein*) Parmenides indicates not the noncommittal labelling of an item, but something stronger and more technical. When glossing Parmenides' word *onomazein* with the English term 'naming' we must thus always have this stronger sense in mind – whatever precisely it turns out to be. We should note, moreover, that, while Parmenides' peculiar notion of naming is distinctive, the very strength of his usage is not itself idiosyncratic. Greek authors often approach names as involved and ideally illuminating descriptions of their referents, rather than mere labels. Hesiod, for example, explains that the Titans were so named because they strained or exerted (*titainontas*) themselves in their wickedness (*Th.* 207–10; cf. also *Th.* 144–5, 234–5, 281–3). Heraclitus also makes much of names. For him, names are always both significant and deficient: if properly interpreted, they yield some insight into the natures of their referents, but they never properly manage to express the complex and unified natures of the things they name. Thus, for example, the name of the bow gives us an insight only into one of the two opposites whose collaboration and unity is manifest in the bow: 'The name of the bow is life (*bios*), but its work is death' (DK22 B48; cf. B32, B67).[88]

What, then, are the particular implications of mortal 'naming' for Parmenides? The following passage from *Alêtheia* helps elucidate the point (B8.36^{b}-41):

> οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται 36
> ἄλλο πάρεξ[89] τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ' ἐπέδησεν
> οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ' ἔμεναι· τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται,

[88] For the general Greek conception of a name as 'an appropriate and illuminating description', cf. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 183–7. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 221 observes that Parmenides' goddess employs 'to name' repeatedly 'with interpretive-epistemic force'. On the significance of names for Hesiod, see also Clay (2003) 160–1. On Heraclitus, see further Kirk (1962) 116–22; Rowett (2013) 180–7; Tor (2016) 103–4.

[89] 'Besides', 'except'; see LSJ. *sv.* παρέκ. I know of no parallel for πάρεξ in the sense '(different) *from*' affirmed for this passage by de Rijk (1983) 43. Tarán (1965) 128–9 compellingly defends this text of B8.36–7 against Coxon's οὐδὲ χρόνος ἔστιν κτλ, which is intrinsically baffling and incongruous to the surrounding context; cf. also Palmer (2009) 385.

ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, 40
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

For nothing else either is or will be
Beside what-is, for Fate shackled it
To be whole and unchanging. All things will be its name,
As many as mortals laid down, believing them to be real,
Both coming to be and perishing, both being and not-being,[90]
And altering place and exchanging bright colour.

We will return to this passage, and ask how precisely we might interpret the goddess's statement that 'nothing else either is or will be beside what-is', when we come to explore the ontological question in Chapter 5.5. We can already temper in passing, however, any inclination to infer from this statement that Doxastic things – including mortals – are categorically non-existent illusions. Such an inference would render the passage incoherent. If Doxastic things were simply non-existent, then there would be nothing there to generate or experience the 'illusion' of such processes as changing place or perishing, let alone to name such things. Our focus at this juncture, however, is on the mortal activity of 'naming' and on the way in which the goddess relates it here to the true nature of ultimate reality.

Scholars traditionally assumed that the reading of the Greek text of B8.38[b] given here (τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ' ἔσται) required the translation: 'therefore, all those things will be a (mere) name' (with τῷ as an inferential particle, as in B8.25). It was then rightly objected that this construal requires the supplement 'mere', for which the Greek affords no indication.[91] A much more natural rendering of this Greek text, however, would be: 'all things will be its name' (interpreting τῷ as a demonstrative pronoun referring to the

[90] Since both pairs in B8.40 are linked with τε καί, each pair represents a compound name, whose two components are taken (by the mortals who are laying down these names) to be interdependent; cf. similarly Vlastos (2008) 368, n.4; Fränkel (1975*a*) 34. At any rate, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί *must* signify the compound name 'both being and not-being'. 'Not-being' alone is 'without name' (ἀνώνυμον, B8.17) and 'being' (εἶναι) could hardly have been isolated for naming by the ignorant mortals, who, given Parmenides' strong notion of 'naming', would have thus successfully recognised what-is; cf. similarly Furley (1973) 7, n.23.

[91] E.g. Woodbury (1971) 145; Furley (1973) 7, n.22; Long (1975) 88; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 181 (his views in 1970); Graham (2010) 238; cf. Reinhardt (1974) 303; Cornford (1933) 101; Minar (1949) 42.

nominee, i.e. what-is; cf. τό in B8.37). This would be in keeping with a familiar grammatical construction, as in the Homeric line: 'let his name be Odysseus' (τῷ δ' Ὀδυσεὺς ὄνομ' ἔστω, *Od.* 19.409; cf. *h.Hom.* 5.198).[92] Given the translation 'all things will be its name', the philosophical divergence between this construal and the alternative and less likely reading of the Greek – τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται ('to it all things will be named') – narrows considerably. On both texts, the goddess identifies what-is as the *true* referent of mortal names.[93] But why is she doing so? Importantly, the goddess's epexegetic remark, 'believing them to be real' (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ), renders explicit what is implicit in her comments on mortal naming in B8.54 and B19.3. The mortal resolution to establish names (ὄνομ' ἔσται, | ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο) for such phenomena as both coming-to-be and perishing, both being and not-being, locomotion and chromatic change constitutes far more than noncommittal labelling. By resolving to establish such names as real, true or genuine (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ), the mortals reflect the conviction that, e.g. 'Hot', 'coming-to-be' and 'locomotion' are to be embraced as categories which can get at, reflect and disclose the true nature of ultimate reality (*alêtheiê*). The mortals' resolve to name Doxastic things and processes in this way thus rests on and betrays ignorance of what-is, which problematises such naming. Once one recognises the homogeneous and unchanging what-is as exclusively what the unshaken heart of reality comprises, one also recognises the deceptiveness of the conviction that the sensory contrast anchoring *Doxa*'s cosmology could underpin an account which gets at and expounds, not merely the origins, natures and behaviours of those things which constitute its proper objects (stars, people, embryos, etc.), but the fundamental, core nature of

[92] Following Kingsley (2003) 190–1; Mourelatos (2008*c*) 386–7.

[93] The reading τῷ πάντ' ὀνόμασται, defended by Woodbury (1971) and Vlastos (2008), is philologically implausible. ὀνομάζειν nowhere takes a dative as the nominee without the use of ἐπί: Woodbury's alleged parallels (149) all involve (as conceded by Vlastos (2008) 379; Furley (1973) 7, n.22) either ἐπί or the noun ὄνομα coupled with τίθεσθαι identifying the dative as the nominee. Cf. the criticisms in Mourelatos (2008*c*) 386; Meijer (1997) 177, n.941. More damningly, coupling the dative τῷ with a passive perfect (ὀνόμασται) suggests a dative of agent, which – as Mourelatos (2008*c*) 386 observes – would yield the absurd result: 'by it [sc. what-is] all those [sc. names] have been named'.

reality (what-is). The goddess tells us that, in fact, what-is is the only possible referent for categories which purport to get at and capture the nature of ultimate reality.

Consistently, therefore, the mortal activity of naming (*onomazein*) involves not merely the noncommittal labelling of the two Doxastic elements (B8.54), Doxastic things (B19.3) and Doxastic processes (B8.40–1). Rather, it involves the active, objectionable and avoidable resolve (κατέθεντο, B8.39, 53; B19.3) to embrace such labels as categories which, when applied in the context of a cosmological account, get at, reflect and disclose the fundamental nature of reality (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ). In B9 we read:

> αὐτὰρ ἐπειδὴ πάντα φάος καὶ νὺξ ὀνόμασται
> καὶ τὰ κατὰ σφετέρας δυνάμεις ἐπὶ τοῖσί τε καὶ τοῖς,
> πᾶν πλέον ἐστὶν ὁμοῦ φάεος καὶ νυκτὸς ἀφάντου.
>
> *But since all things have been named light and night,*
> *And the things corresponding to their powers have*
> *been given as names to these things and to those,*
> *All is full of light and unseen night together.*

We could not coherently take this passage to mean that, by naming the two elements, mortals have literally generated the heterogeneous plurality experienced by them. It is only given and within a context of heterogeneous plurality that *mortals* (essentially heterogeneous and differentiated things that they are) could choose to do anything at all.[94] Rather, the goddess's dense statements here seem to summarise her earlier, more expansive disquisitions concerning mortal naming. The first line ('But since … light and night') recapitulates her remarks on the mortals' foundational resolve to name the two basic, enantiomorphic elements (B8. 53–9). The second line ('And the things … and to those') recapitulates her remarks on the mortals' resolve to name such further processes as 'coming-to-be' and 'changing place' (B8.38^{b}-41) and makes explicit that such processes – and indeed all events and processes on the level of everyday phenomena – are traced to, and explained in terms of, interactions between the two

[94] See similarly Cornford (1933) 110; contrast Reinhardt (1974) 296–7, 308; Mansfeld (1964) 215–21; Woodbury (1986) 8.

fundamental elements.[95] The goddess's remarks in B9.1–2 thus recall and cohere with her strong use of 'naming' elsewhere in the poem. The third line can be read from two perspectives. For the informed *kouros*, who approaches *Doxa* after and in the light of *Alêtheia*, the appropriate consequence to draw is that the totality of Doxastic things – the entire heterogeneous multiplicity which exhibits change and internal differentiations – comprises and is traced to the two elements. For the wayward mortals, who are ignorant of what-is and who mistake the principles and categories of the cosmology for the principles and categories of an account that gives us the nature of ultimate reality, the 'all' (*pan*) which is traced to Light and Night would be truly exhaustive of all things which are there for one to learn and to inquire about.[96]

In sum, Parmenides, as a mortal, is constrained to experience and to recognise a plurality of changing and heterogeneous things. Equally, he is also constrained to think through, and in terms of, the ubiquitous contrast between the two fundamental sensory opposites in all their perceptual aspects (Light/Night, Hot/Cold, etc.) and to generate first-order judgements with regard to multiple, changing, heterogeneous things. At the same time, the *kouros* is encouraged to learn mortal beliefs precisely after and in the light of *Alêtheia*. To be

[95] In this interpretation of how B9.1–2 relates to B8.53–9 and to B8.38^{b}-41, I follow Palmer (2009) 171–4.

[96] Cf. B1.28^{b}-30: 'but it is right for you to learn [or: 'inquire about'] all things (πάντα πυθέσθαι), both . . . and . . . '; B10: 'you will know . . . you will learn . . . you will know'. Since Parmenides describes not-being, *as opposed* to being, as 'without name' (ἀνώνυμον, B8.17), he could not have maintained a categorically pejorative attitude towards naming as such, as noted by Vlastos (2008) 377–8, contra e.g. Loenen (1959) 39–40 with n.68; Verdenius (1949) 130; Diels (1887) 251, n.1. This point, however, in no way undercuts the goddess's consistently critical attitude towards *mortal* naming. In B8.40, the mortals name *both* 'being' and 'not-being': they do not manage to name 'being' alone: see n.90 above; contrast Vlastos (2008) 378, inconsistently with 368, n.4. The so-called 'Cornford fragment', 'it is sole, unchanging; the All has the name "being"' (οἷον, ἀκίνητον τελέθει· τῷ παντὶ ὄνομ' εἶναι, Pl. *Tht*. 180e1, with Cornford (1935) 122), thus coheres with my discussion of the goddess's attitude to *mortal* naming. That said, there is no strong reason to ascribe the statement to Parmenides himself. Plato's follow-up comment on the statement, 'and all the other things which Melissuses and Parmenideses affirm in their opposition to all these people [sc. Heraclitean flux thinkers]', does not, given its generality and especially Plato's ordering of the names, suggest a verbatim quotation of Parmenides, although it could certainly explain how Simplicius wrongly came to present the statement as such (*in Ph*. 9.29.18, 143.10). Arguments for authenticity are necessarily speculative: Cornford (1935) 122–3; (1934) 94, n.1; Woodbury (1971) 148–9; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 185–8.

sure, by hearing the cosmology which makes up the second part of the poem, the *kouros* will gain knowledge and understanding of the origins, natures and behaviours of Doxastic things and processes (such as, among many other things, the nature and workings of human cognition). But, aware as he is of the true nature of 'the unshaken heart of reality', the *kouros* will also be in a position to recognise the 'deceptiveness' of the goddess's account of *Doxa*. That is, he will be able to avoid the mortals' error of mistaking this sort of cosmological account for an account which gets at and discloses the nature of what-is, of ultimate reality.

Before we proceed to weave together the strands of this chapter into an answer to the aetiological question (Chapter 4.5), we should address the goddess's final couplet in the proem as it has come down to us. These two lines are especially beset by ambiguities and difficulties, and no translation or interpretation of them could be remotely certain. Nonetheless, a consideration of some ways in which we may interpret these concluding remarks will pertain to, and help to underscore further, some of the themes which we discussed above. After the goddess informs the *kouros* that he must learn both the heart of reality and mortal beliefs, she adds (B1.31–2):

> ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
> χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.
>
> *But, nonetheless, you shall learn these things too,*
> *how for the things that seem and are accepted*
> *It was* [or: *would have been*] *right to be accep-*
> *tably, all of them traversing across everything.*

Several aspects of this translation are tentative and uncertain, and several others require some argumentation and elucidation. What is the reference of 'these things too' (καὶ ταῦτα)? How exactly should we interpret and translate the cognate words *ta dokounta* and *dokimôs* (here rendered respectively 'the things that seem and are accepted' and 'acceptably')? Should we construe *chrên* as a past obligation ('how it was right') or a past counterfactual ('how it would have been right')?[97]

[97] Also, should we indeed read περῶντα ('all of them *traversing* across everything') or περ ὄντα ('all of them altogether *indeed being*')?

The words 'but, nonetheless, you shall learn these things too' come immediately after the goddess declares that Parmenides must learn mortal beliefs 'in which there is no real trust'. This progression clearly indicates that 'these things' refers back to mortal beliefs, which the mortal shall learn despite their lack of 'real trust'.[98]

Mourelatos highlights the emphatic *figura etymologica* in *dokounta* … *dokimôs*, and the prominence of the notion of acceptance in *dok-* words (whose stem is related to the δεκ- of δεκ(/χ)ομαι). He thus construes the *dokounta* as 'accepted' things, rejecting entirely the sense 'appearing'.[99] Such a surgical distinction seems too neat. As Mourelatos himself concedes, 'the two expressions δοκεῖ μοι and φαίνεταί μοι have a tendency to converge and mimic one another.'[100] The *dokounta* are perhaps best thought of as signifying, more inclusively and in a unified manner, the things which seem to mortals and are accepted by them.[101] The 'things that seem and are accepted' would presumably be the things which comprise the subject matter of 'the beliefs of mortals', i.e. Doxastic things and processes quite generally (stars, people, coming-to-be, locomotion, etc.). Importantly, however, the connotation of 'appearing' in the term *dokounta* in no way suggests that, through this designation, Doxastic things are somehow reduced to categorically non-existent 'illusions'. Rather, the term underscores that mortals (who, we must remember, themselves essentially comprise Doxastic things no less than anything with which they interact) experience, register and form judgements

[98] Contra Mourelatos (2008*a*) 209, therefore, we cannot take B1.31–2 to express the injunction to learn some third item over and above what-is and mortal beliefs. In his gloss, 'you shall learn about truth *and* about opinions; but, nevertheless, you shall learn this also … ', Mourelatos omits the pertinent interjection 'in which there is no real trust'. On this point, cf. Cordero (2011) 107–8. It is independently implausible to interpret ταῦτα as a *further* item to what has already been described as an exhaustive programme of study (πάντα, B1.28[b]). ταῦτα can take δόξας as its antecedent. The gender discrepancy is no obstacle, see LSJ. sv. οὗτος BII.3. This need imply neither that ὡς … περῶντα expresses mortal beliefs as articulated by the mortals themselves (as Owen (1960) 88–9 implies, and Clark (1969) 21 rightly denies) nor that in ὡς … περῶντα the goddess is speaking from within the framework of *Doxa* rather than commenting on it from an external perspective (as Mourelatos (2008*a*) 209–10, n.46 assumes when criticising Owen).

[99] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 194–200. [100] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 199; cf. Kahn (1973) 393–4.

[101] Cf. Clark (1969) 19–20. I am not suggesting a 'fusion of the two senses' (questioned by Mourelatos (2008*a*) 195, n.5), but the absence of a strict demarcation between them.

about all the things and processes that appear to them, i.e. all those things that simply present themselves to the human mind. Furthermore, we saw above that it is by perceptual things and of perceptual things that humans *qua* humans are, by physiological necessity, aware. In that respect, we can also say that 'the things which seem' appear to us in perceptual ways: they comprise sensory objects and processes (ultimately, interactions of Light and Night) and are registered through sensory cognitive mechanisms. This is not to say, however, that the term *dokounta* itself serves to highlight the sensory nature of our experience of 'the things which seem and are accepted'.

The *kouros* shall learn how, for the things which seem and are accepted, 'it was right [or: it would have been right] to be acceptably (*dokimôs*)'. The adverb *dokimôs* is cognate with the term *dokounta* and literally means 'acceptably'. But it bears no hint of the concession or compromise felt in that English word and suggests, rather, success in meeting a fixed standard applied rigorously. The adjective *dokimos* generally bears the senses 'acceptable' or 'accepted' and hence 'approved', 'reliable', 'notable'. In its two classical occurrences, the adverb seems to indicate that something was done or took place 'genuinely', 'actually' or 'properly', i.e. in a fully 'acceptable' manner: 'I too sustain the genuinely (*dokimôs*) lamentable fate of the departed' (Aeschylus, *Pers.* 547); ' . . . so that he himself might properly (*dokimôs*) become fine and good' (Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1.6.7).[102]

We may next distinguish two possible interpretations, depending on what we think the 'acceptance' amounts to here. On the first interpretation, we will take it that 'to be acceptably' or 'properly' indicates a mode of being which is in line with the strong and uncompromising application of the verb 'to be' in *Alêtheia*. On this view, 'to be acceptably' means to be the true and fundamental reality. Call this the 'absolute' interpretation of *dokimôs*. Within the absolute interpretation, there are then two further viable

[102] The syntax is ambiguous in both cases. Alternatively, δοκίμως could be qualifying, with the same force, the verb in the Aeschylus passage ('properly sustain') and the adjectives in the Xenophon passage ('properly fine and good'). On δοκίμως, see further Owen (1960) 86; Tarán (1965) 212–13; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 200, 204; Coxon (2009) 285; Lesher (1984) 19; Curd (1998) 21–2.

options, which amount to much the same philosophical result. The statement concerning the 'things that seem and are accepted' could be either a counterfactual spoken by the goddess from outside the framework of *Doxa* ('how for the things that seem and are accepted it would have been right to be acceptably'), or a past obligation spoken by the goddess from within the perspective of *Doxa* ('how [sc. from the perspective of mortals ignorant of *Alêtheia*] it was in fact right for the things that seem and are accepted to be acceptably').[103] The goddess *cannot*, on the absolute interpretation of *dokimôs*, be stating a past obligation from outside the framework of *Doxa*.[104] That is, she cannot be stating that – even from the perspective of one who had acquired the knowledge of *Alêtheia* – it was in fact right for Doxastic things to be, in the full and unqualified sense that what-is is. This would amount to confusing Doxastic things with what-is and beliefs about them with knowledge of it, incompatibly with B1.30 ('in which there is no real trust') and quite generally the deductions of the properties of what-is in B8. It is essential to humans (trees, pebbles, etc.) that they are generated, perishable, mobile and heterogeneous. Such things, then, precisely do not instantiate the mode of being of what-is.[105] Nor can the goddess's statement be a counterfactual spoken from *within Doxa*, for this would imply that the *ignorant mortals* are in a position to deny, correctly, that Doxastic things can be said to be in the same way that what-is is. In sum, if the goddess's statement is a counterfactual spoken from outside *Doxa*, the *kouros* will learn how (sc. were it not for the true nature of what-is as established in *Alêtheia*), it would have been right for the things that appear to mortals and are accepted by them to be genuinely. If it is a past obligation spoken from within *Doxa*, the *kouros* will learn how (sc. from the perspective of mortals ignorant of *Alêtheia*) it was in fact right for the things that appear to mortals and are accepted by them to be genuinely. In either case, the goddess's statement ('how . . . acceptably') specifies, from the goddess's perspective, how one *ignorant* of *Alêtheia* would be

[103] Nehamas (2002) 58, n.49 identifies and allows both of these options.
[104] This appears to be how Thanassas (2011) 294, n.8 reads these lines.
[105] See further Ch. 5.5.1.

inclined to interpret *Doxa*, confusing the things that appear to and are accepted by mortals with what genuinely is.

On an alternative reading of *dokimôs* – call it the 'intrasystematic' interpretation – we may indeed take the goddess to express *in propria persona* a past obligation ('how it was right'). On this interpretation, we would, after all, take the expression 'to be acceptably' to indicate, not the mode of being instantiated by what is (in line with the strong application of 'to be' in *Alêtheia*), but a distinct and inferior mode of being typical of Doxastic things. Now, it will *not* be the adverb *dokimôs* by itself which would generate this sense of concession or qualification, but the context within which this adverb, and the goddess's statement as a whole, are configured. The goddess's gloss of this aspect of the *kouros*' programme of study ('how … everything') comes immediately after her stipulation that mortal beliefs lack 'real trust' and that the mortal shall learn them despite this fact ('but, nonetheless … ', B1.31). Within this pejorative framework, it is possible to interpret the words 'how … to be acceptably' as stipulating a standard, which is indeed met as fully and successfully as possible by the things which seem to mortals and are accepted by them, but which has already itself been qualified as something that lacks real trust. That is, Doxastic things instantiate their own distinctive mode of being in an (as far as this mode of being goes) acceptable and proper way, but this mode of being itself falls short of the mode of being associated with what-is in *Alêtheia*. The intrasystematic interpretation has the great advantage of emphasising and accounting for the marked *figura etymologica*: '*ta dokounta … dokimôs*'. The things which seem and are accepted (*ta dokounta*) have a mode of being which is proper quite specifically *for them* (*dokimôs*). The acceptability which Doxastic things can legitimately be ascribed (*dokimôs*) is qualified as the sort of acceptability which is proper and approved for things of that nature (*ta dokounta*).[106] The *kouros*, then, will also learn in what way even *those* things, beliefs about which are without real trust (because they do not reflect the nature of fundamental reality), are after all there in a way which is distinct and proper specifically

[106] Cf. similarly Johansen (2016) 6: 'We should allow *dokimōs* to indicate reliability of the sort appropriate to what it qualifies.'

for them. The final specification – ' . . . to be acceptably, all of them traversing (*perônta*) across everything' – accentuates how the mode of being which is proper to such things differs from the unshaken heart of reality. Such things *traverse* across everything: they constantly exhibit motion and change.[107] Similarly to the absolute interpretation, the *kouros* is again in a superior position to the ignorant mortals. Unlike them, he will be informed of the ways in which Doxastic things and their mode of being diverge from, and fall short of, what-is. Unlike them, he would not mistake Doxastic things for the fundamental reality.

I highlighted at the outset that any translation and interpretation of B1.31–2 must be uncertain. The arguments concerning the epistemological and aetiological questions advanced in this chapter do not depend on the foregoing analysis of this difficult couplet. Nonetheless, let us tentatively highlight the general conclusions, which have emerged from this analysis.

First, it is quite possible that Parmenides conveys in these lines the notion that Doxastic things possess a mode of being which falls short of the mode of being instantiated by what-is. On the absolute interpretation of 'to be properly', this idea would be more implicit and indirect. Nonetheless, the insistence that only what-is *properly* or *genuinely* is could be thought to create room for the view that Doxastic things possess something *else*, which falls short of such *genuine* being (δοκίμως εἶναι). On the intrasystematic interpretation, Parmenides directly and explicitly ascribes a distinct mode of being to Doxastic things. We will revisit these possibilities and B1.31–2 in Chapter 5.5.1.

Secondly, on both the absolute and intrasystematic interpretations (although in slightly different ways), these lines reflect the same sense in which *Doxa* is deceptive, and the same sense in which the *kouros* will be wary of this deceptiveness, which we

[107] This last point relies on the reading περῶντα, favoured by most editors (see Palmer (2009) 380), over περ ὄντα. The latter is arguably a *lectio facilior*, but could not be conclusively excluded. Mourelatos (2008*a*) xxxii, 212–14 champions περ ὄντα. Contra Mourelatos, however, the idea in περῶντα of entering a space and then leaving it behind is not inappropriate: the image represents Doxastic things as constantly traversing from one location and then onto the next through everything (διὰ παντός), like ships continuously ranging every which way across a kind of global sea (cf. *Od*. 6.272, *Od*. 24.118).

found before. The mistake that one who is ignorant of the doctrine of *Alêtheia* will make is to confuse the things that appear to mortals and are accepted by them with ultimate reality and to construe accounts of such things as if they were accounts of ultimate reality. Once again, *Doxa* is 'deceptive' (B8.52) and lacks 'real trust' (B1.30), *not* because it misdescribes its objects (mortals, stars, embryos), but because it may mislead one into believing that these objects, or the two elements of which they consist, are in fact the fundamental nature of reality, which would be inconsistent with the nature of what-is as established in *Alêtheia*.

4.5 Conclusions: Why Did Parmenides Write *Doxa*?

We are now in a position to draw an inference from our analysis of the epistemological question to the aetiological one and to offer an interpretation of B1.28^{b}-30 (for the text and translation, see the introduction to the chapters on Parmenides).

By accepting *Alêtheia*'s ontology and its notion of what-is, Parmenides can and should come to attain a critical and informed attitude towards his experience and recognition of such Doxastic processes as locomotion, and of such things as stars, as well as towards his own and all other first-order beliefs with regard to such processes and things. The fundamental qualities of Doxastic things and processes are incompatible with the fundamental qualities of the unshaken heart of reality. Correct accounts of Doxastic things are liable to (but must not) be mistaken for correct accounts of reality, of what-is. Significantly, however, the very notion of mortals, as distinct from each other and from other things such as stars and embryos, diverges from what *Alêtheia* describes as reality no less than any other Doxastic thing concerning which mortals may hold or reject first-order beliefs, or than those beliefs themselves. I find no evidence that Parmenides attempted to square the apparent presence of mortals (stars, embryos . . .) with the incompatibility of their properties with the properties of what-is, or that he saw the need to do so.[108] The important point for us is

[108] See further Ch. 5.5.1.

that, insofar as we can speak of such Doxastic things as mortals (and the fact that the goddess speaks of and to mortals shows that there is an extent to which we can do so), we can also construe and describe them correctly and incorrectly. The theories advanced in *Doxa* do so correctly. They represent Parmenides' own views of the origins, natures and behaviours of Doxastic things and are taken to endow their student with knowledge of such things (B10). The views that the moon's light is a reflection of the sun's, and that mortals comprise Hot and Cold, account respectively for the moon and for mortals correctly, in a way that competing accounts do not. The theory of mortal cognition advanced in B16, therefore, bears directly on our question: 'What are the ways in which the *mortal* agent, to whom the goddess speaks, must think?'

In B16, Parmenides advances a theory of human cognition. This theory analyses the same 'wandering', Doxastic cognition which characterises the ignorant mortals in *Alêtheia* (B6.4–6) as an ineluctable and passively determined function of the physiological, cognitive apparatus which characterises all mortals universally. As we noted (Chapter 4.3), the fragment thus reflects Parmenides' recognition that he can no more simply discard first-order beliefs with regard to heterogeneous, plural things and processes than he can permanently switch off his experience and recognition of such things and processes. All mortals comprise themselves Hot and Cold; perceive a heterogeneous plurality of things as mixtures of Hot and Cold; recognise such things, and form first-order judgements with respect to them.

By brute, physiological necessity, therefore, mortals judge things in accordance with precisely the same contrast between two, sensible enantiomorphic elements, each one of which both is (itself) and is not (the other), which constitutes also the essence and basis of the cosmology developed in *Doxa* (ἐκρίναντο δέμας, B8.55). The individual theories advanced in *Doxa* comprise very specific and sophisticated accounts of particular Doxastic things and processes. But the fundamental sensory oppositions, which underpin all those theories, are constitutive of mortal thinking as such. Again, mortals perforce perceive, and form first-order beliefs about, such sensible processes as change ('this man

grows older'), which diverge from what *Alêtheia* shows to be the unshaken heart of reality.

Parmenides pursued and included *Doxa*'s cosmology because he held (i) that thinking through contrasts between two sensible opposites, and experiencing, recognising and forming judgements with regard to a multiplicity of heterogeneous things such as we encounter in our sensory experiences, is an inescapable aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal, and (ii) that the theories advanced in *Doxa* – even as they fail to capture the homogeneous and unchanging nature of the unshaken heart of reality – account for such heterogeneous and multiple things correctly.

This is why the mortal should learn all things (χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι), not only the true nature of reality, of what-is (ἠμὲν ἀληθείης ... ἦτορ), but also mortal beliefs (ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας), while recognising, although he could never simply discard them *qua* first-order beliefs, that all such beliefs lack real trust (ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής). This is why, *despite* its failure to capture the unshaken heart of reality, the mortal should nonetheless learn *Doxa* too (ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, B1.31), and attain knowledge and understanding of such things as stars, mortals and embryos (B10).

I am not arguing that B16 is a programmatic text. I do not suggest that, in it, Parmenides explicitly or implicitly communicates why he wrote *Doxa*. I am arguing, rather, that B16 articulates a doctrine which, given further considerations, best explains why Parmenides wrote *Doxa*. It explains, that is, why learning *Doxa* makes good epistemological sense also for the mortal who has attained knowledge of the true nature of what-is.

After she introduces the key principles of *Doxa*, the goddess announces that she will now embark on her account of the cosmology proper, 'so that' (ὡς) no 'judgement of mortals' (βροτῶν γνώμη) shall outstrip Parmenides in the race (B8.61). The ambiguity in the English as to whether 'so that' introduces a result or final clause tracks the ambiguity in the Greek. It is unclear whether the goddess is saying that she will be narrating *Doxa* with the result that, or with the intention that, no mortal judgement shall outstrip Parmenides. At any rate, even if we read a final clause, this line hardly expresses by itself an answer to the

aetiological question since, were it not for the ineluctability of Doxastic cognition as analysed above, we would still ask ourselves why Parmenides should wish to join the mortal race in the first place. However we read this clause, the arguments advanced in this chapter indicate that, by a 'judgement of mortals' (βροτῶν γνώμη, B8.61) and the 'beliefs of mortals' (βροτῶν δόξας, B1.30), the goddess is referring, not to beliefs and judgements which happen to be held by agents who happen to be mortal, but to beliefs and judgements which essentially belong to a specifically mortal kind of cognition.[109] With regard to B8.61, this seems independently plausible. If a 'judgement of mortals' indicated *any* kind of judgement held by a mortal, rather than judgements specific to mortal cognition, then *Alêtheia* itself would presumably have sufficed to secure the *kouros* against being outstripped by any other judgement.

The goddess's statement that 'it is right' for Parmenides to learn mortal beliefs or that he 'must' do so (χρεὼ δέ σε, B1.28[b]) highlights that learning *Doxa* is *appropriate* for Parmenides. In uses of this vocabulary, the nature, status or identity of an agent typically renders it incumbent upon him to conduct himself in a certain way. So, for example, Sarpedon states that champions, who receive the highest social honours, must fight in the foremost ranks (χρή, *Il.* 12.315).[110] Doxastic thought and cognition are not only an ineluctable but also an appropriate aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal.

At the same time, we saw that Parmenides' attitude to *Doxa*, unlike that of the ignorant mortals, is *informed* by his knowledge of *Alêtheia*. While Parmenides accepts *Doxa*'s theories *qua* accounts of Doxastic things, he recognises their inadmissibility as accounts of what-is. Parmenides will not, therefore, be bullied (μηδέ σ' . . . βιάσθω, B7.3) into sharing in the *avoidable* resolve of mortals (κατέθεντο, B8.39, 53; B19.3) to embrace their mortal language ('tongue', B7.5), and the appellations of Doxastic

[109] Cherubin (2005) 21 suggests similarly, although without pursuing the point in the ways defended here or relating it to B16, that βροτῶν δόξας are 'a set of beliefs and a way of thinking that reflect something of what it is to be a mortal'.

[110] For the point that the term χρεών (and its cognates) signifies normative necessity, see Mourelatos (2008*a*) xxxi, 277–8.

elements (B8.54), things (B19.3) and processes (B8.40–1), as categories which actually reflect and disclose the fundamental nature of reality (B8.39; B1.30). So too, he will not heedlessly acquiesce in his sensory experiences as trustworthy reflections of what-is (recall 'an aimless eye and echoing ear', B7.4).[111]

In B6, does the goddess state that she withholds the *kouros* from (εἴργω), or that she will later commence with (ἄρξω), the way of inquiry which the ignorant mortals wander? The Greek is incomplete and these or any other supplements will be uncertain.[112] Reading 'I withhold' (εἴργω), and taking the line to mean simply that the goddess categorically bars the *kouros* from pursuing mortal inquiries, flies in the face of all the evidence which we considered in this chapter and the basic point that Parmenides does, in fact – whatever one makes of this fact – go on to pursue a mortal way of inquiry in some detail. One possibility, however, is to keep the traditional supplement εἴργω but to interpret the goddess as barring the *kouros*, not from any way of mortal inquiry whatsoever, but from the particular way of mortal inquiry which the ignorant mortals wander (ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω> | αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν | πλάζονται, B6. 4–6). That is, the goddess bars the *kouros* from pursuing, not *any* inquiry based on mortal thinking or *any* cosmological inquiry, but the manner of inquiry which the uninformed mortals exhibit. Indeed, the following lines focus on this point. The ignorant mortals pursue their way of inquiry in a daze of aimless confusion. The goddess's own exposition of the natures of Doxastic things (B8.60 and following) will be a different affair. Alternatively, we can read 'I will commence' (ἄρξω), or a verb to some such effect, and take it that the goddess's own exposition of the way of mortal inquiry will lack the flaws exhibited by the ignorant mortals, who wander about this same way aimlessly and helplessly. Either way, since the *kouros* will pursue mortal inquiries in the informed manner which we described above, and since the theories which the goddess expounds in *Doxa* account for Doxastic things and

[111] In addition to 'aimless', ἄσκοπος can also signify 'heedless', 'un-regardful', see *Il.* 24.157; Aesch. *Ag.* 462.

[112] εἴργω: e.g. Wedin (2014) 53–71. ἄρξω: e.g. Nehamas (1981); Palmer (2009) 159–60, 367.

processes correctly, the cosmology will endow the *kouros* with knowledge and understanding of its proper subject matter (B10), so that he will never be outstripped by any other judgement of mortals (B8.61). By contrast, the goddess describes the mortals who pursue mortal inquiries without comparable guidance, and without the ability to situate such inquiries in relation to an awareness of what-is, as doing so blindly and helplessly, and as remaining confused and ignorant (εἰδότες οὐδέν, B6.4).

Our conclusion, that Parmenides accepts *Doxa* as an account of Doxastic things, but rejects it as an account of the unshaken heart of reality (of what-is), gives us a clear explication of the sense in which he both developed and advanced *Doxa*'s theories *and* kept those theories at arm's length ('in which there is no real trust', B1.30, etc.). Ancient commentators were often sensitive to the point that Parmenides does represent *Doxa* as part of his philosophy, but does not do so unqualifiedly. Theophrastus (*apud* Alexander, *in Metaph.* 31.9–14 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 40) writes that Parmenides both argued that the all is one and ungenerated, and attempted to expound the coming-to-be of the many things. He qualifies: 'not holding beliefs in the same way about both, but, on the one hand, in accordance with truth [or "reality": *alêtheia*] . . . and, on the other hand, in accordance with belief (*doxa*)'. Simplicius observes that, unlike Melissus who denies coming-to-be categorically (ὅλως), Parmenides does allow it, but 'not with respect to truth (*alêtheia*), but with respect to belief' (*doxa, in Cael.* 7.556.12–14 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 203). Aristotle names Parmenides as the only monist to appreciate the efficient cause, but qualifies that he too did so only 'to the extent that he posits not only one but in a way also two principles' (κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὅσον οὐ μόνον ἓν ἀλλὰ καὶ δύο πως τίθησιν αἰτίας εἶναι, *Metaph.* A.3 $984^{b}3$–4; cf. A.5 $986^{b}27$–34). *Doxa* is sufficiently Parmenides' for Aristotle to ascribe to him the postulation of two causes as his own thesis, but it is not so unqualifiedly ('to the extent that . . . in a way').[113]

Adopting Parmenides' conception of the mortal cognitive agent as our starting point for thinking about the relation between the two parts of the poem is defensible not least because Parmenides himself

[113] See also Philop. *in Ph.* 16.22.6–7, quoted in Ch. 4.4.

does much the same. The programmatic statement that both *Alêtheia* and *Doxa* are to be learned (ἠμέν … ἠδέ, B1.29–30) is embedded in a conversation between a goddess and, emphatically, a mortal. Our ensuing analysis of the aetiological problem, however, gives rise to another. If we previously asked, 'why did Parmenides write *Doxa*?', we will now ask, 'how *could* Parmenides have written *Alêtheia*?' If, being a mortal, Parmenides must think in *Doxa*'s structuring categories, i.e. through the *krisis* between Light and Night, then how could he have *also* thought in the competing structuring categories of *Alêtheia*, i.e. through the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not'? If, being a mortal, it is *appropriate* for Parmenides to learn mortal beliefs, then why is it *also* appropriate for him to learn *Alêtheia* ('it is right for you to learn all things', B1.28)?

There is, then, an apparent tension in Parmenides' thought. Doxastic cognition characterises the human mind ineluctably (' … so is mind present to humans', B16.2). But, when encountering the goddess, Parmenides is encouraged to resist the mental habits of mortals (B7) and to apply his mind *rather* to what-is: 'but gaze … with your mind' (λεῦσσε … νόῳ, B4.1). Exploring this tension will help us not only to address our new problem – 'how could Parmenides have written *Alêtheia*?' – but also to deepen our understanding of the relation and interaction between mortal and divine in Parmenides' poem.

5

HOW COULD PARMENIDES HAVE WRITTEN *ALÊTHEIA*?

5.1 Recap and Introduction: Some Resolutions of the Paradoxical Implications of Parmenides' Theory of Human Cognition

Our central concern in this chapter will be to ask why Parmenides thinks that the mortal is capable of attaining the knowledge of reality proffered in *Alêtheia*, despite the fact that, insofar as he is a mortal, he is constrained to think and to experience in human ways; that is, in ways which could not sustain an understanding of *Alêtheia*. It will help, first, to review how some previous readers have responded to the apparently puzzling implications of Parmenides' account of human thinking in DK28 B16, and to sharpen further the challenge that confronts us.

It has long been appreciated that the idea that the human mind is passively determined in the way that B16 suggests appears to jar, *prima facie*, with the mortal's ability to acquire knowledge of what-is. Some scholars pre-empt any paradoxical implications by stating that *Doxa*'s theories – its account of human thinking in B16 included – simply do not represent Parmenides' own views.[1] As we saw in the previous chapter (especially Chapter 4.4), however, *Doxa*'s theories do represent Parmenides' own views of the natures, origins and behaviours of Doxastic things (such as human cognitive agents). Scholars also regularly take it that the mortals' habit of thinking like mortals and their possession of first-order Doxastic beliefs, as analysed in B16, is a regrettable, avoidable and reversible choice.[2] Such descriptions are, as they stand, oversimplifications.

[1] Lesher (1984) 29, n.39; Trépanier (2004) 164; Torgerson (2006) 37, n.28; cf. Gallop (1984) 120–1.

[2] E.g. Woodbury (1986) 8ff ('a deliberate, though mistaken policy'); Curd (1998) 114 ('a bad habit'); (2011) 121, 131; (2015).

As we saw (Chapter 4.2), Parmenides' theory of human cognition is a universalising account, which describes all, not some, acts of human cognition. But the concern behind these descriptions is clear enough. The ineluctability of Doxastic cognition to the mortal (reflected in B16) must somehow coexist with the mortal's evident capacity to think in accordance with *Alêtheia*'s *krisis*, and to come thereby to cognise what-is.

Anthony Long takes it that in B16 Parmenides describes the 'normal (i.e. delusory) human νοῦς'.[3] In doing so, however, Long illicitly limits (n.b. 'normal') the *unqualified* and *universalising* account in B16 of the human mind ('as on each occasion . . . in all humans and in each . . . '). But if the human mind can never know what-is, then how can the human *kouros* know it?

Jaap Mansfeld (1964) argued that, once we posit divine revelation as the source of Parmenides' knowledge, further questions become superfluous.[4] According to Mansfeld, only the goddess's intervention, which he takes to comprise her assurance of the truth of the otherwise indemonstrable premises of Parmenides' argumentation, could explain how the mixture of Light and Night which is the mortal mind could have left its humanity behind, come to know what-is, and been initiated into *Alêtheia*'s logic.[5] Mansfeld is, I believe, entirely correct that, if we are to account for the mortal's capacity to know what-is, then we must see Parmenides as positing non-figuratively an epistemically significant interaction with the divine. Parmenides describes to us an interaction with a divine power through which he was able to attain knowledge which he could not have attained independently of that interaction.

As it stands, however, Mansfeld does not yet confront the difficulty posed by Parmenides' account of human thinking in B16. The problem runs deeper than is implied by Mansfeld's assumption that the bare postulation of genuine divine revelation satisfactorily and finally explains the mortal's capacity to sustain

[3] Long (1996) 147; cf. similarly Curd (2015) nn.15–17.
[4] Mansfeld (1964) 259 ('nehmen wir aber an, daß Parmenides seine Erkenntnis der Gnade und der Offenbarung verdankt, so sind weitere Fragen überflüssig und das alte Problem der Beziehung zwischen Fr. 16 und Fr.1 fällt fort').
[5] Mansfeld (1964) 260–1.

Alêtheia's argumentation and to acquire knowledge of what-is. The question is not simply, 'how can the mortal come to *find out* and *ascertain* the truth of *Alêtheia*'s premises and conclusions?', but rather, 'how can the mortal even come to *recognise, understand* and *contemplate* the argumentation and tenets of *Alêtheia* and, thereby, the homogeneous what-is, if Parmenides maintains that such understanding is possible for the divine but not for the mortal mind?' *How can* the goddess reveal to the mortal's mind something which the *mortal* mind cannot cognise? My own answer to these questions ascribes to the goddess a similarly essential role, but it is not that of acting as the 'guarantor of truth' of otherwise indemonstrable propositions, which are therefore accepted on trust.[6] Even if the goddess also provided for Parmenides an assurance of the truth of his accounts,[7] this will not explain how Parmenides can maintain both (i) that the human mind, unlike the goddess, cannot know what-is, and (ii) that, through divine favour, the initiated human, like the goddess, does know what-is.[8] The knower himself must have in some sense become divine and acquired a higher-than-mortal, divine mind.

In an important article, Gregory Vlastos (1946) suggested that the mortal will know what-is when he thinks pure Light as something changeless and self-identical, with a mind completely free of darkness. 'So immovable a thought', writes Vlastos, 'could only have Being as its object: not the "seeming" light of the senses, whose apparent qualities depend on the felt contrast with darkness.' The mortal, Vlastos concludes, would thus 'think light as pure Being'.[9]

[6] 'Bürgin der Wahrheit', Mansfeld (1964) 261.

[7] I return to this question (noncommittally) in Ch. 6.3.

[8] The insightful reflections in Ranzato (2015) 205–7 also do not explain this same puzzle: *how and why* does Parmenides think that the *kouros*, a mortal creature of Light and Night, can through the goddess's favour resist the thinking of Light and Night and transcend it to something different and higher? Every human mind must think of and through sensory oppositions. Drozdek (2007) 46-8 interestingly posits *logos* as something divine in the mortal actuated by the goddess but does not support this idea.

[9] Vlastos (1946) 71–2, 67–8; followed by Kahn (2009) 217 with n.10. When it comes to the question of the *prima facie* paradoxical implications of B16 itself concerning mortal thinking, Vlastos (1946) 66–7 simply does away with the problem by dismissing B16 as a doctrine only of non-cognitive sense-perception. As we saw in Ch. 4.3, the cognitive language of B16 renders such a view of the fragment untenable.

5.1 Recap and Introduction

Our inquiries in this chapter into Parmenides' ideas of soul, eschatology, initiation and revelation will ultimately lead us to agree with Vlastos on his core point that, when the mortal knower thinks what-is, he is thinking with a mind that is pure light and divested entirely of darkness. Vlastos himself, though, nowhere asks exactly *how* the mortal might come by this ability to divest his mind of darkness and to think with pure light – a question which will preoccupy us throughout this chapter – nor puts this idea to the interpretative uses suggested below. Furthermore, it will be useful to highlight here certain aspects of Vlastos' account with which we should not agree, and to delineate further the interpretative problems which will be addressed in the following sections.

It is difficult to see how Vlastos can designate the very same object of knowledge as (i) Being *rather than* 'the light of the senses', and (ii) Light, which the mortal thinks as pure Being. Vlastos eventually resolves this difficulty in his account by postulating that 'the positive self-identity of fire [sc. rather than fire *simpliciter*] . . . *is* Being'. Vlastos, then, adopts Aristotle's ontological alignment of Hot with Being and Cold with not-Being. Night – unlike Light – cannot be and is somehow only apparently 'positive'.[10] We saw in Chapter 4.3 that Aristotle's ontological identification or even alignment of Light with what-is is ill-conceived. There is no sense in which Parmenides considers Night (heavier and denser than Light as it is) a less positive thing than Light. Indeed, since both elements symmetrically possess the property of self-identity, it is arbitrary to identify what-is with Light's property of self-identity but *not* Night's.[11] We saw that Parmenides is in fact at pains to emphasise that, unlike the self-identity of what-is (B8.49, 29), the self-identity of each Doxastic element is inextricably related to its contradistinction from the self-identity of the other (B8.57–8). We cannot, therefore, identify what-is with Light, or with some quality of Light, and conclude that Light (or a quality of it) and what-is are the same ontological item and, therefore, the very same object of knowledge. What-is cannot itself be described as Light or in terms of a

[10] Vlastos (1946) 73–4 with n.45 (my emphasis), 76; cf. Kahn (2009) 217.
[11] Vlastos (1946) himself (at 72, 76) describes self-identity as a property of both opposites.

certain relation between Light and Night. It cannot be the case that thinking Light (or Night, or some proportion of Light and Night) is itself nothing other than thinking what-is.

Nonetheless, it *can* still be the case that the mortal's capacity to sustain knowledge of what-is is concomitant with and even dependent on his acquisition of a very particular physiological state, viz. his acquisition of an exclusively Hot (= Light) mind. Indeed, I will strive to establish this view and to explore its significance in the course of the following sections. At this point, at any rate, we can introduce in principle the mere interpretative possibility that our ability to think what-is is concomitant with and dependent on a state in which our mind is pure Light and divested entirely of Night. What Parmenides cannot do, however, is to conflate Light and what-is as items in the world, or to posit that thinking Light (some of the fundamental properties of which are incompatible with some of the fundamental properties of what-is: Chapter 4.3) just is, in itself, nothing other than thinking what-is.

Indeed, although he conflates Light and Being as objects of cognition in this way, Vlastos also insightfully recognises a difficulty inherent in the very attempt to articulate a physical formula for knowledge of what-is:

> No such formula could be given without translating Being into terms of Becoming. We are here face to face with the central paradox of Parmenides' theory of knowledge. The mortal frame, qua mortal, cannot think Being. Yet the "knowing man" can and does think it . . . To resolve the paradox is impossible, for it is only the epistemological counterpart of the ontological dualism of Being and Becoming.[12]

We must disentangle here clearly different interpretative problems, which belong to different interpretative orders. In the first instance, I highlighted in the introduction to these chapters on Parmenides that a certain paradox inheres in attempting to explain how anything other than what-is (e.g. mortals, the goddess) can cognise what-is. In a sense, this attempt straddles the conceptual frameworks of both parts of the poem. It is itself inexpressible both in terms of the structuring contrast of *Alêtheia* (the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not' allows for the expression of what-is but not of

[12] Vlastos (1946) 71–2.

things like mortals) and in terms of the structuring contrast of *Doxa* (the *krisis* between Light and Night (or Hot and Cold, etc.) allows for the expression of mortals but not of what-is). This paradox indeed seems to be the epistemological aspect of an ontological tension. If what-is comprises reality, then what exactly is the status of things like mortals, and how can they know what-is? Indeed, how can they do anything at all for that matter? This ontological tension will not be our focus in this chapter, although in Chapter 5.5.1 I will advance my own suggestions about it (suggestions on which the central arguments of this chapter will not depend). The question on which we will be focusing is more limited. Parmenides describes knowledge of what-is as divine knowledge, i.e. as attainable by the goddess, but unattainable by the human mind. The human mind passively and ineluctably perceives-and-cognises Doxastic things and operates in terms of the Doxastic *krisis* (Light/Night) rather than *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* ('is'/'is not'). But if this is so, then how can the knowing man nonetheless think what-is? It is with *this* paradox in mind that I wish to address the question – with which Parmenides' engagement seems textually undeniable – 'how can *mortals* cognise what-is?' My proposed resolution of this problem will not by itself help with the *prima facie*, ontological paradox which haunts any talk of anything other than what-is knowing what-is (or doing anything at all). Nor, however, will my arguments further exacerbate the ontological difficulty by attempting somehow to align or to identify what-is with Light or to argue that knowledge of what-is is in fact nothing other than knowledge of Light (or of Night, or of some proportion between the two).

5.2 Parmenides on the Soul: Hot Metempsychosis and the Physiology of Divinisation

We will see in this section that Parmenides understood the mortal agent to be a complex thing. The mortal agent comprises not only a mortal but also a *divine* part – his soul. The soul consists of the aethereal element Hot, undergoes eschatological migrations and is possessed of a cognitive disposition which is superior and more pure. Our findings in this section will thus help lay the ground for

our discussion in Chapter 5.3 of the proem (B1), and for the broader argument advanced in this chapter that a sort of epistemological becoming-like-god is central to Parmenides' system. In this section, we will prepare for and support that argument by exploring the cosmological, physiological, psychological[13] and eschatological aspects of the presence and function of a divine part within the mortal.

Various contemporary and near contemporary sources attest (different, broadly complementary aspects of) what appears to have been a familiar view, according to which the mortal comprises both a mortal, earthy element and a divine, higher, *aethereal* element. The aethereal element is identified with the soul, and both elements return to their source at the mortal's death. Now, we cannot reconstruct with any confidence Parmenides' views – he does appear to have held some – concerning the topography of the soul's origin and destination. I offer some aporetic remarks concerning this matter in the Appendix. Nonetheless, by considering our evidence for Parmenides' attitude to Hot, aether, metempsychosis and especially the soul and its divinity, we will be able to establish that Parmenides advanced what may reasonably be considered *a* version of this contemporary view of the soul. Before we delve into our evidence for Parmenides, therefore, it will be useful first to lay out some reflections of this general attitude.

Epicharmus, writing in the late sixth or fifth century, describes the process of death: 'It was combined and it was separated, and it went back whence it came, earth to earth, and breath upwards' (συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη κἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν, | γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω, DK23 B9). Elsewhere, Epicharmus suggests that the quality of one's experiences following this separation may depend on the nature of one's disposition prior to it: 'If you are by nature pious in mind, you would not suffer any evil when you die; your breath will persist above in heaven' (ἄνω τὸ πνεῦμα διαμενεῖ κατ' οὐρανόν, DK23 B22). An epigram for the fallen in Potidaea (432 BCE) states that 'aether received their souls, and earth their bodies' (αἰθὲρ μὲμ φσυχὰς ὑπεδέχσατο, σόμ[ατα δὲ χθόν], *IG* I^2 945). In Euripides' *Erechtheus*, Athena proclaims

[13] By Parmenides' 'psychology' I mean his conception of the nature of the soul.

concerning Erechtheus' daughters: 'Their souls, then, did not depart to Hades, but I have settled their breath in the aether' (ψυχαὶ μὲν οὖν τῶνδ' οὐ βεβᾶσ' [Ἅι]δ̣ην πάρα, | εἰς δ' αἰθέρ' αὐτῶν πνεῦμ' ἐγὼ [κ]α̣τ̣ώ̣κισα, *TrGF* 5.370.71–2). Athena's statement has the ring of an eschatological divine reward about it, like Epicharmus' comment concerning the pious man's breath and, perhaps, like the Potidaea inscription.[14] In Euripides' *Suppliants*, Theseus articulates what sounds more like a cyclical cosmological principle (reminiscent of Epicharmus DK23 B9), although one whose orderly and smooth implementation perhaps depends on the fulfilment of the proper burial practices: 'Let the dead now be buried in the earth, and, whence each thing came to the light, there let it return, the breath to the aether, and the body to the earth' (πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, | τὸ σῶμα δ' ἐς γῆν, *Supp*. 531–4). Euripides engages with aethereal eschatology twice more. In his *Helen*, we hear that not only the living but also the dead can undergo punishment, since 'the mind of the dead does not live, but it does have immortal thought, as it falls into immortal aether' (ὁ νοῦς | τῶν κατθανόντων ζῇ μὲν οὔ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει | ἀθάνατον εἰς ἀθάνατον αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών, 1013–16). In his lost *Chrysippus*, Euripides spoke of the 'aether of Zeus' as the 'progenitor of both men and gods', and again articulated a cyclical principle: 'the things that are grown from the earth return to the earth, and the things that sprouted from the seed of aether went back again (πάλιν ἦλθε) to the heavenly vault, and nothing of what comes to be dies' (θνῄσκει δ' οὐδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων, *TrGF* 5.839.1–2, 9–12 = Anaxagoras, DK59 A112). A similar eschatology is expressed on some fourth- and third-century Attic tombstones: 'The earth raised the body to the light, and the earth conceals it; but aether has again taken the breath, as it previously gave it' (γαῖα μὲν εἰς φάος ἦρε . . . γαῖα δὲ κεύθει | σῶμα, πνοὴν δὲ αἰθὴρ ἔλαβεν πάλιν, ὅσπερ ἔδωκεν, IG II/III2 12599), and again: 'Eurymachus' soul and his lordly thoughts moist aether holds, but his body this tomb holds' (Εὐρυμάχου ψυχὴν καὶ ὑπερφιάλος διανοίας | αἰθὴρ ὑγρὸς ἔχει, σῶμα δὲ τύμβος ὅδε, IG II/III2 11466). This last inscription is almost identical to an epigram in the Aristotelian Peplos

[14] Rohde (1925) 437 finds retributive eschatology in the Potidaean epigram.

(fr. 641.7–8 Rose: θυμὸν δὴ Κύκνου … ὅδε), where aether is, however, not 'moist' but 'bright' (λαμπρός). The similarity suggests a common formula.[15]

We should not try to force a homogeneous or overly worked-out theology and eschatology on such texts. Nonetheless, we may note that they all divide the human person into two fundamental components: the earthy human body and the aethereal soul or breath. Furthermore, a cyclical principle is at work, either invariably or as a matter of divine discretion. At the time of the person's death, each component part returns to its proper place of origin. The earthy body descends back into the earth, whereas the aethereal soul or breath ascends back to the aether, understood as a higher and brighter region of the world. Some notion of the persistence and, indeed, immortality of the aethereal soul is clearly implicit in these passages. The earthy corpse may decay in the ground, but our aethereal soul or breath – including, at least in some articulations of this conception, our thoughts and our judgement – carries on and persists in the aether. For the pious man of Epicharmus, this is something to look forward to. Equally, aether has received the souls of those who fell in Potidaea, and the souls of the daughters of Erechtheus found a new home ([κ]ατῴκισα) in the aether (rather than Hades). In his *Helen*, Euripides expressly speaks of our mind's retention of 'immortal' thought or judgement (γνώμην … ἀθάνατον).

Let us turn now to Parmenides and see how a version of this general conception – a distinctive version, to be sure – emerges from our evidence.

Parmenides positions 'common aether' (αἰθήρ … ξυνός, B11.2) in the midst of a catalogue of such celestial bodies as the sun, the moon, the Milky Way and the heavens. In B10, the goddess promises the *kouros* knowledge of the nature of aether and of the celestial bodies positioned in it (αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ' ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα | σήματα), as well as of the sun, the moon and the heavens (σήματα, then, denotes, as often, celestial bodies). For Parmenides,

[15] For discussions of these passages, see Rohde (1925) 435–8; Gomperz (1929) 24 with n.18; Dodds (1951) 174, n.112; Burkert (1972) 361; (2004) 112–13; Gagné (2007) 13 with n.39; Mihai (2010). Vlastos (1946) 75 associates Parmenides with such passages (although without further elaboration or argument) for the basic idea that the human comprises both aethereal and earthy parts. On Vlastos (1946), see Ch. 5.1.

therefore, 'aether' signifies primarily a hot, celestial region (note also his reference to 'the hot might of starts', B11.3).[16] But Parmenides also characterises the element Light, which is the same as the Hot (see Chapter 4.2–3), quite generally as 'the *aethereal* fire of flame' (φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ, B8.56). Thus, the element Fire or Hot – including the Fire or Hot within us – is itself called 'aethereal', perhaps insofar as the element Hot is concentrated chiefly in the celestial region of aether, and insofar as this region is closely associated with, and, it seems, consists especially of, the element Hot.[17] Although it is never explicitly paralleled in the extant fragments, moreover, the common doxographic employment of 'earth' for Parmenides' Night[18] is supported by that element's characterisation as solid, heavy and dark (B8.59).

In our analysis in Chapter 4.2 of Theophrastus' account of Parmenides in his *On the Senses*, we saw that Theophrastus gives us conclusive evidence that Parmenides considered corpses to be Cold things and took death to involve 'the departure of the fire' (τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, *Sens*. 4.5–6) from the Cold body.[19] We may note here further the congruent (but, in themselves, less compelling) reports that Parmenides also explained both ageing (Aëtius, A46a) and sleeping (Tertullian, A46b) by reference to a more partial decrease in Hot.[20] Also congruently, Diogenes

[16] In his notoriously difficult account of Parmenides' cosmology (A37), Aëtius describes aether as the uppermost region of the universe (ἀνωτάτω πάντων τοῦ αἰθέρος), which orders the fiery heavens (ὑπ' αὐτῷ τὸ πυρῶδες ὑποταγῆναι τοῦθ' ὅπερ κεκλήκαμεν οὐρανόν), and Cicero speaks of a ring of fire (*continentem ardorem lucis orbem*) which encircles the heaven (*ND* 1.28 = A37). For discussions of this evidence, see Morrison (1955) 60–5; Coxon (2009) 362–9.

[17] See similarly Coxon (2009) 353; cf. Kahn (1960) 148. This formulation does not commit us to the view that Parmenides *equates* aether and fire, an idea criticised by Kingsley (1995) 18. The association of aether with celestial regions is, however, clearly not a later development, contra Kingsley (1995) 16–17. Kahn (1960) 140ff shows that, already in epic, 'aether' signifies most properly 'celestial light', and, moreover, that epic texts often do not strictly demarcate light as an active force, the state it produces (celestial brightness or translucence), and the celestial region it inhabits. Kahn (1960) 148 observes also that the etymological connection of αἰθήρ with αἴθω ('kindle', 'blaze') aided its later association with fire.

[18] See Coxon (2009) Testim. 26; 32; 40–1; 53; 88; 90; 193; 195–6; 204; 207.

[19] Note Ch. 4.2, n.20: the departure of fire from the corpse at death leaves it either entirely devoid of that element or at least very largely so.

[20] Tertullian is speaking en masse also of Empedocles, who is accorded also in DK31 A85 the views that sleep results from the partial, and death from the complete, departure of Hot.

Laertius reports that, in his anthropogony, Parmenides maintained that 'the generation of humans arose first from the sun' (γένεσίν τε ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι, A1.9–10), perhaps suggesting that Parmenides conceived of the sun as the initial source of Hot and, therefore, of life in mortals.[21] As we can confidently maintain on the basis of our evidence from Theophrastus alone, then, Parmenides clearly subscribed to the widespread association of Hot with one's life-force and vitality.[22]

Now, direct doxographic reports concerning Parmenides' view of the soul are scanty, schematic and variable. Aëtius indiscriminately ascribes to Parmenides and Hippasos the view that the soul is fiery (πυρώδη, A45). According to Macrobius, Parmenides maintained that it was constituted from earth and fire (*ex terra et igne*, A45). Theophrastus, according to Diogenes Laertius, said that Parmenides identified soul (*psychê*) and mind (*nous*, A1.11–12). In view of this scarcity and variance, it is not surprising that the question of Parmenides' psychology has been largely ignored in modern scholarship.[23] And indeed, it is not at all clear that Parmenides *explicitly* discussed the soul's physical composition. That is not to say, however, that Parmenides did not use a term in reference to souls nor, moreover, that he did not do so in a manner that implied a certain integration of it into his cosmological

[21] In retaining the manuscript reading ἐξ ἡλίου, I follow the avoidance of unnecessary emendations in Tarán (1965) 251–2 (contrast Verdenius (1947) 287–9). As Tarán suggests, αὐτόν in the following clause is most probably elliptical for αὐτὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, to be supplied from the immediately preceding ἀνθρώπων: 'and the human himself (αὐτόν) comprises the Hot and the Cold, from which all things combine'. The clause thus indicates that the human, as finally produced, comprises both Hot and Cold, in keeping with Censorinus' report (A51) that Parmenides' (like Empedocles') anthropogony involved the mixture of two elements (he gives *ignis* and *umor*). If so, then the sun would play for Parmenides a primary but non-exhaustive role in the first emergence of living mortals. Compare the causal role which Anaximander accorded the sun in the generation of ζῷα (DK12 A11.6, with KRS (1983) 141–2); cf. also *PDerv.* col.25.9–10. For the generative role of Hot and fire, see also Archel. DK60 A1; A4.5; Emped. DK31 B62. For divine aether as generative, cf. Eur. *TrGF* 5.877; 839.1–5 = Anaxag. DK59 A112.

[22] The representation of the vital force in humans as a kind of fiery heat is at least as old as Homer, see *Il.* 21.463–6 (βροτῶν . . . οἳ . . . ἄλλοτε μέν τε | ζαφλεγέες τελέθουσιν . . . ἄλλοτε δὲ φθινύθουσιν ἀκήριοι), and cf. *Il.* 24.54 for the corpse as 'un-sensing earth' (for Parmenides, as we saw, the fireless corpse *is* perceptive and cognisant in its own way). On vital heat in the Hippocratics, Aristotle and the Stoics, see Solmsen (1957).

[23] See e.g. Casertano (2011) 49, n.111: 'we do not have any clue to judge on this point'.

system. In fact, Simplicius offers us a far more reliable report of what shows every sign of being a theory of metempsychosis. A close consideration of this report will support Aëtius' account of Parmenides' conception of the soul against Macrobius' – Parmenides did indeed take the soul to be a fiery thing – while Theophrastus' reported comment will be exposed as a formulaic and misleadingly oversimplified Peripatetic complaint.[24]

When expounding Parmenides' account of *Doxa*'s goddess, Simplicius writes (*in Ph*. 9.39.19–21 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 207):

καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλίν φησιν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν διὰ τὴν πολλὴν νῦν ἄγνοιαν τῶν παλαιῶν γραμμάτων μηκύνειν ἀναγκάζομαι.

And he says that she conveys the souls, now from the visible to the invisible,[25] *and then back again. I am compelled to go on about these issues at length due to current ignorance of the ancient texts.*

Admittedly, the passage does not confirm *beyond doubt* that 'the souls' (*tas psychas*) reflects Parmenides' own phraseology, although this is entirely plausible. The important point to recognise, however, is that Simplicius works here very closely indeed from Parmenides' text. In the previous sentences (*in Ph*. 9.38.30–9.39.18), Simplicius

[24] Relying on Theophrastus' reported statement, Tarán (1965) 252 with n.59 reinterprets Macrobius as referring to man as a whole, and dismisses Aëtius as Stoicising. Coxon (2009) 382 integrates all three reports: the soul is fiery (Aëtius), but contains also a portion of earth (Macrobius), since it is identified with mind as explicated in B16 (Theophrastus). Vlastos (1946) 70 assumes that both fire and its opposite are present in the Parmenidean soul. The conception of the soul as fiery can be paralleled elsewhere in early Greek thought. Betegh (2007) 13–24 has demonstrated that the Heraclitean soul comprises exhalations, ranging from atmospheric air to (superior) celestial fire. In its ideal state, then, the soul is fiery (B118; contrast the drunkard's 'moist' soul at B117); cf. also Schofield (1991) 20–1, 28–30. Aristotle ascribes to Democritus and Leucippus the view that the soul is 'a kind of fire and a hot thing' (πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν, *de An*. 404^{a}1–6). Conceptions of the soul as immaterial are not clearly attested before Plato: Burkert (1985) 323; Vernant (1991*a*) 29–30.

[25] The contrast with ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς by itself guarantees that 'invisible' must be the meaning of ἀειδές here (as universally assumed). With τὸ ἀειδές, moreover, Simplicius clearly preserves an allusion to 'Hades', whatever the original Parmenidean word (ἀϊδές? ἀειδές?). For Hades and invisibility, see already *Il*. 5.845. LSJ in fact do not offer 'unseen' or 'invisible' as a possible sense of ἀειδής, but this is an oversight. For just a handful of numerous possible examples, see Plut. *Mor*. 382F5, 1130A7; Phil. *de Abr*. 75.5; Corn. *ND* 74.6; Clem. *Strom*. 5.14.93.5.2–4; Greg. Nyss. *de An. et Res*. 46.48.38; Eus. *PE* 11.27.6.3–27.8 (citing Pl. *Phd*. 79a6-b16). Mss. for Pl. *Gorg*. 493b4–5 and *Phd*. 79a6-b16, 83b4 carry forms of both ἀειδής and ἀϊδής, although editors typically (but not invariably) prefer the latter.

cites *verbatim* a series of fragments (B13; B12.1–3 and B8.50–61) and, soon after (9.39.27–9.40.6), he cites *verbatim* another series of fragments (B8.26–8 and B8.30–3). In the midst of these citations, he introduces this sentence with 'he says' (φησιν). Most conclusively, in the *immediately following sentence*, Simplicius apologises that he must expound Parmenides at such length and in such detail due to current ignorance of the ancient texts (9.39.20). Elsewhere (9.144.28), Simplicius similarly explains that he is citing at length from Parmenides' treatise because of its rarity. Simplicius thus provides strong and under-discussed evidence that, in a now lost passage, the goddess was explicitly endowed with the eschatological role of cyclically receiving and dispatching 'souls' or, minimally, what Simplicius referred to as such in the context of a very close paraphrase. But how should we interpret the terms which Simplicius employs, and can we relate *Doxa*'s eschatological doctrine of soul-conveyance to its elemental cosmology?

Crucially, we know – as we just recalled – that Parmenides considered Hot the mortal's life-force and death a 'departure of the fire' from the Cold corpse. The conveyance of souls reported by Simplicius, therefore, corresponded to a physiological account of the inception and cessation of life. The evidence indicates, then, a cyclical process (ποτὲ μέν . . . ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν) whereby the goddess dispatches Hot from one location to the other, where she incarnates it in a Cold body (so that the living mortal comprises a mixture of both Hot and Cold), and dispatches it back to the other location when separating it from the Cold.[26]

[26] Deichgräber (1959) 716–19 assumes (without mentioning the Cold corpse) that the goddess conveys pure fire-souls, but contrasts these with the 'inkarnierten Seelen' of living mortals, which comprise fluctuating proportions of both elements. Mansfeld (1964) 170 rightly objects that we cannot extend 'soul' also to the Night-element of the body if we maintain (as I follow Deichgräber in doing) that Night (or Cold) takes no part in the metempsychosis. Mansfeld's own view (171–4), that Simplicius is merely paraphrasing B16, is impossible to accept. B16 makes no mention of divine ministration and Simplicius nowhere uses *psychê* as a synonym for *nous* when discussing Parmenides. I cannot see how any reader of Simplicius' paraphrase could suspect anything like the doctrine of B16 from what would be an inexplicably elliptical and idiosyncratic exposition of it. Similarly unmotivated and untenable, I think, is the idea (which was put to me) that Simplicius might merely be paraphrasing the proem. This would, again, constitute an impenetrably compressed and misleading gloss – this time of the detailed journey to the goddess and her opening words in B1 – which could scarcely be squared with Simplicius' immediately following remark that he was forced to go on at length about these aspects of the poem due to current ignorance of the text. In B1,

This framework raises a question concerning conceptual priority. Did Parmenides identify the mortal's soul as a particular token of Hot, or the Hot itself as living or ensouled stuff? On the first alternative, the soul would be identified with the stable, core Hot element, which animates the mortal *continuously* from birth to death and persists across successive incarnations. The goddess's conveyance of Hot to and from the mortal would represent two delimited actions at both extremes of the mortal's life. If, as seems possible but less likely, Hot is itself a living substance, so that one's soul was simply the sum of Hot in him at any given moment, then the goddess would seem to convey Hot continuously and gradually. An adult mortal life as a whole would be characterised by a gradual decline in living substance, with the cause of ageing being a partial (A46a) decline in Hot (the mortal would lose his soul-stuff bit by bit). But there will also be fluctuations in the presence of living substance in the mortal, with Hot decreasing, for example, whenever the mortal is asleep (A46b). Simplicius uses the plural and substantive term 'the souls' (*tas psychas*). If this reflects Parmenidean usage (recall how closely Simplicius works here from Parmenides' text), then it supports the former alternative, that Parmenides explained the soul as a particular token of Hot.[27] More generally, we will see momentarily that what Simplicius reports is almost certainly a doctrine of metempsychosis. If so, then unless Parmenides advances a very idiosyncratic subversion of notions of metempsychosis, this in itself suggests that they are the *same* souls, i.e. for Parmenides, the same unified, individuated tokens of Hot, which the goddess conveys to and fro at birth and death, as opposed to ever-changing batches of Hot,

moreover, it is not the goddess but the Heliades who 'convey' the *kouros* (B1.8) and nothing there parallels the notion, which takes centre stage in Simplicius' brief statement, of a *cyclical* conveyance. There is, finally, the context (*in Ph*. 9.38.18–39.21): Simplicius is illustrating the cosmological functions of the goddess (whom he identifies as the cosmic efficient cause: 39.13) within that section or 'account' (τὸν λόγον, 39.10) of the poem which belonged in the domain of 'belief' (δόξαν, δοκοῦν, κτλ, 38.20–6, 39.10–12), which came after the account of the intelligible in *Alêtheia* (συμπληρώσας κτλ, 38.28–9) and which was introduced along with the two physical elements in B8.50–61 (cited here by Simplicius) – i.e. within *Doxa*.

[27] As does, for what it is worth, Aëtius' report (A45) that Parmenides described the soul as fiery.

whose unity and identity are not retained through successive incarnations. Admittedly, however, Parmenides need not have indicated a clear position on this particular question. It is also possible that Parmenides did identify Hot as ensouled stuff but still spoke of particular 'souls' as enduringly individuated tokens of this ensouled stuff.[28]

On either reading, Parmenides exemplifies what Gábor Betegh has described as the widespread 'portion model' of the relation between soul and cosmos, in which the soul comprises one or more of the specific stuffs which also have cosmic functions (in this case, 'Hot' or 'Light' or 'fire').[29] Notably, Betegh highlights that the portion model can express and address eschatological concerns insofar as the soul's stuff(s) – and, therefore, its origin and destination – are standardly taken to be superior and, often if not invariably, divine.[30] Indeed, in his *Helen* (1013–16, cited above), Euripides employs something very much like the portion model to explain that both the living *and the dead* can undergo punishment, since the mind of the deceased retains immortal cognition as it falls into immortal aether.[31] Quite generally, in the passages expressing aethereal eschatology which we considered in this section, the eventual return of souls to the aether constituted a happy fate (and, in some cases, a divine reward) for those particular souls. Nothing prevents the portion model from accommodating a notion of the persistent unity of the soul. Individual souls can comprise particular, stable tokens of some stuff(s), as is most

[28] Betegh (2007) 6–13, 24–7 shows that Heraclitus uses *psychê* both as a mass term denoting a kind of cosmic stuff (ψυχή, B36), commensurable with 'water' and 'earth', and as a count noun (ψυχῇσιν, B36; cf. Simplicius' plural τὰς ψυχάς). The Hippocratic treatise *de Hebdomadibus* offers a partial parallel to what I reconstructed above: at death, 'the breath of the hot (τοῦ θερμοῦ) departs as a whole back to the whole', a process glossed, apparently interchangeably, as the soul (ἡ ψυχή) leaving behind the cold, mortal corpse (τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ θνητόν), *Hebd*. 52; cf. also *Nat. Hom*. 3. Heat causes life, and its departure death, also in Lucretius, *DRN* 3.121–9.

[29] Betegh (2006*b*), not discussing Parmenides. The proem (B1), though, evinces what Betegh calls the 'journey model' of the relation between soul and cosmos, see Ch. 5.3. Betegh (2006*b*) 43–6 observes that the two models are juxtaposed in both Empedocles and the Derveni papyrus. Cf. also Betegh (2004) 346.

[30] Betegh (2006*b*) esp. 32, 36–8, discussing in particular frr. 226 and 228a Kern = 437 and 436 Bernabé.

[31] The other Euripidean passages cited above leave no doubt that, in *Hel*. 1013–16 too, the mind is implied to be aethereal also in origin.

probably the case with Parmenides' soul, and as is indeed the case, *mutatis mutandis*, with Euripides' mind in his *Helen*.

We know that Parmenides developed a naturalistic embryological theory in his *Doxa* (B17–18; A53–4). One might wonder, then, whether Parmenides' doctrine of metempsychosis and soul-conveyance could fit with this embryology. Did Parmenides maintain a coherent and consistent account of the formation of living mortals? In fact, the two theories hang together closely, and the connections between them are illuminating. Above all, it is again the governing goddess who administers not only the conveyance of souls but also the processes of copulation and birth (B12.3–6):

δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾷ·
πάντα γὰρ <ἥ> στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει
πέμπουσ' ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν τό τ' ἐναντίον αὖτις
ἄρσεν θηλυτέρῳ

. . . The divinity who steers all things.
For she rules over the hateful birth and mixture of all things,
Conveying the female to mingle with the male and again contrariwise
The male to mingle with the female.

Parmenides' striking description of birth as 'hateful' has been convincingly related to current discourses of metempsychosis.[32] Indeed, the term for 'hateful' here (στυγερός) is a common and traditional epithet for death and Hades.[33] Parmenides' pointedly inverted portrayal of *birth* as 'hateful' accords with eschatological ideas that our incarnate life is flanked by a superior prenatal and post-mortem existence. A fourth-century Gold Tablet from Thurii in South Italy holds out to the initiate the prospect that he may 'fly out of the painful, grievous circle' (κύκλō δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπενθέος ἀργαλέοιο, GJ 5.5). The phrase is plausibly taken to express final release from the burden of cyclical reincarnations. Proclus cites the ritual Orphic prayer 'to cease from the circle and to have

[32] Burkert (1972) 284; Coxon (2009) 372.

[33] στυγερὸν θάνατον, *Od*. 24.414; Aesch. *Ch*. 1008; Eur. *Med*. 994; πάντες . . . στυγεροὶ θάνατοι, *Od*. 12.341; στυγερὸς Ἀίδης, *Il*. 8.368 (cf. *h.Hom*. 2.395; *Il*. 20.61–5); κήρ . . . στυγερή, *Il*. 23.78–9 (cf. *Th*. 211–12) Cf. *Il*. 23.48 for the funeral feast as στυγερή. Seeing especially that the traditional 'hateful death' (στυγερὸν θάνατον) occurs at 994, Medea's description of *life* as hateful at 145–7 (βιοτὰν στυγεράν) is a pointedly paradoxical inversion (occasioned by her unique circumstances), reminiscent of the inversion in Parmenides B12.4. Parmenides' description of birth as 'hateful' could of course be overdetermined, explicable in terms of both eschatology and physical pain.

reprieve of evil' (κύκλου τ' ἂν λήξαι καὶ ἀναπνεύσαι κακότητος) as the aim of the mysteries of Dionysus and Korê (fr. 229 Kern = 348 Bernabé).[34] A Pythagorean *acusma*, which probably predates Aristotle, pronounces pains good and pleasures bad because mortals enter this life as a punishment (Iamblichus, *VP* 85).[35] A generation after Parmenides, Empedocles recounts his own entrance into human life as a traumatic and lamentable event: 'I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar place' (DK31 B118).[36]

Notably, Simplicius, when describing the goddess's conveyance of souls, employs the very same verb (πέμπειν, *in Ph*. 9.39.19) which Parmenides uses for her ministration of copulation (πέμπουσ', B12.5). Parmenides also uses the same verb in the proem for the conveyance of the youth by the Daughters of the Sun (πέμπειν, B1.8; cf. προὔπεμπε, B1.26). As we will see in detail in the next section, the proem figures the youth's journey to the goddess as that of the discarnate, post-mortem soul. In short, it is the same terminology that describes the goddess's ministration of the different processes (transmigratory and embryological) which govern the formation and dissolution of particular mortal lives. (The recurrence of the term in B1.8, 26 and B12.5 makes it likely that Simplicius' use of it tracks Parmenides' own language.)

Finally, in Simplicius' discussion, his citation of the first three lines of the fragment whose second half we just cited and examined (B12.1–3), and his description of Parmenides' theory of soul-conveyance, are separated only by his citation of B13: 'first of all the gods, then, she devised Eros' (πρώτιστον μὲν Ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσσατο πάντων).[37] Now, this fragment is chiefly concerned with *Doxa*'s lost theogony (Simplicius introduces it with the

[34] Cf. Johnston (2013*b*) 127; Bremmer (2014) 75–6.

[35] Burkert (1972) 166ff (note 168, n.14) convincingly argues that Iamb. *VP* 82–6 derives from Aristotle, who, indeed, very nearly cites this *acusma* at *Protr*. fr. 106 Düring (*apud* Iamb. *Protr*. 47.25); cf. Dillon and Hershbell (1991) 107, n.3; Huffman (2009) 36, n.43; cf. also Philol. DK44 B14.

[36] With Clem. *Strom*. 3.3.14; Wright (1995), *ad loc*.; Burkert (1972) 284.

[37] *In Ph*. 9.39.14–19. Simplicius then adds an 'etc.' (καὶ τὰ ἑξῆς), and immediately reports the theory of soul-conveyance (19–20). The proximity in Simplicius' account may well reflect proximity in Parmenides' poem. By comparison, Simplicius then follows a citation of B8.26–8 immediately with a citation of B8.30–3 (9.39.27–9.40.6). Simplicius cites B12.2–6 some pages earlier (*in Ph*. 9.31.13–17).

words: 'and he says that she is also the cause of gods, saying . . . ', *in Ph*. 9.39.17–18), and it was no doubt chosen for quotation by Simplicius partly under the influence of Plato's interest in it (*Symp*. 178b). But this statement about Eros could also plausibly have related to Parmenides' account of copulation.[38] Some lines from Parmenides' embryology, rendered into Latin by Caelius Aurelianus, speak of 'the buds of Venus' (*Veneris . . . germina*, B18). Caelius, therefore, shows that Parmenides associated insemination with the very same divine milieu to which Eros belonged, regardless of precisely which Greek appellation underlies his *Venus*.[39]

In sum, Parmenides' embryology and his doctrine of soul-conveyance are not only compatible but hang together closely. The goddess's direct administration of intercourse and birth (ἄρχει | πέμπουσ', B12.4–5), and perhaps also her indirect facilitation of these processes through the creation of Eros (μητίσσατο, B13), cohere with her eschatological role of conveying souls (καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν κτλ, *in Ph*. 9.39.19–20). These are constituents of a unified account, which explicates the formation and dissolution of living mortals through divine agency.

Erwin Rohde, and some subsequent scholars, thought that the coexistence of the theory of metempsychosis reported by Simplicius with Parmenides' account of human cognition in B16 poses special difficulties.[40] But there is no special problem in accounting, on the basis of these two texts, for the relation in Parmenides between soul (*psychê*, or whatever the operative term in Parmenides' eschatology was) and mind or cognition

[38] As Coxon (2009) 372 suggests.

[39] Caelius' stipulation *latinos enim ut potui simili modo composui, ne linguarum ratio misceretur* (B18) should caution against, rather than encourage, drawing seemingly self-evident inferences. 'Aphrodite' is of course possible but not *obvious*. There is no clear evidence that Parmenides ever made direct reference to any member of the Olympian pantheon. While Plutarch interprets the maker of Eros in Parmenides as Aphrodite (*Mor*. 756e10–11 = B13), Aëtius refers to the goddess as Necessity (Ἀνάγκη), Fate (Εἱμαρμένη), Justice (Δίκη) and Providence (Πρόνοια; A32, A37; cf. Coxon (2009) 280).

[40] Rohde (1925) 373 assumes the equivalence of soul and mind in Parmenides and reasons that, given B16, the theory of metempsychosis is an inconsistent adage, which Parmenides, 'not speaking as a physiologist, but as an adherent of the Orphic-Pythagorean theosophy', imported without modification. Deichgräber (1959) 716 and Mansfeld (1964) 174, whose alternatives I criticised above (n.26), allow Rohde's view as a possibility.

(*noos*). As we saw in Chapter 4.2, we register things, according to Parmenides, through both elements. By the Hot in us we cognise Hot things, and by the Cold in us we cognise Cold things. In the living mortal, who comprises mixtures of both elements, mind or cognition (*noos*) will thus be a function of the activity of both elements. The soul, therefore, either as a particular, delimited token of Hot or as the sum of ensouled Hot in the mortal at any given moment, will play a non-exhaustive role in the living mortal's mind.

But what of Theophrastus' remark that, according to Parmenides, 'the soul and the mind are one and the same' (τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, A1.11–12)? Parallels from Peripatetic doxography elsewhere make clear that this remark is merely criticising Parmenides in formulaic terms for failing to draw a particular Peripatetic conceptual distinction.[41] Aristotle ascribes the very same identification to Democritus (ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν) simply on the alleged basis (γάρ) that Democritus regarded what appears as true (*de An*. 1.2. 404^{a}27–9). In doing so, Democritus failed to isolate mind as a particular capacity in relation to truth (404^{a}30–1). We saw in Chapter 4.3 that, in *Metaphysics Gamma*, Aristotle cites B16 to assimilate Parmenides to an alleged ancient consensus, which included also Democritus among others, according to which what appears is true, and sense-perception is 'cognition' or 'knowledge' (φρόνησις, 1009^{b}12–1010^{a}3). As we noted, when Aristotle later reprises and develops this same discussion in *On the Soul* (3.3 427^{a}17-^{b}14), he asserts more explicitly the stronger view that the ancients identified knowing (τὸ φρονεῖν) and perceiving (τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι) as one and the same thing. The ancients thus failed to isolate the perceptual activities of the soul from the mind's distinctive activity (τὸ νοεῖν), in which there is both 'correctly' and 'incorrectly' (τὸ ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς), with the former including cognition (φρόνησις, 427^{b}6–11; cf. 427^{a}21–8).[42] In sum, an established Peripatetic-doxographic tradition cited Parmenides' theory of human cognition in B16 to implicate him in the view that all impressions are true, and *identified* that same view with the

[41] Mansfeld (1964) 172 interprets similarly; cf. Tarán (1965) 252, n.59.

[42] For Aristotle himself on the relation between *nous* and *psychê*, see *de An*. 429^{a}10–430^{b}32; cf. 415^{a}11–12.

failure to distinguish soul and mind. Theophrastus' reported remark that Parmenides identified soul and mind conveys this same, Peripatetic criticism of Parmenides. We saw in Chapter 4.3 that his statement in *On the Senses* 4.1, that Parmenides speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same thing (τὸ γάρ . . . ὡς ταὐτὸ λέγει), seems heavily indebted to the same passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics Gamma*, and is best read as the criticism that Parmenides failed to isolate what *a Peripatetic* would distinguish as sense-perception and cognition. Indeed, this sentence from *On the Senses* could *be*, at some remove, what Diogenes Laertius ends up reporting as Theophrastus' claim that Parmenides identified soul and mind.[43]

Is there any truth at all, then, in the remark that Parmenides assimilated soul and mind? The remark is perhaps partially true to the extent that the soul of the living mortal is (or is part of) the Hot in him, and the living mortal not only perceives but also cognises with the Hot in him. As we saw in Chapter 4.3, Parmenides' theory in B16 expounds not merely the perceptual experiences of humans but, more broadly, the mechanisms which determine the sorts of things of which we are aware as well as our beliefs and judgements concerning those things. It explains how mind (*noos*) is present to mortals and how the human frame cognises (*phroneei*). At the same time, Theophrastus' reported remark is unjustified insofar as Parmenides does not reduce mind, which at least in the living mortal involves both Hot and Cold, to soul. As we know from Theophrastus' own report in *On the Senses* (4.4–6), the corpse, at any rate, has no Hot soul in it, but nonetheless perceives-and-cognises (Cold things). And if the notion that something can be lifeless but perceptive strikes us as excessively counterintuitive, we should recall Euripides' *explicit* expression of the idea that 'the mind of the dead does not live, but does have immortal thought' (*Hel*. 1014–16). We would be viewing Parmenides (and Euripides) through our own, etic category of 'life' – which would not in itself be a hermeneutic sin, of course – if we insisted that, if the corpse is perceptive, then it must retain some sort of life. At any rate, for

[43] A later (and no doubt derivative) expression of this same doxographic tradition, Aëtius A45 indiscriminately lumps Parmenides together with Democritus – as well as Empedocles – as thinkers who identified soul and mind.

Parmenides, the Cold corpse is perceptive but not ensouled (following 'the departure of fire').

Simplicius couches the process of metempsychosis within some sort of topography: 'from the visible to the invisible, and then back again'. Any elaboration of this topography, however, would be necessarily speculative. The invisible (*to aeides*) is an obvious allusion to Hades (the etymological association with invisibility is as old as *Il*. 5.845), but the topographical implications of this allusion are unclear. Neither here nor in our discussion of the proem will we rely on inevitably speculative and inconclusive reconstructions of Parmenides' eschatological topography.[44]

Now, whether or not Parmenides made aether the source or destination of the prenatal and post-mortem soul, we can conclude that he developed what is recognisably a version of the familiar, contemporary eschatological conception of the soul as aethereal in nature, and as incarnated at birth in bodies, which comprise also another, axiologically lower (earthy) element. Parmenides conceived of the element Light or Hot as, in itself and regardless of its spatial location, 'aethereal', inasmuch as it is the element especially characteristic of the aether, understood as the higher and Hotter celestial region of the universe. We have no direct evidence that he described the lower element as 'earthy', although there is a widespread assumption to this effect in the doxographic tradition, and he certainly described it as cold, heavy and dark. He took the Hot to be the cause of life, separated from the Cold at death. He conceived of the soul as Hot and, therefore, aethereal (or, possibly but less likely, of the aethereal Hot as itself ensouled stuff).

Most importantly, we observed above that the *divinity* of the soul is clearly implicit, and sometimes explicit, in the contemporary eschatological conceptions of the soul as aethereal.[45] We can now turn more directly to the eschatological migrations and divinity of the soul in Parmenides' system.

That the cyclical conveyance of souls to and fro by a goddess indeed expresses a doctrine of metempsychosis is overwhelmingly likely. The cyclicality which Simplicius highlights (τὰς ψυχάς . . .

[44] See the Appendix for a discussion of these issues.

[45] One could have read the divinity of aether already into its association in epic with the overdetermined adjective δῖος ('heavenly', 'noble', 'divine'), e.g. *Il*. 16.365; *Th*. 697.

ποτὲ μέν . . . ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν) indicates that the goddess conveys from life to death 'and then back again' the same souls[46] or, *minimally*, different amalgamations of the same batches of ensouled Hot. Parallel accounts of cyclical metempsychosis strongly favour the same conclusion. We already noted in this section the fourth-century Gold Tablet from South Italy which speaks of escape from the 'painful, grievous circle' (GJ 5.5; cf. κύκλου, fr. 229 Kern = 348 Bernabé). Pindar uses cyclical language very reminiscent of Simplicius' report when expressing a process of metempsychosis which is administered by a female goddess (Φερσεφόνα . . . ψυχὰς πάλιν, fr. 133 M *apud Men*. 81b8–10). So does Plato's Socrates when, before citing these lines from Pindar, he comments on this doctrine (τοτὲ μὲν τελευτᾶν . . . τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γίγνεσθαι, *Men*. 81b4–5).

Parmenides' theory of metempsychosis itself, like any such theory, presupposes some notion of the soul's divinity. As Burkert puts it, by denying that the soul is subject to death, by making it *athanatos*, metempsychosis renders 'the epithet which since Homer had characterised the gods in distinction from men . . . the essential mark of the human person'.[47] Indeed, even if, for whatever reason, one was disinclined to allow that Parmenides' theory of soul-conveyance should be thought of as a doctrine of metempsychosis, there is no question that, in this psychological scheme, our souls precede our birth and survive our death. The soul cannot, therefore, be mortal in the same sense that living humans are. Indeed, Simplicius makes no suggestion that the cyclical eschatological process (ποτέ . . . ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν) was delimited in any way.[48]

We may further support the plausibility of this conclusion, that Parmenides considered the transmigrating, aethereal soul divine,

[46] *Pace* Tarán (1965) 248–9, n.51, rightly criticised on this point by Kurfess (2016) 41, n.63.

[47] Burkert (1985) 300; cf. Bremmer (1983) 71–2. Metempsychosis and the soul's divinity are intimately connected e.g. at Hdt. 2.123 (ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός ἐστι) and Pl. *Men*. 81b3-6 (ψυχήν . . . ἀθάνατον), where Socrates ascribes these views to unnamed priests and priestesses and to inspired poets. This connection, especially in contemporary South Italy, is explored further in this and the following section.

[48] My argument that Parmenides considered souls divine requires only this point, that they precede the mortal's birth and survive his death in this way. I will continue, however, to refer to Parmenides' doctrine of metempsychosis.

by observing further instructive parallels for the divinity of the soul, or of (hot) aether, or of the hot or aethereal soul.

Anaximenes may have already related our soul to his divine air, which controls the cosmos (DK13 B2).[49] Diogenes of Apollonia (fifth century), who also adopts air as his key principle, describes our soul as a portion of god (μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ, DK64 A19.42). Alcmaeon of Croton, probably writing in the first half of the fifth century, argued for the immortality of the soul, and for its similarity to the divine celestial bodies, on the basis of its capacity for everlasting self-motion (DK24 A12).[50] Pherecydes of Syros, writing in the sixth century, is reported by Apponius to have divided the soul into two spirits, heavenly (*de caelo spiritum*) and earthy (*terrenis seminibus comparatum*, F86b Schibli = DK7 A5). Scholars have prudently questioned the historicity of this report.[51] And yet, Apponius' account may well be a Neoplatonic and Christian[52] misinterpretation of the genuine view that the mortal comprises both a divine, aethereal element and a mortal, earthy one, the soul being identified with the former.[53] This interpretation would agree with the recurrent insistence in our testimonia that Pherecydes (first) maintained both metempsychosis and the divinity and immortality of the soul (as well as with the archaic conception of the soul as aethereal).[54]

That Pythagoras and early Pythagoreans in South Italy advanced notions of metempsychosis and, concomitantly, the divinity of the soul is perhaps the only doctrinal statement that can be made about early Pythagoreanism without reservation, even if there is little prospect for crystallising a sharply defined theory.[55] In several Gold Tablets, the initiate's soul exclaims to

[49] See further Ch. 1.2.

[50] Alc. DK24 B2 might express a notion of metempsychosis, see KRS (1983) 347–8; cf. Burkert (1972) 296 with n.97–8; but contrast Guthrie (1962) 353–6.

[51] See Schibli (1990) 109–12. Gomperz (1929) 24–5 accepts it.

[52] See Schibli, *loc. cit*. [53] Vlastos (1970*b*) 110 with n.60 argues similarly.

[54] Divinity: Cicero (perhaps drawing on Posidonius: see Schibli (1990) 104), F7 Schibli = DK7 A5; cf. F48; F85a-b Schibli; metempsychosis: F2 Schibli = DK7 A2; F88 Schibli = DK7 B6, with Schibli (1990) 105–6, 109, 112–13, 117–20, 123–5. Doxographers regularly make Pherecydes Pythagoras' teacher, F2; F11; F20; F48–9; F55; F84; F85b Schibli.

[55] See esp. Xenoph. DK21 B7; Ion DK36 B4; Hdt. 2.123; Ar. *de An*. 407^{b}20–3; Theophr. *apud* Por. *Abst*. 3.26.1–4; with Burkert (1972) 121–36; cf. Schofield (1991) 25–7; Vlastos (1970*b*) 110–11, n.62; Kahn (2001) 18; Huffman (2009) 21; Lloyd (2014)

eschatological divinities 'I am a child of Earth and starry Sky (Γῆς . . . καὶ Οὐρανοῦ), but my race is heavenly (γένος οὐράνιον)', and, in others, 'For I also claim to be of your blessed race (ὑμῶν γένος).'[56] In the next section, we will see that there are significant affinities between Parmenides' proem and the Tablets, and that these formulae in the Tablets, spoken by the initiate's soul, concern his divinisation.

Pindar, reflecting on both the gulf and the affinity between mortal and divine, writes: 'from a single mother we both draw our breath' (*N* 6.1–2). Elsewhere, Pindar speaks of an image of life, which survives the mortal's death and exercises divinatory powers in his sleep, since it alone comes from the gods (fr. 131 M). Plato, as we saw, cites Pindar's description of a retributive metempsychosis when himself expounding metempsychosis and the soul's immortality.[57] The Hippocratic author of *On Fleshes* understands the Hot to be an immortal substance, which apprehends and knows all things and which, he says, is what 'the ancients' (οἱ παλαιοί) named 'aether' (*Carn*. 2 = DK64 C3). Aristotle is following in this broad tradition when he maintains that the power of every soul shares in a divine Hot, which is analogous to the element of the stars (i.e. aether).[58]

Numerous further examples could be cited (Stoic psychology being an obvious if later case). But we can conclude quite generally that the divinity of the soul, especially in the context of metempsychosis and in South Italy, was already maintained before Parmenides' time, and that the more specific conception of the

28–32, 43. Zhmud (2012) 221–38 maintains that Pythagoras took metempsychosis from the Orphic traditions. As Schofield (*loc. cit.*) and Huffman (2009) 34–5 argue, the evidence from Xenophanes, Herodotus and Ion of Chios gives every reason to believe that '*psychê*' was the operative term in Pythagorean metempsychosis. As far as our evidence from Simplicius goes, this is most probably the case also in Parmenides' doctrine of metempsychosis. I return in the next section to Parmenides' relation to the early Pythagoreans. Wilamowitz (1959) vol.2 209, when rejecting the possibility of Pythagorean influence, wrongly asserts: 'von der Seele, gar von ihrer Unsterblichkeit und Wanderung, weiß Parmenides nichts'.

[56] See nn.139, 141 below.

[57] On Pindar's eschatology, see further Johnston (2013*b*) 100ff.

[58] *GA* 736^{b}29–38, with Solmsen (1957) 121–2 on the peculiarities of the passage and the possible motivations underlying it; cf. Burkert (1972) 362, n.60. Aristotle, at least as paraphrased by Sextus at *M* 9.20–1, even argues that our notion of the divine was partly derived *from* observations about the soul.

(hot) aethereal soul as divine was current both during and after his generation, if not espoused already by Pherecydes precisely in the context of metempsychosis.

Before we move on from this survey, though, we might consider finally the possibility of a dualistic conception of the mortal in the archaic Orphic tradition. An Orphic anthropogony seems to suggest some sort of Titanic provenance for, or element in, mortals by tracing the origin of mankind to the ashes of the Titans, who were struck by Zeus' thunderbolt in punishment for tearing apart and devouring Persephone's son, the infant Dionysus. For Olympiodorus, the sixth-century CE commentator who first relays the myth in something like a complete form, the story even indicates a Dionysiac element in mortals: '... our body is Dionysiac; for we are a part of him, if indeed we consist of the soot from the Titans who tasted of his flesh' (*in Phd*. 1.3). In the verses of Pindar which Plato cites in his *Meno* (81b8-c4 = fr. 133 M), the transmigrations of mortal souls are related to some process of offence and recompense: 'Persephone will receive requital for an ancient grief.' Plato ascribes these same ideas of an immortal soul and metempsychosis to 'priests and priestesses who are concerned to be able to give an account (*logos*) of their practices' (*Men*. 81a10–12). Plato's citation from Pindar leaves the cause of Persephone's grief unspecified, and it is at least possible (though hardly obvious) that it refers to *some* version of the Dionysus myth.[59] If so, then an Orphic conception of the human as comprising in part a Titanic or divine component may go back to the archaic period. It remains and will remain debated, however, whether this Orphic anthropogony in fact belongs to the archaic stratum of Orphism or was a (much) later invention.[60]

[59] See Johnston (2013*a*) 69

[60] Johnston (2013*a*) esp. 66–9 argues for a late sixth- or early fifth-century BCE date for the myth's debut; cf. also Bremmer (2014) 62–3, 76. For the view that the Dionysus myth cannot be traced back to early Orphic traditions, that Persephone's grief in Pindar refers rather to her abduction by Hades and that Olympiodorus himself largely concocts the myth which he relays, see Edmonds (2013) 296–391. Some Orphic fragments (226 and 228a Kern = 437 and 436 Bernabé) express the view that the soul comes from, consists of, and returns to aether; see Betegh (2006*b*) 36–8. For a survey of Greek notions of an afterlife among the stars, or 'astral immortality', see Burkert (1972) 357–68.

Having already argued that Parmenides considered the soul divine and subject to eschatological migrations, I turn to some intriguing remarks by the Platonist philosopher Numenius, which Porphyry records in his *On the Cave of the Nymphs* (22.6–23.7 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 133):

> Now the theologians posited Cancer and Capricorn as these two gates, while Plato spoke of two mouths. Of these, Cancer is the one through which souls descend, and Capricorn is the one through which they ascend. Cancer is northerly and is used for descent, while Capricorn is southerly and is used for ascent. The northerly parts are for souls descending to birth (ψυχῶν εἰς γένεσιν κατιουσῶν), and it is right that the gates of the cave [sc. in Homer] towards the north are the places where humans descend, while the southerly ones are not for the gods but for those ascending to the gods (τῶν εἰς θεοὺς ἀνιουσῶν). For the same reason, he [sc. Homer] did not say that it is a way of gods, but of immortals (ἀθανάτων) – which is a term used in common also for souls (ἐπὶ ψυχῶν), which are immortal either *per se* or by their essence. These two gates he [sc. Numenius] says that Parmenides too recalled in his *Physics* and also the Romans and Egyptians.

Numenius aligns Parmenides with an alleged tradition that posits two celestial gates by which souls descend 'to birth' (εἰς γένεσιν) and ascend 'to gods' (εἰς θεούς). Now, unlike Simplicius' report of Parmenides' doctrine of soul-conveyance, Numenius' report is not independently reliable. Numenius indiscriminately situates Parmenides within what he dubiously styles a widespread tradition spanning also the '*theologoi*', Plato, Homer and 'the Romans and Egyptians'. Indeed, Numenius enlists Homer in this tradition simply on the basis of his distinction between two sets of gates which lead up to the Nymph's Cave, northern gates designed for mortal usage (καταιβαταὶ ἀνθρώποισιν) and 'more divine' southern ones (θεώτεραι, *Od.* 13.110–12).[61] First, however, the very eclecticism of Numenius' list renders it unlikely for the choice of Parmenides to be simply arbitrary. More importantly, our evidence from Simplicius, as analysed above, *does* corroborate Numenius' ascription to Parmenides of the two distinct psychic journeys. The first journey mentioned by Numenius is explicitly 'to birth', while the latter ('to gods') no doubt follows the mortal's death (as the reference to Plato's Myth of Er confirms). Even the vocabulary of

[61] The 'two mouths' (δύο στόμια) refer to Plato's 'openings' (χάσματα) in the Myth of Er (*Rep.* 10.614c2); we get στομίου at 10.615d5.

gates (although not their identification as northern and southern, or their portrayal as axiologically asymmetrical) may be supported or, perhaps, motivated by the proem's two aethereal gates of night and day (πύλαι ... αἰθέριαι, B1.11–13; cf. θυρέτροις, B1.13).[62] This is especially the case since the proem's imagery echoes *Doxa*'s cosmological framework and would rightly be styled eschatological, insofar as the journey of the *kouros* is represented in terms of the journey of the post-mortem, discarnate soul.[63] In the light of all of this, it is noteworthy that Numenius emphatically accentuates the *divinity* of the migrating soul, which precedes our birth and survives our death, praising Homer for describing the way upwards with terms that are not restricted to gods, but extend also to other divine things, such as souls.[64]

Can we say anything about the physiological composition of the goddess herself? It has been suggested that the goddess should be identified with the aether, and some evidence inconclusively favours this tempting identification.[65] But we will not assume this hypothesis here.[66] Nonetheless, it is worth observing the conjunction of two points in the light of, and in further support of, our conclusion that Parmenides associated the Hot with life and with the divine. First, Parmenides strikingly associates the divine with the female. Aside from the goddess herself, the proem boasts

[62] Cf. Coxon (1986) 163, 241–2.

[63] For both points, see Ch. 5.3. For the point that the proem's journey takes place within the framework of *Doxa*, see the introduction to the chapters on Parmenides, n.6.

[64] Homer in fact employs the intriguing comparative 'more divine' (θεώτεραι).

[65] According to Cicero, Parmenides posited a *ring of light* which confined heat and girdled the sky (*caelum*) and called it *a god* (A37). According to Aëtius' fuller summary at A37, the fiery sky (τὸ πυρῶδες ... οὐρανόν) was placed under and governed by *the aether*, which should thus presumably be identified with Cicero's divine ring of light. Both accounts echo Parmenides' description of the celestial 'goddess who governs all things' (B12.3); see further Coxon (2009) 14–15, 280–1, 363–70.

[66] Especially on the assumption that the revelatory goddess of B1 and the governing goddess of *Doxa* are one and the same (by far the most economical and natural view, although not one on which, as it happens, any of the arguments advanced in these chapters depend), one might raise an epistemological challenge to the identification of the goddess with aether. If the goddess's constitution involves purely Light and in no way any Night, then, given the principle of the perceptual cognition of like by like, how can she govern, or disclose the nature of, Night and objects which involve that element? But I can see no strong reason to think that Parmenides was ever struck by the question of the physiological composition of the goddess herself or of her own knowledge of things, any more than Hesiod addressed the question of his Muses' source of knowledge (cf. Ch. 2.2, n.76).

an elaborate, all-female divine cast (including most prominently the Daughters of the Sun), which conveys the *kouros* to the goddess. Second, Aristotle reports that, according to Parmenides, the female's constitution is *hotter* than the male's (A52; cf. A53).[67]

We saw in the previous chapter that Parmenides emphatically represents knowledge of what-is as divine knowledge. He considers it unattainable by the human mind, which is limited to the qualitatively different sort of cognition that underpins the cosmology of *Doxa*. But we saw in this section that Parmenides identifies a divine constituent within the mortal – his soul – which comprises only Hot, is detached at death from the Cold, mortal coil and persists across successive incarnations. We may also recall here Theophrastus' report that the thought of Hot through Hot is a better and purer kind of cognitive act than the thought of Cold through Cold (*Sens*. 3.4). Recall also that Parmenides traced, not only death, but also old age and forgetfulness to a deficiency in Hot, while, correspondingly, not only vitality but also memory involved its preponderance.[68] Theophrastus' statement, then, suggests that a hotter constitution is characterised by a superior mental disposition and superior mental activity. Hot thought constitutes a more vital, healthy, acute and effective kind of cognitive act and, consequently, a preponderance of Hot means mental activity of this nature, while a preponderance of Cold, the cause of forgetfulness and old age (senility?), constitutes a general deterioration in one's mental faculties.[69]

As we saw in Chapter 5.1, we cannot identify what-is with Light or some quality of Light, and it cannot be the case that thinking Light is itself nothing other than thinking what-is. The axiological nature of the contrast between Light and Night in *Doxa* does not support Aristotle's mistaken alignment of Light with what-is and

[67] On the associations within Parmenides' cosmology between the female, Light, vitality and the divine, see further Journée (2012).

[68] Ch. 4.2, with n.21.

[69] Night can be characterised as 'ignorant' (ἀδαῆ, B8.59), then, insofar as it brings about such cognitive and mental incapacity, and allows only the inferior cognition of Cold through Cold, and so *not* of all that ensouled things register: light, heat, sound, etc. (*Sens*. 4.4–6). Vlastos (1946) 68, 72 similarly sees Hot as the 'active aspect of the mortal mind, memory and judgement'; cf. also Tarán (1965) 259; Laks (1990) 14, n.40; Journée (2012) 308–10.

Night with what-is-not, although it may certainly explain how Aristotle came by this view. Nonetheless, it is pertinent and important that, in his cosmology, psychology, physiology and eschatology, Parmenides thinks of the mortal agent as a complex thing that comprises not only a mortal but also a divine part, which is independent of and prior to the living mortal and is, furthermore, associated with a superior cognitive and mental disposition. If the living mortal could somehow promote the divine part within himself against the mortal and attain (however momentarily) the cognitive and mental condition of the discarnate, post-mortem, pure Hot soul, then he would be attaining the cognitive and mental condition of a divine thing.

The proem to Parmenides' poem will further substantiate the conclusions at which we have arrived in this section concerning the soul's physiological makeup and its divinity. Furthermore, we will find that it characterises the *kouros*' journey as the eschatological journey of the discarnate, post-mortem soul, and highlights his unusual privilege in undertaking that journey while still alive. It represents, moreover, the *kouros*' attainment of the disposition which is necessary for acquiring knowledge of what-is as a cognitive identification with his divine soul. The proem also offers some insight into *how* Parmenides thought such cognitive divinisation was possible for the living mortal, and will best prepare us for identifying more precisely what this divinisation involves. It is to the proem, then, that we shall now turn.

5.3 The Proem in Its Time and Place

Notions of becoming like god (*homoiôsis theôi*) as the end of the ideal philosophical life play significant roles in many explorations of theology, epistemology and ethics in ancient Greece. Plato prescribes assimilation to the divine on several occasions and in different contexts. In the most sustained and instructive passage, he maintains that the philosopher, who constantly exercises the divine, rational soul-part within him (to which Plato refers as his internal *daimôn, Tim*. 90c4–6), will attain divine as opposed to mortal thoughts and cognition (φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, *Tim*.

90c1; cf. δόγματα, *Tim*. 90b3), and so partake of divinity insofar as this is possible for a human.[70] Aristotle similarly enjoins that 'we must not heed those who say that a human must think and cognise (φρονεῖν) human things, and a mortal, mortal things. Rather, we should become immortal so far as possible (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν)', adding: 'it may even be held that this is what each one is, inasmuch as it is the better and authoritative part' (*EN* 10.7 $1177^{b}31$–$1178^{a}3$).[71] Similar (and simultaneously divergent) descendants may be cited from a wide array of later Greek and monotheistic philosophies.[72] For all their differences, these models all take up and develop a pre-existing, pervasive and deep-seated theology of approximation – as I will refer to it – which construes the boundary between mortal and divine as a malleable and negotiable one, which understands the height of mortal excellence as an approximation to, or attainment of, divine qualities or capacities, and which already dominates the *Iliad*. They do so (with the idiosyncratic exception of the Epicurean model) by adopting the fundamental principle that the human being comprises a mixture of divine and non-divine parts and, correspondingly, capacities. The more one promotes the divine aspects of one's complex identity, the closer one assimilates oneself to divinity in one's cognition and/or character.

[70] Correspondingly, by exercising our mortal, non-rational soul-parts we acquire mortal cognition and become as mortal as a mortal can, *Tim*. 90b1-c6; cf. *Tht*. 176a8-b2 (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν); *Rep*. 6.500c8-d1; see further Sedley (1999*b*); Annas (1999) esp. 52–65; Armstrong (2004).

[71] Cf. also fr. 61 Rose. See Sedley (1999*b*) 324–8. For the theology and morality which Aristotle targets here, see Epicharm. DK23 B20; cf. also Pind. *I* 5.16; Eur. *Alc*. 799.

[72] For later Platonists, see e.g. Alcin. *Didasc*. 28.3–4; Plotin. *Enn*. 1.2.5–7; Apul. *de Plat*. 2.23.30–2; cf. Xenoc. fr. 236 Isnardi Parente, with Annas (1999) esp. 59, 63–71; Sedley (1999*b*) 322–3. For Stoics, see e.g. Sen. *Ep*. 92.3–4; Epic. *Disc*. 2.14.12–13 (with Long (2002) 145–7, 156–8, 170–2); cf. Plut. *Mor*. 1076a. For the more idiosyncratic, Epicurean take, e.g. *Sent. Vat*. 33; *Men*. 135.5–9; Lucr. *DRN* 5.8 (cf. 3.322); Philodem. fr. 386 Usener; Diog. Oen. fr. 52 col.4 Chilton, with Warren (2000) esp. 260–1; Erler (2002); cf. Most (2003) 314; Kenney (1971) 1–3. For ancient Jewish and Christian variants, see e.g. Philo *Fug*. 62–4 (Annas (1999) 65–6, n.37 cites further passages); Clem. *Strom*. 2.19; 2.22; 5.14.94.4–95.2, with Russell (2006). On these and such passages, cf. also Dodds (1951) 238, 255–6, n.6, 257, n.19; Most (2003) 313–16; Betegh (2006*a*) 636–7 with n.17; Lenz (2007); Boys-Stones (2009) 15. For an illustrative example of the numerous medieval descendants, see the discussion in Kreisel (1994) of Maimonides and his Greek and Islamic sources. Cases could be made also for Empedocles (cf. Ch. 6.2) and Heraclitus, see Roloff (1970) 180–6, 192–7; Broadie (1999) 219–20; Betegh, *loc. cit*.

Conceptions of the human as a complex of mortal and divine parts themselves emerge alongside metempsychosis already during the archaic period (as we saw in the previous section). They offer a new psychological and eschatological framework in which to accommodate the widespread theology of approximation prominent already in Homer. Xenophanes strikingly renounced these fundamental aspects of Greek religious thought (see Chapter 3.5). That Parmenides, conversely, understood the human to be a complex of mortal and divine we already saw in our discussion of his conception of the soul. In this section, I will argue further that Parmenides espouses what we will rightly call his own model of *homoiôsis theôi* in a manner that bears comparison with Plato and some of his philosophical descendants. To attain divine knowledge, the knower must himself be (qualifiedly, momentarily) divinised by identifying himself with his divine soul. Parmenides will emerge as a significant early exponent of the philosophical tradition of *homoiôsis theôi*.[73]

Parmenides' poem opened as follows (B1):

ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεί μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ' ἄ<σ>τη[74] φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.
ἄξων δ' ἐν χνοίῃσιν ἴ<ει> σύριγγος ἀυτήν
αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν
Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός
εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.
ἔνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων,
καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·
τῶν δὲ δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.
τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν

[73] The essential notion that the mortal's achievement of the rational cognition of *Alêtheia* involves his divinisation in some way has of course been suggested: Cornford (1952) 120; Roloff (1970) 171–7; Hussey (1990) 37; Göbel (2002) 158–66; Drozdek (2007) 46–8; Miller (2011) 43–57. These discussions do not relate this notion to the questions about and the links between Parmenides' epistemology, psychology and eschatology addressed here, or develop it in the ways suggested below.

[74] The corruption κατὰ †πάντ' ἄτη† (B1.3) cannot be emended with confidence. I follow noncommittally the traditional emendation ἄστη.

πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα
ἀπτερέως ὤσειε πυλέων ἄπο· ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων
χάσμ' ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι πολυχάλκους
ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι
γόμφοις καὶ περόνῃσιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ ῥα δι' αὐτέων
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους.
καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί
δεξιτερὴν ἕλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·
ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,
ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

The mares, which bear me as far as my heart might reach,
Conveyed me, when they brought me to the far-famed way
Of the divinity, that bears over all cities the man who knows.
By this way I was borne, for by this way the much-attending mares bore me
As they strained the chariot, and the maidens led the way.
And the axle in the naves sent forth the screech of a pipe
As it blazed, for it was driven by two whirling
Wheels on both sides, when the maidens, the Daughters of the Sun,
Made haste to convey me, after they had left behind the House of Night
For the Light, and had pushed back their veils from their faces with their hands.
There stand the gates of the paths of Night and Day,
And a lintel encloses them and a stone threshold;
And the aethereal gates themselves fit into great doors.
And much-avenging Justice holds their alternating keys.
The maidens blandished her with gentle words
And cleverly convinced her that she should push away for them
The bolted bar quickly from the gates. And the gates made
A yawning gap in the doorway as they swung open, and caused the bronze
Hinges to rotate in turn in their sockets,
Fitted with pins and rivets; straight through them
The maidens held the chariot and the mares down the road.
And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right hand in hers
And spoke these words to me and addressed me as follows:
'O youth, companion to immortal charioteers
And to the mares which bear you, you who arrive at my house,
Welcome, since it was not an evil fate which sent you forth to travel
This way, for indeed it is far from the track of humans,

But it was Law and Justice who sent you. And it is right for you to learn all things,
Both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality,
And the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no real trust.'[75]

It has been well observed that the proem is 'intrinsically vague'.[76] We will not, I hope, lose sight of this salutary *caveat*. Our aim in this section will by no means be to demystify the proem's rich mysteriousness and, indeed, obscurity, much less to subject – and thereby render explicable – every detail of its elaborate imagery to an exhaustive explanatory framework. The discussion that follows will focus only on some aspects of the proem, analysing them both internally and in the light of previously established conclusions and certain external parallels and models, which constitute part of the theological and conceptual framework within and against which the *kouros*' journey is described.

The topographical markers in the proem are sufficiently ambiguous, and the cultural models which it evokes so varied, that the trajectory of the *kouros*' journey may be viably interpreted as, among other things, a descent (*katabasis*), an ascent (*anabasis*) or inherently blurred. A systematic but inconclusive treatment of this question will be reserved for the Appendix. I will not here pursue or rely on any such inevitably speculative and unsettled reconstruction. Instead, I will highlight several features of the *kouros*' journey, which any tenable reconstruction of its trajectory would have to take into account. We will emphasise and explore the significance of two points in particular. First, Parmenides represents his journey as an eschatological one, the journey of the post-mortem, discarnate soul, and, furthermore, evokes the imagery and terminology of mystery initiations. Second, the *kouros*' journey is made possible by divine powers, which are identified as agents of Light, Heat and the higher, celestial and aethereal region, and with which he himself is intimately connected.

The journey's topography famously appropriates elements of the Hesiodic Underworld (*Th*. 736ff). Parmenides' 'House of Night' (δώματα νυκτός, B1.9) recalls Hesiod's Underworldly

[75] For B1.31–2, see Ch. 4.4. This translation of the proem draws in particular on Graham (2010) *ad loc*.
[76] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 14.

'abode of Night' (Νυκτός . . . οἰκία, 744). In the proem, the *kouros* passes through the gates of the paths of Night and Day (B1.11) whose keys are described as 'alternating' (κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς, B1.14; cf. ἀμοιβαδόν, B1.19). In Hesiod, Night and Day greet one another as they alternately traverse a great threshold (ἀμειβόμεναι μέγαν οὐδόν, 749; cf. Parmenides' οὐδός at B1.12 in the same metrical position), one descending into the House of Night while the other ascends from it (748–54). Again, Hesiod's description of Tartarus as a 'great chasm' (χάσμα μέγ', 740) located beyond the infernal gates (πυλέων ἔντοσθε, 741) is echoed in B1 in the yawning chasm, which is generated by the gates as they swing open (πυλέων . . . χάσμ' ἀχανές, B1.17–18).[77] This clear appropriation of Hesiod's Beyond already indicates that the *kouros* travels on an eschatological path to the setting of the afterlife. Relatedly and significantly, in describing his path as that of the 'knowing man' (εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3), and in having the goddess address him as *kouros* (B1.24), Parmenides is adopting the technical vocabulary of mystery initiations.[78] We will return below to mysteries and to initiatory eschatological journeys (in particular to the journey of the initiate's soul in the Gold Tablets). For now, I note only that the language of mystery initiation further supports the impression that the *kouros*' journey is assimilated to that of the post-mortem soul. This impression is finally confirmed by the goddess's reassurance that it is not an 'evil fate' (μοῖρα κακή) that has conveyed Parmenides on this way (τήνδ' ὁδόν, B1.26–8). The phrase 'evil fate', as scholarly

[77] The topological marker 'there' (ἔνθα, B1.11) structures throughout Hesiod's account of the Underworld: *Th*. 729, 734, 736, 758, 767, 775, 807, 811. For the parallels between B1 and *Th*. 733–66, see Morrison (1955) 59–60; Burkert (1969) 8, 11–13; Dolin (1962) 96; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 15; Miller (2006) 7–8; Palmer (2009) 54–5; Kraus (2013) 454; and esp. Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 8–10 for a painstaking exposition of the verbal echoes.

[78] As Burkert (1969) 5 with n.11 observes, there are two fundamental cases in which εἰδώς is used without an object: (i) when linked to a *verbum dicendi* (e.g. πρὸς εἰδότας λέγειν) and (ii), of which (i) is an extension: in reference to the initiate; cf. Diels (2003) 49; Jaeger (1947) 98; Bowra (1953*c*) 50–1; Coxon (2009) 272; Kingsley (1999) 62; Palmer (2009) 58; Kraus (2013) 455; Ranzato (2015) 93. See [Eur.] *Rhes*. 971–3 (σεμνὸς τοῖσιν εἰδόσιν θεός; cf. also Eur. *Bacch*. 72–4: ὦ μάκαρ, ὅστις εὐδαίμων τελετὰς θεῶν εἰδώς); Aristoph. *Nub*. 1241 (parodying: Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος τοῖς εἰδόσιν); Andoc. *Myst*. 30.10 (τοῖς εἰδόσιν); cf. Eur. *TrGF* 5.781.11–13; Pind. *O* 2.85 (φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν, note the eschatological theme; cf. Bowra, *loc. cit*.) and, perhaps more playfully, Pl. *Symp*. 199a1–2. For the *kouros* motif as initiatory, see Burkert (1969) 14, n.32; Kingsley (1999) 71–4; cf. Rohde (1925) 601–3; also Verdenius (1947) 285.

consensus rightly recognises, is a formulaic designation for death.[79] The goddess, then, impresses upon Parmenides that he has travelled while still alive the way which mortals (that is, their souls) travel after death and that his special privilege in doing so is proper and divinely sanctioned (οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακή . . . ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε, B1.26–8).[80]

The Daughters of the Sun evoke the myth of Phaethon's disastrous celestial journey in Sun's chariot, which is probably at least as old as Hesiod (fr. 311 M-W; cf. *Th*. 987) and which formed the subject of Aeschylus' *Heliades* (*TrGF* 3.68–73) and Euripides' *Phaethon* (*TrGF* 5.771–86).[81] That the gates through which the chariot travels are 'aethereal' (B1.13), whatever topographical inferences we may or may not draw from this description, further strengthens this association. The identification of his guides as Sun's Daughters thus recasts Parmenides as a new, successful Phaethon, guided safely by the appropriate charioteers (B1.24), and secures the identification both of the chariot with its blazing axle (αἰθόμενος, B1.7), and of the 'much-prompted' or 'much-attending' horses (B1.4), as those of the Sun.[82] In line 3, we see that the *kouros*' road is that of some unspecified divinity (ὁδόν . . . δαίμονος). A reader left puzzled by this indeterminate remark, who then learned that the *kouros*' charioteers were the Daughters of the Sun (B1.5, 9, cf. 24) and, therefore, that his chariot and horses were those of the Sun (B1.9), and, furthermore, that the *kouros* was journeying on the paths of Night and Day (B1.11), would most

[79] Ganschinietz (1919) 2409; Burkert (1969) 14; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 15; Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 60–1; Coxon (2009) 10, 17, 282; Kingsley (1999) 61; Robbiano (2006) 73; Ranzato (2015) 70. See *Il*. 13.602; cf. e.g. *Il*. 3.101; 6.488–9; *Od*. 11.560; similarly, Quint. *Posthom*. 13.440. Note also the image of passing Hades' *gates, Il*. 5.646; *Il*. 23.71, with Robbiano (2006) 154, n.405.

[80] That the term νέεσθαι (B1.26) connotes the sense 'return' (e.g. *Il*. 23.229; *Il*. 12.32–3; *Il*. 6.189) is appropriate given Parmenides' theory of metempsychosis: the *kouros* returns to his soul's prenatal habitat.

[81] Cf. also κοῦραι | Ἡλιάδες in Apollonius' *Argonautica* 4.603–4. For these and further references, see Bowra (1953*c*) 44–5; Burkert (1969) 6–7; Palmer (2009) 56 with n.16.

[82] Cf. Burkert (1969) 7; Owens (1979) 17; Palmer (2009) 56. αἰθόμενος (B1.7) relates the chariot to the fiery element Light (cf. Coxon (2009) 273) and recalls later descriptions of Helios' chariot in the context of Phaethon's myth, as in Nonnus' *Dionysica* 38.192 (ἔμπυρον ἅρμα) and Lucian, *DDeor*. 24.2 (ἐπιβὰς τοσούτου πυρός), see further Bowra (1953*c*) 45. For the iconic chariot and horses of the Sun, cf. *h.Hom*. 2.62–3; *h.Hom*. 4.68–9; *h.Hom*. 28.13–14; *h.Hom*. 31.8–9. For πολύφραστοι (B1.4), see Mourelatos (1965) 262; (2008) 22.

naturally infer that the divinity in question was the Sun.[83] That the Sun's path takes him daily to the Beyond (traditionally, the Underworld) is a standard Greek *topos* (as in Hesiod's *Theogony* 760–1 (οὐρανόθεν καταβαίνων) and Stesichorus, *PMG* 185). Indeed, in the *Odyssey*, Hermes the psychopomp leads souls to Hades by 'Sun's gates' (Ἠελίοιο πύλας, *Od*. 24.12).

Parmenides, then, represents the *kouros* as an initiate who journeys into a scenery which is obviously modelled on Hesiod's Underworld. Furthermore, he represents him as positioned, in a manner reminiscent of Phaethon, in the seat of the ultimate manifestation of celestial Light in a journey through gates which are themselves described as 'aethereal'. Any tenable reconstruction of the proem's trajectory would have to allow for both of these points. We can turn now to develop further the significance of these conclusions (without committing ourselves to a particular spatial trajectory).

The most important point for us to recognise is that the mortal *kouros* is travelling towards his divinisation. This is already suggested by the description of his way as that of a divinity (ὁδόν . . . δαίμονος, B1.3). With this notion of a divine way, we may compare especially Homer's Cave of the Nymphs, with its celebrated demarcation of a mortal entrance from that reserved for divine travellers: 'There are two sets of doors to the cave. One set, facing North, is for humans to go down by (καταιβαταὶ ἀνθρώποισιν), and the other in turn, facing South, is more divine; nor do men enter by there, but it is the way of immortals' (ἀλλ' ἀθανάτων ὁδός ἐστιν, *Od*. 13.109–12; cf. θεῶν . . . κελεύθου, *Il*. 3.406). Pindar speaks of the 'way of Zeus' (Διὸς ὁδός), by which souls journey to the island of the blessed (*O* 2.70), while an Orphic hymn describes the rising and setting of celestial bodies as the 'ways of heavenly gods' (θεῶν ὁδοὶ οὐρανιώνων, fr. 168.15 Kern = 243.15 Bernabé).[84]

[83] For the view that ὁδόν rather than δαίμονος is the antecedent of ἥ, see Coxon (2009) 272; Lesher (1994*a*) 1, and, for the further identification of the *daimôn* with the Sun, Cornford (1952) 118, n.1; Guthrie (1965) 7; Burkert (1969) 4; Palmer (2009) 56–7, with nn.17–19. Alternatively, though, the antecedent could be the *daimôn*, which would then be feminine and, presumably, refer to the narrating goddess, see Bowra (1953*c*) 50; Mansfeld (1964) 225. Both readings are syntactically possible, but the immediate context favours an identification of the *daimôn* as Helios, whereas the goddess is not clearly introduced until B1.22, cf. Burkert, *loc. cit*.

[84] These passages are noted as parallels to B1.3 by Diels (2003) 46–7; Bowra (1953*c*) 50; Burkert (1969) 4.

Later on, the goddess emphatically states that this path is 'far from the track of humans' (ἀνθρώπων, B1.27).[85] This statement itself immediately follows, and further explains and amplifies (ἦ γάρ), the identification of the way which the *kouros* travels as that which the soul usually travels after death (μοῖρα κακή κτλ, B1.26–7). Within Parmenides' psychological and eschatological system, then, we would expect the *kouros*' journey to be that of the fiery, Hot, Light, aethereal soul. And indeed, he is conveyed by the Daughters of the Sun, agents emblematic of fiery Heat, Light and the celestial region of aether.[86] Again, his journey is that of the divine soul and, fittingly, he is closely related and even assimilated to these divine guides. The appellation 'youth' (κοῦρε, B1.24) places the traveller on an equal footing with the aforementioned maidens (κοῦραι, B1.9) as their brotherly counterpart.[87] This impression is further supported by the portrayal of the *kouros* as a new and successful Phaethon – another child of Helios – and, significantly, by the goddess's immediately following (B1.24) affirmation that the *kouros* is closely linked to his divine guides: *'*O youth, companion to immortal charioteers'. The term translated as 'companion' here (συνάορος) is a fairly rare word, which suggests an appropriate and strong connection.[88]

Since the *kouros* is associated with the Daughters of the Sun and travels in the manner of the Sun, it is tempting to find in Parmenides' concept of the εἰδὼς φώς a punning play on φῶς: the knowing 'man' (φώς) is a knowing 'light' (φῶς). When describing the moon In B14, Parmenides makes virtually the same pun by substituting the phrase 'a foreign light' (ἀλλότριον φῶς) for the familiar Homeric phrase 'a foreign man' (ἀλλότριος φώς, e.g. *Il.*

[85] Recall how in B16 the goddess underscores that she is describing here the thinking of humans (ἀνθρώποισι, B16.2–3).

[86] In B10 and B11, the aether and the sun, together with the other celestial bodies, are linked in the context of Parmenides' astronomy.

[87] As Burkert (1969) 14, n.32 observes.

[88] Homer uses the term to describe the lyre as the companion of a rich feast (δαιτὶ συνήορος [sc. φόρμιγξ], *Od.* 8.99), and Pindar to describe praise as the companion of the lyre (εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάορος, *N* 4.5). A scholion glosses συνάορος in the latter passage as 'brought together with' or 'corresponding with' (συμφερομένη) and 'being in common with' (κοινωνοῦσα), Σ N4.9.1 Drachmann. Plato cites Pindar for the view that hope accompanies (συναορεῖ) the just old man, *Rep.* 1.331a6–9. By Classical times, συνάορος signifies close intimacy and often wedlock, e.g. Eur. *Or.* 654, 1136. Coxon (2009) 52 renders 'consort'; cf. Kingsley (1999) 75.

5.214).[89] Our analysis of Parmenides' conception of the soul in the previous section enables us to understand the significance of this pun in the wider framework of his psychology and eschatology. Under the guidance of the Daughters of the Sun, the *kouros* travels the way of the knowing man, or the knowing *light*: the *kouros* journeys to the goddess with – or as – his Light, Hot, fiery, aethereal soul.

The goddess's kindly reception of the *kouros* (πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, B1.22) speaks comforting reassurance.[90] If the gates of the afterlife are proverbially hateful to mortals (*Il*. 9.312), his own arrival through them, conversely, calls for a joyful welcome, since (χαῖρ', ἐπεί) it was not the work of death (μοῖρα κακή) but of Themis and Dikê (B1.26–8). Epic texts standardly speak of what is the 'law' (*themis*) or 'justice' (*dikê*) of certain groups given the nature, status or identity of their members (e.g. as gods, mortals, kings, slaves, guests, suppliants, women).[91] By saying that it was sanctioned and right for him to travel this *divine* path, far from the track of *humans*, the goddess accepts the *kouros* as the sort of agent for whom such a journey is appropriate. The vocabulary of obligation which the goddess uses in her next breath (χρεὼ δέ σε, B1.28^{b}) similarly expresses what is normatively necessary for certain agents, given their nature, status or identity.[92] And what is necessary for the *kouros* is to learn, not only the beliefs of *mortals*, but also the heart of reality (B1.28^{b}-30).

A confluence of internal evidence, then, indicates that the *kouros*' journey involves and culminates in some sort of divinisation, and, in particular, in some sort of identification with the divine, Light soul within him. Now, in progressing along this journey, the *kouros* is repeatedly characterised as the dependent object of acts of guidance and transportation, the control over

[89] For the pun, see Torgerson (2006) 41–2, cf. 28–9; Kahn (2009) 215; Cosgrove (2011) 29. ἰσόθεος φώς is one of the common Homeric formulae for a godlike man (see below).

[90] As does her hand-clasp (B1.22–3), see Coxon (2009) 10. Mansfeld (2005) 554–5 compares similar scenes of Heracles or Theseus with Athena on archaic vases, and interestingly suggests that the gesture signals some sort of enhancement in the *kouros*' status.

[91] *Themis: Il*. 9.134, 276; *Il*. 11.779; *Il*. 19.177; *Od*. 9.268; *Od*. 14.130; *h.Hom*. 3.541; cf. *Il*. 16.796; *Od*. 10.73; *Od*. 14.56. *dikê: Od*. 4.691; *Od*. 11.218; *Od*. 14.59; *Od*. 19.43; *Od*. 24.255; *h.Hom*. 3.458; *Scut*. 85.

[92] See Ch. 4.5.

which is attributed to his divine guides (με φέρουσιν . . . μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν . . . φερόμην . . . φέρον . . . κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον, B1.1–5; cf. ἥ . . . φέρει, B1.3).[93] The *kouros* is borne along the way *because* that is where the mares are carrying him (B1.4). It is the *kourai*, not the *kouros*, who persuade Dikê with 'gentle words' to unbolt the gates (B1.15–17). We noted that, by describing the *kouros* as a 'companion to' (συνάορος) immortal charioteers, the goddess is highlighting the close link between the *kouros* and the *kourai*. But the literal sense of the term is 'bound' or 'yoked together'. The literal equestrian image, especially given the equestrian context of this statement itself, further underscores the *kouros*' dependence on the guidance of the *kourai*: the *kouros* is himself 'yoked' to his divine charioteers.[94] The journey, we saw, identifies the mortal *kouros* with his discarnate, divine soul and culminates in some sort of sanctioned divinisation. Furthermore, it takes place at, or at least in keeping with, the *kouros*' own volition ('as far as my heart might reach', B1.1).[95] At the same time, however, it is an important point, which Parmenides takes pains to emphasise, that the mortal's ability to undergo this journey is dependent on his privileged access to these divine conveyors and guides, who bring him to the goddess, who then issues to him her revelation.

So far, we have pursued a mostly internal examination of the proem. In the remainder of this section, we will consider further some cultural frameworks, both pan-Hellenic and more local, which the proem evokes. These parallels will corroborate the conclusions at which we arrived largely on the basis of the internal evidence and, by contextualising them, help us make better sense of them. They will enable us to grasp more clearly how the proem constructs the mortal's attainment of the disposition which is

[93] Cf. Jacobs (1999) 187–9; Lesher (1984) 24–5.

[94] In Homer, the literal equestrian sense is in evidence in uses of the cognate verb, e.g. *Il.* 10.499 (σὺν δ' ἤειρεν ἱμᾶσι); *Il.* 15.680 (συναείρεται ἵππους).

[95] θυμός suggests above all a conative faculty, prompting action through volition; cf. *Od.* 15.339, with Coxon (2009) 270. Through divine gift, Demodocus sings 'in whatever way his heart (θυμός) urges him to sing' (*Od.* 8.44–5). θυμός could also indicate the instrument of thought or understanding (e.g. *Il.* 2.409), see Lesher (1994*a*) 9–10. Mourelatos (2008*a*) 17, n.21 (cf. also Primavesi (2013) 55, n.59) conclusively refutes the tenuous claim in Tarán (1965) 9, 13, 16, 27, 30 that the optatives ἱκάνοι (B1.1) and σπερχοίατο (B1.8[b]) suggest that the journey occurs repeatedly.

anterior to his reception of the goddess's revelation and his acquisition of the knowledge of what-is.

We will best begin to approach the theological models and patterns of thought which underlie the *kouros*' divinisation by first stepping back to a fundamental observation. Already our earliest sources do not typically conceive of human agents as agents who are *simply* and *strictly* human. Archaic texts are preoccupied with the gulf which separates mortal and divine, but we also find in them an unmistakable measure of fluidity between these two categories. Most obviously, sexual unions between gods and mortals produce divine, semi-divine or godlike offspring. Hesiod, for example, stresses that it was the mortal Semele who bore the immortal son Dionysus (τέκε . . . ἀθάνατον θνητή, *Th*. 940–2). Indeed, Hesiod invokes the Muses quite generally to sing of the liaisons between goddesses and men and of the resulting 'children like gods' (θεοῖς ἐπιείκελα τέκνα, *Th*. 965–8).[96] The Muses oblige (969–1018), and the offspring of gods and women permeated the *Ehoiai* (see *Th*. 1019–22). In the *Iliad*, Zeus similarly lists his liaisons with various women and the resultant godlike and divine offspring (*Il*. 14.313–25). In the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*, the poet explains Aeneas' exceedingly godlike nature (μάλα . . . θεοείκελος, 279) as the son of the mortal Anchises and the goddess Aphrodite, and as a nursling of nymphs who are themselves intermediate between gods and men (*h.Hom*. 5.255–79). Even certain groups of mortals, such as the Phaeacians, may be close(r) to the divine by birth (ἀγχίθεοι γεγάασιν, *Od*. 5.35).[97]

But such intermingling between gods and mortals is only the starkest illustration of the deep-seated and more general notion that the mortal and the divine inhabit the same, commensurable plane, and that the former can approximate the latter. Even in the absence of semi-divine parentage, and even prior to and independently of the appearance of notions of the soul's divinity and metempsychosis, we find that some mortal agents possess also divine features and capabilities, and have the potential to promote them.

[96] Mortal 'god*likeness*' always expresses an approximation to the divine in some features or accomplishments; note that, in *h.Hom*. 31.7, ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισιν is used of a god.
[97] Cf. *Od*. 7.201–6 (with Vernant (1991*a*) 45, n.27); *h.Hom*. 5.200–1.

Almost every page of Homer illustrates the principle that, by virtue of a privileged affinity with the divine, whether through semi-divine parentage or through interactions and associations with the divine, mortals are capable of what would otherwise have been impossible for them. Mortals who attained such heights of excellence are standardly and ubiquitously represented as 'god-like', 'equal to the gods' or, simply, 'divine'. Homer also describes a son of two mortals, like Odysseus, as 'divine' (Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο, *Il*. 2.335), and refers to the heroes fallen at Troy quite generally as 'the race of half-divine men' (ἡμιθέων γένος ἀνδρῶν, *Il*. 12.23). Epithets which describe the best mortals as godlike or equal to the gods, either in general or in particular respects, permeate the verses of Homer.[98] As the passages presently cited (and numerous others) exemplify, the frequency and formulaic nature of some Homeric deifying epithets do not imply that these epithets are by now vestiges of an obsolete theology but, on the contrary, reflect the vibrant ubiquity of the notion of (partial, temporary) mortal approximation to the divine.[99] We observed before that Homer regularly construes the same actions and impulses as caused simultaneously by both human and divine agencies ('double motivation').[100] The actions or features which exemplify approximation to divinity are not achieved *by* the gods *for* mortals, conceived as mere passive instruments. Rather, it is (only) through divine interaction, communication or parentage that mortals are capable of certain accomplishments. To offer one illustration, if

[98] For example, θεῖος, e.g. *Il*. 16.798–9 (ἀνδρὸς θείοιο); *Od*. 2.259; ἡμίθεος, *h.Hom*. 31.19; *h.Hom*. 32.18–19; cf. Simon. *PMG* 523; ἰσόθεος φώς, *Il*. 2.565; *Od*. 1.324; δαίμονι ἶσος, *Il*. 20.493; *Il*. 21.18; *h.Hom*. 2.235; ἀντίθεος, *Il*. 5.629; *Od*. 1.21; Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντος, *Il*. 2.636; θεόφιν μήστωρ ἀτάλαντος, *Il*. 7.366; *Od*. 3.110; ἀτάλαντος Ἄρηϊ, *Il*. 13.295; ἶσος Ἄρηϊ, *Il*. 11.295; θεῷ ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν, *Il*. 19.250; θεοείκελος, *Il*. 1.131; *Od*. 3.416 (cf. θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ', *Il*. 9.485; ἐπιείκελον ἀθανάτοισιν, *Il*. 11.60; θεοῖσι γὰρ ἄντα ἐῴκει, *Il*. 24.630); θεοειδής, *Il*. 24.217; *Od*. 1.113; γυνὴ ἐϊκυῖα θεῇσιν, *Il*. 11.638; ἰκέλη χρυσέῃ Ἀφροδίτῃ, *Il*. 19.282; δέμας ἀθανάτοισιν ἐοικώς, *h.Hom*. 5.55; cf. *Od*. 8.14. Note also the overdetermined δῖος ('heavenly', 'noble', 'divine'), e.g. *Il*. 15.652. For epic godlikeness, see Roloff (1970) 3–83 (cf. Griffin (1980) 81–102) and, for later archaic and classical literature, Roloff (1970) 102–26.

[99] Centuries later, Plato (*Men*. 99c7-d9) remarks that women and Spartans describe good men as 'divine'. (Plato appeals to this custom in support of the idea that the true beliefs of ignorant but inspired and so 'divine' mortals may have a divine origin.) As Homer teaches us, we should not assume that such encomiastic terminology did not correspond to some widespread, implicit theology of approximation.

[100] Ch. 2.2.

Diomedes can contend against mortal adversaries independently of divine interaction, it is only after Athena granted him might (*menos*), and in conjunction with her active aid, that *he* – equal to a god (δαίμονι ἶσος, *Il*. 5.438, 459, 884) – can successfully challenge Ares (*Il*. 5.1–3, 121–32, 815–61).

Right after the poet describes the ambitious Diomedes as equal to a god (δαίμονι ἶσος, 438), Apollo warns the hero to recall and respect the disparity between mortal and divine: 'consider, son of Tydeus, and draw back, and do not wish to think on a par with the gods' (μηδὲ θεοῖσιν | ἶσ' ἔθελε φρονέειν, *Il*. 5.440–2).[101] That the extent to which mortals can and should approximate divinity is a constant issue of theological and moral reflection demonstrates the openness of Greek religious thought to the possibility of such approximation. Full-blown deification is the limiting case of approximation to the divine. The prospect of deification is markedly absent from the *Iliad*, but it is in plain sight in the *Odyssey*, Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. The conflicting epic traditions concerning Heracles instructively reflect on-going engagements with the question of where and whether an impassable line should be drawn. The *Iliad* insists that even Heracles, the best-case-scenario of mortal excellence and divine favour (φίλτατος), was constrained by the inexorable fact of his mortality (*Il*. 18.115–21). Conversely, Hesiod's *Theogony* and the eponymous Homeric Hymn render him a deified god dwelling on Olympus (*Th*. 950–5; *h.Hom*. 15.7–8). The poet of *Odyssey* 11, in a gesture of conciliatory synthesis,[102] recounts that Heracles himself (*autos*) rejoices among the immortals, while his image or phantom (*eidôlon*) remains in Hades (601–4).[103] Dodds has, therefore,

[101] In the same book, Dione describes the dire consequences of mortal aggression against gods, *Il*. 5.382–415; cf. *Il*. 6.128–43. On the slippery slope from godlikeness to hybris, see further Roloff (1970) 77–80; Griffin (1980) 168–9.

[102] Following Bremmer (1983) 81.

[103] For the challenges posed by Heracles, the Dioskouroi and Asclepius to the boundary between mortal and divine, see further Burkert (1985) 208–15. Odysseus must refuse precisely an offer of full-blown deification in order for the narrative of *nostos* to take place (as presently discussed). But the goddess Leucothea, previously a mortal woman, exemplifies the road not taken: *Od*. 5.334–5. In Hesiod, Semele and Ariadne similarly become ageless goddesses, *Th*. 940–2, 949. Abduction by the gods may lead to deification, *h.Hom*. 5.202–14; *Th*. 987–91; cf. the more vague *Od*. 15.250–1; *Il*. 20.232–5. Hesiod's myth of Races recognises various middle-ground positions between mortal and divine, see Ch. 6.1.

oversimplified our evidence when he wrote: 'Men may share at times in the divine attribute of power, but in Homer there is nevertheless no real blurring of the sharp line which separates humanity from deity.'[104] In fact, the prevalent phenomenon of mortal participation in divine capacities, manifested in the 'god-like' or 'divine' man, is throughout concurrent with a constant negotiation of the malleable line which separates humanity from deity, a negotiation in which 'Homer' does not adopt a consistent position.

Parmenides' language is fundamentally Homeric. Epic phraseology, resonances, narrative conventions and imagery permeate the extant lines, which contain on average only one non-Homeric word for every three verses, while most of these exceptions are themselves compounded from Homeric words.[105] As Mourelatos maintains, we should not dismiss Parmenides' epic language as mere superficial garb. Parmenides, rather, 'uses old words, old motifs, old themes, and old images precisely in order to think new thoughts in and through them'.[106] On a rudimentary level, then, by immersing his poem and its proem in Homeric language and imagery, Parmenides relates the *kouros*' novel approach to his goddess to the approach of a Homeric protagonist to his patron divinity.

More specifically, however, scholars have plausibly identified in Parmenides a particular engagement with the *Odyssey*. The same language of journeying (ὁδός, κέλευθος, πέμπω, ἡγεμονεύω, etc.) dominates both poems. Furthermore, if the Daughters of the Sun guide the *kouros* in his own journey to the setting of the afterlife, it is Circe, another daughter of the Sun (*Od*. 10.138), who directs Odysseus to Hades, where he is to learn from the seer Teiresias (*Od*. 10.537–40; *Od*. 11.50, 89).[107] While, however, both protagonists travel far beyond the familiar track into eschatological locations, their journeys also diametrically diverge. Odysseus

[104] Dodds (1951) 10.
[105] Coxon (2009) 7–12 (Coxon prints epic parallels under each page of text); Mourelatos (2008*a*) 1–46.
[106] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 6, 39; cf. Dolin (1962) 93.
[107] For further echoes, see Havelock (1958) 137–40; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 17–25; Montiglio (2005) 150.

is repeatedly made to wander astray, sometimes through malignant divine agency, and it is through his wandering that he amasses knowledge and experiences (μάλα πολλὰ | πλάγχθη κτλ, *Od.* 1.1–4). Conversely, the *kouros*' divine guides escort him directly to his goal (ἰθύς, B1.21) and precisely prevent him from undergoing the wandering which the poem associates throughout with error and ignorance.[108] We may sharpen one overlooked aspect of this pointed divergence. It is fundamental to the *Odyssey* that, for the narrative of *nostos* to take place, Odysseus must reject the offers of divinisation which are proffered to him by his female divine host Calypso (*Od.* 5.135–6; *Od.* 7.255–8; *Od.* 23.334–7) and choose instead the life of a wandering mortal (ἄνδρα ... πλάγχθη, *Od.* 1.1–2).[109] Parmenides' female divine host, by contrast, precisely separates the willing (B1.1[b]) traveller from those to whom she refers as ignorant mortals and whom she repeatedly describes as wandering (βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν | πλάζονται ... πλαγκτὸν νόον, B6.4–5; cf. B8.54; B16.1). The *kouros*, then, pointedly outdoes Homer's Odysseus in willingly accepting divinisation.[110]

That Parmenides employs the metre, language and imagery of inspired poetry and oracles is a fact so fundamental that it is often ignored. In addition to Parmenides' language, the chariot and road of song are conventional idioms of inspired poetry.[111] Parke and Wormell, in the introduction to their edition of Delphic oracles (1956), observed that Parmenides, like Empedocles and Heraclitus, displays 'affiliation in subject matter, tone, and style with the Pythian responses'.[112] Indeed, Parmenides' goddess echoes, I think, the Pythia's terminology. The term which Parmenides repeatedly uses to refer to his philosophical inquiry is, in its verbal form (*dizêmai*), a

[108] Mansfeld (1964) 229–31; Lesher (1994*a*) 4–6; Montiglio (2005) 150.
[109] See Vernant (1996).
[110] See Ch. 6.1 on related divergences between Parmenides and Hesiod.
[111] B1 displays especially close verbal and imagistic echoes with Pindar's chariot, which is led by female mules on a way towards the gates of song (*O* 6.22–7). For the chariot, path and journey of poetry, see also *Od.* 8.479–81 (οἴμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε); Pind. *O* 9.80–1; *P* 10.65; *I* 2.1–2; 8.61; *N* 1.7; *N* 6.53–4; Bacch. *Epin.* 5.176–8; *Paean.* fr. 2 Irigoin; Choeril. *EGF* 1.4–5; Emped. DK31 B3.5; B35.1; Timoth. *PMG* 791 col.5.225–6. See further Fränkel (1975*a*) 1–2; Bowra (1953*c*) 41–3; Burkert (1969) 3, n.6, 10, n.21; Ranzato (2015) 128, and, for a dedicated exploration of the markers of poetic inspiration in B1, Lesher (1994*a*) 8–16.
[112] PW xxxiii–xxxiv.

standard technical term in Delphic oracular responses, which expresses the act of consulting Apollo.[113] More broadly, both the Pythia and Parmenides' goddess characteristically issue their disclosure to their mortal audience with numerous second person pronouns and, typically, imperatives,[114] and both formulaically bid their audience to 'ponder' (*phrazesthai*) the content of their disclosure.[115] The self-asserting rhetoric of both inclines to acerbic contrasts between their own epistemic superiority and mortal ignorance,[116] and both have always been noted for the studied and laconic obscurity of their hexameters.[117]

These observations – and, of course, the fundamental fact that Parmenides frames his poem as divine disclosure – are significant for our inquiry above all because they support the thesis that Parmenides postulates an epistemically significant interaction with the divine only through which can he attain the knowledge he comes to attain.[118] As we saw (Chapter 5.1), however, the mere postulation of divine disclosure is not by itself sufficient to resolve our difficulty. *Human* cognition could not grasp and sustain the knowledge of *Alêtheia* even if it were communicated to it. Here

[113] PW 111.2; 202; 216.5; 317.1; 379.4; 406.3; 517.2. The usage is at least as old as *Odyssey* 11 (προσηύδα μάντις . . . νόστον δίζηαι κτλ, 99–100; see similarly Apollo's reply to Alcmaeon: νόστον δίζηαι, PW 202; cf. Thuc. 2.102). In Herodotus, the phrase διζημένων τὸ μαντήιον indicates the attempt to interpret an oracular response (7.142; compared by Guthrie (1962) 418–19 with Herac. DK22 B101: ἐδιζησάμην ἐμεωυτόν). Compare Parmenides' ὁδοὶ διζήσιος: B2.2; B6.3; B7.2. Parmenides also uses the verb: B8.6 (διζήσεαι). Robbiano (2006) 125–6 takes the references to 'signs' (σήματα) in B8.2 to evoke the mantic framework of a divinity issuing signs; cf. also Robbiano (2006) 170, n.451 (on πεφατισμένον, B8.35).

[114] On the Pythia: see PW xxv; cf. B1.28[b]; B2.1; B7.2, 5–6; B8.8, 50–2.

[115] B6.2 (τά σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα) cf. PW 7 (ταῦτά νυν εὖ φράζεσθε), 112, 181, 225, 301, 374, 408, 487 (φράζεσθ' ἐξ ἐμέθεν χρησμὸν θεοῦ, cf. B7.5–6: κρῖναι . . . ἔλεγχον | ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα).

[116] On the Pythia: e.g. PW 41; 52; 55, with PW xxv; Maurizio (2013) 116–17. Cf. B6; B7. On this point, cf. Ranzato (2015) 89–91.

[117] On the Delphic oracle, note most famously Herac. DK22 B93; see further Ch. 3.1. On Parmenides, see by way of illustration Plutarch A16; Proclus A17; KRS (1983) 241; Barnes (1982) 155. On 'systematic equivocity' in Parmenides, see Mourelatos (2008*a*) 222ff, esp. 260–3.

[118] In Ch. 2 (esp. 2.2), we discussed the role of epistemically significant interactions with the divine in poetic inspiration. For divination, see Ch. 3.1. Mansfeld (1964) 273 explained satisfactorily, in my view, why Parmenides wrote in verse: 'Die Dichtung ist in der griechischen Tradition das Wort der Gottheit. Weil des Parmenides Weg zur Philosophie der Weg der Offenbarung war, mußte er ein Dichter werden'; cf. also Most (1999*a*) 353–5.

too, then, it is worth emphasising that the higher epistemic status of the inspired poet or diviner (however precisely we are to understand this status in different cases) was also sometimes accompanied by the more general and less clearly demarcated perception of the poet or diviner himself as godlike or divine.[119]

Parmenides' association of the acquisition of divine knowledge with the divinisation of the knower (*homoiôsis theôi*) is thrown into sharper relief by his appropriation of the imagery and terminology of mystery initiations. A variety of mystery cults spreads throughout the Greek world from the end of the seventh century onwards, including Eleusinian, Dionysiac, Samothracian and Meter cults, as well as different clan and family-based initiations.[120] We saw that Parmenides pointedly adopts the vocabulary of mystery initiation by describing the traveller as a 'knowing man' (εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3) and a 'youth' (κοῦρ', B1.24). We can now explore further the significance of this point.

The *kouros*, rightly and properly initiated (B1.26–8), is throughout characterised by contradistinction with the ignorant 'mortals'. The contrast between the initiated and the uninitiated is similarly central to the rhetoric of the mysteries. Representations of the blessedness (*makarismos*) of the former, to whom alone the secret of the mysteries is lawfully divulged (e.g. Lysias, 6.51; Isocrates, 4.28.6–7), always picture it in contradistinction with the ignorance, exclusion and sorry state and prospects of the latter.[121] The *kouros*, like mystery initiates, is permitted to progress only once the appropriate words – or *pass*words – are spoken.[122] His eschatological

[119] We explored this aspect of divination in Ch. 3.1. For poetic inspiration, consider for example the common term 'divine minstrel' (θεῖος ἀοιδός), *Od*. 1.336; *Od*. 4.17; *Od*. 8.87 (etc.); *Marg*. fr. 1.1 W; Theocr. *Id.* 16.44; cf. Bacchyl. *Ep*. 9.3, with Roloff (1970) 117–19.

[120] On the mystery initiations of ancient Greece, see Burkert (1985) 276–304; (1987); Bowden (2010); Bremmer (2014).

[121] E.g. *h.Hom*. 2.480–2; Soph. *TrGF* 4.837.3–4. One popular eschatological image has the uninitiated lying in mire, Pl. *Phd*. 69c; D.L. 6.39; Plut. fr. 178.16–20 Sandbach; Aristid. 22.10 Keil. In another, they carry water in broken pitchers, Paus. 10.31.9; cf. Pl. *Gorg*. 493b. An Italian *lekythos* from about 500 BCE depicts a similar scene, Cook (1940) vol.3, pl.36. We might compare the futile (endlessly?) back-turning path of the mortals (B6.9).

[122] μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν, B1.15. Compare the Eleusinian 'password' (σύνθημα), Clem. *Protr*. 2.21.2, with Burkert (1983) 269–73; (1985) 285–7; Richardson (1974) 22–3. A similar parallel obtains with the Gold Tablets, as we shall see presently.

journey culminates in a direct encounter with a female deity, who remains unnamed, and is identified only as 'goddess' (θεά, B1.22).[123] References to Underworld and initiatory divinities standardly leave them unnamed.[124] Even before availing ourselves of the Gold Tablets, we may explore more tentatively and generally the eschatological and divinising facets of initiations, focusing perforce on the best but by no means well-attested initiations at Eleusis.

As early as the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, our texts trace the initiate's blessedness to an act of directly seeing what is revealed in the mysteries, and allude to the 'appearances' (*phasmata*) in question.[125] We of course do not precisely know what the 'ineffable apparitions' (Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 22.3 Keil) were, and 'precisely' could be a misleading expectation. Our sources do, however, regularly speak of the fear which the ritual first provokes and then dispels in the initiate. Aelius Aristides writes that 'of all that is divine to humans (θεῖα ἀνθρώποις)' Eleusis is at once 'the most frightening and joyful'.[126] Plutarch suggests an eschatological understanding of this fear, comparing the soul's experiences at death to the experiences of 'those celebrating great initiations' (fr. 178.5–6 Sandbach). After first wandering through frightening dark paths and undergoing panic, shivering, sweat and amazement (7–10), some wonderful light (φῶς τι θαυμάσιον) meets the initiate along with pure meadows, dances, sacred words and holy views (10–13). Now fully initiated and free, he celebrates the rites with his fellow initiates. This is why, not only what they signify, but also the very signifiers 'dying' (*teleutan*) and 'being initiated'

[123] The goddess is neither Justice nor Night. See the Appendix, with n.25.

[124] Referring only to θεός, θεά, θεαῖ, τὼ θεώ, etc., e.g. Soph. *OC* 1548 (ἥ τε νερτέρα θεός); *Th.* 767 (θεοῦ χθονίου); *LSCG* 4; 5; 8; 20 (Eleusis, fifth century); *Syll.*[3] 736.33 (Μεγάλοις θεοῖς, Andania). See further references and discussion in Rohde (1925) 185, n.19; West (1966) 369–70; Richardson (1974) 27; Burkert (1969) 13–14 with n.31. The latter draws the connection with Parmenides' nameless goddess; cf. also Kingsley (1999) 96; Bonnechere (2003) 186, n.43.

[125] *h.Hom.* 2.480 (ὄπωπεν); Soph. *TrGF* 4.837 (δερχθέντες); Pl. *Phdr.* 250b6–8 (μακαρίαν ὄψιν τε καὶ θέαν . . . εἶδόν τε καὶ ἐτελοῦντο κτλ); Aristid. *Or.* 22.3 Keil (cf. 12); also Eur. *Bacch.* 73–5. For the φάσματα, see further the sources cited in Burkert (1983) 288, n.64 (referring also to the mysteries of Dionysus and Sabazios), cf. also 275 with n.3.

[126] Aristid. 22.2 Keil; cf. Aesch. *TrGF* 3.387 (ἔφριξ᾽· ἐρῶ δὲ τοῦδε μυστικοῦ τέλους); Plut. *Mor.* 47a; 81d–e; cf. Pl. *Phdr.* 251a3–4 (πρῶτον . . . ἔφριξεν κτλ); see further Richardson (1974) 306–7; Burkert (1987) 92–3; (1985) 277 (here associating this process with the anticipation and overcoming of death); Bremmer (2014) 13.

(*teleisthai*) are similar (6–7). In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, the priest of Isis describes the initiation as 'like a voluntary death and salvation by grace' (*Met*. 11.21.26–7). Apuleius then narrates our only extant first-person account of a mystery initiation. After playfully regretting that he cannot lawfully sate the reader's desire to know all the details (11.23.21–7), Apuleius nonetheless concedes the following (11.23.28–31, tr. after Burkert (1987) 97):

> I approached the frontier of death (*accessi confinium mortis*), I set foot on the threshold (*limine*) of Persephone, I was borne through all the elements and came back, I saw at midnight the sun sparkling in white light (*solem … lumine*), I approached close to the gods of the upper and the nether world and reverenced them from near at hand (*deos … accessi coram et adoraui de proxumo*).

Neither Plutarch nor Apuleius can be taken at face value. Both have their own agenda and may be to some degree creatively theorising and Platonising. Equally, though, neither should be written off as mere idiosyncratic fiction. It is itself noteworthy that Plato invokes the mysteries when he recasts philosophy as the business of practising dying during one's life and, thereby, ensuring post-mortem bliss (*Phd*. 80e-81a; 69c). Pindar more directly supports the association between initiation and the experience of death when he states that, having seen the mysteries (ἰδὼν κεῖν'), the initiate knows the end of life (οἶδε μὲν βίου τελευτάν), as well as a Zeus-granted beginning (fr. 137 M). This association between initiation and the experience of death is highly reminiscent of Parmenides' eschatological proem, in which the *kouros* journeys to the setting of the afterlife, as are the interplay of light and darkness, Plutarch's analogy with the journey of the post-mortem soul and Apuleius' emphasis on his unmediated encounter with the divine.[127] Interestingly, Apuleius comments in particular about seeing the sun amidst darkness. On the following day, he was stood in front of the goddess's statue clothed 'in the likeness of the Sun' (*ad instar Solis*, 11.24.1–18). As we saw, Parmenides too adopts the Sun's role in the proem.[128] Most

[127] On the importance and interrelation of light and darkness imagery and the experience of death in Greek representations and appropriations of mystery initiations, see more generally Seaford (2005) and (2010); see also Ustinova (2009) 229–55; Patera (2010); Paleothodoros (2010).

[128] In Aristophanes' *Frogs*, it is only the initiates in the Underworld who enjoy the sun and light (454–6, cf. 445). The Stoic Cleanthes pronounces the gods mystic forms, the sun a

importantly, the association of the experience of death with the initiate's initial terror and subsequent bliss instructively coheres with the mysteries' perceived eschatological function. Our Eleusinian evidence advertises above all what is prominent also in the Gold Tablets: initiations were regularly perceived to ensure a blessed afterlife and so, as a hierophant's funerary inscription records, dispel the fear of death.[129]

Now, Burkert emphasises that immortality is never mentioned in connection with the Eleusinian initiations, in which death remains an ineluctable reality, although not an absolute end.[130] While lifetime deification is admittedly not at issue, Burkert's emphasis is nonetheless misleading. The eternal and blissful existence after death, which the mysteries were regularly taken to guarantee, amounts to post-mortem divinisation, and has demonstrably been understood as such. The initiates alone can be said to *live* after death (τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ ζῆν ἔστι, Sophocles, *TrGF* 4.837.3–4). In Pindar, again, the initiate knows, not just the end of life, but, crucially, also a divinely granted beginning (διόσδοτον ἀρχάν, fr. 137 M). His hopes concern simultaneously the end of life and an eternal life (τοῦ σύμπαντος αἰῶνος, Isocrates, 4.28.10–12). Plato writes that, according to the founders of the mysteries and those who participate in them, initiation aims to ensure that the initiate, i.e. his post-mortem soul, spends eternity dwelling 'among the gods' (μετὰ θεῶν, *Phd*. 69c3–7, 81a8–9). In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, which at least in part constitutes an *aition* for the Eleusinian mysteries, the queen Metaneira sees the disguised Demeter placing her son, Demophon, in a great fire, and

torchbearer and the cosmos a mystery, *SVF* 1.538. On various associations of the sun with mysteries, see further Seaford (2005) 602–4.

[129] *H.Hom*. 2.480–2; Pind. fr. 137 M; Soph. *TrGF* 4.837; Isoc. 4.28.10–12; Cic. *Leg*. 2.36; Crinagoras *Anth. Pal*. 11.42; Aristid. *Or*. 22.10 Keil; D.L. 6.39. Funerary inscription: *IG* II/III^2 3661.5–6; cf. Plut. fr. 178.19 Sandbach (φόβῳ δὲ θανάτου). Cf. Burkert (1985) 277, 289; (1983) 269; further on Dionysiac mysteries: Burkert (1985) 294–5. A similar eschatological purpose may well have been associated with other Greek mysteries, but we could not presuppose it across the board. Samothracian mysteries appear to have aimed at least initially to ensure safe naval voyages, Σ Ap. Rh. 77.15–16 Wendel; see further Burkert (1985) 284. Bremmer (2014) 18–20 plausibly suggests that agricultural fertility was at least another important focus of the Eleusinian rites themselves, but he downplays the degree to which our evidence repeatedly emphasises the mysteries' eschatological aspect.

[130] Burkert (1983) 294–5; (1985) 289.

misinterprets the goddess's good intention to deify him. Demophon already grew to be godlike (235, 241) and, were it not for Metaneira's intervention, would have become 'ageless and immortal' (242), but now death must remain ineluctable for him (260–3). Nonetheless, the mysteries that Demeter proceeds to establish in Eleusis and their attendant rewards of a blessed afterlife (480–2) may be said, in keeping with the other texts considered here, to *substitute* her initial intention to bestow *lifetime* deification. It is unsurprising and instructive that Heracles and the Dioskouroi, who epitomise the prospect of scaling the boundary between mortal and divine, were emphatically numbered among the initiates.[131]

Put simply, the promise of the mysteries to remove the fear of death is recurrently linked with a promise of divinisation. Insofar as the former is central to the mysteries, so is the latter. The perceived eschatological function of the mysteries relies on and fosters the notion of a divine potential within the mortal. Through initiation, this potential is actualised. The mortal's initiation involves a transformation which is marked by a new relation to the divine, as well as by his integration into a new group of initiates, circumscribed by contradistinction with the uninitiated. The initiate's transformation means the attainment of a new and higher status, which – according to a dominant conception of the mysteries in our sources – will subsequently result in everlasting, post-mortem bliss.

The Gold Tablets, some of which are very close to Parmenides in time, place, language and imagery, offer a refreshingly tangible corroboration.[132] The extant specimens date from the late fifth century BCE to the second or third century CE (references here are to BCE unless otherwise stated). These little scraps of gold foil are found in tombs in South Italy (predominantly), Sicily, Rome, Crete, some parts of Mainland Greece (particularly Thessaly) and Macedonia. Despite some regional variations, they display

[131] For literary and pictorial attestations as early as Pindar, see Burkert (1983) 267 with n.11; (1985) 213. Note X. *Hell.* 6.3.6 (πρώτοις ξένοις); Aristid. *Or.* 22.4 Keil (ξένων πρώτους).

[132] On the Tablets in general, see Graf and Johnston (2013*a*); Bernabé and Cristóbal (2008); Edmonds (2011*a*). Whether or not we should label the Tablets 'Orphic' has no bearing on my argument. For competing answers, see Bernabé and Christóbal (2011) and Edmonds (2011*b*).

remarkable formulaic continuity across different eras and locations.[133] The Tablets range from extended narratives, which instruct the initiate's post-mortem soul as to what path it should travel and what it should do and say in the afterlife, to briefer 'proxies', which themselves speak the appropriate words on behalf of the initiate's soul, to mere records of names or names plus 'initiate' or simply 'initiate'.[134]

Much like the *kouros*, the initiate's soul in the Tablets journeys to the setting of the afterlife where it encounters guardians who, once it speaks the appropriate words (or *pass*words), admit it to an audience with an eschatological goddess, the 'Queen of the Chthonian ones'.[135] The goddess is sometimes left unnamed and sometimes identified explicitly as Persephone. Just like Parmenides' eschatological goddess, she comports herself 'kindly' to the initiate (πρόφρων).[136] There are unmistakable affinities, then, between the eschatological 'way' of the post-mortem soul which the *kouros* travels in Parmenides' proem (ὁδόν … τήνδ' ὁδόν, B1.2, 5, 27) and what our earliest and longest Gold Tablet from Hipponion describes as the 'sacred way (ὁδόν … ἱεράν) on which also other glorious initiates and bacchoi travel'.[137]

The initiation to the goddess, as elsewhere, guarantees for the initiate, who is again 'blessed' (ὄλβιος) or 'thrice-blessed' (τρισόλβιος), a better lot in the afterlife.[138] Most importantly for

[133] Bernabé and Cristóbal (2008) 5.

[134] Extended narratives: GJ 1–3; 8; 25. Proxies: GJ 10–14, 29. Records: GJ 20–4*a*; 31–6.

[135] See GJ 5–7 (South Italy (Thurii), fourth cent.); 8 (Sicily, *circa* third cent.). See also GJ 1 (South Italy (Hipponion) late fifth cent.), where the same scene culminates in an admission to a Chthonian *King* (καί … βασιλῆϊ). Some editors read βασιλεί<αι> (Bernabé and Cristóbal (2008) 48–9) in conformity with the Tablets elsewhere, but this is perhaps overly homogenising. For passwords, cf. also the list of Bacchic σύμβολα in GJ 27.

[136] Unnamed: e.g. GJ 5; 8–9. 'Persephone': e.g. GJ 6–7; 26a–b. It is neither warranted nor illuminating to identify therefore *Parmenides*' goddess as Persephone, contra Kingsley (1999) 94. πρόφρων: GJ 6.7; 7.7 (South Italy (Thurii), fourth cent.); B1.22 (πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο); cf. Kingsley (1999) 64. Floyd (1992) 252–4 observes that epic combinations of πρόφρων and ὑποδέχεσθαι suggest a relation between agents of unequal stations. Note esp. Demeter on Demophon at *h.Hom.* 2.226 (πρόφρων ὑποδέξομαι).

[137] GJ 1.15–16 (South Italy (Hipponion), late fifth cent.). Feyerabend (1984) observes the parallel in the (cultic and poetic) image of the road in B1 and GJ 1. For further echoes in language and imagery between Parmenides and the Tablets, see Ranzato (2015) 66–70.

[138] GJ 3.5; 6.7; 7.7; cf. GJ 2.11. ὄλβιος: e.g. GJ 5.9; τρισόλβιος: GJ 26a-b.1. Sophocles also describes initiates as 'thrice-blessed', *TrGF* 4.837.1. In at least one case, the initiate's blessed state seems to involve breaking free of the cycle of metempsychosis, the notion

us, in several of the Tablets the soul's eschatological, initiatory journey culminates in an explicit articulation of its divinisation, an idea which I argued is, in some form, often important if more implicit in Greek mysteries elsewhere. At the end of his journey, the initiate is now in a position to insist on his rightful divine status and he either has been or will presently be divinised. First, the initiate's soul formulaically states to the guardians: 'I am a child of Earth and starry Sky (γῆς . . . καὶ οὐρανοῦ), but my race is heavenly (αὐτάρ . . . οὐράνιον).'[139] Hesiod speaks of 'the sacred race of immortals . . . who were born from Earth and starry Sky' (*Th.* 105–6), and the kinship specifically of initiates with the divine can be paralleled elsewhere.[140] Second, and more explicitly, in several fourth-century South Italian Tablets, the initiate finally states to the unnamed goddess: 'For I also claim to be of your blessed race (ὑμῶν γένος).'[141] In one case, the initiate is answered expressly: ' . . . you will be a god instead of a mortal (θεὸς δ' ἔσηι ἀντὶ βροτοῖο).'[142] In another South Italian Tablet, the initiate is similarly addressed: 'You have become a god instead of a human (θεὸς ἐγένου ἐξ ἀνθρώπου).'[143]

of which further relates the Tablets to Parmenides' eschatology as we reconstructed it in Ch. 5.2: see GJ 5.5, cited in Ch. 5.2 with fr. 229 Kern = 348 Bernabé. On these texts, see further Johnston (2013*b*) 118–19, 127, 132–3. Several other sources link mystery initiation with notions of metempsychosis (e.g. Pl. *Lg*. 9.870d5-e3), but this connection should not be exaggerated. For both further sources and qualifications, see Burkert (1987) 87–8.

[139] GJ 2.6 (South Italy (Petelia), fourth cent.); 8.12, 15 (Sicily, *circa* third cent.); 29.3–4 (Thessaly, fourth cent.); *uel sim*.: GJ 25.8–9 (Thessaly, 350–300); without the last clause: GJ 1.10; 10–14.3; 16.3; 18.3.

[140] For the comparison with *Th*. 105–6, cf. Johnston (2013*b*) 114–16, 124. An inscription at the entrance to a Meter sanctuary in Crete welcomes initiates but warns 'those who transgress into the race of the gods' (θιῶν γένος, fr. 32.iv.1–3 Kern = 568.1–3 Bernabé). (More specifically, the goddess welcomes the initiates οἳ γονεὰν ὑπέχονται (2^b); the sense is uncertain, but 'who guarantee their lineage' is one plausible possibility, see Burkert (1987) 157, n.58.) In the ps.-Platonic *Axiochus*, a dying man in need of consolation is termed 'kin to the gods' (γεννήτης τῶν θεῶν) by virtue of the Eleusinian mysteries, 371d5-e4 with Rohde (1925) 602–3; see further Burkert (1987) 76–7; (1972) 359.

[141] GJ 5.3; 6.3; 7.3 (South Italy (Thurii) fourth cent.).

[142] GJ 5.9 (South Italy (Thurii), fourth cent.). One immediately recalls Emped. DK31 B112.4 (see Ch. 6.2, n.51).

[143] GJ 3.4 (South Italy (Thurii), fourth cent.), cf. the later GJ 9.2–4 (Rome, second or third cent. CE). Burkert (1985) 295 writes that these statements go beyond everything else known from Classical Greek mysteries. But, if the strong language of apotheosis (*theos*) is indeed unique, the initiate's immortalisation nonetheless takes place only

Now, unlike the speaker in the Tablets, the *kouros* is, pointedly, not yet dead (B1.26). Any statement about views which Parmenides may have held concerning the post-mortem fate of the initiated soul will be pure speculation, and extrinsic to a study of the poem. We have seen throughout that Parmenides appropriates traditional religious models of this kind in a decidedly creative manner. By contrast with the interpretative approach that Peter Kingsley (1999) has made famous (or notorious), analysing the religious context of Parmenides' thought, and recognising the interpretative exigency of such analyses, does not warrant us simply to reduce or assimilate Parmenides to those religious models which he appropriates. Our own analysis in this section of Parmenides' appropriation of the language and imagery of mystery initiations, and especially the comparison with the initiatory Gold Tablets of South Italy, further substantiates the same conclusion – at which we first arrived through an internal evaluation of the evidence – that Parmenides frames the *kouros*' eschatological journey to the goddess as one which takes its culmination to be a transformative divinisation of the mortal through an identification with his divine soul. Our interpretation of Parmenides' application of this initiatory model of divinisation – of the nature and role of divinisation in his thought – must be context-sensitive.

Before detailing that conclusion (Chapter 5.4), we will briefly address the association in our sources of Parmenides with the Pythagoreans. An association of some kind is eminently plausible. The Pythagorean communities, lying close to Elea, were an important social and political force in contemporary South Italy.[144] Some of our reports, furthermore, do not sound like mere formulaic, doxographic systematisation. Notably, Sotion records the very specific and distinctive testimony that Parmenides established a hero shrine for the deceased Pythagorean Ameinias, who first led him 'into quietude' (εἰς ἡσυχίαν), a familiar term

after death and is as such equivalent to what, as I argued above, we also get in our evidence for the Eleusinian mysteries. Bernabé and Cristóbal (2008) 178 reasonably suggest that these statements indicate the acquisition of superhuman status, but not thereby equality with the major gods (i.e. something like Heracles' full-blown deification).

[144] On our evidence for the society and political activities of early Pythagorean communities in South Italy, see Burkert (1972) 115–20; Horky (2013) 85–124; Rowett (2014).

associated with the Pythagorean life.[145] The *Tabula* of Cebes (of uncertain date) tantalisingly speaks about an old wise man 'who was emulating the Pythagorean and Parmenidean life (βίον) in both word and deed' (2.2.2–5).[146] The early Pythagoreans advanced notions of metempsychosis and the divinity of the soul.[147] Our identification of these same notions in Parmenides (Chapter 5.2) lends further support to reports of some sort of relation with the Pythagoreans, although our evidence allows for nothing like detailed elaborations.

Aristotle reports that, in their 'very secret doctrines' (ἐν τοῖς πάνυ ἀπορρήτοις), the Pythagoreans observed a taxonomy of rational beings, according to which 'one kind is a god, one is a human, and one is like Pythagoras' (τὸ μέν ἐστι θεός, τὸ δ' ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ οἷον Πυθαγόρας, fr. 192 Rose).[148] Whether or not the early Pythagoreans put the point in this or even a proximate way, the hagiographic traditions surrounding Pythagoras support tracing to them some such conception and fit with Aristotle's remark. To name only three among numerous other reported feats, Pythagoras commands a unique ability to recall facts about his earlier incarnations (as probably reflected in Empedocles DK31 B129), is observed in different places simultaneously, and intuitively issues miraculous predictions.[149] In the most extreme case, Pythagoras was identified wholesale with Hyperborean

[145] D.L. 9.21. For 'quietude' as a Pythagorean observance, see D.L. 8.7, 10 (cf. 8.31–2); Luc. *Auct*. 3; Isoc. *Bus*. 29.6–8; Iambl. *VP* 95–7, 114, 197, cf. 10, 64–5; Hippol. *Haer*. 1.2.18, with Burnet (1930) 94–5; Burkert (1969) 28, n.62; (1972) 178–9, 199; Coxon (2009) 40–1; Kingsley (1999) 179–87 (*caveat lector*); Gemelli Marciano (2014) 144–5. Hero cult itself relates to the theology of approximation: it is regularly concomitant with a conception of the worshipped hero as a former mortal, who now enjoys a higher-than-mortal status; see e.g. on the heroised Archilochus, E_1 II.50–1 *apud* Clay (2004) 106 ([ἀθ]άνατος . . . [ἔ]σται), and Cleomedes, Paus. 6.9.8 (μηκέτι θνητόν); cf. Currie (2002) on Euthymus. In GJ 2.11 (fourth century, Petelia), the initiate is promised he will 'rule among the heroes'. On heroisations of philosophers after death, see Grau (2013).

[146] For further testimonia linking Parmenides with the Pythagoreans, see Iamblichus, Proclus and Photius in A4; Anatolius A44; Iamblichus *VP* 267.19 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 154; with Burkert (1969) 28; (1972) 280; Kingsley (1999) 223–4; cf. also Robbiano (2006) 135–6.

[147] Ch. 5.2.

[148] Ps.-Apollonius counts Pythagoras 'in the race of *daimones*', *Ep*. 50.1–2; cf. Iambl. *VP* 10–11.

[149] Burkert (1972) 136–47 comprehensively surveys the hagiographic tradition; cf. Dodds (1951) 144–5 (with notes).

Apollo.[150] Barring this limiting case of full-blown apotheosis, however, Pythagoras emerges from these traditions as the *tertium quid* which Aristotle describes: as a mortal who is decidedly *closer* to the divine or *more* divine.[151]

Most interesting for us is the fact that our sources, indirect and satirical as they are, also link Pythagoras' exceptionally divine status to the tradition that he undertook a descent to the Underworld (a *katabasis*). In Hermippus' parodying version of this tradition, Pythagoras in fact hides in an underground chamber, to which his mother relays 'what happened . . . and the time' (τὰ γινόμενα . . . καὶ τὸν χρόνον), presumably, that is, who died and when. An emaciated Pythagoras then re-emerges, allegedly from an eschatological *katabasis*, and dupes his audience into believing that he narrates to them his experiences from such a journey and, *therefore*, that he is 'some divine person' (θεῖόν τινα, *apud* Diogenes Laertius, 8.41).[152] The prospect of an approach to a higher, divine status in journeys like Pythagoras' eschatological *katabasis* corresponds to traditions, prominent in South Italy, of parallel journeys undertaken by the likes of Heracles and Orpheus.[153] The link between such journeys and a heightened status was sufficiently familiar for Sophocles' Orestes to state without further elaboration: 'For often before now I have seen

[150] Ar. *apud* Ael. *VH* 2.26; cf. Iambl. *VP* 30.14–18. See further Burkert (1972) 141–2, 149 for sources and discussion.

[151] Iamblichus expressly reports inferences from Pythagoras' feats to his super-human status, *VP* 143 (κρείττονος . . . οὐχὶ ἀνθρώπου).

[152] Diogenes (8.21) outlines a similarly snide *katabasis* of Pythagoras also by Hieronymus of Rhodes. Hermippus' satire is reflected e.g. in Σ Soph. *El.* 62 Papageorgius. Herodotus (4.94–6) records a similar story about Zalmoxis, presenting him as a former slave of Pythagoras and linking the 'immortalising Getai' (Γέται ἀθανατίζοντες) to the Pythagoreans. Concerning Hermippus' satire, Burkert brilliantly argues that the strange detail about Pythagoras' 'mother' suggests a parallel role, in the Pythagorean traditions which he satirises, for a divine Meter, or *De*meter, to whom Pythagoras owed his astonishing wisdom, see Burkert (1969) 23, 26; (1972) 159; Bonnechere (2003) 172. For Demeter as 'Meter', see e.g. Andoc. *Myst.* 124.7. Pythagoras' house in Croton was converted into a temple for Demeter, Tim. *BNJ* 566 F131. If this is right, then Pythagoras too encounters in his eschatological journey a female deity, like the initiate of the Tablets, and like Parmenides' *kouros*.

[153] On these *katabaseis*, especially in South Italy, see Burkert (1969) 5, 17, 25 n.57; (1985) 195, 296; (1972) 130, n.57; Kingsley (1999) 61–3; Graf and Johnston (2013*b*) 173–6; Bremmer (2014) 59–61; for Orpheus, also frr. 978–1002, 1087 Bernabé. Plato putatively ascribes an initiatory myth about the soul in Hades to 'some clever man, perhaps some Sicilian or Italian', *Gorg.* 493a1–c3, with Dodds (1951) 225, n.5.

clever men die falsely in words; then, when they return home, they are held in greater honour' (ἐκτετίμηνται πλέον, *El.* 62–4).[154] We may finally note in passing the anecdotes surrounding such 'divine men' figures, frequently associated with South Italy, as Aithalides, Aristeas, Abaris, Hermotimus, Epimenides, Phormio and Leonymus, who are linked in our sources with Pythagoras, and who are accorded parallel, super-human feats. In particular, the traditions that these divine men performed miraculous journeys, undertaken at least in some versions with their souls and while their bodies themselves remained stationary, have long elicited comparisons with the extra-ordinary journey described in Parmenides' proem.[155] The *kouros*, then, in undertaking as a living mortal an eschatological journey – and perhaps especially in journeying with or as his soul – would seem to evoke also the Pythagorean model and these current and local models of the exceptionally divine man.[156]

5.4 Conclusions: How Could Parmenides Have Written *Alêtheia*?

Parmenides describes the traveller in the proem as a 'knowing man' (εἰδότα φῶτα, B1.3). But, as in comparable passages which identify initiates as 'those who know', he does not elaborate what

[154] Proclus reports that 'many among the ancients', including Democritus, wrote about those who have been thought to die and subsequently returned, *in R.* 2.113.6–9 = DK68 B1.1–4.

[155] For psychic journeys in these traditions, see e.g. Pliny *NH* 7.174–5, cf. Hdt. 4.15; Σ Apoll. Rhod. 1.645 = Pher. DK7 B8. For the moniker *theios anêr* itself, see Pl. *Lg.* 1.642d5. The traditions and the sources are discussed in Bremmer (1983) 24–53; Dodds (1951) 141–2 (with notes); Burkert (1972) 147–53; on Aristeas, see further Bolton (1962). For broad comparisons of these traditions with Parmenides B1, see e.g. Guthrie (1965) 11–12; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 41–5. Aristotle reportedly hesitated as to whether Hermotimus or Anaxagoras first stated that 'mind (*nous*) is the god in us . . . and that mortal life contains a portion of some god' (fr. 61 Rose; cf. *Metaph.* A.3 $984^{b}15$–22); cf. Betegh (2006*a*) 636; (2012) 115–18.

[156] A first-century CE inscription, found in Elea on the base of Parmenides' bust, reads: 'Parmeneides, son of Pyres, *Ouliadês, physikos*'. Several scholars speculatively but not implausibly argue that, along with the titles *oulis* and *phôlarchos* on related finds, this inscription points to an Apolline medical association, which practised incubation and recognised Parmenides as its founder, see Kingsley (1999) esp. 77–86, 139ff; Ustinova (2004); cf. Burkert (1969) 22. *Pace* Kingsley, however, these late inscriptions hardly afford the key for the decipherment of Parmenides' fragments, as Palmer (2009) 61, n.37 rightly objects. At most, they interestingly disclose a local reception of Parmenides as a figure of religious authority.

it is that the knower knows. The phrase could signal that the *kouros* should be thought of as (like) an initiate without alluding further to knowledge of Parmenides' philosophy. Alternatively, that the way, or the goddess, 'bears the man who knows' may signify that the *kouros* has now been set on the path which ultimately leads the mortal to knowledge of reality.[157] Either way, the proem's 'way' (ὁδός) cannot be identified with the 'way' of inquiry of what-is ('that [it] is and cannot not be') which the goddess announces later – in B2 – because this will imply that, in B2, the goddess is telling Parmenides what way he is to follow after he has already traversed it. Rather, as Malcolm Schofield puts it: 'The implicit question tackled in Fr. 1 is: "What puts someone in the position to raise and understand the goddess's questions of Fr. 2?"'[158]

The foregoing study of Parmenides allows us to frame this question in the context of a more specific problem. Parmenides identifies as the essence and conceptual basis of the cosmology developed in *Doxa* the very same *krisis* between the two opposite sensory elements in accordance with which specifically mortal cognition functions by brute, physiological necessity. It is the qualitatively different *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not' which structures the argumentation of *Alêtheia* and frames its concept of what-is. I argued in Chapter 4 that Parmenides wrote *Doxa* in part *because* thinking in accordance with the Doxastic *krisis*, and experiencing, recognising and forming first-order beliefs with regard to a multiplicity of heterogeneous things, is an inescapable aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal. This analysis, however, left us with a new difficulty. If, being a mortal, Parmenides must think in *Doxa*'s structuring categories, i.e.

[157] Cf. Mansfeld (1964) 227; Roloff (1970) 172; Lesher (1994*a*) 7. The scholastic argument that the words 'knowing man' imply that the *kouros* is knowledgeable already in B1.3, and so prior to and independently of meeting the goddess (e.g. Torgerson (2006) 25, 30, 41), is wholly unpersuasive. That the way on which the mares set the *kouros* is 'the way which carries the knower' (the argument presupposes that ὁδός rather than δαίμων is the antecedent of ἥ) simply does not imply that *the kouros* must *already* be a knower. If the phrase alludes to knowledge of Parmenides' philosophy, then the comment must be proleptic for the *kouros*: indeed, the comment is itself part (recall the mares) of the very dramatic setting which, even if nothing else, manifestly portrays the goddess's disclosure as anterior to the *kouros*' acquisition of knowledge (B1.28^{b}-30). Mansfeld (1964) 225–9 offers different objections.

[158] Schofield (1987) 357; see also Coxon (2009) 12–13.

through the *krisis* between Light and Night, then how could he have *also* thought in the principal categories of *Alêtheia*, i.e. through the qualitatively different *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not'? If, being a mortal, it is appropriate for Parmenides to learn mortal beliefs, then why is it also appropriate for him to learn the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality (χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι, B1.28^{b})?

Schofield outlines the following answer to the question of the proem as he posed it: 'The divine represents a *perspective* opposed to our own human perspective. The way of the goddess represents . . . the abandonment of a merely mortal way of looking at things – of βροτῶν δόξαι, in short.'[159] We are now, again, in a position to integrate and to develop this attractive but embryonic idea within a fuller and more particular epistemological and theological framework. In Chapter 5.3, we analysed the proem in itself, and in the light of Parmenides' own eschatology and psychology (as reconstructed in Chapter 5.2) and of a variety of religious and literary paradigms, both local and pan-Hellenic, with which it engages densely and creatively. Our analysis recommends the following conclusions. In keeping with Greek religious thought quite generally (but unlike Xenophanes), Parmenides does not conceive of the human agent as an agent who is *simply* and *strictly* human. The mortal, for Parmenides, is a complex hybrid, which comprises both divine and mortal aspects and parts. In attaining the disposition which is necessary for acquiring knowledge of what-is, the living *kouros* is cognitively identified with the divine within him – i.e. with his Hot, aethereal soul – and, as such, undergoes a process of epistemic *homoiôsis theôi*.

Greek initiation is always and everywhere transformative, and it is the divine which facilitates the initiate's transformation. The epistemological thrust of the encounter between the *kouros* and the goddess is, I suggest, the following. With her injunctions and arguments throughout *Alêtheia*, the goddess repeatedly enjoins the *kouros* to think and to attain a certain understanding in new ways, and through an unfamiliar kind of opposition ('is'/'is not'), which his own mortal mind could not have identified or

[159] Schofield, *loc. cit.*

recognised, and she guides him in doing so. The mortal is able to heed the goddess's injunctions and follow her guidance only because there is in him a non-mortal, divine part – a pure Hot and, as such, supremely vital and cognitively acute and active part – which can be responsive to such injunctions and guidance. The process of following the goddess's injunctions and arguments *is* a process of becoming cognitively identified with one's divine soul to the temporary suspension of the mortal parts and aspects of one's composite mortal mind. It is in gradually acquiring the ability to register and evaluate *Alêtheia's* qualitatively different kind of thought that the *kouros* thus undergoes a process of cognitive *homoiôsis theôi*. Importantly, the *kouros* could not have undergone this process in the absence of his encounter with the goddess. The *human* mind, a prisoner to passively determined, uncontrollable physiological processes, could never have pulled itself up by its own bootstraps. This point follows from Parmenides' theory of human cognition. It is confirmed and reflected in his repeated characterisations of the *kouros* as dependent on the guidance and transportation of his divine guides and, above all, in the goddess's divine disclosure with which his journey culminates.

As we saw in Chapter 5.1, what-is cannot itself be described as Light or in terms of a certain proportion or relation between Light and Night. The thinking which is reflected in *Alêtheia*, framed by the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not', is qualitatively different from the thinking which underpins *Doxa*, framed by the *krisis* between Light and Night. Notably, the interplay of Light and Darkness dominates the proem but disappears entirely when the goddess embarks on her exposition of the way 'that [it] is'. Parmenides, then, is able to explain how a mortal can sustain a higher-than-mortal thought by thinking with his divine Light soul, but this does not mean that Light and what-is can be identified as the same item in the world nor, therefore, as the very same object of knowledge. Nonetheless, on the basis of our discussion of *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* and *Doxa*'s *krisis* (Chapter 4.3), we can suggest one sense in which the knowing mortal's pure-Light cognitive constitution is indeed structurally suited to thinking in terms of *Alêtheia*'s *krisis*. *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* involves retaining one side ('is') and rejecting the other ('is not'). *Doxa*'s *krisis*, conversely,

involves retaining both elements (Light and Night) and essentially relating each one to its enantiomorphic counterpart. When we think purely with our Light soul, however, we are in a position to cognise pure Light and no longer any Night. We thus adopt a physiological frame-of-mind which is suited to thinking and being aware in terms of only one thing, without an equally positive and equally reified enantiomorphic counterpart.[160] Thus, the Light that we perceive is not itself what-is. And yet, when we temporarily acquire a pure-Light cognitive constitution, we are in a position to apply our mind to the goddess's exposition of what-is as something that is wholly homogeneous and unified, something that is precisely free of those clashes – between enantiomorphic and equally reified opposites – that constantly dominate human experience and human thought.

Both Plato and Aristotle, for whom *homoiôsis theôi* similarly means identifying ourselves with what is divine in us, relate such divinisation to our capacity for reasoning and contemplation. In this respect, as in many others, they are the descendants of Parmenides. The deductive argumentation that permeates *Alêtheia* constitutes a distinctive and pioneering sort of rational thought. By momentarily suspending thought through the *krisis* 'Light/Night', and being liberated to recognise instead the qualitatively different *krisis* 'is / is not', the *kouros* can take the further step of selecting 'is' and rejecting 'is not'. Having thus formed the notion of 'what-is', the *kouros* can then follow the tightly developed arguments of B8, which throughout deduce the properties of what-is on the basis of the contrast between 'is' and 'is not', and grasp what this thing must be like. He recognises that, to be what strictly is and what has no share whatsoever in what-is-not, it must be perfected, ungenerated, imperishable, indivisible, homogeneous, immobile, etc.[161] It is through this process that the goddess enjoins the *kouros* to persevere when she instructs him: 'judge

[160] I thank Gábor Betegh for this observation.

[161] It is beyond the scope of this study to offer reconstructions of the different arguments in B8 for these properties of what-is. For such reconstructions, see e.g. McKirahan (2008). That the primary mainspring of these arguments is the contrast 'is / is not', and the determination to exclude categorically 'is not' from what-is, is clear and expressly stated (B8.15–16).

(*krinai*) by reasoning (*logos*) the much-contested examination spoken by me' (B7.5–6). With the injunction to judge or discriminate, the goddess invokes *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not'. With the term *logos*, she is looking forward to the deductions which are argued for on this basis in her examination (cf. B8.50). For Parmenides, when we apply our mind to this argumentative reasoning, and to the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not' which frames it, this amounts to suspending the operation of our mortal perceptual-cognitive apparatus and thinking instead with – or as – our divine souls. For the Parmenides who emerged here, a *human*'s mind can reason about 'is' and 'is not', but it is then a divinised and no longer a *human* mind, thinking in non-human, divine ways and attaining non-human, divine knowledge.[162]

The interpretation of the indispensable function of the goddess advanced here thus fully accommodates the undeniable prominence of argumentative reasoning in the poem. Indeed, it is even compatible with the view (although it does not require it) that the logic of *Alêtheia* is designed to be self-sufficient and that none of its premises are in need of external divine ratification.[163] Far from demanding passive acceptance, the goddess bombards the *kouros* with injunctions to engage his mind in an evaluation of her disclosure.[164] Indeed, the tenets of *Alêtheia could not* have been communicated to a piously obedient but uncritical mind. It is only by mastering *Alêtheia*'s argumentative reasoning, by actively applying his liberated understanding to the *krisis* 'is / is not', that the *kouros* can register, evaluate and accept for himself its account of the unshaken heart of reality.

None of the above implies that Parmenides is *deified* pure and simple so that he can simply dispense with human thinking.

[162] Lesher (2008) 473–6 is, on my view, precisely wrong to claim that Parmenides championed the reasoning of 'the *human* mind' and sought to '*humanize* knowledge' (my emphases). Specifically 'human' cognition is analysed in B16 (ἀνθρώποισι . . . ἀνθρώποισιν). It is the very Doxastic cognition beyond which we must go (Ch. 4.2–3). Equally, therefore, we cannot accept the postulation in Curd (2015) that, while Parmenides maintains that 'mortal' thinking (βροτῶν δόξας, B1.30) cannot grasp what-is, he simultaneously champions the capacity of 'human' thinking to do so. Note also B1.27: the *kouros* has travelled far from the track of '*humans*' (and cf. ἄνθρωποι at B19.3).

[163] On this question, see further Ch. 6.3.

[164] See B4.1; B6.2; B7.2, 5–6; cf. B8.7–8, 52.

Despite momentary achievements of such cognitive *homoiôsis theôi*, the *kouros* remains a living mortal. He remains *constrained* in the course of his life to experience, and to think and form first-order beliefs about, multiple, mobile, differentiated things in accordance with contrasts between sensory opposites. The ineluctability and appropriateness of Doxastic cognition to the mortal and to mortal life is no less part of the teachings of the goddess than *Alêtheia*. As Plato and Aristotle will later prescribe, Parmenides strove to become divine *insofar as* this is possible for a mortal. To use an imperfect analogy: for Parmenides, thinking rationally (where this means the type of thinking which underpins *Alêtheia*) is like holding your breath, whereas thinking like a mortal is like breathing. Breathing is an inexorable and unavoidable part of human life. And yet you can, with effort, suspend that human necessity for stretches of time, even if you cannot lead a human life in this way.

Significantly, the goddess also renders the *kouros* a prophet of sorts and enjoins him to convey her disclosure (B2.1): 'Come now, I will tell you, and do you convey the discourse once you have heard it' (κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας).[165] The goddess's many second-person addresses and injunctions have the effect of placing the reader in the *kouros*' role.[166] Indeed, if Parmenides is to render coherent not only his own but also his readers' ability to acquire knowledge of what-is, then his text – like all initiatory texts – must be thought of as performative and transformative. In those who read, or, rather, in those who gradually acquire the ability to understand *Alêtheia* and its argumentation, the poem must effect the same initiation and the same cognitive transformation which the *kouros*' unmediated, initiatory encounter with the goddess effected in him. For us, no less than for Parmenides himself, the process of acquiring the ability to apply our minds to thinking about 'is' and 'is not' is the process of identifying ourselves, however momentarily, with our divine soul and, therefore, of

[165] For this force of κομίζω, see Mourelatos (2008*a*) 17 with n.20; cf. e.g. Isoc. *Bus*. 28.5–7 (. . . ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν . . . εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐκόμισεν).

[166] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 16 suggests that Parmenides leaves the *kouros* unnamed precisely in order to allow his audience to identify themselves with the protagonist.

undergoing a cognitive *homoiôsis theôi*. For us, no less than for Parmenides himself, applying our mind to such thought is possible only thanks to his own first encounter with the goddess. By guiding him to a cognitive *homoiôsis theôi*, the goddess enabled Parmenides to produce a text, which, by reprising this encounter, is to effect the same cognitive transformation in its audience.[167]

Even if Parmenides would have allowed that one could formalise the arguments of *Alêtheia* without making reference to any deities, he would, on my view, insist that we cannot explain any mortal's ability to register and evaluate such arguments without making reference to that mortal's divine soul. Furthermore, we cannot explain how a mortal – Parmenides – was *first* able to register and evaluate such arguments without making reference to that mortal's epistemically significant interaction with the divine. By asking, 'Why did Parmenides choose to represent his philosophy as acquired by him through an interaction with a goddess?', we wrongly presuppose that Parmenides conceived of his philosophy independently of conceiving of it as acquired by him through an interaction with a goddess. The poem subverts our pervasive and deep-seated expectation that reasoning and divine disclosure must constitute dissonant and opposing tendencies. Argumentative reasoning and an epistemically significant interaction with the divine play harmonious and equally indispensable roles in Parmenides' philosophy.

[167] We might usefully compare the cognitive function of initiation in Parmenides, while never losing sight of its distinctiveness, with associations elsewhere in our sources for mystery initiations with the inducement in the initiate of what scholars broadly term 'altered states of consciousness'. On these associations, see Burkert (1987) 89–91, 112–14 (with notes); Ustinova (2009) 226–55; cf. Bonnechere (2003) on *katabasis*, initiation and altered consciousness in the oracle of Trophonius. A fragment of Aristotle tantalisingly states that 'those who are being initiated do not need to learn something but to undergo something and to be put into a certain condition; that is, to become fit-for-purpose' (οὐ μαθεῖν τι δεῖν ἀλλὰ παθεῖν καὶ διατεθῆναι, δηλονότι γενομένους ἐπιτηδείους, fr. 15 Rose). (At first sight, Aristotle's statement may seem to suggest that initiations were generally not thought to involve new understanding, but the context in Synesius indicates rather a distinction between different forms and stages of the acquisition of new understanding; see further Burkert (1987) 69–70; Graf and Johnston (2013*a*) 248 n.78. At any rate, the Derveni author takes it as read that would-be initiates hope in part to attain knowledge (εἰδήσειν), col.20; cf. Chrys. *SVF* 2.42; and see further Burkert (1987), *loc. cit.*)

5.5 The Ontological Question; Being, Intelligence and Intelligibility in *Alêtheia*

The foregoing study of Parmenides could cohere with different elaborations of what I called the 'ontological question',[168] and of the relation between being, intelligence and intelligibility in *Alêtheia*. This section addresses both issues. My suggestions here will be offered in a more tentative vein. Our aim is to consider how we might best think about these much-disputed problems, with our foregoing conclusions in mind, so as to achieve a more holistic understanding of all the different aspects of Parmenides' philosophy and see how this unified philosophy can be viewed as a viable and even attractive one. But an important concern will be to contend that the preceding analyses of the religious and epistemological aspects of the relation between the two parts of the poem do not depend on a prior resolution of the problems addressed in this section, and to gather together and systematise certain limited but pertinent points which were already established in the course of our discussions above.

5.5.1 *The Ontological Question*

In the light of the goddess's account of 'reality', what is the status of Doxastic things? How precisely do Doxastic things relate to what-is? Parmenides' ontology and cosmology nowhere explicate this relation. Parmenides nowhere directly elucidates how the ontology of *Alêtheia* coheres with the manifest availability of Doxastic things for experience, discussion and belief. There is no reason to assume that Parmenides did, despite his silence on the matter, develop a fully worked-out approach to these questions. The project of isolating for explicit analysis and discussing the relation between what unqualifiedly is (such-and-such) and the multiple population of everyday experience waited to become a focal point of Plato's metaphysics.[169]

[168] See the introduction to the chapters on Parmenides.

[169] What Plato's 'Parmenides' first critiques in the *Parmenides* (130e5–134e8) is specifically the coherence of Socrates' novel notion of the relation of participation between Forms and particulars.

Answers to the ontological question, I suggest, offer philosophical and interpretative elaborations for an issue which our text itself raises, but never itself elaborates or addresses. I will critically explore here what strike me as the most instructive or viable types of approach, and defend one philosophical and interpretative elaboration which is, I think, on balance most faithful to Parmenides' text and to the tenor of his thought, and which is expressed by some of his ancient readers. There is no question of attempting here a comprehensive survey of ontological models. Nor do I wish to exclude that there could be other viable elaborations. First, however, let us recapitulate certain pertinent points, which were established in the previous sections on Parmenides.

Doxastic things, we saw, are manifestly available for experience, discussion and belief. The goddess speaks of, and to, Doxastic things (mortals). Furthermore, we can expound such things correctly and incorrectly. Indeed, one can acquire knowledge of the nature of Doxastic things and processes (B10). *Doxa* describes such things correctly. It correctly expounds their origins, natures and behaviours by tracing them to (interactions between) the two constitutive principles which underlie them. It correctly explains, for example, the human mind (B16) and procreation (B17–18). *Whatever else* we say in response to the ontological question, then, Parmenides clearly takes it that there are present and available such things as mortals, who can experience and be experienced, err and know, think and be thought about, speak and be spoken to and about, and be expounded correctly or incorrectly. At the same time, what-is is aligned with *alêtheiê*, understood in some sense as the core or ultimate reality, and the *kouros*' attitude towards *Doxa* is informed by his knowledge of *Alêtheia*. He accepts *Doxa*'s theories as accounts of Doxastic things and processes. But he also recognises that beliefs about and accounts of Doxastic things form no part of an account of what-is. Indeed, the mortals' error consists not least in mistaking Doxastic accounts for accounts of the nature of the core or ultimate reality, and *Doxa*'s cosmology is 'deceptive' insofar as it is liable to be misinterpreted in just this way.

I do not restate these points so that I could assume them as premises in the following criticisms. I will not use them in this way, even though I do believe that any viable answer to the

ontological question will have to take them into account. Rather, I recapitulate these conclusions in order to clarify what I take to be the only relevant points on which the evidence permits us to insist. Beyond these limited points, moreover, the arguments of the previous sections regarding the religious and epistemological aspects of Parmenides' poem do not rely on any particular story concerning the ontological status of Doxastic things or the nature of the relation between what-is and Doxastic things.

The view that *Alêtheia*'s ontology implies the non-existence of Doxastic things – call this 'non-existentialism' – was for a long time the standard interpretation, but appears to have become a minority position.[170] Non-existentialism has its mainspring above all in the fact that, when deducing the properties of what-is in B8, the goddess does not issue assertions of the form 'what is changeless is F', but rather 'what-is is changeless'. At least *prima facie*, then, by predicating attributes to what-is (*to eon*), Parmenides does not seem to delineate the attributes of a subset of the things which are, but to state unqualifiedly that 'what-is' did not come to be and is imperishable (B8.6–21), is homogeneous and indivisible (B8.22–5) and is changeless and immobile (B8.26–31, 38, 41).[171] But how could Parmenides, then, still allow that there are some things, such as mortals and stars, which are (what they are), and which *do* come to be, change, move and perish? How could Parmenides reject generation and perishing (B8.21–2, 27–8) *only* with respect to what-is as contrasted with *other* things (mortals, etc.), rather than with respect to what-is and, *therefore*, categorically?[172]

Such considerations raise the challenging question of how Parmenides could avoid committing himself to non-existentialism. But, whatever our ultimate answer may be, ascribing to Parmenides the unqualified view that Doxastic things (mortals, trees, stars, etc.)

[170] But see e.g. Wedin (2014).

[171] Even if one viewed *esti* in B2 as a paradigm of predication (' . . . is (. . .)') without existential force, the deductions of B8 undoubtedly specify the properties of a certain entity, what-is. Some interpreters object for this reason to formal readings of B2, Gallop (1979) 63; Barnes (1982) 161.

[172] In framing the issue in this way, I sidestep the question of whether the extant fragments converge on the thesis that what-is is unique (numerical monism). Melissus explicitly infers some form of numerical monism, although from an anti-Parmenidean premise (B6 with KRS (1983) 395). After Plato, numerical monism often crops up as the doxographic hallmark of Parmenides.

do not exist as a conscious and unapologetic philosophical tenet is in many ways a non-starter. The untenable ramifications of this traditional view are not generally spelled out. If we maintain non-existentialism, for example, we cannot also consistently maintain that Doxastic things appear to mortals. If there are no such things as Doxastic things or, therefore, mortals, then there is nothing there either to give rise to or to experience such appearances. No one, I take it, would suggest that it is the unchanging and immobile what-is which either generates or registers the appearance that this person is walking. Scholars often describe Doxastic things and processes as 'illusions' or 'hallucinations'.[173] But, at least as a description of non-existentialism, this is an incoherent articulation of an interpretation which cannot be coherently articulated. We experience an illusion, presumably, when we observe one state-of-affairs and are under the impression that we are observing another state-of-affairs. We hallucinate when we mentally conjure up a state-of-affairs.[174] But all such scenarios require, incompatibly with non-existentialism, that we are there to observe or mentally conjure up states-of-affairs. It is surely not what-is, as described in B8, which both creates and registers illusions or hallucinations![175]

The objection here is not merely that Parmenides neglects to explain how, given his commitment to non-existentialism, Doxastic things appear to mortals, but that he renders this matter inexplicable. He closes off in advance any possible avenue of explanation. After all, there is, *ex hypothesi*, only one candidate answer for what causes and registers these appearances or illusions – what-is – and this candidate is wholly unsuitable.

We can appreciate the difficulty from another direction by asking whether the non-existentialist will classify Doxastic things

[173] Nietzsche (1974) 122–4; Rohde (1925) 372; Reinhardt (1974) 310; Jaeger (1947) 105; Burnet (1930) 182; Vlastos (2008) 376, n.29 (cf. (1946) 76, n.59; (1973) 65–6); Owen (1960) 89; Tarán (1965) 230; Guthrie (1965) 75 ('a hallucination or dream'); Furth (1974) 268; Gallop (1984) 22–3; Lloyd (1987) 61; Sedley (1999*a*) 117; Gemelli Marciano (2002) 87; Sisko (2003) 102; Trépanier (2004) 152.

[174] Cf. Austin (1962) 22–5.

[175] A more specific consequence of non-existentialism is that Parmenides himself does not exist (Palmer (2009) 181–3 emphasises this point). *A fortiori*, it is not the case that Parmenides wrote a poem, which argues for non-existentialism.

as what-is or as what-is-not. Non-existentialism draws its appeal in large part from the veneer of uncompromising rigour in its insistence that Parmenides permits us a choice only between these two alternatives: (it) is or (it) is not. *Ex hypothesi*, Doxastic things could not be identified as what-is or classified under its rubric as things-that-are. There is hardly a better prospect, however, for identifying them as what-is-not or classifying them as so many things-that-are-not. What-is-not cannot be described, pointed out or thought about (B2.7–8; B8.7–9). This is patently false of Doxastic things. In fact, the goddess asserts that the way of what-is-not cannot be inquired into (παναπευθέα, B2.6), but she enjoins the *kouros* to inquire into Doxastic things (πυθέσθαι, B1.28[b]; πεύσῃ, B10.4). For non-existentialists, therefore, Doxastic things prove unclassifiable within what they take to be an exhaustive framework. Indeed, this is why non-existentialists fall back on the incoherent measure of describing Doxastic things as 'illusions' (a term which lacks even a remote parallel in the text).

Non-existentialism does not merely impute to Parmenides an unbelievable thesis, but also imports into his text an *internal* incoherence and inconsistency. By writing that mortals name things, and by developing a theory of, say, embryology, Parmenides commits himself, minimally, to the recognition that it is possible that it should appear as if mortals name things and such theories are developed. But this possibility is directly inconsistent with non-existentialism, unless the unchanging what-is is what gives those names, develops such theories and registers the appearances that doing so is possible.[176] If Parmenides was a non-existentialist, then he was also an extraordinarily confused and inconsistent thinker.

This is not to say, however, that clear explanations of *how* Parmenides could reconcile the view that Doxastic things exist – 'existentialism' – with the ontology of what-is are easily forthcoming. One way of salvaging existentialism would be to maintain that *Alêtheia* and *Doxa* describe two separate worlds, where the

[176] Sedley (1999*a*) 125 (cf. also Nietzsche (1974) 132–3) questions how what-is could 'find room to misconceive itself', but does not pursue this insight to spell out the interpretative nightmares attendant on unvarnished non-existentialism.

goddess's ontological strictures concerning the former do not exclude the existence of Doxastic things in the latter.[177] But the fragments offer no textual support for such a two-world model.[178] More damningly, if certain *a priori* logical and semantic considerations deductively led us to accept the existence only of what-is and, *ex hypothesi*, to exclude the existence of Doxastic things in the first world, then why should those same considerations not force us to the same conclusion concerning the population of the second (third, fourth . . .) world?[179]

According to a different existentialist model, what-is and Doxastic things are consubstantial. This model sees Parmenides as a material monist. Parmenides takes what-is to be the single underlying substance of which all things in the changeable cosmos consist, much as (on one interpretation) Anaximenes posits that all things are made of air. Light and Night, in turn, are 'forms' or 'phase-states' of what-is.[180]

One difficulty with this view is that differences between different items and qualities in the world would have to be causally

[177] E.g. Nehamas (2002) 62–3; cf. Clark (1969) 27.

[178] Cf. de Rijk (1983) 30, 52; Palmer (2009) 183.

[179] In the absence of a two-world solution, though, the spatially extended nature of what-is as a uniformly extended, uninterrupted, immobile and delimited entity (B8.22–31, 42–9) throws up yet another puzzle: how can the same world accommodate, not only logically but also *spatially*, both the uninterrupted what-is and Doxastic things? In fact, the same puzzle emerges concerning the apparent colocation of certain privileged entities with all other things with regard to Xenophanes' god (possibly), Anaxagoras' Mind (n.b. DK59 B14: 'most assuredly even now it is where also all the rest is') and Empedocles' Love and Strife. One response is to consider the problem items incorporeal, Curd (2010); (2013*b*). Parmenides' spatial descriptions of what-is have often been interpreted metaphorically, although there is no obvious warrant for doing so (e.g. Owen (1960) 95–9; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 124, xxxv–xxxvii; contrast Schofield (1970) 131–4; Sedley (1999*a*) 117–22). Alternatively, Betegh (2016) 415–20 interestingly suggests that it was the privileged and divine status of the special entities which led Xenophanes, Empedocles and Anaxagoras to acquiesce in positing their colocation with all other things without attempting to discover or determine the underlying physical mechanisms, and compares similar phenomena in ancient Greek religious attitudes to the physical relationship between gods and things. What-is is unquestionably a special and privileged sort of entity, and a good case can be made that it enjoys divine status, albeit in a pointedly non-traditional and refined sense; see Ch. 5.5.2 and Ch. 6.1. Conversely, Palmer (2009) 180–8 equips Parmenides with sophisticated explications of the physical mechanisms underpinning the spatial relation between what-is and other things, but his solutions are not always clear; for criticisms, see Wedin (2014) 243–5; Sisko and Weiss (2015) 47–8.

[180] Sisko and Weiss (2015). Whatever its drawbacks, this model does have the advantage of dispelling altogether any puzzle about spatial colocation.

traceable to differences in how they relate to what-is, understood as the one and only substance which underlies all things. By comparison, this is why Anaximenes posits the processes of rarefaction and condensation, which explicate how the single underlying substance, air, issues in a plurality of different items like clouds (from more rarefied air) and rocks (from more condensed air). But no comparable account is possible in Parmenides' case. The unchanging what-is does not undergo qualitative modulations (such as rarefaction and condensation) and Parmenides emphasises its thoroughgoing homogeneity and even distribution: 'nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is it any more there . . . nor any less' (B8.22–5), and again: 'for it is not right for it to be any greater nor any smaller here or there . . . nor is what-is such that there would be of what-is more here and less there' (B8.44^{b}-8). But if what-is is the single underlying material of all things, and if, for example, a certain stretch of Night is denser and heavier than an equivalent stretch of Light (B8.59), then will we not have to say that the Night stretch has a higher concentration of what-is than the Light stretch? In general, it is difficult to see how the heterogeneity of different items and processes in the world could be explicable even in principle if the single underlying substance of which they all consist is evenly distributed in a completely uniform and unchanging way and can undergo no qualitative changes.[181]

Another problem with this view stems from Parmenides' assertion that what-is abides without motion in the same place (B8.26–31, 38, 41). There is no conceptual difficulty with the thought that the ultimate substance of which a human or a flying arrow consist is ungenerated and imperishable even though the human and flying arrow are not. We need only think of Democritean atoms. But we could not say in the same vein that

[181] A similar objection applies to the non-existentialist hypothesis in Mourelatos (2008*a*) xliv–xlviii and (2011) 184–9 that the relation between *Alêtheia* and *Doxa* is akin to the relation between Sellars' Scientific Image (SCI) and Manifest Image (MI), where the theoretical objects of SCI exist and the observational ones of MI do not. It is clear how the constituents and processes in SCI (e.g. atoms) could causally underlie and, indeed, explain the (only apparent) constituents and processes of MI (e.g. humans). But it is not clear how what-is could be related to Doxastic things in a comparable way. Cosgrove (2014) 15 objects similarly.

the fundamental material of which they are composed always stays put even though the human being and flying arrow do not.[182]

Parmenides' remarks concerning the indivisibility, homogeneity and even distribution of what-is seem to warn precisely against thinking of what-is as consubstantial with the rest of the cosmos' population. After all, this would subject it to the internal differentiations which characterise this population. The same concern recurs in B4:

> οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι 1
> οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντῃ πάντως κατὰ κόσμον
> οὔτε συνιστάμενον. 3
>
> *For you will not cut off what-is from holding fast to what-is*,
> *Neither dispersing everywhere every way in a world-order*
> *Nor drawing together.*[183]

Parmenides, then, distances himself from the idea that what-is and Doxastic things are consubstantial. He precisely discourages us from construing what-is as a cosmogonic or cosmological starting point in the Ionian vein. Overall, Parmenides displays a complex attitude towards the Ionian project, at once critical and appropriative. On the one hand, Light and Night are Ionian-style cosmological principles, to which all the phenomena of change and differentiation are traced and reduced in an explanatory account. On the other hand, Parmenides denies that what we find in those cosmological principles is the ultimate and fundamental reality. Indeed, mistaking them for the ultimate reality is a central facet of the mortals' error (Chapter 4.4–5).

[182] Sisko and Weiss (2015) 55 with n.35 are aware of the latter difficulty. They solve it by maintaining that the property of immobility applies to the totality of what-is (it does not egress its bounds) and positing that Parmenides' physics involved what they call 'antiperistasis', i.e. motions of cyclical replacement within a voidless plenum, and so allowed relative changes of location within the spatial limits of what-is. It is not clear precisely what sort of internal motions Sisko and Weiss have in mind or how they are meant to ground the complex and heterogeneous motions involved in Parmenides' cosmogony and cosmology. At any rate, what-is is not only a voidless plenum but also an entirely homogeneous and evenly distributed one, with no distinctions or divergences between different areas or parts. A plurality of different motions within it would mark off the differently moving areas from one another. A simple rotation of the sphere on its axis would not raise this problem but could certainly not exhaust all the intracosmic motions of Parmenides' cosmology.

[183] On this point, cf. Palmer (2009) 184–5; for *kosmos* as 'world order', see Palmer (2009) 184, n.65 (comparing Herac. DK22 B30).

A more metaphysical version of the idea that what-is and Doxastic things are consubstantial takes what-is to be a steady and unchanging substance in all things or the true essential nature of each and every thing (but not thereby their *material* substrate).[184] But the problem of immobility recurs. It is not easy to see what it might mean to say that the essential nature or substance of the arrow abides without motion in the same place even as that same arrow itself flies. This model thus ultimately encourages us to think of what-is as a property (beingness[185]) rather than as an entity. But it is at least doubtful that we can square such a deflationary construal of what-is with the deductions and specifications in B8 of the different properties which it bears (homogeneity, indivisibility, boundedness, sphericity). It is worth stressing that all these problems with the various attempts to make what-is and Doxastic things *consubstantial* do not undermine the idea that they are *compresent*. As far as these problems go, we can still think of the same spherical plenum which is the world as inhabited at one and the same time both by what-is and by the many different things. Insofar as what-is is concerned, the world is entirely homogeneous: what-is is the same everywhere without any internal articulation. The same space occupied by this human and this tree – and, indeed, by all other such discrete items – is also occupied by an uninterrupted and continuous stretch of being. Nothing 'happens' to this plenum of being when this human moves from here to there. We ran up against our conceptual problems (and against B4 and B8) only once we tried to think of the unchanging, continuous and homogeneous what-is as itself constituting the being *of* this tree, or the being *of* this human, either as their material substrate or as their abiding essence or nature.[186]

The most radical existentialist proposal is that we should think of Doxastic things *themselves* (humans, trees, etc.) as so many beings or 'things-that-are'.[187] The difficulty here is more direct. If Doxastic things are things-that-are (in the loaded sense of *Alêtheia*), then they must have the properties of what-is as

[184] De Rijk (1983). [185] As de Rijk (1983) himself puts it.
[186] The compresence of what-is with Doxastic things does, however, involve the phenomenon of 'colocation'; see n.179 above.
[187] E.g. Thanassas (2011) 291–4; Pulpito (2011) 203–6.

explicated in B8. But it is essential to humans *qua* humans (or pebbles *qua* pebbles, etc.) that they are generated, perishable, mobile and not homogeneous. If the idea is that it is not *qua* human that some particular thing is, but *qua* entity, then we are no longer talking about the same thing or about the being or existence *of* humans. How can we say that a particular human (or tree, etc.) never came to be and does not move, insofar as it – i.e. that same, particular human – is an entity?

The final existentialist model I will consider, before proceeding to my own suggestions, is the hypothesis developed by John Palmer (2009) that Parmenides' metaphysics is founded on the modal demarcation of necessary and contingent being. Palmer highlights the modal clauses in Parmenides' initial articulation of *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* in B2: 'that [it] is and that [it] cannot not be . . . that [it] is not and that [it] must not be'. If B8 refers, not simply to that which is, but, more restrictedly, to what-is-*and-must-be*, then its rejection of generation, perishing, change and mobility *with regard to necessary being* need not extend also to contingent things, like mortals and trees, which are (what they are), but not necessarily. The ontology of what-is, which always signifies what-is-*and-must-be*, is thus compatible with the (contingent, non-necessary) existence of Doxastic things.[188] Palmer ingeniously and painstakingly reconstructs a coherent and attractive philosophical position. The difficulties with it are textual.

Palmer observes that nothing whatsoever suggests that the significance of the modal clauses (B2.3^{b}, B2.5^{b}) is already somehow present in the assertoric clauses (B2.3^{a}, B2.5^{a}).[189] It is thus all the more noteworthy, however, that Parmenides himself omits the modal clauses, and retains only the assertoric ones, when he reprises *Alêtheia*'s *krisis* as that between '[it] is' and '[it] is not' (ἡ δὲ κρίσις . . . ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, B8.15–16), and describes the first way as the way 'that [it] is' (μῦθος ὁδοῖο . . . ὡς ἔστιν, B8.1–2). Indeed, throughout B8, Parmenides repeatedly refers to 'what-is' (*to eon*, B8.19, 32, 35, 37; cf. 25, 47–8), but nowhere speaks in modal terms of 'what-must-be'. The modal clauses in B2 do

[188] Palmer (2009) 45–188. Palmer too continues (with Parmenides) to refer to 'What Is'.
[189] Palmer (2009) 83.

indeed indicate that what-is has the modal property that it must be. What is difficult to square with our text is the stronger claim that this modal property means that the subject of the deductions in B8 is, not that which is (which has this modal property), but, *more restrictedly*, what-is-and-must-be. On Palmer's reading, it is in fact false to state that what-is is ungenerated, indivisible, etc., unless we mentally supply the qualification, which Parmenides himself consistently and misleadingly fails to highlight: 'what-is-*and-must-be*'. If the modal fact, that what-is must be, plays this crucial logical role, then the complete disappearance of the modal clauses from Parmenides' extended deductions of the attributes of 'what-is' in B8 becomes mystifying. Parmenides' persistent, unqualified talk of 'what-is' suggests rather that this modal property of what-is, that it must be, does not license us to speak of the subject of the deductions in B8 in terms of the *restricting* conjunction 'what-is-and-must-be'. The attributes belong, not restrictedly to what-is-and-must-be, nor restrictedly to what-is-and-is-unchanging, but to what-is, which must be, and is unchanging, and is ungenerated, etc. If this is right, however, then the modal fact, that what-is must be, has no bearing on whether the existence of what-is is logically compatible with the existence of Doxastic things. This brings us back to square one of the ontological question.

At this point, we should take a step back and reassess the adequacy of starting from or focusing on the category of 'existence' in the first place. Parmenides himself speaks in terms of 'being' (*einai, to eon*) and 'reality' (*alêtheiê, alêthês*). Interpreters of Parmenides once attempted to establish stark demarcations between existential, predicative and veridical uses of the verb 'to be' and to determine which sense was operative in Parmenides' arguments. As a growing scholarly consensus recognises, however, we cannot plausibly impose such stark demarcations on our text and all three senses are involved (often inextricably) in Parmenides' use of the verb.[190] There is, furthermore, a syntactic

[190] See esp. Brown (1986) 54–7, 69 and *passim*; (1994) 216–20; cf. Kahn (2002) 85–90 (and, already, Kahn (1969) 712; (1973) 401–2); de Rijk (1983) 50; Long (1996) 144; Sedley (1999*a*) 115; Miller (2006) 42, n.63, 44–5; Robbiano (2006) 80. To take one example, the claim that what-is-not cannot be indicated or thought about suggests a confluence of senses of the verb 'to be'. We can indicate and think about something

and semantic divergence between the English verb 'exist' and the Greek 'is' (*esti*). Whereas the former is always complete, the latter can at least in principle receive a complement (is *such-and-such*).[191] Corresponding to this divergence is a logical and conceptual one. Whereas existence is 'all-or-nothing' and does not admit of degrees, the notion of being (such and such) allows, at least in principle, of being more or less, unqualifiedly or qualifiedly, properly or somehow catachrestically.[192]

Parmenides employs the terms *alêtheiê* and *alêthês* to indicate reality and what is real or genuine. What-is, as the subject matter of *Alêtheia* (recall especially B1.29; B8.50–1), is thus aligned with reality.[193] By contrast, then, Doxastic things (the subject matter of *Doxa*) fall outside and fall short of the rubric of reality and what is real. One could leap from this point to non-existentialism and say that, in dissociating Doxastic things from reality, *Alêtheia* categorically identifies what-is as the only item in the world. We saw, however, that insurmountable objections face this position. *Alêtheia* may rather suggest the more inclusive and philosophically viable view, not that only what-is exists, but that it is only of what-is that we can use the term 'being' in a strict and uncompromising application of the verb. Only what-is really, unqualifiedly and properly speaking *is* (and is, therefore, ungenerated, imperishable, etc.). On this line of thought, what-is is, properly speaking, the only truly *real* entity. Since Doxastic things cannot be said to involve only 'is' to the complete exclusion of 'is not' (nor, of course, only 'is not' to the exclusion of 'is'), one could only say

which does not exist, or is false or is not something-or-other. Parmenides seems to have in mind rather what is quite simply nothing (cf. μηδέν, B6.2). One could still conceivably privilege the predicative sense and construe what-is-not – or 'nothing' – as what has no properties, i.e. what is not anything at all. But this construal has immediate existential and veridical implications, which Parmenides himself does not demarcate as such from the predicative issue: such a thing could not exist, and nothing could be true of it.

[191] In a classic paper, Brown (1994) argues that the absence of a sharp distinction between complete (existential, non-predicative) and incomplete (predicative, non-existential) senses of *esti* is a quite general feature of ancient Greek, which is duly reflected in the philosophies of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle; see also Brown (1986). Leigh (2008) questions the universality of this thesis in relation to the distinctive case of some of the arguments in Plato's *Sophist*.

[192] On this conceptual issue, see further Vlastos (1973) 65 and *passim*; Kahn (2002) 88.

[193] See further the introduction to the chapters on Parmenides.

that they *are* by using the verb in a qualified, imperfect and imprecise or catachrestic way. It is for this reason that Doxastic things cannot be considered *real* or *genuine* entities. But, however qualifiedly, imperfectly, mutably and contingently, they still are (what they are) and, therefore, they are still there to be experienced, spoken of and understood. They are not, then, implied to be non-existent.[194]

An urgent requirement for this interpretation is to explicate clearly what this statement amounts to, that only what-is really is, whereas Doxastic things fall short of being real entities. Parmenides' deductions of the predicates of what-is do give us much to work with here. What-is did not come to be and will not perish or change, it is homogeneous and indivisible and it does not locomote. These predicates all reflect different respects in which what-is involves strictly 'is' and in no way 'is not': there is no time in which it was not or will not be (what it is), and there are no places or areas in which it is not, or in which it is to some lesser degree. By contrast, a Doxastic thing like a human or a pebble is (what it is) now but not earlier or later, and here but not there (B8.36^{b}-41). Furthermore, what-is possesses all of its properties in a perfect and absolute way (it is entirely and superlatively homogeneous, etc.). Indeed, what-is is only ascribed properties which *can* be possessed in this way. The characterisation of Light and Night is pertinently different. For example, Night is heavy and dense while Light, for its part, also possesses some measure – a smaller measure – of weight and density: it is rare and light-weight (B8.56–9). Quite generally, the characterisation of Light and Night in relation to one another as enantiomorphic opposites involves them essentially with 'is not' as well as 'is': Light *is* hot, light-weight and rarefied and *is not* cold, dark, heavy and dense, while

[194] The approach sketched here and elaborated below has affinities with that for which Johansen (2016) argues from another direction. Johansen suggests that the partial extent to which the cosmos meets Parmenides' criteria of intelligibility (i.e. the 'signs' (B8.2) set out in *Alêtheia*) is also the extent to which it *is*. The cosmos thus enjoys a degree of being, corresponding to the extent to which it satisfies these criteria of intelligibility and, therefore, to which it is like the being (what-is) which satisfies them entirely. At some junctures, Palmer (2009) also indicates that Parmenides associates what-is with reality as a mode of being of which contingent things fall short; thus, 'only What Is *only* or *really* is' (165, 179).

the opposite is the case for Night (see further Chapter 4.3). But Night is not *perfectly* or *absolutely* heavy. Indeed, it is unclear that anything could be. Conversely, what-is possesses all of its attributes (homogeneity, indivisibility, etc.) in a perfect and absolute manner.

In sum, Doxastic things are involved with 'is not' as well as with 'is' (εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί, B8.40) in a number of ways. They are now but not later or earlier, and they are here but not there. They possess properties mutably and not perfectly or absolutely (they admit of being (such-and-such) more or less). They comprise two opposite elements each of which essentially is what the other is not. It is for these reasons and in these respects, then, that Doxastic things fall short of being real entities. It is for these reasons that the verb 'to be' could not be used of them in the strict and uncompromising manner which is on display in *Alêtheia* and in which it is used of what-is. Rather, such things are but also are not, and, as such, they could only be said to be in what would amount to a compromising and imprecise use of the term. Correspondingly, it is the nature of the properties of what-is, and the manner in which it possesses those properties, which render it the only truly real entity and the only thing which could truly and strictly speaking be said to be, since it alone does not involve 'is not' in any way. 'Reality', for Parmenides, comprises that which instantiates a mode of being which excludes 'is not' categorically.

It is worth noting that the poem indeed confronts us with both technical uses of the verb 'to be', which restrict it to what-is, and looser uses, which deploy the verb more broadly also of Doxastic things and processes. For example, the goddess's introduction of the way 'that [it] is' (ἔστιν, B2.3) instantiates the technical use (cf. e.g. B8.15–16). But contrast her statement that humans are in a state of having erred (εἰσίν, B8.54) or that, within the human constitution, the full is thought (ἐστί, B16.4).[195] Such statements reflect the broader and looser use of the verb, on which humans can be said to be (now, here, in a state of having erred, etc.), even though their involvement with 'is not' means that the verb could

[195] For the broader usage, cf. also B1.11, 27; B6.9; B9.3; B16.3; B19. De Rijk (1983) 49 draws a distinction between technical and non-technical uses of εἶναι in Parmenides and attempts to classify every occurrence of the verb accordingly.

not be used of them in the strict and uncompromising way in which it is used of what-is.

The goddess concludes the proem with the difficult assertion that the mortal shall learn 'how for the things that seem and are accepted (*ta dokounta*) it was [or: would have been] right to be acceptably (*dokimôs*), all of them traversing across everything' (B1.31–2). In our analysis of these lines at the end of Chapter 4.4, we identified two possible interpretations. On the first ('absolute') interpretation, the phrase 'to be acceptably' or 'properly' signals true, genuine being, alluding to the uncompromising attitude towards the verb 'to be' in *Alêtheia* and to the status of what-is as a real entity. On the second ('intrasystematic') interpretation, 'to be acceptably (*dokimôs*)' indicates, not the pure mode of being instantiated by what-is, but a distinct and inferior mode of being which is typical of Doxastic things and elements (*ta dokounta*) and which is reflected in part in their mutability and constant motions ('all of them traversing across everything'). In fact, on either interpretation Parmenides could be taken to convey here the notion that Doxastic things possess their own mode of being which falls short of the mode of being instantiated by what-is. On the intrasystematic interpretation, Parmenides would be making this point directly and explicitly. On the absolute interpretation, the idea would be more implicit. Still, the insistence that only what-is *properly* or *genuinely* is can be seen to create room for the possession by Doxastic things of something else, which falls short of such *genuine* being (*dokimôs einai*). On either reading, the creation of ontological room for Doxastic things would indeed answer an urgent need for Parmenides, insofar as Doxastic things could not be reduced simply to what-is-not. On the other hand, such ontological space notwithstanding, it is still what-is alone which is identified with what Parmenides calls 'reality', insofar as it alone strictly is, in line with the uncompromising application of the verb 'to be' in *Alêtheia*, which excludes any involvement with 'is not'. It would be question-begging to reason that Doxastic things cannot have a qualified and imperfect kind of being because *Alêtheia* rejects the notion of qualified and imperfect being with regard to what-is.[196] That Doxastic things can

[196] See e.g. Long (1975) 95; Robinson (1975) 631.

and what-is cannot be so qualified could be a central facet of their dissimilarity.

The goddess's remarks on mortal naming in B8.36^{b}-41 offer a helpful test-case for the evaluation of the ontological question (for the text and translation, see Chapter 4.4). One might conclude that only what-is exists from the statement that 'nothing else either is or will be except what-is' and the following inference that mortal names, like 'coming-to-be-and-perishing' and 'both-being-and-not-being', in fact have what-is as their true referent. But this reading would starkly exemplify the internal, textual and philosophical incoherence of non-existentialism. If only what-is exists, then mortals do not exist and, *a fortiori*, cannot name anything. Alternatively, however, this progression could underscore that only what is *strictly* or *really* is, in line with the uncompromising or technical application of the verb 'to be' in *Alêtheia*. The goddess emphasises in this connection that the mortals take their names to be true reflections of reality (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, B8.39). Mortal naming purports to capture reality truly (Chapter 4.4). The whole and unchanging what-is is the only genuinely real entity and, as such, coincides with reality. On a *de re* rather than *de dicto* level of analysis, therefore, what-is is in fact the only possible referent for mortal names.

When the goddess reprises the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not' in B8, she specifies that this is the appropriate discrimination 'concerning *these* matters' (περὶ τούτων, B8.15). When she completes her deductions of the properties of what-is, she notes that she has now concluded her account 'about reality' (ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης, B8.51). Parmenides thinks of *Alêtheia* as one, privileged domain of inquiry, which treats of a certain, privileged subject matter – 'what-is' or 'reality'. In his cosmology, Parmenides recognises a different domain of inquiry, which treats of a different subject matter – Doxastic things, which are but also are not. It is the most plausible response to the ontological question, I suggest, that Parmenides does – as he must – allow room in his ontology also for these mutable and heterogeneous items, even though their involvement with 'is not' means that they, unlike what-is, are denied the status of 'real' entities.

What, finally, of the goddess's description of what-is as 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality' (B1.29)? There is little prospect for interpreting the words 'of reality' as a possessive

genitive. Well-rounded reality is itself, for Parmenides, identical with the indivisible what-is (recall B8.50–1), which does not have a heart as opposed to other parts. Far more likely, this is the so-called genitive of material or contents, as in the Homeric expression 'barrier of teeth' (ἕρκος ὀδόντων, *Il.* 4.350), where the barrier comprises the teeth.[197] The unshaken heart itself comprises the well-rounded reality. Does this characterisation of reality as a steady heart help towards our evaluation of the ontological question? In a different context, this expression could have naturally represented what-is as a cosmological agent, which animates and acts on all other things. Nothing else in the fragments, however, remotely suggests such a conception of what-is. Indeed, we saw that Parmenides pointedly resists treating what-is as an Ionian-style cosmological principle. Most likely, the characterisation of what-is as a stable heart primarily serves to reflect its *own* vitality and (perhaps) intelligence (see Chapter 5.5.2). Nonetheless, although what-is is not a causally efficient cosmological agent, its characterisation as an unshaken heart (B1.29) still aptly reflects its status as the core and ultimate reality in the world, which abides stably even as it is concealed from human understanding by the many and heterogeneous things which constantly traverse this same world in every direction (B1.31–2).

Far from being a novel interpretation, the basic thrust of my proposals can be found among some of Parmenides' ancient readers, who discuss his notion of what-is in terms of the Platonic concept of 'what really (or: truly) is' (*to ontôs on*). So, for example, Plutarch rejects Colotes' contention that Parmenides simply did away with such things as fire, water, rocks and, indeed, all the cities of Europe and Asia. Rather, Plutarch explains, Parmenides reserved the term 'being' to what really is since it alone abides in being. Correspondingly, he judged that the other things, which now are and now are not, require a designation other than 'being'.[198] Plutarch is admittedly construing Parmenides here in terms of his own, later conceptual framework, although he scarcely differs in this respect

[197] See further Smyth (1972) noo.1323–4.

[198] Plut. *Mor.* 1114d-e (esp. e6–10; d5–7) = Coxon (2009) Testim. 113; similarly, Simp. *in Cael.* 7.557.20–558.17 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 203; cf. also Philop. *in Ph.* 21.30–22.15 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 193.

from Parmenides' modern interpreters. At any rate, we would be rash to dismiss Plutarch's remarks as uninsightful on those grounds.

In a passage famous for its Parmenidean echoes, Plato will expressly represent the objects of belief as things which both are and are not and, therefore, as ontological intermediates: 'in between . . . what purely is and what altogether is not' (μεταξύ . . . τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάντως μὴ ὄντος, *Rep*. 5.478d5–7). There is no question of reading Plato back into Parmenides. Rather, by observing what was conceptually possible for Plato, we can lend further, extrinsic support to what I suggested above (without appealing to this echo) is on balance the most viable approach to the earlier and more obscure text of Parmenides. The later concepts of 'what purely is' (*to eilikrinôs on*) and 'what really is' (*to ontôs on*), I suggest, reflect an ontological attitude which is already at work more embryonically in Parmenides himself. Indeed, Parmenides too modifies the verb 'to be' with an adverb – 'to be acceptably' (*dokimôs einai*, B1.32) – either in reference to the *genuine* being of what-is or to a distinct mode of being possessed by Doxastic things.

Nowadays, one runs the risk of being diagnosed with 'Platonitis' by offering an interpretation of Parmenides which is deemed excessively close to later Platonic attitudes.[199] Nonetheless, I conclude that there is a significant affinity between Parmenides and the later tradition of Platonic philosophy, over which he has clearly exerted a profound influence. There is much interpretative insight and potential in the basic interpretation of the ontological question which Plutarch adopts in his response to Colotes.

This is not to claim, however, that Parmenides articulated or systematised his attitude to the ontological question in terms which were any more explicit or direct than the evidence which we considered in this section. Parmenides stands at the very beginning of a long philosophical tradition, which will later issue in clearer and systematic classificatory demarcations between what purely or really is, what altogether is not, and the

[199] Cordero (2011*b*) 100. My interpretation, though, does not involve thinking of *Doxa* as a realm of mere appearances, which is the main symptom Cordero has in mind.

ontological intermediates, the objects of perceptual experience, which both are and are not. With the benefit of historical hindsight, these clear and worked-out articulations are familiar to us in a way that they could not have been to Parmenides himself.[200] As I noted at the outset, I put forward in this section what I take to be the philosophical and interpretative elaboration which is, on balance, most faithful to the obscure text of Parmenides and to the direction in which his thought tends. Parmenides himself does not recognise a special need to explicate how those things (stars, mortals, etc.), whose properties diverge from the properties of what-is, are manifestly available for experience, discussion, belief and explanation. If nothing else, however, his poem points towards at least one viable ontological avenue for meeting this need coherently.

Simplicius offers a sobering insight: 'when he said that what-is is one, Parmenides was perfectly aware that he himself was born and had two feet'.[201] Much like Plutarch, Simplicius is arguing that Parmenides did not reject generation and perishing categorically, but with respect to 'what really is' (ἐπ' ἐκείνου, 7.559.14–27). I suggested in this section that there is much to be said for this conception of Parmenides' ontology (nor should we reject this conception simply on the grounds that Plutarch and Simplicius themselves may well have been attracted to it by the impulse to see Parmenides in a Platonic light). Nonetheless, the textual, epistemological and theological interpretations of Parmenides which were developed over the last two chapters do not *require* this conception. Insofar as those interpretations are concerned, we need only agree with Simplicius that Parmenides clearly recognises that, in some sense, Doxastic things are there to be experienced by mortals and to occasion views in them. He clearly recognises that, in some sense, those mortals, and he himself, are there to form correct and incorrect views about multiple and heterogeneous things (such as they themselves and the number of their feet) and about reality.

[200] Cosgrove (2014) 10 remarks similarly on Parmenides' relation to the later Platonic tradition, although he does not ascribe to Parmenides the attitude to the ontological question which I suggest here.

[201] *In Cael*. 7.559.27–560.1 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 203.

5.5.2 *Being, Intelligence and Intelligibility in Alêtheia*

A number of notoriously difficult verses in *Alêtheia* address the relation of cognition or understanding (*noein*) to what-is (B3; B6.1–2[a]; B8.34–6[a]; cf. B8.7–9).[202] The syntax of these verses is ineradicably ambiguous, and their translation is highly uncertain. As such, they are best considered in the light of already established readings, rather than adopted as interpretative starting points.[203]

B3 reads:

> τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.

This fragment has been analysed both as B3$^{(i)}$, 'for it is the same thing to understand and to be', and as B3$^{(ii)}$, 'for the same thing is (there) for understanding and for being'.[204] B3$^{(i)}$ asserts the identity of what-is and understanding or cognition. B3$^{(ii)}$ indicates more weakly that what-is is somehow especially an object of understanding. This dilemma could not be reasonably determined on the basis of the words of B3 alone.

B6.1–2[a] reads:

> χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
> μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

Syntactically, perhaps the most sober and straightforward translation is: 'It is necessary[205] to say and understand that what-is is; for it is to be, but nothing is not.'[206] It is syntactically conceivable, however, to take ἐόν as a predicate and ἔμμεναι as the copula, and translate: 'It is necessary that speaking and cognising be real-and-true (ἐὸν ἔμμεναι).' On this construal, B6.1–2[a] *could* also, like B3$^{(i)}$, identify being and understanding (and speaking).[207]

[202] For the point that *noein* and its cognates indicate, not merely thought without a belief component, but, minimally, an attempt to cognise or apprehend a situation, object or person, see Ch. 3.4, Ch. 4.3. These particular verses invite the translation 'understanding' inasmuch as they use *noein* as a success term in relation to the successful cognition of what-is (as discussed below).

[203] Cf. Mourelatos (2008*a*) xv.

[204] B3$^{(i)}$: Long (1996) 132–8; Sedley (1999*a*) 120; Robbiano (2006) 57–8. B3$^{(ii)}$: Coxon (2003); Palmer (2009) 118–22; Wedin (2014) 202–29.

[205] χρή, signifying 'normative necessity'.

[206] Alternatively, '. . . nothing [it] is not', Palmer (2009) 113–14.

[207] See Kahn (1988) 260–1 (cf. Kahn (2002) 86, n.13). Kahn lists several possible construals of B6.1, and convincingly argues that the translation 'what can be spoken and thought must be' is not remotely plausible.

B8.34 reads:

> ταὐτὸν δ' ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα.

We may distinguish three possible construals:

B8.34$^{(i)}$: *understanding and the understanding that* [it] *is are one and the same*

B8.34$^{(ii)a}$: *understanding and that because of which there is understanding* [sc. what-is] *are the same thing*

B8.34$^{(ii)b}$: *the same thing is both for understanding and that because of which there is understanding*.

One key question here is how to interpret οὕνεκεν. If we translate οὕνεκεν as 'that'[208], then we get B8.34$^{(i)}$.[209] If, however, οὕνεκεν means 'because of which',[210] then we have two options. We *could* read B8.34$^{(ii)a}$, which identifies understanding and being.[211] But the translation 'because of which' does not necessarily imply that identification. Alternatively, we can construe νοεῖν as a dativel infinitive (a construal which is also plausible for νοεῖν in B3 – as in B3$^{(ii)}$ – and for νοῆσαι in B2.2), meaning 'for understanding'. This would yield B8.34$^{(ii)b}$.[212]

The immediately following words (B8.35–6^{a}) are no less difficult and uncertain:

> οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ πεφατισμένον ἐστιν,
> εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν.

We can again distinguish alternative possible translations:

[208] Cf. e.g. *Od*. 5.216. [209] Cornford (1939) 34; Robinson (1975) 630.

[210] E.g. *Il*. 9.505; cf. B8.13, 32.

[211] Phillips (1955) 552–3; Long (1996) 136; Sedley (1999*a*) 120; Crystal (2002) 217.

[212] Palmer (2009) 164; cf. KRS (1983) 252; Wedin (2014) 211. The goddess states in B2.2 that the ways 'that [it] is' and 'that [it] is not' are the only two ways of inquiry available for understanding (νοῆσαι). Taking this statement to mean that these are the only *conceivable* sorts of inquiry (e.g. by rendering νοῆσαι more weakly as 'for thinking' or 'to be thought of') would introduce a glaring inconsistency with the later emergence of the cosmology. However else one interprets its status, the cosmology is certainly not inconceivable, nor is it identical with either of the two ways introduced in B2.2. Palmer (2009) 63–73 plausibly argues that νοῆσαι is used here in a strong sense, and that it indicates the sort of understanding which facilitates and is achieved in a comprehension of reality, i.e. (once the second way is eliminated in lines 6–8) of what-is. Alternatively, Wedin (2014) 65, n.95 suggests that the later emergence of the cosmology does not contravene the statement made in B2.2, because the cosmology proceeds by the *combination* of the two ways of inquiry first identified there.

B8.35–6$^{a(i)}$: *for not without what-is, depending upon which* [sc. what-is]*, it* [sc. understanding] *has been expressed, will you find understanding*

B8.35–6$^{a(ii)}$: *for not without what-is, in what has been expressed* [sc. the preceding arguments]*, will you find understanding*

B8.35–6$^{a(iii)}$: *for not without what-is, in that in which it* [sc. understanding] *has been expressed, will you find understanding*.

What is the subject of the verb 'has been expressed' (πεφατισμένον ἐστιν) and what is the antecedent of 'in which' or 'upon which' (ἐν ᾧ)? An obvious candidate for the subject of 'has been expressed' is 'understanding' (τὸ νοεῖν) at the end of the sentence. Taken by itself, moreover, the word-order most naturally suggests that what-is is the antecedent of 'in which' (τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧ). But it is difficult to make sense of the notion that understanding has been expressed *in* what-is. One possibility, then, is to interpret the clause as signifying a relation of dependence rather than location: 'depending upon which'. This gives us B8.35–6$^{a(i)}$.[213] Alternatively, we may question whether what-is must, after all, be the antecedent, and take the 'in which' clause to be making an implicit reference to the preceding verses and arguments as its antecedent. In this case, the subject of 'has been expressed' could be impersonal: literally, 'in that in which it has been expressed'. This gives us B8.35–6$^{a(ii)}$.[214] Or else, we can combine this interpretation of the antecedent with the assumption that 'understanding' is the subject of the clause. This yields B8.35–6$^{a(iii)}$.[215]

Where do these considerations leave us? No syntactical construal of these verses could be remotely compelling or definitive. On some syntactically viable (although hardly obvious) readings, they assert the identity of what-is and understanding or cognition (B3$^{(i)}$; B8.34$^{(ii)a}$). They do minimally, however, express some sort of close connection between what-is and understanding. Minimally, these statements seem to converge on the notions that what-is (and, perhaps, the proposition '[it] is') is somehow

[213] Palmer (2009) 164, n.39 (offering parallels for this sense of ἐν with the dative).
[214] Sedley (1999*a*) 120. [215] Robbiano (2006) 169–70.

especially an object of understanding (B3$^{(ii)}$) and, perhaps, somehow a necessary condition for understanding (B8.35-6$^{a(i)}$). Understanding is either occasioned by what-is (B8.34$^{(ii)a\text{-}b}$), or else it *means* cognition of what-is (B8.34$^{(i)}$).

We must, however, qualify and nuance even this minimal impression by recognising a textual fact. However we read these verses, it is simply not the case that Parmenides invariably uses his cognate terminology for mind and understanding (*noos, noein*) as success words, where success means cognition or knowledge of what-is. In *Alêtheia*, the goddess explains that the mortals *fail* to cognise what-is, and that helplessness guides their wandering mind (πλάζονται . . . πλαγκτὸν νόον, B6.5–6). Again, her analysis of the human mind in *Doxa* allows it wandering cognition, but not cognition of what-is (πολυπλάγκτων . . . νόος . . . φρονέει . . . νόημα, B16). One's mind (*noos*) *can* fail to grasp what-is and, as we have seen throughout Chapter 4, can grasp and even know (B10) other things. Mourelatos consequently suggests that we should construe the affinity which is expressed in the verses which we considered in this subsection as an ideal rather than a fact, styling it a 'normative necessity'.[216] Put differently, we must take it that these statements are being made *from within* the framework of *Alêtheia*'s account of reality. In these verses, 'understanding' is used almost technically as a clear success term, where success means cognition and understanding of reality as delineated in *Alêtheia*. The affinity expressed in *Alêtheia* between what-is and understanding refers to that cognition and understanding (*noein*) which is based on the *krisis* between 'is' and 'is not', and which comprises the selection of the former and rejection of the latter. It refers to that purely reliable and uniquely steadfast apprehension of what-is, the unshaken heart of reality.

The relation between being and intelligence in *Alêtheia* also raises interesting questions concerning the nature of what-is. If, within *Alêtheia*'s account of reality, being is identified with cognition, then what-is must be intelligent as well as intelligible.[217] That what-is is intelligent and self-knowing would of course be

[216] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 175–6; cf. Curd (1998) 49.
[217] Long (1996); cf. Trépanier (2010) 292–5.

consistent also with the more minimal readings of these verses. Indeed, what-is is the stable *heart* of reality (B1.29). This term (*êtor*) is never used, in any period of ancient Greek, except of the life, emotion or thought of a human or divine person. The goddess, it seems, promises to teach Parmenides the stable heart of living reality.[218]

The possible intelligence and apparent vitality of what-is raise the question of whether, and, if so, in what way, we should think of what-is as *divine*. We will return to this question when discussing the similarities between Xenophanes' supreme god and Parmenides' what-is (Chapter 6.1). Here I will only highlight an important qualification. Noticeably, and even pointedly, Parmenides withholds traditional divine epithets from what-is.[219] If there is a sense in which we may nonetheless think of what-is as divine, it must be a highly refined, nuanced, pointedly non-traditional and arguably specifically Xenophanean sense. The divinity of what-is (if that is a legitimate way of speaking) is certainly not of the same type as, or on a par with, the more traditional divinity of the goddess, who initiates the *kouros* and issues her revelation to him (*thea*, B1.22). It is this divinity of the goddess with which the mortality of the *kouros* is contrasted, from the proem onwards, in a complex dynamic which lies at the heart of the epistemology of Parmenides' poem.

[218] Long (1996) 142–3 emphasises this semantic point in support of this conclusion; cf. also Coxon (2009) 282–3.

[219] As noted by Mourelatos (2008*a*) 44; cf. Cornford (1939) 29, 43; Granger (2008) 5; (2010) 35.

6

RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

In this final chapter, we will take some opportunities to look both backwards and forwards. We will first (Chapter 6.1) consider how Xenophanes relates himself to Hesiod and how Parmenides relates himself both to Xenophanes and to Hesiod. We will ask how the interrelations between these thinkers might further illuminate and, in turn, be illuminated by our self-standing discussions of them in the previous chapters. Next (Chapter 6.2), we will consider how Empedocles fits into the broad tradition of theology and epistemology that has emerged from the foregoing studies of Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. Empedocles will thus provide one (important) example of how the interpretative approaches developed above might be deployed also in relation to other and later developments in theology and epistemology. Finally (Chapter 6.3), we will revisit – in the light of the conclusions defended in this book – the questions of rationality and irrationality, and philosophy and religion, which were our focus in Chapter 1.

6.1 Interrelations

We saw in the previous chapters how Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides inscribe and pursue questions of epistemology within a theological framework. We explored the particular ways in which their divergent views on the cognitive capacities and limitations of mortals flow from their correspondingly divergent views on (i) the nature of the divine, (ii) the nature of the mortal and (iii) the nature of the relation and interactions between them.

With their dramatic opening address, 'we know how to speak many falsehoods which are like verities (ψεύδεα … ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα), and we know, whenever we wish, how to utter truths'

(ἀληθέα, *Th*. 27–8), Hesiod's Muses articulate a framework in which the problem of epistemology becomes the problem of understanding the interactions between mortal and divine. The *Theogony* (along with much of the *Works and Days*) prescribes a wary and circumspect stance within this framework. The goddesses leave it uncertain, and the mortal poet is helpless to determine, whether the verses they inspire comprise truths, verisimilitudinous falsehoods or a mixture of the two. The framework that the Muses articulate is, however, sufficiently indeterminate to allow competing elaborations of its fixed principles. At one juncture in the *Works and Days* (646–62), we encounter a competing and more optimistic, albeit fleeting, stance in response to their address.

We find in Hesiod, then, the following principles: (i) The problem of understanding the epistemic capacities and limitations of mortals is the problem of understanding correctly what mortals and gods are like, how they relate to one another and how they interact; (ii) it is only through a special and privileged interaction with the divine that the mortal poet can produce potentially true (since divinely disclosed) accounts of matters that lie beyond the grasp of human cognition; (iii) the mortal cannot himself ascertain the truth-value of those accounts. Principle (i) frames Xenophanes' and Parmenides' own otherwise radically divergent approaches to epistemology. In this respect, Hesiod not only isolates for consideration the epistemological question of the conditions of human speculation: he crystallises the major contours of an emerging enterprise of theological epistemology. Xenophanes can be said to deny (ii) and develop his own, very different version of (iii). Mortals form forever corrigible and conjectural beliefs and judgements about states of affairs external to their experience on the basis of a necessarily limited range of experiences, which (or, minimally, some of which) the divine purposively enables them to consider. No mortal can himself know or ascertain the truth-value of his corrigible accounts (cf. iii). The scope of divine disclosure most probably encompasses all that any mortal experiences ('universal disclosure'). At any rate, Xenophanes stakes no claims for a special and privileged relation with the divine (contra ii). Parmenides can be said to deny (iii), but develop his own, very different version of (ii). The human mind perforce thinks of, and in terms of, sensory contrasts between Light

and Dark, Hot and Cold, etc. It perforce experiences and forms beliefs about multiple, heterogeneous, mobile and differentiated things and processes. But, through his encounter with the goddess (cf. ii), the *kouros* attains the ability to think rather through the competing categories of *Alêtheia* (is / is not), to master its argumentation and to ascertain for himself the true homogeneous and unchanging nature of ultimate reality (contra iii).

We can only tentatively trace deliberate and precise engagements by Xenophanes with Hesiod, and by Parmenides with Hesiod and Xenophanes. Yet, if nothing else, this exercise will help us to delineate further the continuities and discontinuities between the three thinkers, and will afford a new perspective on familiar textual echoes.

It is often observed that Xenophanes' programmatic remark in DK21 B35 – 'let these things be believed as like the truths' (ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι) – recalls the Muses' address in *Theogony* 27–8 (ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα).[1] I interpreted the phrase 'like the truths' as a qualified endorsement. By stating that his views are like truths, Xenophanes signals that they may *be* true, but he cautions that this similarity could also be specious.[2] Xenophanes thus encapsulates in a single line both sides of Hesiod's couplet – both the prospect of truths (ἀληθέα) and that of verisimilitudinous falsehoods (ψεύδεα . . . ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα). Xenophanes, we saw, advances his own alternative notion of divine disclosure against the traditional notions that he rejects. This conclusion places this textual echo in a new light. Both Hesiod and Xenophanes faced the same question which, we saw (Chapter 3.1), also exercised Greek reflections on divination: why are statements formed on the basis of divine disclosure sometimes false? Hesiod appeals to the possibility of divine deception and the unforeseeable arbitrariness of divine caprice. By positioning himself in DK21 B35 against the Muses' address to Hesiod in *Theogony* 27–8, Xenophanes underscores

[1] See Bryan (2012) 12–16; cf. Guthrie (1962) 396, n.2; Heitsch (1966) 232–3; Hussey (1990): 35; Koning (2010) 205–6; Iribarren (forthcoming). Xenophanes names Hesiod when criticising his theology: DK21 B11; cf. related critiques: B12, B1.21–3; B14–16; B26; also D.L. 9.18.8–10 = A1; D.L. 2.46.8–11 = A19. In *Rep*. 2.382d2–3, Plato seems to allude to *Th*. 27–8 while criticising (in a manner reminiscent of Xenophanes) Hesiodic theology among other things; see Ch. 2.1, n.42.

[2] Following Bryan (2012) 6–57; see Ch. 3.5.

that, in keeping with his theological objections to the makeup of Hesiod's gods (DK21 B11–12, B14, etc.), his own second-order reflections do not involve the gods in deception or caprice. Rather, we can explain the corrigibility of belief and the possibility of error once we realise that divine revelation in fact consists in the disclosure of a necessarily limited repertoire of experiences to spatially and temporally limited mortals.

Again, scholars have long observed that Parmenides' goddess recalls the Muses' address when she issues the programmatic statement which was our focus in Chapter 4: 'And it is right for you to learn all things, both the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality (ἀληθείης . . . ἦτορ), and the beliefs of mortals, in which there is no real trust' (βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής, DK28 B1.28^{b}-30).[3] Like Hesiod, and unlike Homer who remains more in the background, Parmenides makes central the figure of the mortal agent who is identified with the poetic voice.[4] Both poets narrate in extensive detail a first-person encounter with an all-female divine apparatus. It is from goddesses that the ensuing poem is said to emanate and they avow that they issue (or, in Hesiod's case, that they *can* issue) two types of discourse: one trustworthy and concerned with 'truths' (*alêthea, Th*. 28) or 'true reality' (*alêtheiê*, DK28 B1.29),[5] while the other is, in *some* sense, not so. In both cases, the interaction between mortal and divine presupposes and reflects the epistemic superiority of the latter. And yet, the goddess is not 'an exact counterpart' of Hesiod's Muses.[6] The Muses do not clarify the implications of their words for their relationship with Hesiod, or whether the *Theogony* itself will comprise truths, deceptive falsehoods or a mixture. By contrast, Parmenides' goddess expressly states that the *kouros* will inquire both into ultimate reality and mortal beliefs devoid of real trust. Indeed, she later signposts *what parts* of her speech fall under which category (DK28 B8.50–2), and flags up that her own

[3] Jaeger (1947) 94; Dolin (1962) 94ff; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 33, 219; Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 6–7; Robbiano (2006) 41; Torgerson (2006) 35; Iribarren (forthcoming); cf. Heitsch (1966) 201; KRS (1983) 262; Schofield (2007) 4.

[4] Jaeger (1947) 98.

[5] On Parmenides' use of *alêtheiê*, see Introduction to the Chapters on Parmenides.

[6] *Pace* Jaeger (1947) 94.

account of mortal beliefs is 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν) insofar as it is liable to be mistaken for an account which gets at and discloses the nature of ultimate reality (what-is). Most importantly, the goddess directs her mortal addressee to judge *for himself* her disclosure through *Alêtheia*'s argumentation (DK28 B7.5–6), and so to identify and evaluate for himself the distinction between her accounts of reality and her accounts of mortal beliefs.[7] When it comes to her relation to the *kouros*, Parmenides removes from his kind goddess the spectre of a mocking and almost predatory deceptiveness that marks female divine wisdom in Hesiod. The Muses open their address with scornful mockery ('shepherds of the field, base, shameful things, mere bellies,' *Th.* 26). The goddess is, by contrast, all gentle reassurance ('and the goddess received me kindly, and took my right hand in hers etc.', DK28 B1.22–8).[8]

The divinisation of the *kouros* signals a related contrast. The Muses descend to the mortal poet, while the goddess welcomes the *kouros* to her domain.[9] If the Muses begin by rhetorically reducing the shepherd to the level of the beasts that he tends ('mere bellies'), the goddess aligns the *kouros*, conversely, with his *divine* guides and the divine milieu into which he is welcomed as an appropriate member (DK28 B1.24–8[a]; see Chapter 5.3). Hesiod is irremediably unable to discriminate truths from specious falsehoods. This inability corresponds to his inexorably mortal status. By contrast, the *kouros*, through his capacity for reasoning, attains the ability to discriminate accounts of true reality from accounts of mortal beliefs in which there is no real trust. This attainment corresponds to his divinisation and his alignment with his divine escort and with the goddess.

[7] For this point, cf. Morgan (2000) 75; Torgerson (2006) 36; Koning (2010) 212; Benzi (2016).

[8] One might go even further. We find in Parmenides a nexus of associations between the female, Light, vitality, better and purer thinking and the divine; in particular, within his dualistic system, the element which is bright rather than dark and hot rather than cold also appears to be the element which typifies the nature of the female rather than the male (see Ch. 5.2, with nn.67, 69). Thus, insofar as Parmenides approaches the goddess through that within him which is hot, aethereal and bright (his soul), he is also arguably approaching her through that within him which is more female and less male. We might say, then, that Parmenides not only rehabilitates female divine wisdom, but also aligns the knowing mortal *himself* with those aspects of his constitution which are brighter, hotter, more intelligent and more vital and – as such – more female.

[9] Koning (2010) 212 observes the divergence in the direction of travel.

The framework that Hesiod's Muses articulate can accommodate ambivalent vacillations on the part of the poet between more or less optimistic stances (Chapter 2.4). By contrast, Xenophanes and Parmenides both resolve the indeterminacy of the Muses' address to Hesiod, and of the framework which they articulate, into definite epistemological positions.

The tradition that Parmenides studied under Xenophanes is highly suspect. The statements in Aristotle (*Metaph*. A.5 986^{b} 21–2) and Theophrastus (*apud* Diogenes Laertius, 9.21.1–3; cf. Simplicius, *in Ph*. 9.22.26–31) very possibly derive from Plato's offhand and vague reference to 'the Eleatic tribe (ἔθνος), which begins with Xenophanes and even earlier' (*Soph*. 242d4–6).[10] Xenophanes does appear to have spent some of the latter part of his life in Sicily (Diogenes Laertius, 9.18.5–6) and could conceivably have travelled to South Italy. No clearly dependable evidence, however, links him to Elea. We could not rely on the historicity of the tempting report that Xenophanes composed a poem on Elea's colonisation (Diogenes Laertius, 9.20.6–7).[11] Nor could we press Aristotle's anecdote, which has Xenophanes issuing advice about religious practice to the people of Elea, since it is only one (albeit much the earliest) among other versions found in Plutarch, which place the story in Egypt (DK21 A13).[12]

Much stronger evidence that Parmenides encountered and engaged with Xenophanes' thought is found in some striking echoes between Parmenides' descriptions of what-is and Xenophanes' descriptions of his greatest god. These echoes might themselves have motivated the doxographic traditions that linked Xenophanes and Parmenides.[13] The immobility and invariability of the supreme god and what-is are expressed in markedly similar language: 'but he always abides in the same place not changing at all' (ἐν ταὐτῷ μίμνει

[10] Plato ascribes to 'the Eleatic tribe' numerical monism. By comparison, consider *Tht*. 179e3–4 (also 152d–e; 160d5–8 (φῦλον)), where 'Heraclitean' flux is 'Homeric and still more ancient'. See further KRS (1983) 163–6; Coxon (2009) 18–19. Diogenes (9.21. 3–8) immediately proceeds to Sotion's statement that Parmenides followed, not Xenophanes, but the Pythagorean Ameinias.

[11] See the scepticism in KRS (1983) 164–6.

[12] The version in [ps.-?]Plutarch (*Mor*. 228e) has Lycurgus addressing the Thebans.

[13] The echoes are observed in Coxon (2009) 18–19, 326–9; Long (1996) 143, 148; Palmer (2009) 329–30; Bryan (2012) 97–100. Xenophanes was known to Heraclitus (DK22 B40).

κινούμενος οὐδέν, Xenophanes, DK21 B26); 'unchanging . . . abiding in the same place by itself it lies (ἀκίνητον . . . ταὐτόν τ' ἐν ταὐτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται), and so it remains there steadfast' (Parmenides, DK28 B8.26–30). The 'wholeness' of what-is recalls how the supreme god sees, thinks and hears as a unified 'whole' (οὖλον, Parmenides, DK28 B8.4; οὖλος, Xenophanes, DK21 B24). Xenophanes berates 'mortals' for ascribing coming-into-being to the gods (οἱ βροτοί . . . γεννᾶσθαι, DK21 B14.1; cf. A12). Parmenides berates them for ascribing it to what-is (ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο . . . γίγνεσθαι, DK28 B8.39; cf. B8.21). We may also recall the apparent vitality of what-is (ἦτορ, DK28 B1.29) and the possibility (it is nothing more) that Parmenides expressly accorded it intelligence and (self-)cognition.[14]

Parmenides, then, seems to appropriate some features of Xenophanes' supreme god in his novel account of reality in *Alêtheia*. This appropriation must not, however, obscure the fact that these two thinkers are theologically worlds apart. Parmenides markedly avoids ascribing traditional divine epithets to what-is.[15] He uses the language of divinity rather of the Daughters of the Sun, who convey the mortal *kouros*, and of the goddess, who discloses everything to him (θεά . . . ἀθανάτοισι, DK28 B1.22, 24; cf. δαίμονος, B1.3). Again, it is *Doxa*'s goddess, not what-is, who assumes the traditional governing and directive capacity of the divine: 'the goddess, who steers all things' (DK28 B12.3; compare Xenophanes' god who 'shakes all things by the thought of his mind', DK21 B25).[16] It is this decidedly non-Xenophanean goddess whose divinity Parmenides contrasts with the mortals whose thought and beliefs the *kouros* will transcend by encountering the goddess and being himself divinised. If Parmenides considers reality vital and might have expressly accorded it intelligence, and if he appropriates some features of Xenophanes' supreme god in his account of ultimate reality, then – even though

[14] Long (1996) 143, 148 emphasises these points. The extant fragments do not support later reports that Xenophanes' god is spherical (DK21 A1; A28.7), which may be further assimilating his god to what-is (Parm. DK28 B8.43).

[15] Ch. 5.5.2.

[16] For this point, cf. Palmer (2009) 329. The goddess's administration of metempsychosis, copulation and birth was discussed in Ch. 5.2.

Parmenides himself never speaks in such terms – we may nonetheless think of what-is as divine in a nuanced and non-traditional, Xenophanean sense. It is, however, a very different and, in many ways, more traditional theological framework within which Parmenides reflects about the relation between what he explicitly calls 'mortal' and 'divine' and about the epistemological ramifications of this relation.

Xenophanes rejects the pervasive tendency in Greek religious thought to see the boundary between mortal and divine as a malleable and negotiable one, and to allow that some human agents may approach or attain divine qualities or capacities. Parmenides displays a distinctive version of this tendency.[17] Again, Xenophanes, unlike Parmenides, admits no notion of a privileged interaction with the divine, through which a mortal can attain knowledge. Xenophanes' perspective is made possible, and remains constrained, by what the divine enables him to consider: Xenophanes does not consider himself specially privileged in these respects. This disillusioned attitude raises an interesting point, which Xenophanes himself does not seem to address. Xenophanes' account of mortal epistemology draws on certain views concerning what the gods are and are not like. But all such views can never amount to more than corrigible beliefs (ἀμφὶ θεῶν, DK21 B34). Xenophanes' account of mortal epistemology, then, itself depends on certain corrigible beliefs.[18] Xenophanes identifies the epistemic capacities and limitations of mortals from within the mortal perspective. His account of mortal epistemology is thus itself subject to those same limitations. Parmenides, by contrast, describes the capacities and limitations of mortals from an external, divine perspective. The *kouros* recognises that the human mind operates perforce in accordance with sensory contrasts (Light/Night, etc.) only after he himself mastered the qualitatively different thought that underpins *Alêtheia* (is / is not) and

[17] For Xenophanes, esp. Ch. 3.5; for Parmenides, esp. Ch. 5.3–4. Xenophanes attacks ideas of metempsychosis (DK21 B7), while Parmenides advances one (Ch. 5.2).

[18] This point is not peculiar to my interpretation of Xenophanes in Chapter 3. It will apply to any interpretation which accepts that, for Xenophanes, what the gods are and are not like bears on the epistemic predicament of mortals (n.b. esp. DK21 B18) and yet cannot be ascertained by mortals conclusively (esp. DK21 B34).

attained divine knowledge about the nature of ultimate reality. The *kouros*, then, learns what specifically human cognition is like only after he himself transcends it to sustain divine thought with, or as, his divine soul, and only after and in the light of *Alêtheia*.

Hesiod's Muses grant him access to an extra-human, divine perspective on the cosmos.[19] In this respect, Hesiod sides with Parmenides against Xenophanes. For Hesiod, however, the mortal poet can never himself ascertain the truth-value of accounts disclosed from this divine perspective. In this respect, Hesiod's epistemological attitude is closer to Xenophanes' disillusioned denial that mortals can themselves ascertain the truth-value of accounts about matters external to their direct cognition or experience.

A similar point can be made about Hesiod's attitude to the boundary between mortal and divine. We noted that Hesiod describes the divine or godlike products of sexual unions between gods and mortals, and that these accounts starkly illustrate the notion that mortal and divine inhabit the same, commensurable plane, and that the former can approximate the latter.[20] Hesiod's anthropogony in his narrative of the Races (*Op.* 106–201) is instructive here. The narrative enigmatically promises to relate the common origin (or, perhaps, the initial shared conditions) of gods and mortals.[21] It expounds humanity's gradual decline (even if it is not the case that each race is inferior to all the ones that preceded it) to the current condition of the Iron Age through various middle-ground positions between the extremes of mortality and divinity. Thus, the 'race of humans' (γένος … ἀνθρώπων, *Op.* 109) who made up the Golden Race 'lived as gods' (*Op.* 112), without ageing (*Op.* 113–14) and died as in sleep (*Op.* 116). They persist as benign divinities (*daimones, Op.* 121–6). Again, the Heroic Race is styled 'divine' and is represented by 'half-gods' (ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θεῖον γένος … ἡμίθεοι, *Op.* 159–60). Of these, some died, while others still live, 'apart from humans' (δίχ' ἀνθρώπων) in the Islands of the Blessed (*Op.* 166–73).[22] The general direction of this graded

[19] Clay (2003) esp. 72, 182 emphasises this point. [20] Ch. 5.3.
[21] 'How from the same (ὁμόθεν) gods and mortal humans came to be', *Op.* 108, with West (1978) *ad loc.*
[22] Cf. Parmenides' 'far from the track of humans', DK28 B1.27.

process of anthropogony, then, is one of *decline*, away from divinity, and towards our Iron Age. Like Parmenides, and unlike Xenophanes, Hesiod accepts the theological phenomenon of mortal godlikeness and, more generally, a measure of malleability and negotiability in the boundary between mortal and divine. Unlike Parmenides, however, Hesiod recognises no prospect for *us* to ascend back to godlikeness.[23] This theological divergence between Hesiod and Parmenides corresponds to the divergence between their respectively disillusioned and optimistic epistemologies. Unlike Homer and other archaic sources, Hesiod never describes the mortal poet as divine or godlike (θεῖος ἀοιδός, *Od*. 4.17, etc.).[24] For Hesiod, the poet is inexorably, even wretchedly, mortal. In *these* respects, his theology and epistemology are, again, closer to Xenophanes than to Parmenides.

We saw how Hesiod displays ambivalent theological vacillations of a kind we find neither in Xenophanes nor in Parmenides, and how the epistemologies of both alike diverge from the indeterminacy of his framework. We can now add, however, that, in certain other aspects of their theology and epistemology, Xenophanes and Parmenides share with Hesiod more than they share with one another. All three thinkers reconsider the nature of the divine and reconceptualise its role in human reflection and inquiry. In doing so, they show both fundamental continuities and instructive discontinuities with one another.

6.2 The *daimôn* and Muse of Empedocles

As noted in the Introduction, this book does not aim to exhaust the question of the connections between theology and epistemology in early Greek philosophy. The aim was to offer a new analysis of the significance of these connections in certain key episodes in the

[23] In *On the Obsolescence of Oracles* (415b–c), Plutarch underscores this aspect of Hesiod's text. He sees Hesiod as the first to demarcate clearly between four classes: gods, *daimones*, heroes and mortals. He then immediately proceeds to specify an alternative model, which preserves those same categories but, unlike Hesiod, introduces the prospect of upward mobility from one to the other.

[24] For the poet as divine or godlike, see further Ch. 5.3, with n.119. Contrast *Th*. 95, 99–100; *Op*. 26, 208; cf. Stoddard (2004) 90. On Hesiod's 'divine human-voice' (αὐδὴν θέσπιν, *Th*. 31–2), see Ch. 2.2.

emergence in Greece of systematic reflection about speculative inquiry, and to put forward interpretative approaches which could serve as starting points for considerations of other and later developments. In other words, the story does not end here, and I have not tried to tell all of it. But one later episode in the story that allows for a more circumscribed consideration and which will, I believe, uniquely enrich the overall picture emerging from this book, is that of the *daimôn* and Muse of Empedocles.

It is very likely that Empedocles (working in Sicily, around the middle of the fifth century BCE) was aware of and engaged with all three of the thinkers who were our primary focus in this book. It is difficult not to see in his Muse 'Calliopeia' (DK31 B131) an echo of Hesiod, who makes Calliopeia chief among the Muses (*Th.* 79).[25] He criticises the view that the earth is unbounded as one held by people who have seen little of the whole (B39). Aristotle (*Cael.* 294^{a}21–8) relates this criticism to Xenophanes, who indeed held this view (DK21 B28). Elsewhere, Empedocles speaks of a holy mind (φρὴν ἱερή) and denies that it has human form (B134), echoing Xenophanes' remarks on his greatest god (DK21 B23–5).[26] Finally, echoes of Parmenides' language and thought in Empedocles abound and make it clear that Empedocles was familiar with his work. At one juncture, Empedocles invites us to hear the 'undeceptive expedition' of his account (λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν, B17.26). Commentators have traditionally and plausibly found here an unreserved rehabilitation of the enterprise of cosmology in the face of the statement of Parmenides' goddess that her account of *Doxa*'s cosmology is 'deceptive' (ἀπατηλόν, DK28 B8.51^{b}-2; Chapter 4.4).[27]

Empedocles elaborated a cosmology which postulated four elements (earth, fire, air and water) and two guiding cosmic

[25] On the strong and unmistakable echoes of Hesiod in Empedocles, see Most (2007) 284–92. When Aristotle observes that Hesiod, Parmenides (note DK28 B13) and Empedocles all recognise in love or desire a cosmic force (*Metaph.* A.4 984^{b}22–985^{a} 10), he arguably touches on a genuine connection between the three.

[26] Picot and Berg (2013) reasonably contend that this echo is less than simple and stress the theological divergences between the two thinkers.

[27] On Empedocles' engagement with Parmenidean ideas and his use of Eleatic-style argumentation, see e.g. Graham (1999); Inwood (2001) 22–30; McKirahan (2005). Osborne (2006) and Palmer (2009) 225–349 question the orthodoxy that Parmenides exerted a profoundly formative influence over the following generation of cosmologists.

powers (Love and Strife). He also narrated his own career as a *daimôn*, who was exiled from the company of the gods for his crimes and is now undergoing a series of transmigrations, leading up to his imminent return to the company of the gods. Earlier attempts to separate these two aspects of Empedocles' thought as consciously unrelated and divorced were already coming under considerable strain when the publication in 1999 of the Strasbourg papyrus – in which both appear side by side – finally put them to rest.[28] The question of the relation between these aspects of Empedocles' thought remains, however, a central topic of debate.[29] Discussions have centred predominantly on the connections of Empedocles' theology, anthropology and eschatology with his cosmology and ethics. We will focus here on the connections of his theology, anthropology and eschatology with his *epistemology*. In particular, how do Empedocles' daimonology, theory of metempsychosis and invocations of the Muse fit together? How do they relate to his conception of cosmological speculative inquiry?[30]

[28] In particular, ensemble *d* of the papyrus (which includes B139) treats within the same passage both the cosmological topic of zoogony and Empedocles' crimes in a past lifetime; see further Trépanier (2003) 14–19; cf. Sassi (2009) 190. For earlier critiques of the separatist policy, see Guthrie (1952) 102–3; Kahn (1971); Osborne (1987*b*). Nothing in my discussion will turn on whether our fragments derive from two poems or only one.

[29] Indeed, the papyrus did not put an end to deflationary approaches to Empedocles' daimonology. Primavesi himself – one of the original editors – highlights the echoes and broad structural correspondences between the cosmic and daimonic cycles and restricts Empedocles' talk of transmigration to a purely mythological and evaluative level of expression that should not be regarded as positive doctrine; see Primavesi (2008) 262–8. More likely, the echoes between the different cycles reflect the point, not that the *daimôn*'s biography is merely a symbolic representation of cosmic history, but that it is the same two antagonistic powers, Love and Strife – powers which exert moral as well as physical influence (B115.14: 'trusting in mad Strife'; cf. B128) – that guide not only macrocosmic processes in the world but also the microcosmic life of the *daimôn* who is Empedocles.

[30] One central preoccupation in this section will be the connection in Empedocles between (i) the prolongation of existence and the expansion of experiences across successive incarnations and (ii) the acquisition of greater authority and wisdom. This fundamental connection has been recognised (Trépanier (2004) 169; Sassi (2009) 193–4, 234–5; Palmer (2009) 276–8; Ferella (2013) 43–7; Ranzato (2015) 99–105; Clay (2015) 128–34), but much more remains to be asked and explored concerning the light it sheds on Empedocles' conceptions of wisdom, understanding, speculative inquiry and self-identity, as well as the broader role and import of certain texts (such as B106 and B108).

6.2 The *daimôn* and Muse of Empedocles

Empedocles tells us about his exile from the gods (B115):

ἔστιν ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν,
ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις·
εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ,
†ὅς καὶ† ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομώσει,
δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,
τρίς μιν μυρίας ὥρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι,
φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν
ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.
αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει,
πόντος δ' ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ' ἐς αὐγὰς
ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ' αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίνῃς·
ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες.
τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης,
νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.

There is an oracle of necessity, an ancient decree of the gods,
Everlasting, sealed with broad oaths:
Whenever one in his crimes stains his own limbs with blood . . .
committing misdeeds, swears falsely,
One of the daimones who have obtained as their lot a long life,[31]
He is to wonder for thrice ten thousand seasons away from the blessed ones,
Growing to be all sorts of forms of mortal things through time,
Interchanging the hard paths of life.
For the force of aether drives him into the sea,
And the sea spits him out onto the surface of the earth, and the earth into the beams
Of the shining sun, and it throws him into the eddies of aether;
And one receives him from another, but all abhor him.
I too am now one of them, an exile from the gods and a wanderer,
Trusting in mad strife.

Having committed some crime such as bloodshed or perjury, Empedocles must wander the cosmos away from his fellow gods, being successively reincarnated in 'all sorts of forms of mortal things'. In B117, we learn that Empedocles already became 'a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a fish travelling in the sea'. In B127, he refers to *daimones* who are reincarnated as lions among beasts and laurels among trees. Here too Empedocles is likely thinking of past lives that he experienced first-hand. Elsewhere, he laments for crimes which he himself had committed

[31] These long-lived *daimones* are most likely included among the 'long-lived gods' of B21.12; note φυγὰς θεόθεν (B115.13); cf. Sedley (2005) 346.

as some such wild beast: 'Woe! That the pitiless day did not destroy me before I devised with my claws terrible deeds for the sake of food' (*Strasb. d* 5–6 = B139). In B146, he describes the penultimate stop before the final return to godhood: 'And finally they become prophets and singers of hymns and doctors and leaders among men who dwell on earth. From there, they blossom as gods, foremost in honours.' As the last stop before the final return to godhood, Empedocles noticeably lists activities which typify himself, suggesting that his own return to the company of the gods is imminent. He describes this happy destination as an idyllic gathering (B147).

Empedocles' special awareness of his true identity as a *daimôn* and his past lives clearly has dramatic ethical ramifications. It follows, for example, that we must forgo meat and animal sacrifice: Empedocles envisages a chilling scenario in which a father sacrifices and consumes an animal which in fact houses the reincarnated *daimôn* of his dead son (B137; cf. B128; B136). But what are the epistemological ramifications of this special awareness of past lives?

We should consider this question in relation to the traditional association of wisdom with longevity and experience – a tradition which we discussed in relation to Xenophanes. In Homer, Nestor emblematises old age and wisdom. Old men in general 'see both backwards and forwards' (*Il*. 3.108–10). That is, they possess both a more informed and a more careful perspective. The Odyssean notion of expanding one's wisdom and learning by expanding one's range of experiences becomes a methodological tenet among proponents of Ionian *historiê*. Thus, Xenophanes asserts that 'as [mortals] search in time they discover better' (DK21 B18.2). Indeed, we found reason to think that Xenophanes may have put forward his estimation of his own age at 92 as a reaction against the hyperbolic tradition that Epimenides lived to be 154. At any rate, Xenophanes manifests the widely prevalent associations between (i) old age, (ii) an extended repertoire of experiences and (iii) the premium placed on one's authority as a thinker and speaker. Heraclitus reacts in part against this cluster of associations when he says: 'Much-learning does not teach how to have

understanding; otherwise, it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus' (DK22 B40).[32]

It is with this background in mind that we should read Empedocles' description of an extraordinary sage: 'And there was among them a man of surpassing knowledge (περιώσια εἰδώς), who indeed obtained the greatest wealth (πλοῦτον) in his breast, master of all kinds of particularly wise deeds; for whenever he reached out with all his breast he easily beheld each of all the sorts of things which are (ῥεῖ' ὅ γε τῶν ὄντων πάντων λεύσσεσκεν ἕκαστον) in ten or twenty lifetimes of humans' (B129). Porphyry, who quotes the fragment (*VP* 30), identifies the sage as Pythagoras, traditions about whom do indeed have him remembering his past lives.[33] The important point for us is that the anonymous sage serves for Empedocles as a kind of epistemological hero. His surpassing knowledge is related to his ability to behold – that is, to conjure mentally and so to draw on – a range of experiences spread over multiple lifetimes of humans. The image of 'wealth' stored up in his thinking organs again reflects the association between his extraordinary knowledge and the extraordinarily rich repertoire of experiences of which he is aware, and on which he can draw.[34] In B132, we find the general principle: 'blessed is he who acquired wealth in his divine breast' (θείων πραπίδων . . . πλοῦτον).

In keeping with his positive portrayal of the sage, Empedocles also presents us with epistemological villains (B2):

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται·
πολλὰ δὲ δείλ' ἔμπαια, τά τ' ἀμβλύνουσι μέριμνας.
παῦρον δ' ἐν ζωῇσι βίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες
ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν
αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες, ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος,

[32] On these issues, see further Ch. 3.5.

[33] See Burkert (1972) 138–9. According to Diogenes, some thought that the sage was rather Parmenides (8.54). Empedocles himself, then, probably left him unnamed.

[34] The sage's acquisition of wealth in his breast and ability to behold objects from multiple 'lifetimes' strongly suggests a recollection of past lives, *pace* Macris and Skarsouli (2012) 362. This is corroborated by the connections elsewhere in Empedocles – explored below – between metempsychosis, experience, memory, wisdom and authority. The sage is not ascribed a complete view of the life of the world or of all objects and events (contra Macris and Skarsouli (2012) 365–6, 371), but one restricted to 'ten or twenty' human lifetimes (B129.6).

πάντοσ᾽ ἐλαυνόμενοι, τὸ δ᾽ ὅλον <πᾶς> εὔχεται εὑρεῖν·
οὕτως οὔτ᾽ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ᾽ ἀνδράσιν οὔτ᾽ ἐπακουστά
οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά. 8

For narrow devices are spread throughout their limbs;
And many wretched things strike in, and they blunt their reflections.
And after they had seen only a small portion of life in their lifespans
Swift to their doom they sore and fly off in the manner of smoke,
Each one believing only that thing which he has chanced to meet,
As they are driven in every direction, but <each> boasts that he has seen the whole;
In this way these things are neither seen nor heard by men
Nor grasped with the understanding.

These thinkers operate on the basis of a narrow and myopic repertoire of experiences and so with a narrow and myopic perspective.[35] Furthermore, they are unaware that their perspective is limited. Having observed only a small slice of world, they mistake it for all there is to be aware of and extrapolate carelessly from their immediate and narrow spatial and temporal surroundings. By juxtaposing Empedocles' positive description of the sage (B129) with his account of these fools, we can see that B2 does not describe a cognitive predicament which typifies all mortal agents *equally and to the same extent*.[36] The epistemic superiority of the sage was related to his mental retention of experiences from multiple lifetimes. Similarly, the fools' epistemic inferiority is traced to some kind of *transience*. Rather than storing up experiences from this lifespan and adding them to another, 'swift to their doom they sour and fly off in the manner of smoke'. Rather than persisting across lives, they are scattered: 'driven away in every direction'. This transience could be strictly cognitive or quite general. These expressions could indicate only that the failed thinkers are unaware of their past transmigrations and past lifetimes. They are thus cognitively impermanent and cognitively limited at any moment to their present lifetimes. Alternatively, Empedocles could indeed be saying that, unlike the anonymous sage, unlike Empedocles himself or (presumably) unlike his addressee Pausanias, these people are not

[35] Cf. similarly B39 ('having seen little of the whole').
[36] Contrast the tenor of Palmer (2013) 316, 319, 323–4 (different to Palmer (2009) 276–8). οὕτως (B2.7) refers to the faulty methods of the ὠκύμοροι, cf. Panagiotou (1983) 282–3.

reincarnated *daimones*, but mere humans, limited in every sense to a single lifetime.[37]

Either way, the fools' epistemic inferiority has an obscure physiological manifestation. Their possession of 'narrow devices throughout their limbs' (B2.1) is correlated with their narrow perspective and faulty manner of reflecting, as they are distracted by and, perhaps, overreact to and over-generalise from the many wretched things they encounter. Empedocles draws a general moral: 'In this way these things are neither seen nor heard by men nor grasped with the understanding.' It is not obvious what 'these things' (τάδε) are. Empedocles could mean quite generally the objects of his inquiries: the physical and moral nature and order of all things. Alternatively – or in addition – τάδε could gesture towards our immediate vicinity ('these things here'): people cannot hope to apprehend truly even the things immediately around them if they view them only in the context of a narrow perspective. On either reading, their faulty dataset and penchant to over-generalise from parochial experiences mean that the fools cannot hope to achieve proper understanding by either perceptual or non-perceptual means. The fools, then, possess 'narrow devices' in their 'limbs'. Correspondingly, Empedocles says of Pausanias that 'these things' (ταῦτα: the same question concerning the precise reference of the term recurs), if Pausanias was able to store them in his breast with a proper effort of mind, would be present for him stably throughout his life (δι' αἰῶνος[38] παρέσονται), and his physical cognitive apparatus would literally and materially *grow* (αὔξει, B110; cf. B17.14; B129.2, 4).[39]

[37] Sedley (2005) 345–7 interestingly identifies in Empedocles a distinction between one race of (Love-generated) *daimones* and another of (Strife-generated) humans who do not transmigrate.

[38] This language (αἰών) could plausibly convey here, not a brief period of time limited to Pausanias' current incarnation (contrast the fools' fleeting 'lifespans' and paltry 'portion of life': παῦρον δ' ἐν ζωῇσι βίου μέρος, B2.3), but the span of his existence quite generally, as it does in relation to the *daimones* in B115.5 (μακραίωνος, cf. θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες, B21.12; B23.8).

[39] On B110, see further Macris and Skarsouli (2012) 367–8. Is the idea in Empedocles that, through such cognitive and material 'growth', Pausanias (and Empedocles' ideal readers?) will *also* come to be aware of and recall his own past lives? Or does Empedocles only want us to recognise his own inimitable authority on the basis (in part) of his own inimitable awareness and memories? Our evidence does not give a clear answer.

In B115 (cited above), Empedocles identifies himself as a *daimôn* who has won by lot a long-lasting life (5) and grown into all manner of mortal life forms through time (διὰ χρόνου, 7). He recounts how his journey through successive life forms takes him to different areas of the cosmos, dominated by different elements: from the aether to the sea, from the sea to the earth, from the earth to the sun and then back into the eddies of aether (9–12). Certainly, these lines are a self-lamentation. The *daimôn* is not permitted to linger anywhere and is jostled from one incarnation to the next (12). Still, in the light of Empedocles' description of the anonymous sage (B129), there is also an element of epistemic self-promotion here. Empedocles' lamentable journey resulted in an extraordinarily extensive range of personal encounters with large-scale manifestations of the world's different areas and basic, elemental building blocks.

Again, that Empedocles was 'a boy and a girl and a bush and a bird and a fish travelling in the sea' (B117) reflects his surpassingly rich repertoire of experiences. Xenophanes asks us to imagine how not only humans but also cows and horses would depict the gods (DK21 B15). Heraclitus asks us to reflect on the nature of seawater by considering its impact not only on humans but also on fish (DK22 B61). Empedocles takes to an eccentric new level the epistemological worry about myopically limiting ourselves only to the human perspective on things. He experiences not only different areas of the world and in different times, but also in diverse *ways* and from diverse *perspectives*. Empedocles structures B117 in such a way as to underscore that these perspectives range over both genders ('a boy and a girl') and include organisms belonging to the land, the air and the sea.

B11 offers one concrete case in which Empedocles' extraordinary repertoire of experiences makes some epistemological difference: 'Fools – for their reflections do not have a far-reaching intelligence (δολιχόφρονες) – are those who expect that what previously was not comes to be or that anything dies and is utterly destroyed.' A person aware of his own transmigratory career (like Empedocles and the anonymous sage) would be aware that a thing's generation need not mean its absolute popping into existence (rather than its construction from pre-existing

constituents), and that its dissolution need not mean its categorical disappearance (rather than its transformation into something else). Again, Empedocles says that a wise man would not divine that, before we are 'formed as mortals' (πάγεν τε βροτοί) or after we die, we are nothing, or that it is only during 'what people call life' (i.e. our current incarnation), that we are subject to evil and good (δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά, B15).[40] Of course, Empedocles' eschatological experiences do not directly yield his thesis that birth is only the combination, and death the separation, of persisting elements. But his experiences do cohere well with this cosmological view about birth and death. The fools fail to have a 'far-reaching intelligence'. The imagery is again that of an excessively limited and myopic perspective. In another text, Empedocles begins his account of a zoogony, which appears to be influenced by Strife, and which certainly takes place in an earlier period than the present one, with the words: 'But come now! Hear these things about how separating fire brought up the nocturnal shoots of men and women, full of lamentations. For the account is neither wide of the mark nor uninformed' (ἀδαήμων, B62.1–3). The last term, *adaêmôn*, suggests that one is uninformed by personal experience in some matter.[41] With the word *adaêmôn*, Empedocles plays on his term of art *daimôn*. His account is not uninformed: it is given by a *daimôn* possessed of a long life and extensive experiences. In his *Cratylus* (398b5–7), Plato presents the same etymology for '*daimôn*', deriving it from the word *daêmôn* ('knowing', 'experienced').[42]

In sum, part of what underlies Empedocles' claims for epistemic authority is his ability to draw on a surpassingly rich repertoire of experiences, spanning spatially and chronologically diverse parts of cosmic history, as well as the diverse perspectives of different organisms. Empedocles not only wanders the cosmos as a *daimôn*, he also pursues cosmological inquiry as a *daimôn*.

[40] Empedocles' figurative use of the verb 'divine' (μαντεύσαιτο) draws on the role in divination of the formation of views on the basis of experiences, but also evokes the association of divination with transcending a narrow mortal view of things. For both points, see Ch. 3.1.

[41] *Il.* 5.634; *Il.* 13.811; *Od.* 12.208; *Od.* 17.283; cf. *Od.* 24.244 (ἀδαημονίη).

[42] For δαήμων, cf. *Il.* 15.411; *Il.* 23.671.

Is Empedocles, then, unwary of the Heraclitean objection that much-learning does not generate understanding, certainly not by itself? Does he imagine naively that the accumulation of experiences automatically yields a proportionate accumulation of wisdom? The answer must be an emphatic 'no'. In fact, Empedocles is clear that one must know how to use and how *not* to use perceptual experiences (B3.9–13). He cautions us against setting more store by any one of our perceptual faculties than any other. He urges us to consider each object in all of the perceptual ways in which it is manifest. Most interestingly, Empedocles stresses in this connection that our perceptual organs constitute 'a passage for understanding' or 'for insight' (πόρος . . . νοῆσαι, B3.12). Empedocles, then, puts some daylight between perceptual experience and understanding. Our perceptual faculties are instruments that can facilitate but also obstruct understanding and insight, depending on how we use them.

B17 gives further indications of the proper role and limitations of perceptual experiences, and goes some way towards clarifying how they might offer 'a passage for understanding' in the highest sense. When he touches on the operation of Love among the elements, Empedocles introduces a brief methodological digression: ' . . . and love among them, equal in length and breadth. And you, gaze on her with your mind (νόῳ δέρκευ) and do not sit with stunned eyes (ὄμμασιν). For she is recognised even by mortals (νομίζεται), inborn in their joints, and by her they think loving thoughts and accomplish works of unity, calling her by the names Joy and Aphrodite. Her no mortal has perceived (δεδάηκε) whirling among them. But you, hear (ἄκουε) the undeceptive expedition of my account' (B17.20–6). Some important objects of inquiry, like Love, cannot be registered through sensory perception, however rich our repertoire of perceptual experiences. Empedocles cleverly underscores this point. The digression starts with the injunction to *look* at Love with the mind (21) and ends with the injunction to *listen* to Empedocles' account. Empedocles uses sensory terminology to bookend his core point that sensory perception will *not* get us the cognition we are looking for here. You precisely cannot see or hear Love. On a first reading, then, we might conclude that personal, perceptual experience is irrelevant

for the enterprise of coming to recognise and understand Love. But the situation is not so simple. There is a meaningful sense in which we are indeed asked to 'see' and 'hear'. In the middle of the digression ('for she is recognised … Aphrodite', 22–4), Empedocles appeals to familiar manifestations of Love's influence, which we can experience directly. He asks us to recognise Love as that power which, residing within us, makes us think loving thoughts and effect unity (as opposed to strife and division). Our direct and personal awareness of the operation of Love within us can then bring us closer to recognising the work of this same unifying power in the world at large. In sum, we cannot perceive Love; and yet, our direct awareness of Love's effects on us can indirectly help us to recognise and understand the nature of the power which causes those effects.[43]

In the continuation of the same passage in the Strasbourg papyrus, Empedocles describes the generation of animals, humans and plants under the influence of Love (and perhaps also Strife). Empedocles invites Pausanias to hear his true account (*Strasb. a* (ii) 22), but remarks that he will also demonstrate his point to Pausanias through his eyes ([δεί]ξω σοι καὶ ἀν' ὅσσ', 23; cf. 21: 'not through ears alone'). Empedocles then describes the natures of some zoogonic products, specimens of which are still extant (νῦν ἔτι λοιπά, 25), and encourages Pausanias to deploy his own observations of them as evidence: 'from these things carry to your mind true proofs of words (ἐκ τῶν ἀψευδῆ κόμισαι φρενὶ δείγματα μ[ύθων]), for you will see (ὄψει) the coming together and the unfolding of the offspring' (29–30). Lines 24–8 are fragmentary, and we cannot determine the precise details of the supposed visual evidence. We find a related point, though, in Empedocles' assertion that 'hairs and leaves and the dense feathers on birds are the same (ταὐτά), and the scales on stout limbs' (B82). These seemingly disparate objects display a functional similarity – a protective and preserving effect, which points to the hand of

[43] On the importance of 'analogical reasoning' in Empedocles (and in B17), whereby we grasp and corroborate universal cosmological principles by reflecting on instances of their operation within the limited sphere of our own experiences, see Kamtekar (2009); Palmer (2013) 322–7. The former (226–31) also emphasises the distinctions in Empedocles between thinking and perceiving.

Love.[44] At any rate, Empedocles' general methodological attitude here is similar to what we found before. We cannot directly perceive Love, but we *can* directly perceive some of her products and effects. Empedocles, in sum, has good reasons for thinking that we become better equipped epistemically as our repertoire of experiences grows richer. The more direct experiences one has of the products and effects of Love and Strife, the more one has to work with in coming to recognise and understand these universal powers.

Let us turn to two further fragments which, I think, are very relevant for us:

πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

For people's cunning intelligence is expanded in relation to what is present.
(B106)

ὅσσον <δ'> ἀλλοῖοι μετέφυν, τόσον ἄρ σφισιν αἰεί
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται.

And insofar as they change over to become of a different sort, so far it is always Present to them also to cognise different sorts of things.
(B108)

Aristotle cites these lines to implicate Empedocles in an alleged ancient consensus, which identified sense-perception as cognition and failed to demarcate it from any other sort of thought or cognition.[45] On Aristotle's portrayal, the point of these lines is that one's thinking is always nothing more than unwilled, uncontrolled and veridical reactions to one's current physiological state and immediate surroundings. But could this really be the import of Empedocles' statements? Indeed, we saw that Empedocles not only distinguished between (i) uncontrolled perceptual cognition and experience and (ii) deliberate, non-perceptual understanding, but also developed sophisticated methodological reflections about the proper relation between the two. He also clearly thought that false opinions are possible (B2, B39). Finally, by contrast with Aristotle's concluding remark (*Metaph*. Γ.5 $1010^{a}1$–3), that what

[44] Note also B84 on Love's construction of the pupil, which is protected by the eye like a fire inside a lantern. Cf. Kamtekar (2009) 232–3.

[45] See Ch. 4.3 on Aristotle's doxographic discussions in *Metaph*. Γ.5 $1009^{b}12$–$1010^{a}3$ and *de An*. 3.3 $427^{a}17$-$^{b}14$.

underpinned these views about sense-perception was the assumption that the things-that-are are exclusively perceptible (*aisthêta*), Empedocles demonstrably thought that some objects of inquiry and understanding (like Love) are not perceptible.[46] We can more plausibly relate these fragments to the themes that we have been charting.

B108 conveys rather directly the idea that, by becoming different sorts of things, one gets the opportunity to experience different sorts of awareness and cognition. To be sure, the point is not limited to metempsychosis. The fragment expresses the more general thought that changes in our constitution lead to changes in the sorts of awareness and cognition that are available to us. Thus, when we become ill or healthy or old or young or a man or a woman or a lion or a bird, the nature of our awareness and our cognition changes along with our constitution. Changes in our constitution quite generally lead to changes in what is available for us to experience and register. Nonetheless, metempsychosis will be one especially significant and radical type of change, which – if, like Empedocles, one can retain one's recollections of past incarnations – leads to a quantitatively and qualitatively richer repertoire of experiences.

B106 tells us that people's *mêtis* – their cunning intelligence, their resourcefulness – increases in proportion to what is present to them. I suggest that at least one point this line is making is that the richer your repertoire of experiences is – the more things are present to you – the greater your cunning intelligence will be. We saw that Empedocles does not hold the naïve view that an accumulation of experiences automatically yields greater wisdom and understanding. In this fragment he does, however, indicate that a richer repertoire of experiences will allow people an increased ability to reflect thoughtfully, carefully and resourcefully. The thought is not so implausible: the more experience you gain, the more things you become aware of, the more careful and shrewd you get in the ways in which you act and think on the basis of your experiences. The anonymous sage, who can *behold* (λεύσσεσκεν) with his mind each of all the sorts of things which

[46] Cf. also B133.

are in ten or twenty lifetimes (B129), is precisely a figure to whom an enormous array of things are present whenever he wishes. The more that is currently present in the form of memories to humans – from their current and past lifetimes – the more they have to work with in expanding their intelligence.

We can thus integrate these fragments into Empedocles' overall epistemological framework. B106 and B108 reflect the epistemological significance in Empedocles of experience and recollection, as well as of metempsychosis.

Let us sharpen further one important sense in which Empedocles does not merely advocate a simple, quantitative accumulation of raw perceptual experiences across several lifetimes. Empedocles is attuned to the point that a *daimôn* incarnated in one sort of body may experience and respond to the world in a radically different way to a *daimôn* incarnated in a very different sort of body. Different organisms have different perspectives on things. In his current incarnation, moreover, Empedocles is able to develop a *second-order*, synoptic and critical perspective on all those other perspectives which he occupied in earlier incarnations. Empedocles regrets the crimes of bloodshed which he committed for the sake of food as a wild beast (*Strasb. d* 5–6 = B139, quoted above). Clearly, when he was incarnated as a wild beast, Empedocles was not able, as he is now able (at least to a greater degree), to choose his actions in a reflective and deliberative way. (Nor presumably was he then aware, as he is now, of his own position within a series of incarnations.) Otherwise, he would not have acted as he did. As a wild beast, Empedocles was simply driven to tear flesh for the sake of food. Now, however, he is able to analyse and lament his actions as a beast in terms which were not available to him as a beast. In hindsight, he can situate and criticise those actions within a universal cosmological and ethical framework.

It is not, then, merely raw perceptual experiences and cognitions, from different parts of cosmic history, which Empedocles carries over to be analysed in his current incarnation. Empedocles also has an insight into what we might grandly call different sorts of consciousness. Empedocles carries over a recollection of *what it is like* to be a wild beast (or a girl, a fish, a laurel tree, etc.).

Empedocles thus has some insight into the very different ways in which Love and Strife, as universal cosmological as well as moral powers, operate within very different creatures and organisms. By becoming different sorts of things, we register and experience different sorts of things (B108). In his current incarnation, Empedocles is able to develop a second-order perspective concerning those earlier perspectives and experiences. He can, for example, reflect on the (cosmological and moral) nature of Strife as it dominated his experiences and actions as a wild beast and situate his current position, in relation to his earlier ones, as the latest link in a series of reincarnations.[47]

Now, the universal and second-order perspective of which Empedocles is capable in his current incarnation also allows him an informed recognition of the epistemic and ethical *limitations* of that incarnation. Indeed, Empedocles expressly tells us that he is still now trusting in mad Strife (νῦν εἰμι φυγάς . . . νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος, B115.13–14). This brings us to Empedocles' requests for divine aid:

> καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,
> ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,
> πέμπε παρ' εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἅρμα.
>
> *And you, Muse, much-remembering white-armed maiden,*
> *I beseech you: what is right for ephemeral creatures to hear,*
> *Send to me, driving your well-reined chariot issuing from piety.*
> (B3.3–5)

[47] One might reasonably ask Empedocles how our experiences in and of one sort of consciousness (a wild beast, a bird) could be transferred into and preserved as memories in a very different one (a human). We should remember that, at least on rudimentary, perceptual levels of cognition, all things are aware and experience in fundamentally the same manner within Empedocles' system. Sensory cognition operates on the principle of like-by-like: by earth we see (ὀπώπαμεν) earth, by water – water, by aether – aether, by fire – fire (B109). (It is true that, in B109.3 – 'and Love by Love, and Strife by baneful Strife' – Empedocles segues into a more figurative application of the like-by-like principle (analogical reasoning); but we should not on those grounds completely divest the term ὀπώπαμεν of its literal perceptual significance with regard to the four elements in B109.1–2; contra Kamtekar (2009).) Indeed, *all* things have some measure of cognition and awareness (φρόνησιν . . . νώματος αἶσαν, B110.10). In other words, the elements are themselves independently cognisant. Earth is aware of earth, etc. Thus, some elemental compounds (say, a bush or a fish) will have relatively simpler and more primitive cognitive experiences. Others (a human) will have more complex ones. But these experiences will be broadly commensurable.

εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα,
ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,
εὐχομένῳ νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,
ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι.

For if for the sake of any ephemeral creature, immortal Muse,
<It has pleased you> to let our concerns pass through your thought,
Be present to me again now as I pray, Calliopeia,
As I display a good discourse about the blessed gods. (B131)[48]

Why does Empedocles feel an intellectual or dialectical need to appeal to divine disclosure and to 'the assurances issuing from our Muse' (παρ' ἡμετέρης . . . πιστώματα Μούσης, B4)? If he bases his claims for epistemic authority in no small measure on his possession of a superhuman and surpassingly rich repertoire of experiences, then why does he also need the Muse? One simple but viable answer is that Empedocles' rich repertoire of experiences only renders him more acutely aware of all that still lies *outside* his range of personal experiences. However extensive, his experiences as an exiled and wandering *daimôn* still cover only a relatively small slice of cosmic history. Empedocles is very aware of the pitfalls of mistaking whatever one chances to meet for the whole. This awareness sets him apart from the reckless fools (B2). Empedocles' cosmological story ranges from the unification of all things in the homogeneous Sphere of Love to their complete segregation under the total rule of Strife (and back again). It certainly extends to areas and events which lie well outside his repertoire of personal experiences. We need not posit a neat and tidy classification of cosmological tenets, such that Empedocles asserts on the Muse's authority whatever pertains to events and processes that lie outside the range of his experiences, and on his own authority whatever he encountered first-hand. I suggest only that we can see why Empedocles felt the need to appeal to divine aid and authority so as to go beyond what he could say about cosmic history independently of it. Within the framework of divine revelation, our ordinary perceptual experiences, and *Empedocles*' extraordinarily rich and extensive repertoire of

[48] 'About the blessed gods' does not delimit the subject matter or exclude cosmology. The elements are themselves gods ('Zeus', 'Hera', 'Aidoneus' and 'Nestis', B6).

perceptual experiences, serve to support and illuminate universal cosmological and ethical principles and ideas, which Empedocles could only have received from the goddess.[49]

Empedocles' appeals to the Muse raise another important question. If Empedocles is a *daimôn* with a long-lasting life, if he is, as he says, 'better than much-destroyed mortal humans' (θνητῶν περίειμι πολυφθερέων ἀνθρώπων, B113), then why does he also describe himself as an *ephemeral* creature?[50] Could we say that Empedocles is describing only his *audience* as ephemeral creatures? This solution is implausible. Empedocles prays: 'if for the sake of any ephemeral creature, immortal Muse, it has pleased you to let *our* concerns (ἡμετέρας μελέτας) pass through your thought … ' (B131.1–2). These lines identify Empedocles' own concerns here as those of an ephemeral creature. Why do we find these divergent representations of Empedocles both as a long-living exiled divinity (a *daimôn*), who is superior to 'much-destroyed mortal humans', and, conversely, as an ephemeral mortal?[51]

We should embrace, rather than try to explain away, the paradox that Empedocles is indeed *both* a long-living, divine *daimôn* and an ephemeral creature. Empedocles is a *daimôn* insofar as he persists across successive incarnations as the same agent

[49] Palmer (2013) 322–7 advances a similar view of the structure of the relation between ordinary human experience, reasoning and revelation in Empedocles. Less convincingly, Palmer finds the closest model for Empedocles and his Muse in Parmenides and his goddess, and suggests that we should see the Muse, and *not* Empedocles, as the speaker of most of the fragments of *On Nature* (at 313–14, he makes a good case for B111). Empedocles' Muse is not herself initiatory or eschatological and there is nothing in Parmenides corresponding to Empedocles' addressee, Pausanias (B1; cf. B4.2–3). The triangular model Muse-Empedocles-Pausanias is better compared to the model Muse-Hesiod-Perses in the *Works and Days* (where, indeed, poet and Muse are not generally demarcated as different speakers: Ch. 2.4).

[50] For the sense of fleeting transience in *ephêmerios* ('for a day'), see e.g. *Od*. 21.85; Thgn. 656; Aesch. *Pr.* 547.

[51] The texts discussed in this paragraph suffice to show this duality. I take no position on whether in B112.4 – 'I among you a deathless god, no longer mortal (θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός)' – Empedocles expresses conviction in his essential divine nature as a *daimôn* (Panagiotou (1983)), refers proleptically to his imminent-but-not-yet-realised return to full godhood (Guthrie (1965) 246; cf. Trépanier (2014) 204), or merely comments on how he is *perceived* among the people of Acragas (Palmer (2013) 311). When Empedocles states 'know these things clearly, having heard an account issuing from a god' (τορῶς ταῦτ' ἴσθι, **θεοῦ πάρα** μῦθον ἀκούσας, B23), he may be referring proleptically to his own status as a god among gods or, more likely, to the Muse from whom his account issues (cf. **παρ' ἡμετέρης** … Μούσης, B4.2).

(possessed of a continuous personal history which, from his current vantage point, he can express with first-person pronouns and past tense verbs). His identity as a *daimôn* pre-existed his current incarnation in a human body and will survive its dissolution. At the same time, however, Empedocles *is* also an ephemeral human creature insofar as he is *currently* incarnated in an ephemeral human form. The fact of his current incarnation is hardly insignificant to the question of Empedocles' identity. Empedocles' current imprisonment in a human form imposes all sorts of constraints on him, physical as well as moral and cognitive. As we noted, Empedocles recalls the terrible deeds which he committed with his claws when he was incarnated as a wild beast (*Strasb. d* 5–6 = B139). That Strife-dominated form of life *impelled* Empedocles to commit those violent crimes. Incarnated as a wild beast, then, Empedocles was morally and cognitively constrained. Incarnated as a human rather than a wild beast, Empedocles is presumably *less* constrained, both morally and cognitively. He is less a slave to unthinking impulses. But this does not mean that his current imprisonment in a human form imposes *no* such limitations and constraints. Again, Empedocles is still now trusting in mad Strife, presumably because he cannot help doing so (B115.13–14).

Empedocles makes the issue of self-identity a central philosophical concern.[52] At first sight, it might have seemed that his answer to the question 'who am I *really*?' was 'I am really a *daimôn*, who has a long-lasting life and who persists across successive incarnations.' We can now see, however, that Empedocles will have to give a somewhat more complex and qualified answer: 'I am really a *daimôn*, who has a long-lasting life and persists across successive incarnations, and who is currently incarnated in a human body.' The added clause is significant to who we are. Empedocles' current imprisonment in a human body is constitutive of his current conduct, disposition, impulses, capacities and limitations. It makes a difference to what he is and is not capable and worthy of, physically, morally and cognitively. In this sense, 'boy', 'girl', 'man', 'beast', 'bush', etc. pick out

[52] This centrality is emphasised in Osborne (2005) 295–7; Inwood (2006).

importantly different phases in the existence of the same thing (the transmigrating *daimôn*).[53]

After he lambasts the reckless fools, Empedocles promises Pausanias – and us – that he will take us much further, but, interestingly, only as far as mortal intelligence can reach: 'But you, then, since you have stepped aside here, you will learn (πεύσεαι); mortal intelligence has certainly risen no further' (οὐ πλεῖόν γε βροτείη μῆτις ὄρωρεν, B2.8^{b}-9). Empedocles recognises the ultimate limitations imposed on Pausanias' intelligence as well as on his own by their current human incarnations. In the final analysis, the seemingly incompatible designations '*daimôn*' and 'ephemeral creature' are, in fact, both appropriate. They pick out different aspects of Empedocles' complex current situation. In different contexts, Empedocles will emphasise different aspects of his complex identity. When, for example, he argues against animal sacrifice, he will allude to his awareness of transmigrations. When, however, he wishes to invoke the Muse, he will acknowledge his current incarnation in a wretched and ephemeral human body and piously ask to be told only whatever is appropriate for a creature in that circumstance to hear.

The Empedocles who emerged here operates within the same broad tradition of theological epistemology as Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. He too pursues questions of epistemology and contemplates the nature of speculative inquiry by

[53] The answer to the question 'who am I really?' discussed here does not preclude the additional answer 'I am really a compound of elements.' The material constitution of the *daimones* is unclear. There is no reason to think that Empedocles specified it in some lost lines. Still, we can – minimally – make limited inferences from what he does say. First, Empedocles signals no further exceptions to the rule that all things are elemental compounds apart from Love, Strife and the pure elements themselves. We would thus expect the *daimones* to be an elemental compound of *some* sort. This is guaranteed if they are capable of causing and undergoing bloodshed (although this particular point depends on reading φόνῳ in B115.3, which is an emendation (as Gagné (2013) 462 reminds us), even if an almost universally accepted one). Empedocles describes incarnation as being dressed 'in a tunic of foreign fleshes' (B126). The elemental makeup of *daimones*, then, seems to diverge from that of the bodies in which they are incarnated. Finally, the elemental compound which is a *daimôn* persists across successive incarnations, but we also know that it cannot be *ever*lasting (cf. the long-lived (but not everlasting) gods in B21.12): if not before, the *daimôn* must ultimately be homogenised into the universal Sphere by Love or disintegrated into completely discrete elements under total Strife. For a discussion, which goes beyond such basic points, of the *daimôn* as a material and transmigrating substance, see Trépanier (2014).

integrating these issues into a broader set of reflections on the nature of mortal and divine. Like Hesiod and Parmenides, but unlike Xenophanes, Empedocles is the privileged recipient of an extra-human, divine perspective on the cosmos, which issues from a female deity. Unlike Parmenides, Empedocles does not take this disclosure to encompass 'all things', but only what is right for creatures trapped in human form to hear. In his own distinctive way, however, Empedocles too thinks that the deliverances of divine disclosure can be supported at least in part through contemplation: universal cosmological and ethical principles disclosed by the Muse illuminate and are in turn illuminated by critical reflection on (an extraordinarily broad range of) first-hand experiences. Again, for Empedocles, as for Parmenides, the mortal agent[54] is not simply and strictly mortal, but possesses also a higher-than-mortal, divine aspect and potential. And, with Empedocles as with Parmenides, this idea again has important epistemological consequences. Like all three thinkers, Empedocles operates with his own version of an epistemically significant interaction between mortal and divine agents, only through which can the mortal attain knowledge or come by certain insights and views.

Our discussion of Empedocles in this section was perforce focused and limited. A comprehensive consideration of all the ways in which we might relate these insights concerning his epistemology to his intricate theological and cosmological system – and of how these conclusions might bear on our understanding of different aspects of that system – would require a much longer study. And yet, we were able to see how Empedocles offers one particularly clear and significant, later instantiation of the tradition of theological epistemology which was our guiding theme in this book. This is not to say, of course, that Empedocles is the only other viable candidate for a treatment along the lines pursued in this book with respect to Hesiod, Xenophanes and Parmenides. One could also examine similarly the interrelations between epistemology and conceptions of (the interactions between) mortal and divine in other early philosophers like

[54] At least *some* mortal agents, if we are not all *daimones*.

Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, not to mention in such lyric poets as Pindar, such dramatists as Aeschylus or such historians as Herodotus – thinkers with whom scholars of Greek philosophy converse less frequently. Indeed, it would also be interesting to ask how Socrates and his divine sign might relate to this earlier tradition, exemplified by Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, in which the (typically personal and privileged) interactions between mortal and divine played an important role in one's understanding of oneself as an agent and as a thinker. *sed haec hactenus*.

6.3 Final Remarks: Reason and Revelation, Philosophy and Religion Again

In Chapter 1, we examined ideas of 'rationality', which align rather distinct intellectual phenomena and expect them to be naturally concomitant: on the one hand, coherent, critical, argumentative, inferential, questioning and explicative thinking; on the other hand, transitions away from god-centred patterns of thought and explanation and, in particular, transitions towards human inquiries that forgo any appeal to divine interference or aid. We may now summarise, in the broadest outline, conceptions of reasoning and divine disclosure, which we went on to find and analyse in the subsequent chapters.

With poetic inspiration, one does encounter claims for the truth of divinely disclosed accounts, which are received and conveyed apparently without the intervention of reasoning. Inspired poets often stake such truth-claims for narratives the descriptive truth of which neither they nor their audiences can assess.[55] The epic tradition, however, also reflects destabilising queries concerning the status of inspired but unverifiable narrations. In particular, Hesiod forcefully flags up the second-order question of whether inspiration in fact warrants such truth-claims. Furthermore, Hesiod identifies the factors which will inform and frame *reflection* on this question: above all, our understanding of the relation between mortal and divine, and between male and female, and of

[55] Ch. 2.2.

how this nexus of relations structures the world and our place within it. Hesiod and his audience, moreover, can reflect on this question critically and constructively by considering the prescriptive import even of inspired verses whose descriptive truth-value they are powerless to evaluate.[56] Hesiod is no passive and unreflective recipient of revelation.

In Chapter 3.1, we explored the centrality of conjectural and interpretative reasoning in Greek divination. We saw that, standardly, diviners or interpreters actively form conjectural beliefs by fallibly decoding communications encoded in omens or oracles. It remains the case, however, that the diviners must proceed with the working assumption that what the gods communicate to them are truths, even if mortals are liable to misinterpret divine communications and so to fail to register those truths. So too, when Socrates sets out to determine what Apollo could possibly have meant by declaring that no mortal is wiser than him, he assumes in advance that what the god says must be, in *some* sense, true (Plato, *Apol*. 21b6–7). Xenophanes supplants such traditional notions with a new model of divine disclosure and of reasoning. For Xenophanes, the divine discloses not truth-evaluable messages but evidence. Mortals reason out conjectures about the world beyond their experience on the basis of a necessarily limited but, through inquiries over time, ever-growing body of experiences, which have been made possible for them to consider by the divine.

With Parmenides we can delineate a far more sophisticated, specific and self-consciously developed form of rational thought, which he himself associates with the term *logos* (DK28 B7.5).[57] This type of thought is structured by the contrast (*krisis*) between 'is' and 'is not', as demarcated from the competing contrast

[56] Esp. Ch. 2.3. We also saw there that Hesiod had certain reasons to motivate his very postulation that the Muses inspire both truths and falsehoods.

[57] This last point does not rely on the (viable) translation 'reasoning' for the word *logos* itself. We could also render, say, 'discourse', 'thought', 'reckoning', *vel sim*. (cf. Granger (2010) 31–3; Mourelatos (2013) 165). The significant point is that, with her injunction for the mortal to judge by '*logos*', the goddess looks forward to the subsequent arguments in *Alêtheia*; cf. Ch. 4.3; Ch. 5.4. Long (2009) analyses the emergence in Heraclitus of an idea and ideal of rationality, which incorporates a complex nexus of notions – meaningful discourse, account, measure, proportion, balance, structure, order, plan, law, moderation, commonality and coherence – and which is centred on his term *logos*.

between sensory oppositions (Light/Night, Hot/Cold, etc.). It is manifested in the extended and sustained system of argumentation developed in *Alêtheia* (DK28 B8). Furthermore, this form of rational thought is unsustainable by the human mind. When a *human's* mind does sustain this thought, it is then a divinised and no longer a *human* mind. When a human reasons about and in terms of the contrast between 'is' and 'is not', follows *Alêtheia*'s argumentation and ascertains for himself the true nature of what-is, he is thinking with, or as, his divine soul. Finally, it is only through his interaction with the goddess, and through her disclosure and guidance, that Parmenides was first able to acquire the ability to sustain such thought with his divine soul. It is only through his initiatory and transformative text, which reprises this interaction and this disclosure and guidance, that we can do the same. We thus find in Parmenides a major, early exponent of the subsequent philosophical tradition of assimilation to the divine (*homoiôsis theôi*), which associated our capacity for sustaining rational thought and contemplation with a capacity for identifying ourselves with what is divine in us.[58]

Does the goddess *also* act for Parmenides as the guarantor of truths? With regard to the first part of the poem, this question will turn on whether we think that the initial and foundational principles established in DK28 B2 – however precisely we interpret those principles – are meant to be justifiable self-sufficiently and on the basis of their intrinsic logical self-evidence alone or, rather, rely for their acceptability on the goddess's authority. It is unclear that this dilemma can be determined conclusively. Nonetheless, the way in which the goddess rests her case on the intrinsic impossibility of knowing or indicating what-is-not ('for neither could you know what-is-not (for that cannot be accomplished) nor could you indicate it', DK28 B2.7–8) perhaps suggests the former alternative, as does her emphatic exhortation to the *kouros* to judge and evaluate her examination for himself (DK28 B7.5–6; cf. Chapter 6.1). There is also, however, the second part of the

[58] Esp. Ch. 5.4. By identifying this emerging, self-conscious notion of rationality in Parmenides, we do not, of course, exclude that *Doxa* too may display what *we* would recognise as (systematic, explicative, coherent, abductive) 'rational' thought, as, for example, when it explains the moon's light as a reflection of the sun's (DK28 B14–15; A42).

poem (*Doxa*), which is no less part of the goddess's revelation, and the correctness of whose accounts of multiple, heterogeneous and changing things and processes cannot be established through the same deductive means. When the goddess affirms *Doxa*'s status as the best possible cosmology, she emphasises that this account will be her own (σοι ἐγώ . . . φατίζω, DK28 B8.60–1). It is in her voice that we, along with the *kouros*, are assured that the cosmology will endow us with knowledge and understanding of, for example, cosmic celestial bodies and phenomena (DK28 B10). In sum, it is certainly possible that Parmenides, not unlike Empedocles, rests the authority of his cosmological accounts not only on their abductive, explanatory and observational appeal but also and concurrently on the guidance and guarantees of his kind and benevolent goddess. Nor could we exclude definitively that the foundational principles in *Alêtheia* are similarly accepted concurrently on the basis of both logical appeal and divine authority. Be that as it may, the essential function of this initiatory goddess and of her revelation is to effect the cognitive transformation of the mortal *kouros*, as we discussed above.

Empedocles, finally, makes a direct appeal to the 'assurances' of his Muse (DK31 B4). He combines this appeal to divine revelation with an emphasis on the significance of perceptual experiences and the importance of properly analysing and contemplating those experiences. Within the framework of divine disclosure, Empedocles' reflections on his extraordinarily rich repertoire of experiences, and our own reflections on our own ordinary range of experiences, illuminate and corroborate – and are in turn illuminated by – universal and ethical principles, which Empedocles could only have received from his goddess.

We began this book by discussing certain deep-seated tendencies to dissociate rationality as secularising reasoning, from irrationality, as non-reasoning, god-centred religiosity; to recognise divine interference in human inquiry only as the transmission of truths to unreasoning and passive recipients; and to isolate religious belief as special in kind, and as insulated from, and contrasted with, the activity of reasoning. We ended up finding that, in the emergence of systematic epistemology in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, different forms of

critical reasoning and reflection, and different models of the relation and interactions between mortal and divine, play harmonious and equally integral roles. In their different ways, each of these thinkers operates with a model of divine disclosure which accommodates, facilitates or even necessitates critical human reflection and inquiry.

With Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles, we explored in greater depth a phenomenon which in Chapter 1.2 we identified more briefly also in the cases of the Milesian cosmologists, the Hippocratic author of *On the Sacred Disease* and such myth-critics as Hecataeus, Herodotus and Palaephatus. We find in these thinkers pioneering strides in rational (coherent, critical, argumentative, inferential, questioning and explicative) thinking. We do not, however, find in them concomitant secularising moves away from god-centred patterns of thought and explanation as such. The ancient evidence here resists our deep-seated but historically contingent and even peculiar expectation that such rational thinking should run counter in a general way to religious and god-centred attitudes, or that religious belief must be a special and qualitatively distinct kind of belief, self-consciously insulated from procedures of criticism and evaluation ('faith').[59]

That said, we certainly encountered in the course of this book reflections about the divine which were distinctive, original and not infrequently subversive or critical of common and received religious and theological attitudes. Xenophanes offers the most striking example. He questions what he identifies and portrays as a pervasive (DK21 B10–12, B14) system of interrelated beliefs, which was promulgated above all by Homer and Hesiod and which conceived of the gods as fundamentally *like us* in how they come to be, appear, think and conduct themselves. In rejecting divination, moreover, Xenophanes rejects at least one ubiquitous religious *practice*.[60] Hesiod himself (whether we prefer to think of him as

[59] On 'religious belief', see further Ch. 1.4.

[60] Did Xenophanes reject other practices? Our evidence does not permit us to say. His instructions for the ideal symposium (DK21 B1) do prescribe changes in certain religious activities (even as they retain some traditional ritual patterns) by advocating pointedly non-conventional prayers (for the capacity to act justly) and hymns (which are to use only 'pure speech' and exclude stories about strife among gods). This is hardly evidence for a wholesale overthrow of traditional forms of worship, however, and it has

a philosophical pioneer in his own right or as a key initiator of later philosophical thought[61]) destabilises blithe acquiescence on the part of poets in the truth of their inspired accounts. Parmenides' cosmology included a theological hierarchy that ran counter to the predominant Homeric and Hesiodic patriarchal scheme, placing centre stage a governing goddess, who also appears to be the generator of all other gods (DK28 B13). Even this unusual theological scheme, moreover, is excluded from Parmenides' account of the nature of ultimate reality. Parmenides does not ascribe to what-is traditional theological epithets. If what-is nonetheless possesses a divine status, then it does so only in a highly abstract and non-traditional sense.[62] Empedocles' belief in metempsychosis led him to reject a religious institution no less central than animal sacrifice (DK31 B128, B136–7).

And yet, the engagements of these thinkers with established religious and theological attitudes do not present us with traceless rejections or simple dismissals, but with complex combinations of divergences, criticisms and creative appropriations, even of those very aspects of religion which are being criticised. Above all, their engagements with received or current religious ideas are involved and substantial. We are not dealing here simply with borrowings of imagery and patterns of speech, which have been divested of their religious significance. The categories 'pre-Socratic philosophy' and 'early Greek philosophy' have conditioned us to think that the key (if not the only) intellectual interlocutors of a pre-Socratic philosopher were other and earlier pre-Socratic philosophers.[63]

been well observed that Plato adopted many of Xenophanes' theological criticisms without proposing to abolish any civic cults (Cornford (1952) 146). What we *can* say is that our evidence does suggest the expectation for a harmonious correspondence between religious belief and practice. 'Purity' characterises not only the hymns prescribed for the symposium (καθαροῖσι λόγοις, 14) but, equally, the floor (καθαρόν, 1) and the water (καθαρόν, 8). Conversely, when Xenophanes criticises Homer and Hesiod for 'attributing' to the gods immoral actions, he uses a verb which standardly signifies the consecration of a votive gift or dedication (ἀνέθηκαν, DK21 B11.1; cf. Hes. *Op*. 658; Hdt. 2.159; for the observation, cf. Lesher (1992) 84). Homeric and Hesiodic myths about thieving and cheating gods are thus recast as perverse and impious sorts of *offerings* to the gods. Finally, Xenophanes reportedly advised the Eleans to fit their practices in connection with Leucothea (they might either worship or lament her, but not both) to their beliefs about her (do they take her to be a goddess or a deceased mortal?), DK21 A13. The anecdote's historicity is questionable, but it again associates Xenophanes with the expectation for correspondence between belief and practice.

[61] On this issue, see Ch. 1.5. [62] Ch. 5.5.2, Ch. 6.1. [63] Cf. Ch. 1.5.

But Xenophanes was thinking with and against poets and diviners no less than Ionian cosmologists. He devoted serious reflection to ideas of divine disclosure adumbrated in the traditions of poetry and divination and, while he rejected those ideas, they exerted a substantial influence on his own, alternative model of disclosure.[64] Again, Parmenides converses with the epic tradition and with ideas of metempsychosis and initiation current in South Italy no less than with Xenophanes or Ionian cosmology. To be sure, Parmenides develops his own distinctive version of the notion that the height of mortal excellence involves the promotion of what is divine in the mortal and the attainment of divine qualities, and he puts to novel philosophical use the models of interactions between humans and personal gods found in epic poetry and in the traditions of mystery initiations. But his debt to these religious traditions remains profound.[65]

Xenophanes' philosophical verses evince a very different theology – different beliefs about and notions of the divine – than, say, the representations of divination in Homer or the extant inquiries at the oracle of Zeus at Dodona. They also evince a very different mode of theologising – a different *way* of constructing and conveying beliefs about and notions of the divine. And yet, these different materials can be seen to participate in a shared theological conversation about how a knowledgeable divinity might comport itself in relation to mortals who seek the truth. Again, Parmenides' philosophical verses evince a different theology and a different kind of theologising than the representations of godlike mortals in Homer or the promises of imminent deification in the initiatory Gold Tablets. And yet, these different materials are relatable as participants in an ongoing conversation concerning the nature of the boundary between mortal and divine and the prospect of traversing this boundary.[66] By contrast with the idea of 'natural theology', early Greek philosophical theology did not operate on a qualitatively different plane to common and received religious attitudes. It was not divorced from preoccupations

[64] Ch. 3. [65] Esp. Ch. 5.2–3.
[66] On the ways in which very different theological materials can interact and interrelate, see similarly and more generally Eidinow, Kindt, Osborne and Tor (2016) 4–6.

with the gods elsewhere in Greek culture.[67] We must remember that Greek religion itself was never anything like a theological unity. It encompassed a mass of often competing beliefs, values, questions and reservations. The ultimate unknowability of the gods was often emphasised and, by and large, philosophical and other criticisms of particular religious attitudes, representations and even practices were accommodated. I argued in this book that the philosophical epistemology which emerges in Hesiod, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles was an essentially theological enterprise. As such, this enterprise was not only influenced by Greek religion but was itself one part and aspect of Greek religion.[68]

For all these reasons, this study of early philosophical epistemology was – and had to be – a study also of poetic inspiration, divination, mystery initiation, metempsychosis and other aspects of early Greek conceptions of the relation and interactions between gods and mortals. I strove in this book to examine philosophical texts in the light of their cultural, religious and literary context, without thereby reducing or assimilating them to that context. I tried to show that, by combining the analysis of systematic and critical reflection in those texts with this kind of contextualisation, we can develop full-blooded interpretative accounts which enable us to integrate the different aspects of our evidence and free us from having to decide whether a Xenophanes or a Parmenides was 'a systematic thinker' or 'a religious sage'. They were both. In the end, we did not have to choose between taking seriously Parmenides' goddess or his novel forms of argumentative reasoning. Indeed, we must not choose.

[67] On 'natural theology', see Ch. 1.3.

[68] We emphasised these points in Ch. 1.3, as well as the fact that our evidence for Greek philosophy outside of and before Classical Athens gives no hint of backlash against theological criticisms (indeed, Xenophanes betrays no hesitation about taking his teachings from city to city: DK21 B8, B45) nor supports the notion that philosophical theology was typically thought to clash in a general way with traditional attitudes and practices.

APPENDIX

THE TRAJECTORY OF THE *KOUROS*' JOURNEY AND ESCHATOLOGICAL TOPOGRAPHY IN PARMENIDES: SOME INCONCLUSIVE REMARKS

In Chapter 5.3, we analysed the proem to Parmenides' poem both internally and in relation to a number of religious and literary models that it appropriates. We saw that Parmenides represents the journey of the *kouros* as that of the post-mortem (Hot, Light, aethereal) soul and evokes the imagery and terminology of mystery initiation as well as the scenery of the Hesiodic Underworld. Furthermore, we saw that his journey is made possible by divine agents of Light, Heat and the higher, celestial and aethereal regions, with whom he himself is closely connected. We concluded that these points should be recognised independently of a prior reconstruction of the trajectory of the *kouros*' journey, and, indeed, that any such reconstruction will have to take them into account.

A consideration of the topographical markers internal to DK28 B1 and of cultural models which it evokes should lead us to the conclusion that, the confident assertions of feuding scholars notwithstanding, there are at least four (and probably more) viable interpretations of the trajectory of the *kouros*' journey, none of which we can reasonably insist is demonstrably preferable to the others. The journey could be (i) a *katabasis*; (ii) an *anabasis*; (iii) a journey which follows the daily course of the Sun and, therefore, combines in different stages both *anabasis* and *katabasis*; (iv) intrinsically blurred.[1] The proem does indeed display various

[1] E.g. (i): Morrison (1955) 59–60; Burkert (1969) 1–15 (but Burkert ultimately suggests (15) that it is best to think of the journey simply as one to the Beyond; cf. Primavesi (2013) 41); Furley (1973) 1–5; Kingsley (1999) esp. 50–3; Göbel (2002) 161; Palmer (2009) 52–3; Gemelli Marciano (2013); Ranzato (2015) 39–42; (ii): Diels (2003) 7–8; Fränkel (1975*a*) 5; Jaeger (1947) 93; Verdenius (1949) 119; Cornford (1952) 118; Bowra (1953*c*) 43–4; Roloff (1970) 171ff; Kahn (2009) 210–15. Interpreting the journey's trajectory as an *anabasis* does not imply interpreting it allegorically (or *vice versa*). For Jaeger (1947) 96 and Verdenius (1949) 119–20, for example, the journey is an

topographical markers and, in that sense, itself raises the question of the journey's trajectory.

Before turning to evaluate these alternatives, we will first consider the possible topographical implications of Simplicius' account of the goddess's cyclical conveyance of souls (*in Ph*. 9.39. 19–21 = Coxon (2009) Testim. 207, quoted and discussed in Chapter 5.2). Then, when we assess the different candidate interpretations of B1, we can ask how they might relate to what Simplicius could be taken to suggest. Simplicius certainly refers to *some* sort of topography, and we may outline some interpretative options.

(*a*) 'The invisible', τὸ ἀειδές, especially given the eschatological context, is an obvious reference to Hades (for invisibility, see *Il*. 5.845). One possibility, then, is that 'the visible' simply signifies the region which is visible or manifest to us, i.e. the habitat of living mortals, while 'the invisible', the region we cannot see, signifies the post-mortem destination of our souls.[2] On this view, death would be mentioned first (ποτέ) and birth second (ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν).

(*b*) Now, it seems possible – although not obvious – that we should map the antithesis 'the visible'/'the invisible' unto Parmenides' fundamental and pervasive Doxastic antithesis Light/Night (φάος . . . νύξ, B9; cf. B8.56–9). One might support the identification of 'the invisible' with Night by noting that Parmenides elsewhere describes Night as 'unseen' with a similar alpha-privative adjective (νυκτὸς ἀφάντου, B9.3). Aligning the two terms 'the visible' and 'the invisible' with the Doxastic antithesis is compatible with the view that τὸ ἀειδές signifies the soul's post-mortem destination.[3] This destination, or 'Hades', would be a darker and colder region than that of living humans.[4]

(*c*) We could, however, not only associate the two adjectives with the two elements, but also identify τὸ ἐμφανές as the region inhabited by

anabasis and a genuine encounter with the divine; Palmer (*loc. cit*.) does not clearly distinguish the two positions. (iv): Mourelatos (2008*a*) 14–16; Curd (1998) 19; Morgan (2000) 78; Miller (2006); Cosgrove (2011) 38–9. See Kraus (2013) 453 for scholars who have somehow related the *kouros*' journey to that of the Sun. Options (i)-(iv) are not exhaustive. Tarán (1965) 22ff offers a now dated but nonetheless instructive overview of a range of diverse interpretations advanced in the literature.

[2] See Rohde (1925) 373; Zeller (1919), 722, n.2; Diels (2003) 109–10; Burkert (1969) 28; (1972) 284, n.33.

[3] This is how Ranzato (2015) 224–5 reads Simplicius' testimonium; cf. also Bollack (2006) 327–8.

[4] It is possible – although this point is itself contentious – that the proem describes the destination of the souls of the deceased as 'the House of Night' (B1.9).

prenatal and post-mortem souls and τὸ ἀειδές as the region inhabited by living mortals. On this view, the goddess conveys (Hot) souls from the celestial, fiery and aethereal region predominated by Hot to our own darker, colder, invisible region of the universe, and vice versa.[5] On this view, then, the adjectives do not at all signify 'that which is visible / invisible *to us*' but carry only the objective sense, 'that which is *in itself* visible / invisible'. Birth, on this line, would be the process mentioned first (ποτέ) and death second (ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν). What of the point that τὸ ἀειδές evidently recalls Hades? We could counter that Parmenides is employing τὸ ἀειδές precisely to refer subversively to our own cold and dark region of the universe as the true glum Hades. Indeed, we noted in Chapter 5.2 that Parmenides strikingly describes birth as 'hateful' (στυγεροῖο, B12.4), using a term that standardly describes death and Hades. Furthermore, our lower, sublunary region of the universe does indeed have a larger proportion of cold, dark, 'unseen Night' (B9.3) than the higher region of aether, and Parmenides did associate Cold with death (see Chapter 5.2).[6]

There are, in sum, three possible construals of Simplicius' topographical markers. (*a*) The goddess conveys the post-mortem, Hot soul from our region of the world (the visible) to the afterlife (the invisible). These two topographical markers are not further aligned with the two elements of *Doxa*. (*b*) On the assumption that the two adjectives are aligned with the two elements, the goddess conveys the soul from our own relatively Hotter and Brighter region of the universe (the visible) to a Colder and Darker afterlife (the invisible). (*c*) The goddess conveys the soul from its own Hotter and Brighter habitat (the visible) to our Colder and Darker region of the universe (the invisible). (*c*) strongly suggests, and (*a*) allows, the widespread conception of the aether as the prenatal source and post-mortem destination of the aethereal soul. (*b*), according to which the post-mortem, Hot and aethereal soul inhabits rather a region of Cold Night, would constitute an idiosyncratic and diametrical divergence from this conception, but should not for that reason be excluded in

[5] See Karsten (1835) 272–4; Deichgräber (1959) 716.

[6] Coxon (2009) 276 advances this same interpretation of τὸ ἀειδές as *our* darker vicinity on the controversial premise that, in B1.9, 'the House of Night' refers to the ordinary, mundane region which the *kouros* has left behind. A representation of our vicinity as Hades is plausibly but controversially ascribed to Empedocles, see Rohde (1925) 403–4, n.75; Dodds (1951) 153, with 174, n.114; Jaeger (1947) 148–9; Wright (1995), *ad* B118; B120–1; cf. Schibli (1990) 121–2, n.38.

a thinker as idiosyncratic and creative as Parmenides. Let us now turn to the proem.

(i) *katabasis*

We must first address a point of syntax and punctuation (B1.8^{b}-10^{a}): … ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός εἰς φάος.[7] Proponents of the *katabasis* reading persuasively argue that it is far more plausible to read εἰς φάος with προλιποῦσαι than with πέμπειν and, therefore, that we should delete *DK*'s comma between νυκτός and εἰς. Parmenides does not, then, say that the Daughters of the Sun conveyed him to the Light, but rather: 'when the maidens, the Daughters of the Sun, made haste to convey me, after they had left behind the House of Night for the Light'.[8] The feminine participle προλιποῦσαι has only the Heliades as its grammatical subject. Burkert infers that it is they, and *not* the *kouros*, who initially leave behind the House of Night. That the *kouros* should be *initially* placed in the House of Night is, he argues, independently unlikely if Parmenides locates it in the Underworld (a viable possibility).[9] We may add that 'light' (φάος) is an extremely common marker for the ordinary world of the living, precisely as contrasted with Underworldly, eschatological locations, and often signifies (with εἰς, *vel sim.*) the destination of ascents (back) from Hades.[10] Plausibly, then, only the

[7] *DK*'s widely followed capitalisations, Νυκτός / εἰς φάος, manufacture an asymmetry which would not have been present in any ancient text of B1. The term φάος (like ἤματος in B1.11), I take it, at least strongly evokes the Doxastic element Light.

[8] This is strongly suggested both by Parmenides' word order (referring εἰς φάος back to πέμπειν would generate a jarring hyperbaton, in particular since προλιποῦσαι . . . εἰς φάος is immediately picked up by the participle ὠσάμεναι as the progression of a single train of thought) and by lexical parallels for the use of προλιπεῖν (esp. in the aorist participle) to express the trajectory from departure to arrival, cf. e.g. Mimn. fr. 12.3–4 W (ὠκεανὸν προλιποῦσ' οὐρανὸν εἰσαναβῇ); see Burkert (1969) 7; cf. Morrison (1955) 60; Mansfeld (1964) 238; Furley (1973) 1–2 (listing further parallels); Kingsley (1999) 50–1; Palmer (2009) 53.

[9] Burkert, *loc. cit.*

[10] World of living: *Il.* 18.61; *Il.* 19.103, 118 (φόωσδε for birth); *Od.* 4.540; *Hes. Op.* 155; Aesch. *Pers.* 222; Aristoph. *Av.* 699; [Hippoc.] *Vict.* 1.4 (ἐξ Ἄιδου ἐς φάος . . . ἐκ τοῦ φάεος ἐς Ἄιδην); see further LSJ sv. φάος, b. Ascents: *Od.* 11.223 (φόωσδε, of Odysseus, with *Od.* 23.252); *h.Hom.* 2.335–8; Thgn. 711–12 (ἤλυθε . . . ἐς φάος ἠελίου, of Sisyphus; note 703: ἐξ Ἀίδεω . . . ἀνῆλθεν); Soph. *Phil.* 624–5 (κἀξ Ἄιδου θανὼν | πρὸς φῶς ἀνελθεῖν, cf. 417); Eur. *Alc.* 457 (φάος ἐξ Ἀίδα), 1073–6 (ἐς φῶς . . . νερτέρων ἐκ δωμάτων), 1139

Heliades are said to have left behind the House of Night for the Light prior to conveying the *kouros*, whom it would be natural to find initially positioned in the Light. Since, furthermore, the dichotomic duality of Light and Night is prominent in the imagery of the journey,[11] it would seem plausible that, having left the House of Night (δώματα νυκτός, B1.9) for the Light, the Heliades convey the *kouros back* to that same House (ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ, B1.25).

The journey's topography clearly appropriates the scenery of the Hesiodic Underworld (Chapter 5.3).[12] Should it seem counter-intuitive that the Daughters of the Sun are themselves initially placed in the Underworld or in the House of Night, Greek tradition affords clear parallels. Stesichorus writes that, in the evening, Helios returns to the depth of night (ποτὶ βένθεα νυκτός) where his wife, mother and children live (*PMG* 185).[13] A similar picture seems to be implied in Hesiod, not only since he has Day reside in the House of Night whenever the latter ascends, but also given his statement that, *specifically* on Sleep and Death, Helios does not shine in the Underworld even when he descends from heaven (οὐδ' οὐρανόθεν καταβαίνων, 759–62). In the *Odyssey*, Hermes leads souls to Hades by 'Sun's gates' (Ἠελίοιο πύλας, *Od*. 24.12).

Advocates of this trajectory will also rightly point out that the Underworldly *katabasis* (especially that *katabasis* at the conclusion of which the traveller meets and converses with a(n unnamed) goddess) was a familiar model in contemporary South Italian initiatory and eschatological journeys.[14]

(νέρθεν ἐς φάος τόδε); Aristoph. *Ran*. 1528–9 (of Aeschylus); cf. also Hes. *Th*. 157–8 (of the offspring of Ouranos, kept deep within Gaia and not allowed ἐς φάος; cf. the Giants' release from murky Erebus ἐς φάος: 626, 652–3, 669); Aesch. *Pers*. 630 (of necromancy: πέμψατ' ἔνερθεν ψυχὴν ἐς φῶς). For this topographical point, cf. Gemelli Marciano (2013) 74.

[11] πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματός . . . κελεύθων (B1.11); Ἡλιάδες . . . νυκτός | εἰς φάος (B1.9–10); cf. the images of alternating duality in δοιοῖς . . . δινωτοῖσιν | κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν (B1. 7–8); ἀμοιβούς (B1.14) and ἀμοιβαδόν (B1.19).

[12] For the *descent* into Hades, note κατέβην δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω, *Od*. 23.252; cf. *Il*. 7.330; *Il*. 14.457; also *Il*. 8.13–16; Hes. *Th*. 720–5, 740–3; 750 (ἔσω καταβήσεται). Already in Homer, then, one formulaically journeys *downwards* into Hades; contrast Burkert (1969) 15; Primavesi (2013) 41–2; also Ganschinietz (1919) 2409.

[13] Cf. Morrison (1955) 60; Burkert (1969) 9; Furley (1973) 4.

[14] Burkert (1969) 17, 21–6; Kingsley (1999) *passim*; cf. Palmer (2009) 57–8; Morrison (1955) 60.

The *katabasis* interpretation is compatible with the reconstruction of Parmenides' eschatological ideas about the soul as established in Chapter 5.2. We initially find the Daughters of the Sun, who emphatically connote Light, Heat and the higher, celestial regions, emerging from the House of Night to the Light. Furthermore, Sun or Day traditionally end each of their cyclical journeys in the House of Night before ascending again. So, why should the Hot, fiery, aethereal soul not end each of its own life cycles in that same location of Night, before ascending back to the Light of life (εἰς φάος)?

The *katabasis* interpretation of the trajectory of the journey in B1 – interpretation (i) – will cohere with interpretations (*a*) and (*b*) of Simplicius' report.

(ii) *anabasis*

Although Parmenides undeniably draws on Hesiod's Underworld in his account of the journey's scenery, he does not do so slavishly. Most strikingly, Hesiod's account offers no counterpart to Parmenides' description of the gates as *aethereal* (αἰθέριαι, B1.13). Elsewhere in Parmenides, as we saw (Chapter 5.2), this terminology designates a *higher* celestial region in which the heavenly bodies are located and which is closely associated with the element Hot. Burkert argues that, although by describing his gates as 'aethereal' Parmenides locates them in the sky, his remark that the threshold is made of stone (λάινος οὐδός, B1.12) – also a departure from the Hesiodic bronze threshold (χάλκεος οὐδός, *Th*. 811, cf. 750; *Il*. 8.15) – locates *it* down on the earth. The gates, therefore, loom into the high aether but are based down below, encompassing the domains of both earth and sky. Burkert finds a parallel for this interpretation in the Hesiodic notion that Sky, Earth, Sea and Tartarus all have their 'sources and limits' in the same Underworldly location.[15] Aeschylus offers a parallel use of

[15] πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ, *Th*. 736–8, 807–9; cf. ῥίζαι, 727–8; Burkert (1969) 11–12. Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 57 adds that, in *Th*. 746 (cf. 518), Atlas is positioned in the Underworld and holds the broad heavens. Burkert is followed by Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 57–8; Owens (1979) 18; Furley (1973) 4; Gemelli Marciano (2013) 74–5 n.97. Morrison (1955) 59 tenuously renders αἰθέριαι as 'lofty'. The problem is not even mentioned in the *katabasis* interpretations of Kingsley (1999) and Palmer (2009).

the adjective to designate something (a cloud of dust), which begins on the ground and reaches up to the heavens (αἰθερία κόνις, *Th.* 81).[16] Parmenides, furthermore, does closely juxtapose his reference to the stone threshold and his (contrasting?) description of the gates as aethereal (καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός· | αὐταὶ **δ'** αἰθέριαι κτλ, B1.12–13).

Burkert's ingenious hypothesis seems a possible solution, then, but it could hardly be a compelling one. It is not clear why the fact that Parmenides' threshold comprises stone (rather than bronze) should settle the question of its cosmic whereabouts. The gates themselves possess a 'bolted bar' (βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα, B1.16) as well as hinges or pivots which are rich with bronze and fitted in sockets with pegs and nails (πολυχάλκους | ἄξονας, B1.18–20), but, nonetheless, the gates, minimally, reach up to the aether. Indeed, it seems as likely as not that 'stone' is to be understood not only with the threshold but also with the lintel (ὑπέρθυρον, B1.12), which holds the gates *from above*.[17] Furthermore, the stress in the juxtaposition of B1.12 with B1.13 could equally inhere in the contrast, not between the stony composition of the threshold and the aethereal location of the doors, but simply between the statements (i) that the doors are encompassed by a lintel and threshold (σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει, B1.12) and (ii) that they themselves fit into a great architrave (αὐταὶ **δ'** αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις, B1.13). In this case, the adjective 'aethereal' itself would be irrelevant for this contrast and constitute the only topographical marker in B1.12–13. In sum, we cannot exclude the view that, in B1.13, Parmenides locates in the aether both the gates through which he travels, along with (presumably) the architrave into which they fit, and his journey itself.[18] This interpretation of the description of the gates as 'aethereal' would correspond more easily with Parmenides' own use of this vocabulary elsewhere than Burkert's admittedly viable construal 'reaching from below up to the aether'.

The formula that expresses the passage of the *kouros* and *kourai* beyond the gates (τῇ ῥα δι' αὐτέων . . . ἔχον . . . ἵππους, B1.20–1)

[16] Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 57. [17] As suggested by Coxon (2009) 276.
[18] Cf. e.g. Bowra (1953*c*) 43; Dolin (1962) 96; Kahn (2009) 212–13.

occurs only twice in epic. In both cases, it expresses the passage of Hera and Athena through the gates of heaven.[19] In both of these Homeric passages, moreover, the Horae, among whom Hesiod numbers Dikê (*Th*. 902–3), are charged with opening and closing the gates of heaven. In Parmenides, 'much-punishing Dikê' holds the keys of the gates and exercises a similar function (B1.14–17).[20] The *anabasis* interpretation, furthermore, is perfectly consistent with the syntax of B1.8^{b}-10^{a} as analysed above ('. . . made haste to convey me, after they had left behind the House of Night for the Light'). Kahn reasonably insists that 'for the Light' remains the only marker of a trajectory and that there is no indication (I would qualify: no *explicit* indication) of a return journey downwards or into Darkness as opposed to a continuous progression into the Light.[21] In B1.10, we learn that the Daughters of the Sun journeyed into the Light (ἐς φάος). In the immediately following line, in the same initial metrical position, it is said that *there* (ἔνθα) are the gates of the paths of Night and Day through which Parmenides travels. It seems eminently possible, therefore, that the gates are placed in the destination of the Daughters' initial trajectory, i.e. in the Light.[22] This is again supported by their later description as 'aethereal'.

Although the participle προλιποῦσαι (B1.9) indeed has only the Daughters of the Sun as its grammatical subject, it certainly implicitly includes also the horses and the chariot, which the Daughters of the Sun drive as the charioteers (B1.5, 24).[23] The party that leaves the House of Night to the Light, then, could conceivably include implicitly also the *kouros*. If it does,

[19] πύλαι . . . οὐρανοῦ, *Il*. 5.748–52 = *Il*. 8.392–6; cf. Coxon (2009) 10.
[20] Coxon (2009) 277; Mourelatos (2008*a*) 14; cf. Burkert (1969) 11, n.2.
[21] Kahn (2009) 211, 213, n.8.
[22] The following words (νυκτός . . . κελεύθων), over and above evoking Hesiod's Underworld, constitute a word for word quotation from Homer's apparent account of the (near?) absence of darkness in Laestrygonia, *Od*. 10.82–6; cf. Coxon (2009) 275.
[23] Contrast Burkert (1969) 7. Primavesi (2013) takes it that B1.1–5^{a} describes a journey which the *kouros* undertakes independently, while the guidance of the Heliades comes into play only for a second leg of the journey, from line 5^{b} onwards. But the text gives no indication of such an abrupt shift. The words κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον (B1.5^{b}) complement the immediately preceding remarks about the agency of the mares and, looking backwards to the previous lines as well as forwards, climactically identify the maidens as the *kouros*' guides and as (*throughout* the journey) the charioteers (n.b. ἡνιόχοισιν, B1.24).

then Parmenides subversively represents *our* vicinity (from which, on the current interpretation under consideration, he was conveyed to the Light) as the true Hades (a possibility which we independently raised above). If, conversely, the House of Night retains its traditional place in the Underworld, then it indeed could not be the *kouros*' starting-point (as Burkert argues), but then it would also not have to be his destination. The main internal argument for the *katabasis* reading rests on identifying the House of Night from which the Daughters of the Sun initially depart (δώματα νυκτός, B1.9) with the House to which the goddess welcomes the *kouros* (ἡμέτερον δῶ, B1.25). That it must forgo this identification is a weakness of the *anabasis* interpretation, but it is not a fatal one in the light of the careful symmetrical tension in B1 between Night and Day.

Parmenides speaks symmetrically of the 'gates of the paths of Night and Day' (νυκτός **τε καὶ ἠματος**, B1.11). The 'House of Night' (δώματα νυκτός, B1.9) signifies Night's residence, which the Daughters of the Sun leave behind when they depart *to the Light*. We should not, then, hastily assume that the *unspecified* House to which the *kouros* arrives through *aethereal* gates is the same House of Night and not rather the House of its counterpart, Day.[24] Such a general progression in the *kouros*' trajectory from the House of Night towards the House of Day would cohere with the later characterisation of Night as 'ignorant' (νύκτ' ἀδαῆ, B8.59) and with the suggestion that the knowing man, who journeys to the goddess with or as his fiery and aethereal soul, is a knowing Light (B1.3, with φώς punning on φῶς: see further Chapter 5.3). It should be emphasised that none of the possibilities outlined here require us to identify the narrating goddess herself as either Night or Day.[25]

[24] Roloff (1970) 172, n.96 identifies it as the house of Day; cf. Diels (2003) 51.

[25] The goddess cannot be Night, *pace* Morrison (1955) 60; Palmer (2009) 589; Primavesi (2013) 64. The axiological nature of the contrast Light/Night (see Ch. 4.2, Ch. 5.2) precludes this. Indeed, in B8.59 the goddess would be calling herself 'ignorant'. The Hesiodic House of Night in fact accommodates both Night and Day, although never simultaneously (*Th.* 748–54). So, even if the *kouros* arrives at the House of Night, this fact alone does not imply that he is welcomed by Night rather than by Day. Diels (2003) 51, conversely, argues that αἰθέριαι (B1.13) identifies the location as 'die Wohnung der lichten Tagesgöttin'. But nothing in our direct or indirect evidence for the goddess, or for the two elements, suggests an enantiomorphic duality of two

We saw in Chapter 5.3 that the Daughters of the Sun evoke the myth of Phaethon's celestial journey, and that Parmenides, cast as a new and successful Phaethon, travels in the chariot and in the manner of the Sun. These associations favour, although they do not force, the *anabasis* interpretation.

The *anabasis* interpretation is often accused of anachronism.[26] But the idea that the post-mortem soul ascends to the aether was current. This trajectory, moreover, is explicable within the framework of Parmenides' psychology and astronomy, according to which the divine soul comprises aethereal fire (= Light) and this same element predominates in the higher, celestial region of aether (Chapter 5.2). On the *anabasis* trajectory, the path of the post-mortem Hot soul, which the *kouros* is privileged to pursue while still alive (B1.26–8), is that of an ascent to the aether.

The *anabasis* interpretation of the *kouros*' journey – interpretation (ii) – will fit with interpretations (*a*) and (*c*) of Simplicius' report.

(iii) *anabasis – katabasis*

We saw in Chapter 5.3 that the 'way of the *daimôn*' (B1.3), which the *kouros* travels, is most likely the way of the Sun. At any rate, the *kouros* certainly travels in the manner of the Sun, guided by the Daughters of the Sun in what closely recalls the chariot and horses of the Sun. The *kouros*, moreover, is journeying on the path of Night and Day (B1.11). The way of the Sun, as indeed that of Night and Day, might be most appositely represented, neither as an *anabasis* nor as a *katabasis*, but as an *anabasis* followed by a *katabasis*.[27]

goddesses, Night and Day. The Houses of Day (*if* that is the reference of δῶ at B1.25) and Night (on any reading), then, more probably gesture towards the higher and lower regions which are associated with the elements Light and Night respectively, rather than the abodes of two goddesses. Nor is the goddess Justice. Justice is the gate-keeper, and admits the *kouros* into his interview with the goddess (B1.14–25); cf. Burkert (1969) 13; Furley (1973) 3, n.10. Parmenides' goddess is left unnamed.

[26] E.g. Burkert (1969) 3, 15; Palmer (2009) 52–3; cf. Owens (1979) 17, n.8.

[27] Representing the journey in terms of the traditional concepts of the daily 'ascent' of the Sun towards the heavens and its 'descent' from it is intelligible and legitimate from the perspective of the mortal traveller himself, even if such terms would not be ultimately adequate in a proper astronomical account of the sun within a spherical cosmological

We may, therefore, entertain the following trajectory. (α) First, the Daughters of the Sun leave the House of Night towards the Light in order to find the *kouros* and guide him on the same course which their father travels each day, conveying him in that same upwards direction until they reach the gates of Night and Day which are located in the aether (B1.6–13). (β) Thereupon, they persuade Justice to open the gates of heaven (B1.14–20). (γ) They now proceed through these gates and follow the Sun's daily path *back down* towards the House of Night (B1.20–1) where (δ) the *kouros* finally meets the goddess (B1.22–3). The aforementioned formula which occurs in the description of the journey beyond the gates, 'through them they held the horses' (B1.20–1), conveys in both of its other two occurrences in epic the *descent* of goddesses through and from the gates of heaven.[28] The words ἰθύς . . . κατ' ἀμαξιτόν (B1.21) could mean no more than 'straight . . . along the road', but could alternatively amplify, in keeping with the Homeric resonance, a downward motion: 'straight . . . down the road' (cf. κατά, *Od.* 14.253–4). On this interpretation, the Daughters of the Sun go full circle, as the chariot of the Sun does when it follows the path of each day.

This *anabasis-katabasis* model explains why the proem so clearly evokes the images of both *katabasis* (through, for example, Hesiod's Underworld and mystery terminology) and *anabasis* (through, for example, the Homeric gates of heaven and the Phaethon myth). Parmenides' journey, in its different stages, involves both an ascent and a descent. Like the *anabasis* reading, it employs the less forced interpretation of αἰθέριαι (B1.13) as 'in the aether'. Like the *katabasis* reading, it construes the movement 'into the Light' (εἰς φάος, B1.10) in line with a very common usage, as an ascent from an Underworldly location towards our

system. In the same vein, Aëtius does not contradict himself when he reports that, for Parmenides, the aether encircles everything and is 'highest of all' (περιστάντος δ' ἀνωτάτω πάντων τοῦ αἰθέρος, A37). For cogent arguments for the view that Parmenides, who recognised that the moon gets its light from the sun (B14–15), thought of the heavenly bodies as spherical shapes which orbit around the earth, see Graham (2006) 179–82; (2013*a*) 87–96; Mourelatos (2011) 170–80.

[28] In *Il.* 8.392–6, Hera and Athena head for the battleground below before Iris stays them (at 409ff). In *Il.* 5.748ff, they descend to Troy after pausing to confer with Zeus on the topmost peak of Olympus. Note *Il.* 5.769: their chariot now flies 'in between earth and starry heaven'.

brighter world of the living. Furthermore, it retains the attractive and economical identification of the House at which the *kouros* arrives (δῶ, B1.25) with the House of Night which was mentioned earlier (δώματα, B1.9). Note that Hesiod mentions only a House of Night, which accommodates alternately both Night and Day (*Th.* 744–54). I suggest that, on balance, the *anabasis-katabasis* interpretation is the most satisfactory reading.[29]

What construal of the soul's post-mortem path does this trajectory imply? This will depend on whether, when she refers to the way of the post-mortem soul which the privileged *kouros* travels while still alive (B1.26–8), the goddess has in mind only his final descent (*katabasis*) into her House of Night or both the *anabasis* and the *katabasis* legs of his journey. In the former case, the *anabasis-katabasis* interpretation of the *kouros*' journey – interpretation (iii) – will (just like the *katabasis* interpretation) cohere with interpretations (*a*) and (*b*) of Simplicius' report. In the latter case, the eschatological path of the soul will involve both an ascent and a descent, mirroring the daily path of the Sun. If so, then the *anabasis-katabasis* interpretation of the *kouros*' journey will cohere with interpretation (*a*) of Simplicius' report. The visible will be the area of the cosmos which we inhabit, and the invisible will be the path which the soul traverses (the daily path of the Sun) before it returns again to the visible. But the *anabasis-katabasis* interpretation could also cohere with a combination of interpretations (*b*) and (*c*) of Simplicius' report: the goddess cyclically conveys souls from their habitat in the aether (ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς) into the dark Underworld (εἰς τὸ ἀειδές) and back again (ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν), while *in between* – after the souls emerged from the Underworld but before they reach the aether – they inhabit our world of the living as incarnated humans.

[29] We cannot confidently emend the corruption †κατὰ πάντ' ἄτη† (B1.3). For discussions and conjectures, see Lesher (1994*a*) 6 with n.9; Palmer (2009) 376–8; cf. Mansfeld (2008). κατὰ πάντ' ἄ<σ>τη (Burkert (1969) 6, n.14; Lesher (1994*a*); cf. Palmer (2009) 56–7, n.19) remains attractive, especially if one identifies the *daimôn* of B1.3 as the Sun. To avoid conflict with B1.27, it must mean 'over' (as in *Il.* 4.276, 278; cf. Guthrie (1965) 7, n.) not 'through' all cities. This would again suggest that, at least at some stage of his journey, the *kouros* travels (like the Sun) high in the sky. κατὰ πάντ' ἄ<ν>τη<ν> would have to mean something like 'through everything straight forth' (as Coxon had it in his first edition). It is difficult to motivate the translation 'to meet her face to face' (Coxon (2009) 48, 271–2) from the immediate context.

(iv) Not Kansas

Alternatively, the contrary pull of all the different topographical markers in B1, and the different cultural models it evokes, may lead us to agree with Mourelatos' assertion that 'the topography of the journey is blurred beyond recognition'.[30] It would seem misplaced to consider (iv) a less 'charitable' interpretation. We explored several exegetical alternatives and it would be rash to presuppose that these semantic and imagistic ambiguities are there to be settled. The proem may rather be gesturing simultaneously towards divergent trajectories.[31] By mixing imagery and topographical markers that suggest a *katabasis* with others that point towards an *anabasis*, Parmenides may be signalling, for example, that eschatological topography cannot be coherently reduced to the categories of higher and lower and that his journey to the revelation of what-is is a journey beyond all such frameworks. As Patricia Curd put it to me, the proem may indicate only that 'we're not in Kansas anymore'.

Since interpretation (iv) is intrinsically incoherent, it could not 'cohere' with any interpretation of the implications of Simplicius' report concerning the topography of the afterlife in Parmenides. But it would perhaps coexist most easily with interpretation (*a*), since this construal commits Parmenides to the least specific and concrete eschatological topography.

The important conclusion to draw from these considerations is a methodological one. It would be misguided to exclude from our interpretation of the proem certain representations or associations on the grounds that they do not align with whatever view of the trajectory of the *kouros*' journey we happen to favour. Any analysis of the significance and function of the proem which is not to be reductively lopsided would have to recognise, for example, its appropriation of the Hesiodic Underworld and of the language and imagery of mystery initiations, as well as the close association of the *kouros* with a divine milieu that is emblematic of light and the celestial aether.

[30] Mourelatos (2008*a*) 15–16. Johnson (1999) questions whether Hesiod's account of the Underworld in *Th.* 721–819 aims for topographical coherence.

[31] Compare Heraclitus' celebrated use of what Kahn (1979) 87–95 calls 'meaningful ambiguity'.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adluri, V. (2011) *Parmenides, Plato and Mortal Philosophy*. London.

Adomenas, M. (1999) 'Heraclitus on religion', *Phronesis* 44: 87–113.

Aikin, S. (2014) 'Xenophanes the high rationalist: the case of F1: 17–18', *Epoché* 19: 1–14.

Aikin, S. (2016) 'So what if horses would draw horse gods?', *Sophia* 55: 163–177.

Algra, K. (1999) 'The beginnings of cosmology', in Long (ed.), 45–65.

Alt, K. (1973) 'Zum Satz des Anaximenes Über die Seele, Untersuchung von Aetius ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ', *Hermes* 101: 129–164.

Andriopoulos, D. Z. (1975) 'Parmenides' fragment B16 and his theory of perceiving and knowing', in *Actes de la XII^e^ Conférence Internationale d'Études Classiques Eirene*. Amsterdam, 553–561.

Annas, J. (1999), 'Becoming like god: ethics, human nature, and the divine', in her *Platonic Ethics, Old and New*. Ithaca, NY, 52–71.

Anton, J. P. and Kustas, G. L. (eds) (1971), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. I. Albany, NY.

Anton, J. P. and Preus, A. (eds) (1983), *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. II. Albany, NY.

Armstrong, J. M. (2004) 'After the ascent: Plato on becoming like god', *OSAP* 26: 171–183.

Assmann, J. (2001) *The Search for God in Ancient Egypt*. Ithaca, NY.

Austin, J. L. (1962) *Sense and Sensibilia*. G. J. Warnock (ed.). Oxford.

Austin, S. (2011) 'Existence and essence in Parmenides', in Cordero (ed.), 1–8.

Barker, E. (2006) 'Paging the oracle: interpretations, identity and performance in Herodotus' *History*', *Greece & Rome* 53: 1–28.

Barnes, J. (1982) *The Presocratic Philosophers*. London.

Barney, R. (2012) 'History and dialectic (*Metaphysics* A 3, 983a24–984b8)', in Steel (ed.), 69–104.

Beall, E. F. (1991) 'Hesiod's Prometheus and development in myth', *JHI* 52: 355–371.

Beard, M. (1986) 'Cicero and divination: the formation of a Latin discourse', *JRS* 76: 33–46.

Belfiore, E. (1985) '"Lies unlike the truth": Plato on Hesiod, *Theogony* 27', *TAPA* 115: 47–57.

Bell, C. M. (2002) '"The Chinese believe in spirits": belief and believing in the study of religion', in N. Frankenberry (ed.), *Radical Interpretation in Religion*. Cambridge, 100–117.

Benitez, R. and Tarrant, H. (2015) 'Philosophy', in Eidinow and Kindt (eds), 211–222.

Benzi, N. (2016), '*Noos* and mortal enquiry in the poetry of Xenophanes and Parmenides', *Methodos* 16.

Bergren, A. L. T. (1983) 'Language and the female in early Greek thought', *Arethusa* 16: 69–95.

Bernabé, A. (2013) 'The commentary of the Derveni papyrus: the last of Presocratic cosmogonies', *Littera Antiqua* 7: 4–31.

Bernabé, A. and San Cristóbal, A. I. J (2008), *Instructions for the Netherworld: The Orphic Gold Tablets*. Leiden.

Bernabé, A. and San Cristóbal, A. I. J. (2011), 'Are the "Orphic" gold leaves Orphic?', in Edmonds (ed.), 68–101.

Betegh, G. (2004) *The Derveni Papyrus: Cosmology, Theology and Interpretation*. Cambridge.

Betegh, G. (2006*a*) 'Greek philosophy and religion', in M. L. Gill and P. Pellegrin (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy.* Malden, MA, 625–639.

Betegh, G. (2006*b*) 'Eschatology and cosmology: models and problems', in Sassi (ed.), 27–50.

Betegh, G. (2007) 'On the physical aspect of Heraclitus' psychology', *Phronesis* 52: 3–32.

Betegh, G. (2009) 'The limits of the soul: Heraclitus B45 DK. Its text and interpretation', in E. Hülsz (ed.), *Nuevos Ensayos Sobre Heráclito*. Mexico City, 391–414.

Betegh, G. (2010) 'The transmission of ancient wisdom', in L. P. Gerson, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, vol. I. Cambridge, 25–38.

Betegh, G. (2012) 'The next principle (*Metaphysics* A 3–4, $984^{b}8$–$985^{b}22$)', in Steel (ed.), 105–140.

Betegh, G. (2014) 'Pythagoreans, Orphism and Greek religion', in Huffman (ed.), 149–166.

Betegh, G. (2016) 'Colocation', in T. Buchheim, D. Meissner and N. Wachsmann (eds), ΣΩΜΑ. *Körperkonzepte und körperliche Existenz in der antiken Philosophie und Literatur.* Hamburg, 393–421.

Blank, D. L. (1982) 'Faith and persuasion in Parmenides', *ClAnt*. 1: 167–177.

Bodnár, I. M. (1989) 'Reason and revelation in Parmenides', *Doxa* 17: 61–67.

den Boer, W. (1973) 'Aspects of religion in Classical Greece', *HSPh* 77: 1–21.

Bollack, J. (2006) *Parménide: de l'étant au monde*. Paris.

Bollack, J. (2011) 'From being to the world and vice versa', in Cordero (ed.), 9–20.

Bolton, J. D. P. (1962) *Aristeas of Proconnesus*. Oxford.

Bonnechere, P. (2003) 'Trophonius of Lebadea: mystery aspects of an oracular cult in Boeotia', in Cosmopoulos (ed.), 169–192.

Bormann, K. (1979) 'The interpretation of Parmenides by the Neoplatonist Simplicius', *The Monist* 62: 30–43.

Bouché-Leclercq, A. (1879–1882) *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité*, 4 vols. Paris.
Boudouris, K. J. (ed.) (1989), *Ionian Philosophy.* Athens.
Bowden, H. (2010) *Mystery Cults in the Ancient World*. London.
Bowden, H. (2015) 'Nameless gods: mystery cults, myth, ritual and Greek polis religion', *Kodai* 16: 31–42.
Bowie, E. L. (1993) 'Fiction and slander in early Greek poetry', in C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman (eds), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*. Exeter, 1–37.
Bowra, C. M. (1953) *Problems in Greek Poetry.* Oxford.
Bowra, C. M. (1953*a*) 'Xenophanes on songs at feasts', in Bowra (1953), 1–14.
Bowra, C. M. (1953*b*) 'Xenophanes and the Olympian Games', in Bowra (1953), 15–37.
Bowra, C. M. (1953*c*) 'The proem of Parmenides', in Bowra (1953), 38–53.
Boys-Stones, G. R. (2009) 'Ancient philosophy of religion: an introduction', in Oppy and Trakakis (eds), 1–22.
Boys-Stones, G. R. (2010) 'Hesiod and Plato's history of philosophy', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (eds), 31–51.
Boys-Stones, G. R. and Haubold, J. H. (eds) (2010), *Plato and Hesiod*. Oxford.
Bredlow, L. A. (2011) 'Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Parmenides' theory of cognition (B 16)', *Apeiron* 44: 219–263.
Bremmer, J. N. (1983) *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul*. Princeton, NJ.
Bremmer, J. N. (1994) *Greek Religion*. Oxford.
Bremmer, J. N. (1999) 'Rationalization and disenchantment in ancient Greece: Max Weber among the Pythagoreans and Orphics?', in Buxton (ed.), 71–83.
Bremmer, J. N. (2007) 'Atheism in antiquity', in M. Martin (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Atheism*. Cambridge, 11–27.
Bremmer, J. N. (2008) 'Balaam, Mopsus and Melampus: tales of travelling seers', in his *Greek Religion and Culture, the Bible and the Ancient Near East*. Leiden, 133–151.
Bremmer, J. N. (2014) *Initiations into the Mysteries of the Ancient World*. Berlin.
Bremmer, J. N. and Erskine, A. (eds) (2010), *The Gods of Ancient Greece: Identities and Transformations*. Edinburgh.
Broadie, S. (1999) 'Rational theology', in Long (ed.), 205–224.
Brown, L. (1986) 'Being in the Sophist: a syntactical enquiry', *OSAP* 4: 49–70.
Brown, L. (1994) 'The verb "to be" in Greek philosophy: some remarks', in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought,* vol. III: *Language*. Cambridge, 212–236.
Brown, P. (1971) 'The rise and function of the holy man in late antiquity', *JRS* 61: 80–101.
Bryan, J. (2012) *Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato*. Cambridge.
Burkert, W. (1969) 'Das Proömium des Parmenides und die Katabasis des Pythagoras', *Phronesis* 14: 1–30.

Burkert, W. (1972) *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*. E. L. Minar Jr. (trans.). Cambridge, MA.
Burkert, W. (1983) *Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*. P. Bing (trans.). Berkeley, CA.
Burkert, W. (1985) *Greek Religion*. J. Raffan (trans.). Oxford.
Burkert, W. (1987) *Ancient Mystery Cults*. Cambridge, MA.
Burkert, W. (1992) *The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age*. Cambridge, MA.
Burkert, W. (1999) 'The logic of cosmogony', in Buxton (ed.), 87–106.
Burkert, W. (2000) 'Revealing nature amidst multiple cultures. A discourse with ancient Greeks', *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* 21: 125–151.
Burkert, W. (2004) *Babylon, Memphis, Persepolis: Eastern Contexts of Greek Culture*. Cambridge, MA.
Burkert, W. (2005) 'Signs, commands and knowledge: ancient divination between enigma and epiphany', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 29–49.
Burkert, W. (2008) 'Prehistory of Presocratic philosophy in an Orientalizing context', in Curd and Graham (eds), 55–85.
Burnet, J. (1930) *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th edn, London.
Buxton, R. (ed.) (1999) *From Myth to Reason?: Studies in the Development of Greek Thought*. Oxford.
Buxton, R. (1999) 'Introduction', in Buxton (ed.), 1–21.
Buxton, R. (ed.) (2000), *Oxford Readings in Greek Religion*. Oxford.
Canevaro, L. G. (2015) *Hesiod's Works and Days: How to Teach Self-Sufficiency*. Oxford.
Casertano, G. (2011) 'Parmenides: scholar of nature', in Cordero (ed.), 21–58.
Caston, V. and Graham, D. W. (eds) (2002), *Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos*. Aldershot.
Cerri, G. (2011) 'The astronomical section in Parmenides' poem', in Cordero (ed.), 81–94.
Chadwick, N. K. (1942) *Poetry and Prophecy*. Cambridge.
Chalmers, W. R. (1960) 'Parmenides and the beliefs of mortals', *Phronesis* 5: 5–22.
Cherubin, R. (2005) 'Light, Night, and the opinions of mortals: Parmenides B8. 51–61 and B9', *Ancient Philosophy* 25: 1–23.
Christopoulos, M., Karakantza, E. D., and Levaniouk, O. (eds) (2010), *Light and Darkness in Ancient Greek Myth and Religion*. Lanham, MD.
Clark, R. J. (1969) 'Parmenides and sense-perception', *Revue des Études Grecques* 82: 14–32.
Classen, C. J. (1989) 'Xenophanes and the tradition of epic poetry', in Boudouris (ed.), 91–103.
Classen, C. J. (1996) 'ΑΡΧΗ – its earliest use', *Scripta Classica Israelica* 15: 20–24.
Clay, D. (2004) *Archilochos Heros: The Cult of Poets in the Greek Polis*. Washington, DC.

Clay, J. S. (1974) '*Demas* and *aude*: the nature of divine transformation in Homer', *Hermes* 102: 129–136.
Clay, J. S. (1984) 'The Hecate of the *Theogony*', *GRBS* 25: 27–38.
Clay, J. S. (1988) 'What the Muses sang: *Theogony* 1–115', *GRBS* 29: 323–333.
Clay, J. S. (2003) *Hesiod's Cosmos*. Cambridge.
Clay, J. S. (2015) 'Commencing cosmogony and the rhetoric of poetic authority', in P. Derron (ed.), *Cosmologies et cosmogonies dans la littérature antique: huit exposés suivis de discussions et d'un épilogue. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique,* 61. Vandœuvres, 105–147.
Cleve, F. M. (1965) *The Giants of Pre-Sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct their Thoughts*, 2 vols. The Hague.
Clinton, K. (2003) 'Stages of initiation in the Eleusinian and Samothracian mysteries', in Cosmopoulos (ed.), 50–78.
Cohen, B. (ed.) (1995), *The Distaff Side*. New York, NY.
Cole, T. (1983) 'Archaic truth', *QUCC* 13: 7–28.
Collard, C., Cropp, M. J. and Gibert, J. (2004) *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays*, vol. II. Oxford.
Compton, T. M. (2006) *Victim of the Muses: Poet as Scapegoat, Warrior and Hero in Greco-Roman and Indo-European Myth and History.* Washington, DC.
Connor, W. R. (1988) 'Seized by the nymphs: nympholepsy and symbolic expression in Classical Greece', *ClAnt*. 7: 155–189.
Coo, L. (2016) 'Sight and blindness', in M. Squire (ed.), *Sight and the Ancient Senses*. London, 237–248.
Cook, A. B. (1914–1940) *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion*, 3 vols. Cambridge.
Cordero, N. -L. (ed.) (2011*a*), *Parmenides Venerable and Awesome*. Las Vegas, NV.
Cordero, N. -L. (2011*b*) 'Parmenidean "Physics" is not part of what Parmenides calls δόξα', in Cordero (ed.), 95–113.
Cornford, F. M. (1933) 'Parmenides' two ways', *CQ* 27: 97–111.
Cornford, F. M. (1935) 'A new fragment of Parmenides', *CR* 49: 122–123.
Cornford, F. M. (1939) *Plato and Parmenides*. London.
Cornford, F. M. (1950) *The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays*. Cambridge.
Cornford, F. M. (1952) *Principium Sapientiae: The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought*. Cambridge.
Cornford, F. M. (1974) 'Mysticism and science in the Pythagorean tradition', in Mourelatos (ed.), 135–160.
Cosgrove, M. R. (1974) 'The KOUROS motif in Parmenides: B1.24', *Phronesis* 19: 81–94.
Cosgrove, M. R. (2011) 'The unknown "knowing man": Parmenides, B1.3', *CQ* 61: 28–47.
Cosgrove, M. R. (2014) 'What are "true" *doxai* worth to Parmenides? Essaying a fresh look at his cosmology', *OSAP* 46: 1–31.
Cosmopoulos, M. B. (ed.) (2003) *Greek Mysteries: The Archaeology and Ritual of Ancient Greek Secret Cults*. London.
Coxon, A. H. (1968) 'The text of Parmenides fr. 1. 3', *CQ* 18: 69.

Coxon, A. H. (2003) 'Parmenides on thinking and being', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 56: 210–212.

Coxon, A. H. (2009) *The Fragments of Parmenides: Revised and Expanded Edition*. R. McKirahan (ed. with new translations), M. Schofield (preface). Las Vegas, NV.

Crystal, I. (2002) 'The scope of thought in Parmenides', *CQ* 52: 207–219.

Curd, P. K. (1998) *The Legacy of Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought*. Princeton, NJ.

Curd, P. K. (2002) 'The Presocratics as Philosophers', in Laks and Louguet (eds), 115–138.

Curd, P. K. (2007) *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and Testimonia, a Text and Translation with Notes and Essays*. Toronto.

Curd, P. K. (2010) 'Thought and body in Heraclitus and Anaxagoras', *BACAP* 25: 1–41.

Curd, P. K. (2011) 'Thought and body in Parmenides', in Cordero (ed.), 115–134.

Curd, P. K. (2013*a*) 'The divine and the thinkable: toward an account of the intelligible cosmos', *Rhizomata* 1: 217–247.

Curd, P. K. (2013*b*) 'Where are Love and Strife? Incorporeality in Empedocles', in McCoy (ed.), 113–138.

Curd, P. K. (2015) 'Thinking, supposing, and *physis* in Parmenides', *Études platoniciennes* 12.

Curd, P. K. and Graham, D. W. (eds) (2008), *The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy*. Oxford.

Curd, P. K. and McKirahan, R. D. (eds) (2011), *A Presocratics Reader,* 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN.

Currie, B. (2002) 'Euthymos of Locri: a case study in heroization in the Classical period', *JHS* 122: 24–44.

Daix, D. -A. (2006) 'Réalités et vérités dans la *Théogonie* et Les *Travaux et les Jours* d'Hésiode', *Mètis* 4: 139–164.

Darcus, S. M. (1977) 'Daimon parallels the holy *phren* in Empedocles', *Phronesis* 22: 175–190.

Darcus, S. M. (1978) 'The *phren* of the *noos* in Xenophanes' god', *Symbolae Osloenses* 53: 25–39.

Darcus-Sullivan, S. M. (1994) 'The mind and heart of Zeus in Homer and the Homeric Hymns', *ABG* 37: 101–126.

Darcus-Sullivan, S. M. (1995) 'The mind and heart of Zeus in the poetry of Hesiod', *ABG* 38: 34–47.

D'Avray, D. L. (2010) *Rationalities in History: A Weberian Essay in Comparison*. Cambridge.

Dawkins, R. (2007) *The God Delusion*. London.

Deichgräber, K. (1959) 'Parmenides' Auffahrt zur Göttin des Rechts. Untersuchungen zum Prooimion seines Lehrgedichts', *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz*, Jahrg. 1958, no. 11. Wiesbaden, 629–724.

Denyer, N. (1985) 'The case against divination: an examination of Cicero's *De Divinatione*', *PCPS* 31: 1–10.
Detienne, M. (1981) 'Between beasts and gods', in R. Gordon (ed.), *Myth, Religion and Society*. Cambridge, 215–229.
Detienne, M. (1996) *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*. J. Lloyd (trans.). Cambridge, MA.
Detienne, M. and Vernant, J. -P. (1978) *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*. J. Lloyd (trans.). Hassocks.
Diels, H. (1887) 'Über die ältesten Philosophenschulen der Griechen', in *Philosophische Aufsätze, E. Zeller gewidmet*. Leipzig, 239–260.
Diels, H. (2003) *Parmenides Lehrgedicht*. Sankt Augustin.
Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds) (1951–1952), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 6th edn, 3 vols. Berlin.
Dilcher, R. (2006), 'Parmenides on the place of mind', in King (ed.), 31–48.
Diller, H. (1966) 'Hesiod und die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie', in E. Heitsch (ed.), *Hesiod*. Darmstadt, 688–707.
Dillery, J. (2005) 'Chresmologues and *manteis*: independent diviners and the problem of authority', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 167–231.
Dillon, J. and Hershbell, J. P. (eds and trans) (1991), *Iamblichus: On the Pythagorean Way of Life*. Atlanta, GA.
Dodds, E. R. (1951) *The Greeks and the Irrational*. Berkeley, CA.
Dodds, E. R. (1973) *The Ancient Concept of Progress*. Oxford.
Doherty, L. E. (1995) 'Sirens, Muses, and female narrators in the *Odyssey*', in Cohen (ed.), 81–89.
Dolin, E. F. (1962) 'Parmenides and Hesiod', *HSCP* 66: 93–98.
Dover, K. J. (1988) 'The freedom of the intellectual in Greek society', in his *The Greeks and Their Legacy*. Oxford, 135–158.
Drozdek, A. (2004) 'Xenophanes' Theology', *SIFC* 4a ser. 2: 141–157.
Drozdek, A. (2007) *Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche*. Aldershot.
Dueso, J. S. (2011) 'Parmenides: logic and ontology', in Cordero (ed.), 271–288.
Edmonds, J. (1931) *Greek Elegy and Iambus*, 2 vols. London.
Edmonds III, R. G. (ed.) (2011*a*) *The 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and Greek Religion: Further Along the Path*. Cambridge.
Edmonds III, R. G. (2011*b*) 'Sacred scripture or oracles for the dead? The semiotic situation of the "Orphic" gold tablets', in Edmonds (ed.), 257–270.
Edmonds III, R. G. (2013) *Redefining Ancient Orphism: A Study in Greek Religion*. Cambridge.
Eidinow, E. and Kindt, J. (eds) (2015), *The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Religion*. Oxford.
Eidinow, E., Kindt, J. and Osborne, R. (eds) (2016), *Theologies of Ancient Greek Religion*. Cambridge.

Eidinow, E., Kindt, J., Osborne, R. and Tor, S. (2016) 'Introduction: what might we mean by the theologies of ancient Greek religion?', in Eidinow, Kindt and Osborne (eds), 1–11.

van der Eijk, P. J. (2005) *Medicine and Philosophy in Classical Antiquity*. Cambridge.

Eisenstadt, M. (1974) 'Xenophanes' proposed reform of Greek religion' *Hermes* 102: 142–150.

Emlyn-Jones, C. J. (1976) 'Heraclitus and the identity of opposites', *Phronesis* 21: 89–114.

Erler, M. (2002) 'Epicurus as *deus mortalis, homoiosis theoi* and Epicurean self-cultivation', in D. Frede and A. Laks (eds), *Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, Its Background and Aftermath*, Leiden, 159–182.

Evans, C. S. (2005) 'Faith and revelation', in W. J. Wainwright (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion*. Oxford, 323–343.

Everson, S. (ed.) (1990), *Companions to Ancient Thought,* vol. I: *Epistemology*. Cambridge.

Feeney, D. (1998) *Literature and Religion at Rome*. Cambridge.

Ferella, C. (2013) 'Empedocle, il giorno spietato e l'esilio dagli dei: a proposito di alcuni frammenti "demonologici"', in R. di Donato (ed.), *Origini E Svolgimento Del Pensiero Greco: Studi per Jean-Pierre Vernant*. Pisa, 29–47.

Ferrari, G. (1988) 'Hesiod's mimetic Muses and the strategies of deconstruction', in A. Benjamin (ed.), *Post-Structuralist Classics*. London, 45–78.

Feyerabend, B. (1984) 'Zur Wegmetaphorik beim Goldblättchen aus Hipponion und dem Proömium des Parmenides', *Rhein. Mus.* 127: 1–22.

Finkelberg, A. (1986) '"Like by like" and two reflections of reality in Parmenides', *Hermes* 114: 405–412.

Finkelberg, A. (1997) 'Xenophanes' physics, Parmenides' *Doxa* and Empedocles' theory of cosmogonical mixture', *Hermes* 125: 1–16.

Flacelière, R. (1976) *Greek Oracles*. D. Garman (trans.). London.

Flower, M. A. (2008) *The Seer in Ancient Greece*. Berkeley, CA.

Floyd, E. D. (1992) 'Why Parmenides wrote in verse', *Ancient Philosophy* 12: 251–265.

Fontenrose, J. (1978) *The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations with a Catalogue of Responses*. Berkeley, CA.

Fowler, R. L. (2010) 'Gods in early Greek historiography', in Bremmer and Erskine (eds), 318–334.

Fowler, R. L. (2011) '*Mythos* and *logos*', *JHS* 131: 45–66.

Fränkel, H. (1925) 'Xenophanesstudien', *Hermes* 60: 174–192.

Fränkel, H. (1974) 'Xenophanes' empiricism and his critique of knowledge (B34)', M. R. Cosgrove (trans.), in Mourelatos (ed.), 118–131.

Fränkel, H. (1975*a*) 'Studies in Parmenides', D. J. Furley and R. E. Allen (trans), in Furley and Allen (eds), 1–47.

Fränkel, H. (1975*b*) *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy.* M. Hadas and J. Willis (trans). Oxford.
Frede, D. and Reis, B. (eds) (2009), *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy.* Berlin.
Freeman, K. (1946) *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*. Oxford.
Frère, J. (2011) 'Mortals (βροτοί) according to Parmenides', in Cordero (ed.), 135–146.
von Fritz, K. (1974) '*Nous, noein*, and their derivatives in Pre-Socratic philosophy (excluding Anaxagoras)', in Mourelatos (ed.), 23–85.
Furley, D. J. (1973) 'Notes on Parmenides', in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos and R. M. Rorty (eds), *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos*. Assen, 1–15.
Furley, D. J. and Allen, R. E. (eds) (1970), *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy,* vol. I: *The Beginnings of Philosophy.* London.
Furley, D. J. and Allen, R. E. (eds) (1975), *Studies in Presocratic Philosophy,* vol. II: *The Eleatics and the Pluralists*. London.
Furth, M. (1974) 'Elements of Eleatic ontology', in Mourelatos (ed.), 241–270.
Gagarin, M. (1990) 'The ambiguity of Eris in the *Works and Days*', in M. Griffith and D. J. Mastronarde (eds), *Cabinet of the Muses: Essays on Classical and Comparative Literature in Honor of Thomas G. Rosenmeyer.* Atlanta, GA, 173–185.
Gagarin, M. (2002) *Antiphon the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists*. Austin, TX.
Gagné, R. (2007) 'Winds and ancestors: the *Physika of Orpheus*', *HSPh* 103: 1–23.
Gagné, R. (2009) 'Mystery inquisitors: performance, authority and sacrilege at Eleusis', *ClAnt* 28: 211–247.
Gagné, R. (2013) *Ancestral Fault in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
Gallop, D. (1979) '"Is" or "is not"', *The Monist* 62: 60–80.
Gallop, D. (1984) *Parmenides of Elea*. Toronto.
Ganschinietz, R. (1919) sv. 'Katabasis', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* 10.2: 2359–2449.
Geertz, C. (1973) 'Religion as a cultural system', in his *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York, NY, 87–125.
Gemelli Marciano, M. L. (2002) 'Le contexte culturel des Présocratiques: adversaires et destinataires', in Laks and Louguet (eds), 83–114.
Gemelli Marciano, M. L. (2008) 'Images and experience: at the roots of Parmenides' *Aletheia*', *Ancient Philosophy* 28: 21–48.
Gemelli Marciano, M. L. (2014) 'The Pythagorean way of life and Pythagorean ethics', in Huffman (ed.), 131–148.
Gemelli Marciano, M. L., Rossetti, L. and Pulpito, M. (eds) (2013), *Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza*. Sankt Augustin.
Gernet, L. (1981) 'The origins of Greek philosophy', in his *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece*. J. Hamilton and B. Nagy (trans). Baltimore, MD, 352–364.
Gerson, L. P. (1994) *God and Greek Philosophy: Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology.* London.

Gigon, O. (1945) *Der Ursprung der Griechischen Philosophie, von Hesiod bis Parmenides*. Basel.
Giordano-Zecharya, M. (2005) 'As Socrates shows, the Athenians did not believe in gods', *Numen* 52: 325–355.
Göbel, C. (2002) 'Mysticism and knowledge in Parmenides', *Downside Review* 120: 157–174.
Goldhill, S. (1986) 'Blindness and insight', in his *Reading Greek Tragedy*. Cambridge, 199–221.
Goldhill, S. (1991) *The Poet's Voice*. Cambridge.
Goldhill, S. and Osborne, R. (eds) (2006), *Rethinking Revolutions through Ancient Greece*. Cambridge.
Gomperz, T. (1906) *Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy*, vol. I. L. Magnus (trans.). London.
Gomperz, T. (1929) 'Zur Theogonie des Pherekydes von Syros', *Wiener Studien* 47: 14–26.
Goodwin, W. W. (1889) *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb*. London.
Gould, J. (1985) 'On making sense of Greek religion', in P. E. Easterling and J. V. Muir (eds), *Greek Religion and Society*. Cambridge, 1–33.
Goulet-Cazé, M. -O. (1996) 'Religion and the early Cynics', in B. Branham and M. -O. Goulet-Cazé (eds), *The Cynics: The Cynic Movement in Antiquity and its Legacy*. Berkeley, CA, 47–80.
Graf, F. (2005) 'Rolling the dice for an answer', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 51–97.
Graf, F. (2013*a*) 'A history of scholarship on the Tablets' in Graf and Johnston (eds), 50–65.
Graf, F. (2013*b*) 'Dionysiac mystery cults and the Gold Tablets', in Graf and Johnston (eds), 137–166.
Graf, F. and Johnston, S. I. (eds) (2013*a*), *Ritual Texts for the Afterlife: Orpheus and the Bacchic Gold Tablets*, 2nd edn. London.
Graf, F. and Johnston, S. I. (2013*b*) 'Orpheus, his poetry, and sacred texts', in Graf and Johnston (eds), 167–186.
Graham, D. W. (1999) 'Empedocles and Anaxagoras: responses to Parmenides', in Long (ed.), 159–180.
Graham, D. W. (2006) *Explaining the Cosmos: The Ionian Tradition of Scientific Philosophy*. Princeton, NJ.
Graham, D. W. (2010) *The Texts of Early Greek Philosophy: The Complete Fragments and Selected Testimonies of the Major Presocratics*, vol. I. Cambridge.
Graham, D. W. (2013*a*) *Science Before Socrates: Parmenides, Anaxagoras and the New Astronomy*. Oxford.
Graham, D. W. (2013*b*) 'The theology of nature in the Ionian tradition', *Rhizomata* 1: 194–216.
Granger, H. (2007) 'Poetry and prose: Xenophanes of Colophon', *TAPhA* 137: 403–433.

Granger, H. (2008) 'The proem of Parmenides' poem', *Ancient Philosophy* 28: 1–20.

Granger, H. (2010) 'Parmenides of Elea: rationalist or dogmatist?', *Ancient Philosophy* 30: 15–38.

Granger, H. (2013*a*) 'Xenophanes' positive theology and his criticism of Greek popular religion', *Ancient Philosophy* 33: 235–271.

Granger, H. (2013*b*) 'Early natural theology: the purification of the divine nature', in D. Sider and D. Obbink (eds), *Doctrine and Doxography: Studies on Heraclitus and Pythagoras*. Berlin, 163–200.

Grau, S. (2013) 'Diogenes Laertius between tradition and innovation: philosophers and θεῖοι ἄνδρες', in R. García-Gasco, S. Gonzáles Sánchez and D. Hernández de la Fuente (eds), *The Theodosian Age (A.D.* 379–455*): Power, Place, Belief and Learning at the End of the Western Empire*. Oxford, 183–189.

Graver, M. (2009) 'Cicero', in Oppy and Trakakis (eds), 119–131.

Gregory, A. (2013) *The Presocratics and the Supernatural: Magic, Philosophy and Science in Early Greece*. London.

Gregory, A. (2014) 'Parmenides, cosmology and sufficient reason', *Apeiron* 47: 16–47.

Grice, H. P. (1957) 'Meaning', *Philosophical Review* 66: 377–388.

Griffin, J. (1980) *Homer on Life and Death*. Oxford.

Griffith, M. (1983) 'Personality in Hesiod', *ClAnt*. 2: 37–65.

Griffith, R. D. (1993) 'Oedipus pharmakos? Alleged scapegoating in Sophocles' Oedipus the King', *Phoenix* 47: 95–114.

Griffith, R. D. (2009) 'Putting your mouth where your money is: Eumolpus' will, *pasta e fagioli*, and the fate of the soul in South Italian thought from Pythagoras to Ennius', in G. Casadio and P. A. Johnston (eds), *Mystic Cults in Magna Graecia*. Austin, TX, 131–136.

Griffiths, A. (1999) 'Euenius the negligent nightwatchman (Herodotus 9. 82–96)', in Buxton (ed.), 169–182.

Grottanelli, C. (2005) '*Sorte unica pro casibus pluribus enotata*: literary texts and lot inscriptions as sources for ancient kleromancy', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 129–146.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1935) *Orpheus and Greek Religion*. London.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1952) 'The Presocratic world-picture', *HThR* 45: 87–104.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1962) *A History of Greek Philosophy,* vol. I: *The Earlier Presocratics and the Pythagoreans*. Cambridge.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1965) *A History of Greek Philosophy,* vol. II: *The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus*. Cambridge.

Guthrie, W. K. C. (1970) 'Aristotle as historian', in Furley and Allen (eds), 239–254.

Hack, R. K. (1931) *God in Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates*. Princeton, NJ.

Hadot, P. (1995) *Philosophy as a Way of Life*. M. Chase (trans.). Oxford.

Hainsworth, B. (1993) *The Iliad: A Commentary,* vol. III: *Books* 9–12. Cambridge.
Halliday, W. R. (1913) *Greek Divination: A Study of Its Methods and Principles*. London.
Halliwell, S. (2011) *Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics from Homer to Longinus*. Oxford.
Harrison, T. (2000) *Divinity and History: The Religion of Herodotus*. Oxford.
Harrison, T. (2006) 'Religion and the rationality of the Greek city', in Goldhill and Osborne (eds), 124–140.
Harrison, T. (2007) 'Greek religion and literature', in Ogden (ed.), 373–384.
Harrison, T. (2015*a*) 'Beyond the *polis*? New approaches to Greek religion', *JHS* 135: 165–180.
Harrison, T. (2015*b*) 'Belief vs. practice', in Eidinow and Kindt (eds), 21–29.
Harte, V. and Lane, M. (eds) (2013), *Politeia in Greek and Roman Philosophy.* Cambridge.
Haubold, J. H. (2010) 'Shepherd, farmer, poet, sophist: Hesiod on his own reception' in Boys-Stones and Haubold (eds), 11–30.
Havelock, E. A. (1958) 'Parmenides and Odysseus', *HSCP* 53: 133–143.
Hawes, G. (2014) *Rationalizing Myth in Antiquity.* Oxford.
Hedrick Jr., C. W. (2007) 'Religion and society in Classical Greece', in Ogden (ed.), 283–296.
Heidegger, M. (1992) *Parmenides*. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (trans). Indianapolis, IN.
Heidegger, M. (1999) 'The last undelivered lecture (XII) from Summer Semester 1952', W. McNeill (trans.), in Jacobs (ed.), 171–184.
Heidel, W. A. (1910) 'Περὶ Φύσεως. A study of the conception of nature among the Pre-Socratics', *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 45: 79–133.
Heidel, W. A. (1943) 'Hecataeus and Xenophanes', *AJPh* 64: 257–277.
Heiden, B. (2007) 'The Muses' uncanny lies: Hesiod, *Theogony* 27 and its translators', *AJPh* 128: 153–175.
Heitsch, E. (1966) 'Das Wissen des Xenophanes', *Rhein. Mus.* 109: 193–235.
Heitsch, E. (1974) *Parmenides: die Anfänge der Ontologie, Logik und Naturwissenschaft*. Munich.
Heitsch, E. (1983) *Xenophanes: Die Fragmente*. Munich.
Hermann, A. (2004) *To Think Like God: Pythagoras and Parmenides, the Origins of Philosophy.* Las Vegas, NV.
Herrmann, F. -G. (2007) 'Greek religion and philosophy: the god of the philosopher', in Ogden (ed.), 384–397.
Hershbell, J. P. (1972) 'Plutarch and Parmenides', *GRBS* 13: 193–207.
Hershbell, J. P. (1982) 'Plutarch and Anaxagoras', *ICS* 7: 141–158.
Hershbell, J. P. (1983) 'Parmenides' Way of Truth and B16', in Anton and Preus (eds), 41–58.
Hollmann, A. (2011) *The Master of Signs: Signs and the Interpretation of Signs in Herodotus' Histories*. Cambridge, MA.

Hölscher, U. (1969) *Parmenides: vom Wesen des Seienden*. Frankfurt.
Horky, P. S. (2013) *Plato and Pythagoreanism*. Oxford.
Huffman, C. A. (2009) 'The Pythagorean conception of the soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus', in Frede and Reis (eds), 21–43.
Huffman, C. A. (ed.) (2014), *A History of Pythagoreanism*. Cambridge.
Hülsz, E. (2013) 'Heraclitus on Φύσις', *Epoché* 17: 179–194.
Humphreys, S. C. (2004) 'Dynamics of the Greek "breakthrough": the dialogue between philosophy and religion', in her *The Strangeness of Gods: Historical Perspectives on the Interpretation of Athenian Religion*. Oxford, 51–76.
Hussey, E. (1972) *The Presocratics*. London.
Hussey, E. (1990) 'The beginnings of epistemology: from Homer to Philolaus', in Everson (ed.), 11–38.
Hussey, E. (2006) 'Parmenides on thinking', in King (ed.), 13–30.
Inwood, B. (2001) *The Poem of Empedocles: A Text and Translation with an Introduction*, 2nd edn. Toronto.
Inwood, B. (2006) 'Who do we think we are?', in B. Reis (ed.), *The Virtuous Life in Greek Ethics*. Cambridge, 230–243.
Iribarren, L. (forthcoming) 'Vérité et référence: l'adresse des Muses à Hésiode (*Théog*. 26–28) et son interprétation par Xénophane et Parménide', in J. -B. Gourinat (ed.), *L'interprétation philosophique des mythes religieux*. Paris.
Jacobs, D. C. (ed.) (1999), *The Presocratics after Heidegger.* Albany, NY.
Jacobs, D. C. (1999) 'The ontological education of Parmenides', in Jacobs (ed.), 185–202.
Jaeger, W. (1947) *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*. E. S. Robinson (trans.). Oxford.
Jameson, G. (1958) '"Well rounded truth" and circular thought in Parmenides', *Phronesis* 3: 15–30.
Janko, R. (1992) *The Iliad: A Commentary,* vol. IV: *books* 13–16. Cambridge.
Johansen, T. K. (1999) 'Myth and *logos* in Aristotle', in Buxton (ed.), 279–291.
Johansen, T. K. (2016) 'Parmenides' likely story', *OSAP* 50: 1–29.
Johnson, D. M. (1999) 'Hesiod's description of Tartarus (*Theogony* 721–819)', *Phoenix* 53: 8–28.
Johnston, S. I. (2005*a*) 'Introduction: divining divination', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 1–28.
Johnston, S. I. (2005*b*) 'Delphi and the dead', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 283–306.
Johnston, S. I. (2008) *Ancient Greek Divination*. Oxford.
Johnston, S. I. (2013*a*) 'The myth of Dionysus', in Graf and Johnston (eds), 66–93.
Johnston, S. I. (2013*b*) 'The eschatology behind the Tablets', in Graf and Johnston (eds), 94–136.
Johnston, S. I. and Struck, P. T. (eds) (2005), *Mantikê: Studies in Ancient Divination*. Leiden.
Journée, G. (2012) 'Lumière et Nuit, Féminin et Masculin chez Parménide d'Elée: quelques remarques', *Phronesis* 57: 289–318.

Jürrs, F. (1976) *Zum Erkenntnisproblem bei den frühgriechischen Denkern*. Berlin.
Kahn, C. H. (1960) *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*. New York, NY.
Kahn, C. H. (1969) 'The thesis of Parmenides', *Review of Metaphysics* 22: 700–724.
Kahn, C. H. (1971) 'Religion and natural philosophy in Empedocles' doctrine of the soul', in Anton and Kustas (eds), 3–38.
Kahn, C. H. (1973) *The Verb "Be" in Ancient Greek*. Dordrecht.
Kahn, C. H. (1976) 'Why existence does not emerge as a distinct concept in Greek Philosophy', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 58: 323–334.
Kahn, C. H. (1979) *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*. Cambridge.
Kahn, C. H. (1981) 'Some philosophical uses of "to be" in Plato', *Phronesis* 26: 105–134.
Kahn, C. H. (1988) 'Being in Parmenides and Plato', *PdP* 43: 237–261.
Kahn, C. H. (2001) *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans*. Indianapolis, IN.
Kahn, C. H. (2002) 'Parmenides and Plato once more', in Caston and Graham (eds), 81–93.
Kahn, C. H. (2009) *Essays on Being*. Oxford.
Kahn, C. H. (2013) 'The achievement of early Greek philosophy: a drama in five acts: from Thales to the *Timaeus*', in McCoy (ed.), 1–17.
Kamtekar, R. (2009) 'Knowing by likeness in Empedocles', *Phronesis* 54: 215–238.
Karsten, S. (1835) *Parmenidis Eleatae Carminis Reliquiae*, Philosophorum Graecorum Veterum, i/1. Amsterdam.
Katz, J. T. and Volk, K. (2000) 'Mere bellies? A new look at *Theogony* 26–28', *JHS* 120: 122–131.
Kearns, E. (2004) 'The gods in the Homeric epics', in R. Fowler (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*. Cambridge, 59–73.
Kearns, E. (2006) 'Religious practice and belief', in K. H. Kinzl, *A Companion to the Classical Greek World*. Oxford, 311–326.
Kenney, E. J. (1971) *Lucretius: De Rerum Natura Book* III. Cambridge.
Kindt, J. (2006) 'Delphic oracle stories and the beginning of historiography: Herodotus' *Croesus Logos', Classical Philology* 101: 34–51.
Kindt, J. (2012) *Rethinking Greek Religion*. Cambridge.
Kindt, J. (2015) 'Personal religion: a productive category for the study of ancient Greek religion?', *JHS* 135: 35–50.
King, R. A. H. (ed.) (2006), *Common to Body and Soul*. Berlin.
Kingsley, P. (1995) *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and Pythagorean Tradition*. Oxford.
Kingsley, P. (1999) *In the Dark Places of Wisdom*. Inverness, CA.
Kingsley, P. (2003) *Reality*. Inverness, CA.
Kirk, G. S. (1970) *Myth, its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures*. Cambridge.

Kirk, G. S. and Stokes, M. C. (1960) 'Parmenides' refutation of motion', *Phronesis* 5: 1–4.

Kirk, G. S., Raven, J. E. and Schofield, M. (1983) *The Presocratic Philosophers* 2nd edn. Cambridge.

Kleingünther, A. (1933) ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΕΥΡΕΤΗΣ, *Philologus*, Supplementband 26: 1–155.

Koning, H. H. (2010) *Hesiod: The Other Poet: Ancient Reception of a Cultural Icon*. Leiden.

Kourouniotes, K. (1936) *Eleusis*. Athens.

Kowalzig, B. (2007) *Singing for the Gods: Performances of Myth and Ritual in Archaic and Classical Greece*. Oxford.

Kraus, M. (2013) 'Parmenides', in H. Flashar, D. Bremer and G. Rechenauer (eds), *Die Philosophie der Antike Band 1: Frühgriechische Philosophie*. Basel, 441–530.

Kreisel, H. (1994) '*Imitatio dei* in Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed*', *AJS Review* 19: 169–211.

Kurfess, C. (2016) 'The truth about Parmenides' *Doxa*', *Ancient Philosophy* 36: 13–45.

Laks, A. (1990) '"The more" and "the full": on the reconstruction of Parmenides' theory of sensation in Theophrastus, *De Sensibus*, 3–4', *OSAP* 8: 1–18.

Laks, A. (1999) 'Soul, sensation and thought', in Long (ed.), 250–270.

Laks, A. (2002) '"Philosophes présocratiques" Remarques sur la construction d'une catégorie de l'historiographie philosophique', in Laks and Louguet (eds), 17–38.

Laks, A. (2003) 'Phénomènes et références: éléments pour une réflexion sur la rationalisation de l'irrationnel', *Methodos* 3: 9–33.

Laks, A. (2013) 'Phenomenon and reference: revisiting Parmenides, Empedocles, and the problem of rationalization', S. C. Humphreys (trans.), in R. G. Wagner and S. C. Humphreys (eds), *Modernity's Classics*. Berlin, 165–186.

Laks, A. and Most, G. W. (eds) (1997), *Studies on the Derveni Papyrus*. Oxford.

Laks, A. and Louguet, C. (eds) (2002), *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie présocratique?* Villeneuve d'Ascq.

Lamberton, R. (1992) 'The Neoplatonists and the spiritualization of Homer', in Lamberton and Keaney (eds), 115–133.

Lamberton, R. and Keaney, J. J. (eds) (1992), *Homer's Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic's Earliest Exegetes*. Princeton, NJ.

Ledbetter, G. M. (2003) *Poetics before Plato: Interpretation and Authority in Early Greek Theories of Poetry*. Princeton, NJ.

Lee, M. -K. (2005) *Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus*. Oxford.

Leigh, F. (2008) 'The copula and semantic continuity in Plato's *Sophist*', *OSAP* 34: 105–121.

Lenz, J. R. (2007) 'Deification of the philosopher in Classical Greece', in M. J. Christensen and J. A. Wittung (eds), *Partakers of the Divine Nature:*

The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions. Madison, NJ, 47–67.
Lesher, J. H. (1983) 'Xenophanes' scepticism', in Anton and Preus (eds), 20–40.
Lesher, J. H. (1984) 'Parmenides' critique of thinking: the *poluderis elenchos* of Fragment 7', *OSAP* 2: 1–31.
Lesher, J. H. (1991) 'Xenophanes on inquiry and discovery: an alternative to the "Hymn to Progress" reading of Fr. 18', *Ancient Philosophy* 11: 229–248.
Lesher, J. H. (1992) *Xenophanes of Colophon: Fragments, a Text and Translation with a Commentary*. Toronto.
Lesher, J. H. (1994*a*) 'The significance of κατὰ πάντ' ἄ<σ>τη in Parmenides Fr. 1.3', *Ancient Philosophy* 14: 1–20.
Lesher, J. H. (1994*b*) 'The emergence of philosophical interest in cognition', *OSAP* 12: 1–34.
Lesher, J. H. (2008) 'The humanizing of knowledge in Presocratic thought', in Curd and Graham (eds), 458–484.
Lesher, J. H. (2013) 'A systematic Xenophanes?', in McCoy (ed.), 77–90.
Linforth, I. M. (1941) *The Arts of Orpheus*. Berkeley, CA.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1966) *Polarity and Analogy*. Cambridge.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1979) *Magic, Reason and Experience*. Cambridge.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1987) *The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science*. Berkeley, CA.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (1999) 'Mythology: reflections from a Chinese perspective', in Buxton (ed.), 145–165.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2002) 'Le pluralisme de la vie intellectuelle avant Platon', A. Laks (trans.), in Laks and Louguet (eds), 39–53.
Lloyd, G. E. R. (2014) 'Pythagoras', in Huffman (ed.), 24–45.
Loenen, J. H. M. M. (1956) 'In defence of the traditional interpretation of Xenophanes' Fr. 18', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 9: 135–136.
Loenen, J. H. M. M. (1959) *Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias: A Reinterpretation of Eleatic Philosophy*. Assen.
Loney, A. C. (2014) 'Hesiod's incorporative poetics in the *Theogony* and the contradictions of Prometheus', *AJPh* 135: 503–531.
Long, A. A. (1966) 'Thinking and sense-perception in Empedocles: mysticism or materialism?', *CQ* 16: 256–276.
Long, A. A. (1975) 'The principles of Parmenides' cosmogony', in Furley and Allen (eds), 82–101.
Long, A. A. (1996) 'Parmenides on thinking being', *BACAP* 12: 125–162.
Long, A. A. (ed.) (1999) *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge.
Long, A. A. (1999) 'The scope of early Greek philosophy', in Long (ed.), 1–21.
Long, A. A. (2002) *Epictetus: A Stoic and Socratic Guide to Life*. Oxford.
Long, A. A. (2009) 'Heraclitus on measure and the explicit emergence of rationality', in Frede and Reis (eds), 87–109.

Long, G. (ed.) and Paley, F. A. (commentary) (1861) *The Epics of Hesiod*. London.
Lumpe, A. (1952) *Die Philosophie des Xenophanes von Kolophon*. Munich.
Luther, M. (1995) *Table Talk*. W. Hazlitt (trans.). London.
Mackenzie, M. M. (1982) 'Parmenides' dilemma', *Phronesis* 27: 1–12.
Macris, C. (2009) 'Pythagoras', in G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds), *The History of Western Philosophy of Religion,* vol. I: *Ancient Philosophy of Religion*. Durham, 23–39.
Macris, C. and Skarsouli, P. (2012) 'La sagesse et les pouvoirs du mystérieux τις du fragment 129 d'Empédocle', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 75: 357–377.
Manetti, G. (1993) *Theories of Sign in Classical Antiquity*. C. Richardson (trans.). Bloomington, IN.
Mansfeld, J. (1964) *Die Offenbarung des Parmenides und die Menschliche Welt*. Assen.
Mansfeld, J. (1995) 'Insight by hindsight: intentional unclarity in presocratic proems', *BICS* 40: 225–232.
Mansfeld, J. (1996) 'Aristote et la structure du *De Sensibus* de Théophraste', *Phronesis* 41: 158–188.
Mansfeld, J. (1999*a*) 'Parménide et Héraclite avaient-ils une théorie de la perception?', *Phronesis* 44: 326–346.
Mansfeld, J. (1999*b*) 'Sources' in Long (ed.), 22–44.
Mansfeld, J. (2005) 'Minima Parmenidea', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 58: 554–560.
Mansfeld, J. (2008) 'A crux in Parmenides Fr. B 1.3 DK', in S. Heilen, R. Kirstein, R. Scott Smith, S. M. Trzaskoma, R. L. van der Wal and M. Vorwerk (eds), *In Pursuit of Wissenschaft*. Festschrift für William M. Calder III zum 75. Geburtstag. Hildesheim, 299–301.
Mansfeld, J. (2013) 'Detheologization', *Rhizomata* 1: 330–362.
Mansfeld, J. (2015), 'Parmenides from right to left', *Études platoniciennes* 12.
Marquardt, P. A. (1982) 'The two faces of Hesiod's Muse', *ICS* 7: 1–12.
Marx, K. and Engels, F. (2008) *On Religion*. Mineola, NY.
Martin, A. and Primavesi, O. (1999) *L'Empédocle de Strasbourg*. Berlin.
Martin, G. (2009) *Divine Talk: Religious Argumentation in Demosthenes*. Oxford.
Mastronarde, D. J. (1994) *Euripides: Phoenissae: Edited with Introduction and Commentary*. Cambridge.
Maurizio, L. (1997) 'Delphic oracles as oral performances: authenticity and historical evidence', *ClAnt*. 16: 308–334.
Maurizio, L. (2013) '*Technopaegnia* in Heraclitus and the Delphic oracles: shared compositional techniques', in J. Kwapisz, D. Petrain and M. Szymanski (eds), *The Muse at Play: Riddles and Wordplay in Greek and Latin Poetry*. Berlin, 100–120.
Mayhew, R. (2008) *Plato: Laws* 10. Oxford.
McCoy, J. (ed.) (2013) *Early Greek Philosophy: The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason*. Washington, DC.

McCoy, M. K. (1989) 'Xenophanes' epistemology: empiricism leading to skepticism', in Boudouris (ed.), 235–240.
McKirahan, R. D. (1994) *Philosophy before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary.* Indianapolis, IN.
McKirahan, R. D. (2005) 'Assertion and argument in Empedocles' cosmology or, what did Empedocles learn from Parmenides?', in Pierris (ed.), 163–188.
McKirahan, R. D. (2008) 'Signs and arguments in Parmenides B8', in Curd and Graham (eds), 189–229.
Meijer, P. A. (1997) *Parmenides beyond the Gates: The Divine Revelation on Being, Thinking and the Doxa*. Amsterdam.
Menn, S. (2012) 'Critique of earlier philosophers on the good and the causes (*Metaphysics* A7-A8 989^{a}18)', in Steel (ed.), 201–224.
Mihai, A. (2010) 'Soul's aitherial abode according to the Poteidaia epitaph and the presocratic philosophers', *Numen* 57: 553–582.
Mikalson, J. D. (2010) *Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy.* Oxford.
Miller, E. L. (1968) 'Parmenides the prophet?', *JHP* 6: 67–69.
Miller, M. (2006) 'Ambiguity and transport: reflections on the proem to Parmenides' poem', *OSAP* 30: 1–47.
Miller, P. L. (2011) *Becoming God: Pure Reason in Early Greek Philosophy.* London.
Minar, E. L. (1949) 'Parmenides and the world of seeming', *AJPh* 70: 41–55.
Mogyoródi, E. (2002) 'Xenophanes as a philosopher: theology and theodicy', in Laks and Louguet (eds), 253–286.
Mogyoródi, E. (2006) 'Xenophanes' epistemology and Parmenides' quest for knowledge', in Sassi (ed.), 123–160.
Montanari, F., Rengakos, A. and Tsagalis, C. C. (ed.) (2009), *Brill's Companion to Hesiod*. Leiden.
Montiglio, S. (2000) 'Wandering philosophers in Classical Greece', *JHS* 120: 86–105.
Montiglio, S. (2005) *Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture*. Chicago, IL.
Morgan, K. (2000) *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge.
Morrison, J. S. (1955) 'Parmenides and Er', *JHS* 75: 59–68.
Most, G. W. (1999*a*) 'The poetics of early Greek philosophy', in Long (ed.), 332–362.
Most, G. W. (1999*b*) 'From *logos* to *mythos*', in Buxton (ed.), 22–47.
Most, G. W. (2003) 'Philosophy and religion', in Sedley (ed.), 300–322.
Most, G. W. (ed. and trans.) (2006) *Hesiod*, 2 vols. London.
Most, G. W. (2007) 'ἄλλος δ' ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται: Presocratic philosophy and traditional Greek epic', in A. Bierl, R. Lämmle and K. Wesselmann (eds), *Literatur und Religion I: Wege zu einer mythisch-rituellen Poetik bei den Griechen*. Berlin, 271–302.
Most, G. W. (2011) 'What ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry?', in P. Destrée and F. G. Herrmann (eds), *Plato and the Poets*. Leiden, 1–20.

Most, G. W. (2013) 'Heraclitus on religion', *Rhizomata* 1: 153–167.
Moulton, C. (1977) *Similes in the Homeric Poems*. Göttingen.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (1965) 'Phrazo and its derivatives in Parmenides', *Classical Philology* 60: 261–262.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (ed.) (1974) *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Princeton, NJ.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (1976) 'Determinacy and indeterminacy, being and non-being in the fragments of Parmenides', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, suppl. vol. II: 45–60.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (1979) 'Some alternatives in interpreting Parmenides', *The Monist* 62: 3–14.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (1989) '"X is really Y": Ionian origins of a thought pattern', in Boudouris (ed.), 280–290.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2008*a*) *The Route of Parmenides: Revised and Expanded Edition*. Las Vegas, NV.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2008*b*) 'Heraclitus, Parmenides, and the naïve metaphysics of things', in Mourelatos (2008*a*), 299–332.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2008*c*) 'Editing note' to G. Vlastos, '"Names" of being in Parmenides', in Mourelatos (2008*a*), 386–388.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2008*d*) 'The cloud-astrophysics of Xenophanes and Ionian material monism', in Curd and Graham (eds), 134–168.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2011) 'Parmenides, early Greek astronomy, and modern Scientific Realism', in Cordero (ed.), 167–189.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2013) 'Sounds, images, mysticism, and logic in Parmenides', in L. Rossetti and M. Pulpito (eds), *Parmenide: suoni, immagini, esperienza*. Sankt Augustin, 159–177.
Mourelatos, A. P. D. (2014) 'The conception of *eoikōs/eikōs* as epistemic standard in Xenophanes, Parmenides, and in Plato's *Timaeus*', *Ancient Philosophy* 34: 169–191.
Moyer, I. S. (2002) 'Herodotus and an Egyptian mirage: the genealogies of the Theban priests', *JHS* 122: 70–90.
Murnaghan, S. (1987) *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey*. Princeton, NJ.
Murnaghan, S. (1995) 'The plan of Athena', in Cohen (ed.), 61–78.
Murray, P. (1981) 'Poetic inspiration in early Greece', *JHS* 101: 87–100.
Myers, F. W. H. (1897) 'Greek oracles', in his *Essays-Classical*. London, 1–106.
Mylonas, G. E. (1961) *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Princeton, NJ.
Naddaf, G. (2005) *The Greek Concept of Nature*. Albany, NY.
Naddaf, G. (2006) 'What is Presocratic philosophy?', *Ancient Philosophy* 26: 161–179.
Nagler, M. N. (1996) 'Dread goddess revisited', in Schein (ed.), 141–161.
Nagy, G. (1990) *Greek Mythology and Poetics*. Ithaca, NY.
Needham, R. (1972) *Belief, Language and Experience*. Oxford.
Nehamas, A. (1981) 'On Parmenides' three ways of inquiry', *Deucalion* 33/4: 97–111.

Nehamas, A. (1999) 'Plato on the imperfection of the sensible world', in G. Fine (ed.), *Plato,* vol. I: *Metaphysics and Epistemology*. Oxford, 171–191.
Nehamas, A. (2002) 'Parmenidean being/Heraclitean fire', in Caston and Graham (eds), 45–64.
Nestle, W. (1942) *Vom Mythos zum Logos*. Stuttgart.
Nietzsche, F. W. (1922) *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. V. R. Oehler and M. Oehler (eds). Munich.
Nietzsche, F. W. (1974) *The Complete Works,* vol. II: *Early Greek Philosophy*. O. Levy (ed.), M.A. Mügge (trans.). Brooklyn, NY.
Nightingale, A. W. (2007) 'The philosophers in archaic Greek culture', in H. A. Shapiro (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Archaic Greece*. Cambridge, 169–198.
Nutton, V. (2013) *Ancient Medicine,* 2nd edn. London.
Ober, J. (2010) 'Socrates and democratic Athens', in D. R. Morrison, *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*. Cambridge, 138–178.
Ogden, D. (ed.) (2007), *A Companion to Greek Religion*. Oxford.
Oppy, G. and Trakakis, N. (eds) (2009), *The History of Western Philosophy of Religion,* vol. I: *Ancient Philosophy of Religion*. Durham.
Osborne, C. (1987*a*) *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics*. London.
Osborne, C. (1987*b*) 'Empedocles recycled' *CQ* 37: 24–50.
Osborne, C. (1997) 'Heraclitus and the rites of established religion', in A. B. Lloyd (ed.), *What is a God?* London, 35–42.
Osborne, C. (2005) 'Sin and moral responsibility in Empedocles's cosmic cycle', in Pierris (ed.), 283–308.
Osborne, C. (2006) 'Was there an Eleatic revolution in philosophy?', in Goldhill and Osborne (eds), 218–245.
Osborne, R. (1997) 'The polis and its culture', in Taylor (ed.), 9–46.
Osborne, R. (2016) 'Sacrificial theologies', in Eidinow, Kindt and Osborne (eds), 233–248.
Owen, G. E. L. (1960) 'Eleatic questions', *CQ* 10: 84–102.
Owen, G. E. L. (1974) 'Plato and Parmenides on the timeless present', in Mourelatos (ed.), 271–292.
Owens, J. (1979) 'Knowledge and *katabasis* in Parmenides', *The Monist* 62: 15–29.
Paleothodorus, D. (2010) 'Light and darkness in Dionysiac rituals as illustrated on Attic vase paintings of the 5th century BCE', in Christopoulos, Karakantza and Levaniouk (eds), 237–260.
Palmer, J. A. (1998) 'Xenophanes' Ouranian god in the fourth century', *OSAP* 16: 1–34.
Palmer, J. A. (1999) *Plato's Reception of Parmenides*. Oxford.
Palmer, J. A. (2000) 'Aristotle on the ancient theologians', *Apeiron* 33: 181–206.
Palmer, J. A. (2009) *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy.* Oxford.

Palmer, J. A. (2013) 'Revelation and reasoning in Kalliopeia's address to Empedocles', *Rhizomata* 1: 308–329.
Panagiotou, S. (1983) 'Empedocles on his own divinity', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 36: 276–285.
Parke, H. W. (1967) *The Oracles of Zeus: Dodona, Olympia, Ammon*. Oxford.
Parke, H. W. and Wormell, D. E. W. (1956) *The Delphic Oracle,* vol. II: *The Oracular Responses*. Oxford.
Parker, R. (1997) 'Gods cruel and kind: tragic and civic theology', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*. Oxford, 143–160.
Parker, R. (2000) 'Greek states and Greek oracles', in Buxton (ed.), 76–108.
Parker, R. (2011) *On Greek Religion*. Ithaca, NY.
Pascal, B. (2008) *Human Happiness*. A. J. Krailsheimer (trans.). London.
Patera, I. (2010) 'Light and lighting equipment in the Eleusinian mysteries: symbolism and ritual use', in Christopoulos, Karakantza and Levaniouk (eds), 261–275.
Patin, A. (1899) 'Parmenides im Kampfe gegen Heraklit', *Jahrbuch für klassische Philologie*, Supplementband 25: 489–660.
Pellikaan-Engel, M. E. (1978) *Hesiod and Parmenides: A New View on Their Cosmologies and on Parmenides' Proem*. Amsterdam.
Pendrick, G. J. (2002) *Antiphon the Sophist: The Fragments*. Cambridge.
Penelhum, T. (1983) 'Skepticism and fideism', in M. F. Burnyeat (ed.), *The Skeptical Tradition*. Berkeley, CA, 287–318.
Petridou, G. (2015) *Divine Epiphany in Greek Literature and Culture*. Oxford.
Pfeiffer, H. (1975) *Die Stellung des parmenideischen Lehrgedichtes in der epischen Tradition*. Bonn.
Phillips, E.D. (1955) 'Parmenides on thought and being', *Philosophical Review* 64: 546–560.
Picot, J. -C. and Berg, W. (2013) 'Empedocles vs. Xenophanes: differing notions of the divine', *Organon* 45: 5–19.
Pierris, A. L. (ed.) (2005) *The Empedoclean Κόσμος: Structure, Process and the Question of Cyclicity*. Patras.
Pierris, A. L. (2007) *The Emergence of Reason from the Spirit of Mystery: An Inquiry into the Origin and Nature of Ancient Greek Rationality,* vol. II: *Mystery and Philosophy*. Patras.
Pinto, R. (2016) '"All things are full of gods": souls and gods in Thales', *Ancient Philosophy* 36: 243–261.
Plantinga, A. (2000) *Warranted Christian Belief*. Oxford.
Popper, K. R. (1970) 'Back to the Presocratics', in Furley and Allen (eds), 130–153.
Popper, K. R. (1992) 'How the moon might shed some of her light upon the two ways of Parmenides', *CQ* 42: 12–19.
Popper, K. R. (1998) *The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment*. A. F. Peterson (ed.). London, 93–104.
Price, S. (1999) *Religions of the Ancient Greeks*. Cambridge.

Primavesi, O. (2008) 'Empedocles: physical and mythical divinity', in Curd and Graham (eds), 250–283.
Primavesi, O. (2013) 'Le chemin vers la révélation: lumière et nuit dans le proème de Parménide', *Philosophie Antique* 13: 37–81.
Pucci, P. (1977) *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*. London.
Pucci, P. (2009) 'The poetry of the *Theogony*', in Montanari, Rengakos and Tsagalis (eds), 37–70.
Pulpito, M. (2011) 'Parmenides and the forms', in Cordero (ed.), 191–212.
Rangos, S. (2012) 'Empedocles on divine nature', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 75: 315–38.
Ranzato, S. (2015) *Il Kouros e la Verità: Polivalenza delle immagini nel poema di Parmenide*. Pisa.
Reiche, H. A. T. (1971) 'Empirical aspects of Xenophanes' theology', in Anton and Kustas (eds), 88–110.
Reinhardt, K. (1974) 'The relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem', in Mourelatos (ed.), 293–311.
Richardson, N. J. (1974) *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. Oxford.
de Rijk, L. M. (1983) 'Did Parmenides reject the sensible world?', in L. P. Gerson (ed.), *Graceful Reason*. Toronto, 29–53.
Robbiano, C. (2006) *Becoming Being: On Parmenides' Transformative Philosophy*. Sankt Augustin.
Robertson, N. (2003) 'Orphic mysteries and Dionysiac ritual' in Cosmopoulos (ed.), 218–240.
Robinson, T. M. (1975) 'Parmenides on ascertainment of the real', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 4: 623–633.
Robinson, T. M. (2008) 'Presocratic theology', in Curd and Graham (eds), 485–498.
Rohde, E. (1925) *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*. W. B. Hillis (trans.). London.
Roloff, D. (1970) *Gottähnlichkeit, Vergöttlichung und Erhöhung zu seligem Leben: Untersuchungen zur Herkunft der platonischen Angleichung an Gott*. Berlin.
Rosen, R. M. (1990) 'Poetry and sailing in Hesiod's *Works and Days*', *ClAnt*. 9: 99–113.
Ross, W. D. (1966) *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2 vols. Oxford.
Rowe, C. J. (1983) '"Archaic thought" in Hesiod', *JHS* 103: 124–135.
Rowett, C. (2013) 'On calling gods by the right names', *Rhizomata* 1: 168–193.
Rowett, C. (2014) 'The Pythagorean society and politics', in Huffman (ed.), 112–130.
Rowett, C. (2016) 'Why the philosopher kings will believe the noble lie', *OSAP* 50: 67–100.
Russell, N. (2006) *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*. Oxford.
Santaniello, C. (2012) 'Θεός, δαίμων, φρὴν ἱερή: Empedocles and the divine', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 75: 301–313.

Santos, J. T. (2011) 'The role of "thought" in the argument of Parmenides' poem', in Cordero (ed.), 251–270.
Sassi, M. M. (2002) 'La naissance de la philosophie de l'esprit de la tradition', in Laks and Louguet (eds), 55–81.
Sassi, M. M. (ed.) (2006), *The Construction of Philosophical Discourse in the Age of the Presocratics*. Pisa.
Sassi, M. M. (2009) *Gli inizi della filosofia: in Grecia*. Turin.
Sassi, M. M. (2013) 'Where epistemology and religion meet: what do(es) the god(s) look like', *Rhizomata* 1: 283–307.
Sassi, M. M. (2016) 'Parmenides and Empedocles on *krasis* and knowledge', *Apeiron* 49: 451–469.
Schäfer, C. (1996) *Xenophanes von Kolophon: Ein Vorsokratiker zwischen Mythos und Philosophie*. Stuttgart.
Schein, S. L. (ed.) (1996) *Reading the Odyssey*. Princeton, NJ.
Schein, S. L. (1996) 'Introduction', in Schein (ed.), 3–31.
Schibli, H. S. (1990) *Pherekydes of Syros*. Oxford.
Schofield, M. (1970) 'Did Parmenides discover eternity?', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52: 113–135.
Schofield, M. (1987) 'Coxon's Parmenides', *Phronesis* 32: 349–359.
Schofield, M. (1991) 'Heraclitus' theory of soul and its antecedents', in S. Everson (ed.), *Companions to Ancient Thought,* vol. II: *Psychology*. Cambridge, 13–35.
Schofield, M. (1997) 'The Ionians', in Taylor (ed.), 47–87.
Schofield, M. (2003) 'The Presocratics', in Sedley (ed.), 42–72.
Schofield, M. (2007) 'Heroic Journeys', Presidential Address to the Classical Association. Sherborne.
Schrödinger, E. (1954) *Nature and the Greeks*. Cambridge.
Seaford, R. (1986) 'Immortality, salvation and the elements', *HSPh* 90: 1–26.
Seaford, R. (2005) 'Mystic light in Aeschylus' *Bassarai*', *CQ* 55: 602–6.
Seaford, R. (2010) 'Mystic light and near-death experience', in Christopoulos, Karakantza and Levaniouk (eds), 201–206.
Sedley, D. N. (1999*a*) 'Parmenides and Melissus', in Long (ed.), 113–133.
Sedley, D. N. (1999*b*) 'The ideal of godlikeness', in G. Fine (ed.), *Oxford Readings in Plato: Ethics, Politics, Religion and the Soul*, vol. II. Oxford, 309–328.
Sedley, D. N. (ed.) (2003) *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy*. Cambridge.
Sedley, D. N. (2005) 'Empedocles' life cycles', in Pierris (ed.), 331–371.
Sedley, D. N. (2007) *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity*. Berkeley, CA.
Sedley, D. N. (2010) 'Hesiod's *Theogony* and Plato's *Timaeus*', in Boys-Stones and Haubold (eds), 246–258.
Sedley, D. N. (2013*a*) 'The atheist underground', in Harte and Lane (eds), 329–348.
Sedley, D. N. (2013*b*) 'From the pre-Socratics to the Hellenistic age', in S. Bullivant and M. Ruse (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Atheism*. Oxford, 139–151.

Segal, C. (1992) 'Bard and audience in Homer', in Lamberton and Keaney (eds), 3–29.
Shaw, G. (2004) Review of Kingsley (2003), *BMCR* 2004.07.43.
Shorey, P. (1911) 'Note on Xenophanes Fr. 18 (Diels) and Isocrates *Panegyricus* 32', *Classical Philology* 6: 88–89.
Sider, D. and Johnstone Jr., H.W. (1986) *The Fragments of Parmenides*. Bryn Mawr, PA.
Sisko, J. E. (2003) 'Anaxagoras' Parmenidean cosmology: worlds within worlds within the one', *Apeiron* 36: 87–114.
Sisko, J. E. and Weiss, Y. (2015) 'A fourth alternative in interpreting Parmenides', *Phronesis* 60: 40–59.
Slatkin, L. M. (1996) 'Composition by theme and the *metis* of the *Odyssey*', in Schein (ed.), 223–237.
Smith, W. C. (1980) 'Belief: a reply to a response', *Numen* 27: 247–255.
Smyth, H. W. (1972) *Greek Grammar*, rev. by G. M. Messing. Cambridge, MA.
Snell, B. (1953) *The Discovery of Mind*. T. G. Rosenmeyer (trans.). Oxford.
Solmsen, F. (1957) 'The vital heat, the inborn *pneuma* and the *aether*', *JHS* 77: 119–123.
Sourvinou-Inwood, C. (2000) 'What is polis religion?', in Buxton (ed.), 13–37.
Steel, S. (ed.) (2012), *Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha*. Oxford.
Steele, L. D. (2002) 'Mesopotamian elements in the proem of Parmenides?', *CQ* 52: 583–588.
Stern, J. (1996) *Palaephatus: On Unbelievable Tales: Translation, Introduction and Commentary.* Wauconda, IL.
Stern, J. (1999) 'Rationalizing myth: methods and motives in Palaephatus', in Buxton (ed.), 215–222.
Stoddard, K. (2004) *The Narrative Voice in the Theogony of Hesiod*. Leiden.
Stokes, M. C. (1962) 'Hesiodic and Milesian cosmogonies – I', *Phronesis* 7: 1–37.
Stokes, M. C. (1963) 'Hesiodic and Milesian cosmogonies – II', *Phronesis* 8: 1–34.
Stokes, M. C. (1971) *One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy.* Washington, DC.
Stratton, G. M. (1917) *Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle*. London.
Stroh, W. (1976) 'Hesiods lügende Musen', in H. Görgemanns und E.A. Schmidt (eds), *Studien zum antiken Epos*. Meisenheim, 85–112.
Struck, P. T. (2005) 'Divination and literary criticism?', in Johnston and Struck (eds), 147–165.
Tarán, L. (1965) *Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays*. Princeton, NJ.
Tarrant, D. (1951) 'Plato's use of quotations and other illustrative material', *CQ* 45: 59–67.
Taub, L. (2003) *Ancient Meteorology.* London.

Taylor, C. C. W. (ed.) (1997) *Routledge History of Philosophy,* vol. I*: From the Beginning to Plato*. London.

Tejera, V. (1989) 'The expressive medium of the Ionian Presocratics', in Boudouris (ed.), 384–393.

Thalmann, W. G. (1984) *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Poetry*. Baltimore, MD.

Thanassas, P. (2006) 'How many *Doxai* are there in Parmenides?', *Rhizai* 3: 199–218.

Thanassas, P. (2011) 'Parmenidean dualisms', in Cordero (ed.), 289–308.

Tor, S. (2009) review of Robbiano (2006), *BMCR* 2009.03.57.

Tor, S. (2010) review of Ustinova (2009), *CR* 60: 493–495.

Tor, S. (2012) review of Mikalson (2010), *JHS* 132: 281–282.

Tor, S. (2013*a*) 'Mortal and divine in Xenophanes' epistemology', *Rhizomata* 1: 248–282.

Tor, S. (2013*b*) 'Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes' scepticism', *IJSS* 3: 1–23.

Tor, S. (2015) 'Parmenides' epistemology and the two parts of his poem', *Phronesis* 60: 3–39.

Tor, S. (2016) 'Heraclitus on Apollo's signs and his own: contemplating oracles and philosophical inquiry', in Eidinow, Kindt and Osborne (eds), 89–116.

Torgerson, T. B. (2006) 'The εἰδὼς φώς and the traditional dichotomy of divine and mortal epistemology', *Revue de Philosophie Ancienne* 24: 25–43.

Trampedach, K. (2008) 'Authority disputed: the seer in Homeric epic', in G. Dignas and K. Trampedach (eds), *Practitioners of the Divine*. Cambridge, MA, 207–230.

Trépanier, S. (2003) 'Empedocles on the ultimate symmetry of the world', *OSAP* 24: 1–57.

Trépanier, S. (2004) *Empedocles: An Interpretation*. London.

Trépanier, S. (2010) 'Early Greek theology: god as nature and natural gods', in Bremmer and Erskine (eds), 273–317.

Trépanier, S. (2014) 'From wandering limbs to limbless gods: δαίμων as substance in Empedocles', *Apeiron* 47: 172–210.

Tsagalis, C. C. (2009) 'Poetry and poetics in the Hesiodic corpus', in Montanari, Rengakos and Tsagalis (eds), 131–177.

Tulin, A. (1993) 'Xenophanes Fr. 18 D.-K. and the origins of the idea of progress', *Hermes* 121: 129–138.

Ustinova, Y. (2004) 'Truth lies at the bottom of a cave: Apollo *Pholeuterios*, the Pholarchs of the Eleats, and subterranean oracles', *PdP* 59: 25–44.

Ustinova, Y. (2009) *Caves and the Ancient Greek Mind: Descending Underground in the Search for Ultimate Truth*. Oxford.

Van Noorden, H. (2015) *Playing Hesiod*. Cambridge.

Verdenius, W. J. (1947) 'Notes on the Presocratics', *Mnemosyne* ser. 3, no. 13: 271–289.

Verdenius, W. J. (1949) 'Parmenides' conception of light', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 2: 116–131.

Verdenius, W. J. (1953) 'Xenophanes 34, 3', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 6: 197.
Verdenius, W. J. (1955) 'Xenophanes Fr. 18', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 8: 221.
Verdenius, W. J. (1956) 'Xenophanes Fr. 1, 24', *Mnemosyne* ser. 4, no. 9: 136.
Verdenius, W. J. (1964) *Parmenides: Some Comments on His Poem*. Amsterdam.
Vernant, J. -P. (1982) 'The myth of Prometheus in Hesiod' in his *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*. J. Lloyd (trans.). London, 183–201.
Vernant, J. -P. (1991) *Mortals and Immortals*. F. I. Zeitlin (ed.). Princeton, NJ.
Vernant, J. -P. (1991*a*) 'Mortals and immortals: the body of the divine', F. I. Zeitlin (trans.), in Vernant (1991), 27–49.
Vernant, J. -P. (1991*b*) 'Speech and mute signs', F. I. Zeitlin (trans.), in Vernant (1991), 303–317.
Vernant, J. -P. (1996) 'The refusal of Odysseus', in Schein (ed.), 185–189.
Versnel, H. S. (1987) 'What did ancient man see when he saw a god? Some reflections on Greco-Roman epiphany', in D. van der Plas (ed.), *Effigies Dei: Essays on the History of Religions*. Leiden, 42–55.
Versnel, H. S. (2011) *Coping with the Gods: Wayward Readings in Greek Theology*. Leiden.
Veyne, P. (1988) *Did the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?* P. Wissing (trans.). Chicago, IL.
Vlastos, G. (1946) 'Parmenides' theory of knowledge', *TAPA* 77: 66–77.
Vlastos, G. (1970*a*) 'Review of F. M. Cornford: *Principium Sapientiae*', in Furley and Allen (eds), 42–55.
Vlastos, G. (1970*b*) 'Theology and philosophy in early Greek thought', in Furley and Allen (eds), 92–129.
Vlastos, G. (1973) 'Degrees of reality in Plato', in his *Platonic Studies*. Princeton, NJ, 58–75.
Vlastos, G. (2008) '"Names" of being in Parmenides', A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), in Mourelatos (2008*a*), 367–388.
Wade-Gery, H. T. (1949) 'Hesiod', *Phoenix* 3: 81–93.
Wainwright, W. J. (1974) 'Belief and conceptual relativity', *The Journal of Religion* 54: 305–312.
Walcot, P. (1963) 'Hesiod and the law', *Symbolae Osloenses* 38: 5–21.
Wallace, R. W. (1994) 'Private lives and public enemies: freedom of thought in Classical Athens', in A. L. Boegehold and A. C. Scafuro (eds), *Athenian Identity and Civic Ideology*. Baltimore, MD, 127–155.
Walsh, G. B. (1984) *The Varieties of Enchantment*. Chapel Hill, NC.
Warden, J. R. (1971) 'The mind of Zeus', *JHI* 32: 3–14.
Wardle, D. (2006) *Cicero: On Divination Book 1: Translated with Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford.
Warren, J. (2000) 'Epicurean immortality', *OSAP* 18: 231–261.
Warren, J. (2007) *Presocratics*. Stockfield.
Warren, J. (2013) 'Gods and men in Xenophanes', in Harte and Lane (eds), 294–312.
Wedin, M. V. (2014) *Parmenides' Grand Deduction*. Oxford.

West, M. L. (1966) *Hesiod: Theogony: Edited with Prolegomena and Commentary*. Oxford.
West, M. L. (1971) *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*. Oxford.
West, M. L. (1978) *Hesiod: Works and Days: Edited with Prolegomena and Commentary*. Oxford.
West, M. L. (1983) *The Orphic Poems*. Oxford.
West, M. L. (1997) *The East Face of Helikon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth*. Oxford.
West, S. (1991) 'Herodotus' portrait of Hecataeus', *JHS* 111: 144–160.
Whitmarsh, T. (2015) *Battling the Gods: Atheism in the Ancient World*. New York, NY.
Wiebe, D. (1979) 'The role of "belief" in the study of religion: a response to W.C. Smith', *Numen* 26: 234–249.
Wiesner, J. (1997) 'Wissen und Skepsis bei Xenophanes', *Hermes* 125: 17–33.
von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. (1916) *Die Ilias und Homer*. Berlin.
von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. (1959) *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, 3rd edn, 2 vols. Basel.
Wildberg, C. (2011) 'Dionysos in the mirror of philosophy: Heraclitus, Plato, and Plotinus', in R. Schlesier (ed.), *A Different God? Dionysos and Ancient Polytheism*. Berlin, 205–232.
Willcock, M. M. (1978) *The Iliad of Homer Books I-XII: Edited with Introduction and Commentary*. Basingstoke.
Wise, K. P. (1999) 'Geology', in J. F. Ashton (ed.), *In Six Days: Why* 50 *Scientists Choose to Believe in Creation*. Sydney, 328–332.
Wittgenstein, L. (1966) *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, Compiled from Notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor*. C. Barrett (ed.). Oxford.
Woodbury, L. (1971) 'Parmenides on names', in Anton and Kustas (eds), 145–162.
Woodbury, L. (1986) 'Parmenides on naming by mortal men', A. C. Bowen (ed.), *Ancient Philosophy* 6: 1–13.
Woodruff, P. (2004) 'Antiphon, Sophist and Athenian', *OSAP* 26: 323–336.
Wright, M. R. (1995) *Empedocles: The Extant Fragments*. London.
Wyatt, Jr., W. F. (1992) 'The root of Parmenides', *HSPh* 94: 113–120.
Yonezawa, S. (1989) 'Xenophanes: his self-consciousness as a wise man and Fr. 34', in Boudouris (ed.), 432–438.
Yunis, H. (2011) *Plato: Phaedrus*. Cambridge.
Zaidman, L. B. and Pantel, P. S. (1992) *Religion in the Ancient Greek City*. P. Cartledge (trans.). Cambridge.
Zeller, E. (1919) *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, I. Teil, I. Leipzig.
Zhmud, L. (2012) *Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans*. K. Windle and R. Ireland (trans). Oxford.

INDEX LOCORUM

This index does not list exhaustively all of the passages that are merely referred to or adduced as parallels in the book.

Aelius Aristides
Or. 22.2–3, 268
Aeschylus
Pers. 547, 211
Pr. 447–8, 195
Pr. 499, 195
Pr. 975, 51
Supp. 100–3, 138
Th. 81, 352–353
TrGF 3.68–73, 256
Aëtius
1.3.4, 21
1.6.9, 36, 55
1.6.14–15, 55
1.7.2, 44
1.7.11, 20
1.7.12, 25
2.20.6, 30
5.1.1, 104–106
5.1.4, 105
Alcaeus
fr. 450 Campbell, 30
Alcmaeon
A12, 244
B1, 115, 130
B2, 244
Alexander
in Metaph. 31.9–14, 220
Anaxagoras
A112, 229
B12, 22, 177
B14, 290
Anaximander
A11.5, 201
A11.6, 232
A15, 20, 22, 25
A17, 25
A23, 20
A27, 148
B1, 20–21
Anaximenes
A7, 25
A7.1, 24–25
A7.4, 201
A10, 24, 25
A15, 21
B2, 21, 244
Andocides
Myst. 30.10, 255
Antiphon
A9, 111
Apollonius Rhodius
scholia in Apollonium Rhodium
Σ 77.15–16, 270
Apuleius
Met. 11.21.26–7, 269
Met. 11.23.21–31, 269
Met. 11.24.1–18, 269
Aratus
Phain. 1.5–6, 110
Archilochus
E_1 II.50–1, 275
fr. 131 W, 182
Aristophanes
Nub. 365–7, 44
Nub. 423–6, 44
Nub. 1241, 255
Ran. 454–6, 269
Aristotle
Cael. 294^{a}21-8, 319
de An. 404^{a}1-6, 233
de An. 404^{a}27-31, 240

Aristotle (cont.)
de An. 405^{a}18-^{b}1, 38
de An. 405^{a}19-21, 23
de An. 407^{b}20-3, 244
de An. 411^{a}7-8, 20, 23
de An. 427^{a}17-^{b}14, 192, 240, 330–331
EN 1177^{b}31-1178^{a}3, 251
fr. 15 Rose, 284
fr. 61 Rose, 277
fr. 192 Rose, 275
GA 736^{b}29-38, 245
GC 318^{b}6-7, 186
GC 325^{a}13ff, 193
Metaph. 982^{b}18-19, 55–56
Metaph. 984^{b}3-4, 220
Metaph. 984^{b}11-19, 38
Metaph. 984^{b}15-22, 277
Metaph. 984^{b}22-985^{a}10, 38, 55, 319
Metaph. 985^{a}10-21, 38
Metaph. 986^{b}21-2, 314
Metaph. 986^{b}21-7, 143
Metaph. 986^{b}26-34, 193, 220
Metaph. 986^{b}33-987^{a}2, 186
Metaph. 988^{a}14-17, 38
Metaph. 988^{a}33-34, 38
Metaph. 1000^{a}5-19, 55
Metaph. 1009^{b}12-1010^{a}3, 190–192, 240, 330–331
Metaph. 1009^{b}13-15, 183–184
Phys. 203^{b}10-15, 20, 25
Poet. 1460^{b}10-11, 149
Poet. 1460^{b}35-1461^{a}1, 149
Rhet. 1377^{a}19, 141
Rhet. 1399^{b}6–9, 141
Athenaeus
12.526c, 154
Augustine
Civ. Dei 6.5, 36
Civ. Dei 7.17, 115
Civ. Dei 8.2, 24

Cebetis *Tabula*
2.2.2–5, 275
Cicero
Div. 1.1.1, 105, 115
Div. 1.2.3, 109
Div. 1.3.5, 104–106
Div. 1.3.6, 105
Div. 1.5.9, 115
Div. 1.6.11, 112
Div. 1.13.23, 131
Div. 1.14.24, 113
Div. 1.18.34, 112, 115
ND 1.25, 20, 25
ND 1.28, 231
ND 2.168.3–4, 50
ND 3.5–10, 50
ND 3.29–52, 46
Clement
Protr. 2.21.2, 267
Strom. 3.3.14, 238

Democritus
A128, 175
B68, 148
B299.6–8, 148
Derveni papyrus
col.14–17, 17
col.17.12, 140
col.19, 17
col.19.10, 140
col.20, 284
col.23, 17
Diogenes Laertius
1.43–4, 148
1.111, 151
2.40, 43
2.117, 46
8.21, 276
8.36, 152–153
8.41, 276
8.54, 323
9.18–20, 151, 152
9.18.5–6, 314
9.18.11, 148
9.20, 154
9.20.6–7, 314
9.21, 274–275
9.21.1–3, 314
9.21.3–8, 314
9.22, 164
9.22.11–12, 55
9.52, 42
10.2, 56
Diogenes of Apollonia
A19.42, 244
B5, 22

Empedocles
A85, 231
B1, 335
B2, 323–325, 330, 334
B2.3, 325
B2.8[b]-9, 337
B3.3–5, 333–334
B3.9–13, 328
B4, 334, 335, 342
B4.2–3, 335
B6, 334
B11, 326–327
B15, 327
B17.14, 325
B17.20–6, 328–329
B17.26, 319
B21.12, 321, 325, 337
B23, 335
B23.8, 325
B39, 319, 324, 330
B62.1–3, 327
B62.6, 175
B82, 329–330
B84, 330
B106, 191, 330–332
B108, 191, 330–332, 333
B109, 175, 178, 333
B110, 325
B110.10, 174, 333
B111, 335
B112.4, 273, 335
B113, 335
B115, 321, 326
B115.3, 337
B115.5, 325
B115.13–14, 320, 321, 333, 336
B117, 321, 326
B118, 238
B126, 337
B127, 321
B128, 320, 322, 344
B129, 151, 161, 275, 323, 324, 326, 332
B129.2–4, 325
B131, 319, 333–334
B131.1–2, 335
B132, 323
B133, 331
B134, 319
B136, 322, 344
B137, 322, 344
B146, 322
B147, 322
Strasb. a (ii) 21–30, 329–330
Strasb. d, 320
Strasb. d 5–6 = B139, 321–322, 332–333, 336
Epicharmus
B9, 228, 229
B12, 194–195
B20, 251
B22, 228
Epicurus
Ep. ad Menoec. 123–4, 45
Sent. 1, 45
Epimenides
B1, 75
Epiphanius
Advers. Haeres. 2.2.9, 128, 130
Etymologicum Magnum
574.69–75, 127–128
Euripides
Bacch. 72–4, 255
Hel. 1013–16, 229, 230, 236–237, 241
Ion 532ff, 113
Med. 145–7, 237
Med. 994, 237
Supp. 531–4, 229
TrGF 5.286, 45
TrGF 5.370.71–2, 228–229, 230
TrGF 5.506, 45
TrGF 5.771–86, 256
TrGF 5.795, 129, 130
TrGF 5.839.1–2, 9–12, 229
TrGF 5.913, 44
Euripides (?)
TrGF 2.624, 45
Eusebius
PE 3.9.2, 140
PE 13.14.1.1–3.1, 50

Georgius Choeroboscus
in Theod. 4.1 200.3–5 Hilgard, 127–128
in Theod. 4.2 88.27–33 Hilgard, 124
Gold Tablets
GJ 1, 272
GJ 1.15–16, 272
GJ 2.6, 245, 273
GJ 2.11, 275

Gold Tablets (cont.)
GJ 3.4, 273
GJ 5–8, 272
GJ 5.3, 245, 273
GJ 5.5, 237–238, 243, 273
GJ 5.9, 273
GJ 6.3, 245, 273
GJ 6.7, 272
GJ 7.3, 245, 273
GJ 7.7, 272
GJ 8.12–15, 245, 273
GJ 29.3–4, 245, 273
Gregory of Nyssa
ad Ablab. 3.1.38.19–39.7, 50

Hecataeus, 30
F1, 29
F26, 30
F27, 30
F35a, 33
F35b, 30
F300, 30
F302d, 30
T4, 30
T12a, 148
Heraclitus
B32, 204
B34, 195
B36, 236
B40, 55, 322–323
B41, 22
B48, 204
B57, 53
B61, 326
B64, 22
B67, 204
B93, 48, 114, 266
B101, 266
B117, 233
B118, 161, 233
Herodian
de Pros. Cathol. 3.1 535.28–35 Lentz, 124
περὶ Διχρόνων 3.2 16.17–29 Lentz, 124
Herodotus
1.1–5, 30
1.6–91, 31
1.30, 148
1.32, 117–118, 122
1.53, 113–114
1.60, 31
1.182, 31
2.3, 47
2.53, 53
2.55–7, 30
2.123, 244
2.143, 30
4.76, 148
4.94–6, 276
6.75, 31
6.84, 31
7.6, 145
7.12–19, 31
7.137, 31
7.142, 266
7.142.3–143.1, 111
8.122, 109
9.33, 114
9.92–4, 112, 195
9.100, 31
9.120, 125
Hesiod
fr. 278 M-W, 109
fr. 278.5 M-W, 69
fr. 311 M-W, 256
Op. 1–10, 95–97
Op. 10, 69
Op. 11, 93
Op. 11–26, 84
Op. 26, 318
Op. 42–105, 88–90
Op. 78, 66, 71
Op. 85–9, 92
Op. 106, 57
Op. 106–201, 317–318
Op. 108, 317
Op. 127–55, 70
Op. 178–9, 86
Op. 182–3, 70
Op. 208–9, 83, 318
Op. 218, 122
Op. 267–73, 34–35, 85–86, 100
Op. 282–5, 66
Op. 293–5, 96
Op. 323, 183
Op. 373–5, 93, 183
Op. 483–4, 100
Op. 635–8, 86

Op. 646–93, 97–101, 310
Op. 660–2, 131
Op. 685, 183
Op. 708–9, 66
Op. 788–9, 66
scholia in Hesiodum
Σ *Op.* 130–1, 130a, 55
Σ *Op.* 270–3, 35
Σ *Op.* 661a, 100
Σ *Th.* 23, 74
Σ *Th.* 535.1–2, 88, 90
Th. 1–4, 84
Th. 1–21, 61
Th. 11–21, 74
Th. 22, 64, 73, 98
Th. 22–3, 61
Th. 24, 74
Th. 24–8, 61
Th. 26–8, 61–103, 309–310, 311–314
Th. 29, 75, 91
Th. 29–34, 75
Th. 30–1, 75–76
Th. 31-2[a], 79–80, 90, 318
Th. 32, 76–78
Th. 33, 77
Th. 36–115, 73
Th. 38, 76
Th. 49, 58
Th. 60, 84
Th. 71–4, 84
Th. 79, 319
Th. 80–92, 76
Th. 93–5, 86
Th. 95–100, 318
Th. 99–101, 78
Th. 105–6, 273
Th. 112–13, 84
Th. 114–15, 64
Th. 115–16, 81
Th. 116, 56, 74
Th. 174–7, 87
Th. 175, 90
Th. 207–10, 204
Th. 217, 57
Th. 225–32, 66, 71, 93
Th. 231–2, 66
Th. 233–6, 66, 68, 71, 90
Th. 262, 90
Th. 337–40, 30
Th. 385–8, 58
Th. 411–28, 84
Th. 429–47, 83
Th. 448–52, 84
Th. 468–96, 87
Th. 494, 90
Th. 498–500, 87–88
Th. 510–14, 89
Th. 511[b]-14, 92
Th. 535–616, 88–90
Th. 537, 183
Th. 653–7, 87
Th. 721–819, 254–255, 359
Th. 730–1, 87
Th. 736–8, 352
Th. 744–54, 355, 358
Th. 746, 352
Th. 759–62, 351
Th. 760–1, 257
Th. 780–1, 119
Th. 782–806, 66
Th. 783–805, 87
Th. 807–9, 352
Th. 811, 352
Th. 837–8, 87
Th. 869–80, 84
Th. 881–5, 84
Th. 886–900, 87
Th. 902–3, 354
Th. 904, 57
Th. 940–2, 261, 263
Th. 949, 263
Th. 950–5, 263
Th. 965–1022, 261
Hippocratic corpus
Aer. 22, 29
Carn. 2, 245
Hebd. 52, 236
Morb. 4.2–3, 175
Morb. Sacr. 1, 27
Morb. Sacr. 1–2, 27
Morb. Sacr. 2, 27
Morb. Sacr. 3–4, 28
Morb. Sacr. 4, 28
Morb. Sacr. 5, 27
Morb. Sacr. 5–16, 27
Morb. Sacr. 10, 27
Morb. Sacr. 14, 27

Hippocratic corpus (cont.)
Morb. Sacr. 16, 27
Morb. Sacr. 21, 27
Nat. Hom. 3, 236
Nat. Hom. 6, 175
Vict. 4.87, 28–29
Vict. 4.89–90, 28–29
VM 1, 130
Hippolytus
Haer. 1.1.2, 20
Haer. 1.7.1, 24–25
Haer. 1.26.1–2, 55
Homer
Il. 1.62–3, 109
Il. 1.69–70, 76–77, 109
Il. 1.92–100, 109
Il. 1.365, 109
Il. 1.384–5, 109
Il. 1.528–30, 138
Il. 2.46, 75
Il. 2.100–8, 75
Il. 2.299–300, 76
Il. 2.303–30, 109
Il. 2.335, 262
Il. 2.353, 110
Il. 2.484–93, 82
Il. 2.485–6, 63, 78, 131
Il. 3.65–6, 86
Il. 3.108–10, 322
Il. 3.277, 175
Il. 3.396, 183
Il. 4.200, 183
Il. 4.235, 66
Il. 4.370–405, 65–66
Il. 5.1–3, 263
Il. 5.121–32, 263
Il. 5.438–42, 263
Il. 5.748–52, 354, 357
Il. 5.769, 357
Il. 5.778, 69–70
Il. 5.815–61, 263
Il. 5.845, 233, 242, 348
Il. 6.383–9, 67
Il. 7.44–53, 112
Il. 8.392–6, 354, 357
Il. 9.115, 66
Il. 9.312, 259
Il. 9.508–9, 122
Il. 10.482, 80
Il. 11.27–8, 119
Il. 12.23, 262
Il. 12.211–29, 111
Il. 12.315, 218
Il. 14.313–25, 261
Il. 15.158–9, 119
Il. 15.461, 138
Il. 16.53, 69
Il. 17.547–8, 119
Il. 18.115–21, 140, 263
Il. 18.128–9, 69
Il. 18.329, 69
Il. 21.463–6, 232
Il. 22.281, 75
Il. 23.64–107, 161
Il. 23.304–50, 94
Il. 23.440, 69
Il. 24.222, 66
Il. 24.527–33, 84
Il. 24.592–5, 161
Od. 1.1–4, 148, 264–265
Od. 2.299–330, 110
Od. 3.247–316, 68
Od. 4.157, 69
Od. 4.238–79, 94
Od. 4.379, 109
Od. 4.389–90, 109
Od. 5.35, 261
Od. 5.135–6, 265
Od. 5.196–7, 133–134
Od. 5.334–5, 263
Od. 7.255–8, 265
Od. 8.44–5, 260
Od. 8.63–4, 194
Od. 8.479–81, 265
Od. 8.487–91, 81–82
Od. 10.82–6, 354
Od. 10.138, 264
Od. 10.302–3, 178
Od. 10.490–5, 109, 194
Od. 10.537–40, 109, 264
Od. 11.16, 175
Od. 11.50, 264
Od. 11.89, 264
Od. 11.99–100, 266
Od. 11.109, 175
Od. 11.363–9, 94
Od. 11.543–64, 161
Od. 11.601–4, 263

Od. 12.186–91, 93–94
Od. 12.267, 194
Od. 12.323, 175
Od. 13.109–12, 247, 257
Od. 14.296, 66
Od. 14.379–87, 65
Od. 15.160–78, 111
Od. 15.172–3, 113
Od. 15.251–3, 115
Od. 15.525–34, 112
Od. 15.536, 129
Od. 16.136, 183
Od. 17.153–4, 129
Od. 17.163, 129
Od. 17.218, 175
Od. 17.382–5, 113, 153
Od. 17.514–21, 94
Od. 18.136–7, 182
Od. 19.203, 65, 68, 70, 71, 94
Od. 19.309, 129
Od. 19.409, 206
Od. 19.547, 129
Od. 19.562–7, 69
Od. 20.195, 197
Od. 20.351–62, 112
Od. 21.406–9, 94
Od. 22.347–8, 80–81
Od. 22.420–5, 68
Od. 23.334–7, 265
Od. 24.12, 257, 351
Od. 24.258–9, 68
Hymni Homerici
Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite
82, 71, 94
255–79, 261
Homeric Hymn to Apollo
131–2, 109, 129
156–64, 94
539a, 129
Homeric Hymn to Demeter
147–8, 86
216–17, 86
226, 272
235–42, 270–271
260–3, 270–271
480–2, 70, 267, 268, 270–271
Homeric Hymn to Dionysus
1–9, 34, 65, 93
Homeric Hymn to Helios
7, 261
19, 122–123
Homeric Hymn to Heracles
7–8, 263
Homeric Hymn to Hermes
54–9, 82
368–9, 102
427–33, 82
560–4, 67, 77, 83

Iamblichus
Protr. 47.25, 238
VP 82–6, 238
VP 143, 276
Inscriptiones Graecae
I² 945, 228, 229
II/III² 3661.5–6, 270
II/III² 11466, 229–230
II/III² 12599, 229–230
Ion of Chios
B4, 244
Isocrates
4.28.6–7, 267
4.28.10–12, 270

Leucippus
A1, 175
Lucian
DDeor. 24.2, 256
Lucretius
3.121–9, 236
6.68–79, 46
Lycophron
scholia in Lycophronem
Σ Lycoph. 344, 118
Lysias
6.51, 267

Melissus
B6, 287

Nonnus
Dion. 38.192, 256

Olympiodorus
in Alc. 69.21–70.4, 112
in Phd. 1.3, 246

Orphic fragments
fr. 32.iv.1–3 Kern = 568.1–3 Bernabé, 273
fr. 168.15 Kern = 243.15 Bernabé, 257
fr. 226 Kern = 437 Bernabé, 236, 246
fr. 228a Kern = 436 Bernabé, 236, 246
fr. 229 Kern = 348 Bernabé, 238, 243, 273

Palaephatus
de Incred. pref. 9–12, 32
de Incred. pref. 22–4, 32
de Incred. 1, 31–32
de Incred. 6, 32
de Incred. 15, 32
Parke
oracle consultations at Dodona
266 no.11, 109
272 no.27, 109
Parmenides
A1.9–10, 231–232
A1.11–12, 232, 240
A16-17, 266
A32, 239
A37, 164, 231, 239, 248, 357
A40a, 164
A42, 165, 341
A44a, 164
A45, 232, 235, 241
A46, 164, 169–175
A46a-b, 164, 174, 231, 235, 249
A47, 178
A51, 232
A52, 164
A52-3, 249
A53-4, 164, 165, 237
B1, 10, 236, 252–261, 265, 277, 347–348, 350–359
B1.1, 260, 265
B1.1–5, 259–260, 354
B1.2–3, 272, 277–278
B1.3, 252, 255, 256–257, 258–259, 267, 315, 355, 356, 358
B1.4, 256
B1.5, 272, 354
B1.7, 256
B1.7–8, 256, 351
B1.8^{b}, 238, 260
B1.8^{b}-10^{a}, 350–351, 354
B1.9, 254, 256, 258, 348, 349, 354, 355, 358
B1.10, 357
B1.10–11, 354
B1.11, 255, 256, 298, 350, 351, 355, 356
B1.11–13, 248, 256, 352–353, 355, 357
B1.12, 255
B1.14, 255, 351
B1.14–17, 354
B1.15–17, 260, 267
B1.16–20, 353
B1.17–18, 255
B1.19, 255, 351
B1.20–1, 353–354, 357
B1.21, 265
B1.22, 268, 272, 308, 315
B1.22–3, 259
B1.22–8, 313
B1.24, 10, 255, 256, 258, 260, 267, 315, 354
B1.24-8^{a}, 313
B1.25, 351, 355, 356, 358
B1.26, 238, 274
B1.26–8, 255–256, 258, 259, 267, 356, 358
B1.27, 272, 282, 298, 317, 358
B1.28^{b}, 164, 210, 218, 266, 289
B1.28^{b}-30, 155, 159, 167, 168, 208, 215, 217, 220–221, 259, 278, 279, 312
B1.29, 10, 156, 296, 300–301, 308, 312, 315
B1.29–30, 200
B1.30, 156, 164, 166, 167, 198, 210, 212, 215, 218, 219, 220, 282
B1.31–2, 209–215, 217, 299–300, 301, 302
B2, 278, 287, 294–295, 341
B2.1, 266, 283
B2.2, 266, 305
B2.3, 298
B2.6, 289
B2.7–8, 289
B3, 304, 305, 306–307
B4, 221, 282, 292, 293
B6, 198, 219–220
B6.1-2^{a}, 304
B6.2, 266, 282, 296
B6.3, 266
B6.4–6, 197, 198, 216, 265, 307

B6.7, 190, 194
B6.9, 267, 298
B7, 221
B7.2, 266, 282
B7.2–6, 266
B7.3–6, 194, 218–219
B7.5–6, 184–185, 266, 281–282, 313, 340, 341
B8, 12, 212, 281, 287, 288, 293, 294–295, 341
B8.1–2, 294
B8.2, 266, 297
B8.3–7, 198
B8.4, 156, 315
B8.6, 266
B8.6–21, 287
B8.7–9, 289, 304
B8.8, 266
B8.15–16, 159, 184–185, 281, 294, 298, 300
B8.17, 205, 208
B8.17–18, 156
B8.21, 315
B8.21–2, 198, 287
B8.22–5, 287, 291
B8.22–31, 290
B8.25, 205
B8.26, 186
B8.26–31, 198, 287, 291, 315
B8.27–8, 287
B8.28, 156
B8.29, 186, 225
B8.34, 304, 305, 306–307
B8.35-6[a], 266, 304, 305–307
B8.36[b]-41, 204–207, 297, 300
B8.37, 206
B8.38, 287, 291
B8.39, 198, 200, 315
B8.39–41, 218–219
B8.40, 187, 208, 298
B8.41, 186, 198, 287, 291
B8.42–9, 290
B8.43, 315
B8.44[b]-8, 291
B8.49, 186, 225
B8.50–1, 156, 282, 296, 300, 301
B8.50–2, 199–200, 266, 312
B8.50–9, 185, 198, 207
B8.51, 164
B8.51[b]-2, 167, 319
B8.52, 166, 199–203, 215
B8.53–5, 188–190, 193, 203, 207, 216, 218–219
B8.54, 197, 204, 206, 207, 265, 298
B8.56, 231
B8.56–9, 175, 187, 188, 297, 348
B8.57–9, 186, 187, 225
B8.59, 185–186, 231, 249, 291, 355
B8.60–1, 164, 168, 201–202, 217–218, 219, 220, 342
B9, 164, 207–208, 348
B9.3, 298, 349
B9.3–4, 173, 177, 186
B10, 166, 168, 200–201, 208, 216, 217, 220, 230, 286, 307, 342
B10.1, 178
B10.4–5, 178, 289
B10-11, 164, 258
B11, 230–231
B12, 22, 164
B12.2, 186
B12.3, 248, 315
B12.3–6, 237–239
B12.4, 349
B13, 164, 238–239, 319, 344
B14, 258–259
B14-15, 164, 165, 201, 341, 357
B15a, 164
B16, 164, 175–184, 196, 198, 199, 203, 216, 217, 222–224, 239, 240, 241, 258, 282, 286, 307
B16.1, 186, 265
B16.1–2, 197, 198, 221
B16.2–3, 198
B16.3, 298
B16.4, 298
B17-18, 237, 286
B18, 164, 239
B19, 164, 203–204, 298
B19.3, 198, 206, 207, 218–219, 282

Pausanias
1.34.4, 115
4.10.6, 111
6.9.8, 275
6.17.6, 115

Pherecydes
F86b Schibli = A5, 244

Philodemus
Piet. 737–51, 46
Philoponus
in de An. 86.30–1, 20
in Ph. 16.22.6–7, 201
in Ph. 21.30–22.15, 301
Philostratus
VA 8.19.40–4, 109
Pindar
fr. 131 M, 245
fr. 133 M, 243, 246
fr. 137 M, 269, 270
N 6.1–2, 245
O 2.70, 257
O 2.85, 255
O 6.22–7, 265
Plato
Apol. 18b-c, 43
Apol. 19c, 44
Apol. 21a, 109
Apol. 21b6-7, 340
Apol. 22a, 127
Apol. 23b, 127
Apol. 23d, 43
Apol. 24b, 43
Apol. 26d, 44
Apol. 29c9-d4, 127
Apol. 40a4-7, 127
Apol. 40b3-c3, 127
Cratyl. 398b5-7, 327
Euth. 3c, 131
Euth. 6a-c, 51
Gorg. 493a1-c3, 276
Gorg. 523a, 35
Lg. 4.715e8–716a1, 140
Lg. 10.887c-e, 41
Lg. 10.889a–890a, 44
Lg. 10.899b, 23
Lg. 10.899d4-900b6, 79
Lg. 10.909b, 153
Men. 81a10-c4, 243, 246
Men. 81b3-6, 243
Men. 91d-e, 42
Men. 92c4-7, 130
Men. 99c7-d9, 262
Parm. 130e5-134e8, 285
Phd. 66d, 127
Phd. 69c, 269, 270
Phd. 80e-81a, 269, 270
Phd. 96a5-99d2, 37
Phdr. 229d-e, 32
Phdr. 244b6-d5, 112
Phdr. 244c, 127
Phdr. 250b6-8, 268
Phlb. 28c-d, 22
Phlb. 30d7-8, 22
Rep. 2.364e, 153
Rep. 2.382d2-3, 72, 311
Rep. 5.478d5-7, 302
Rep. 6.500c8-d1, 251
Rep. 10.607b1-6, 60
Rep. 10.614c2, 247
Rep. 10.615d5, 247
scholia in Platonem
Σ *Lg.* 715e, 140
Soph. 242d4-6, 314
Symp. 178b, 239
Symp. 199a1-2, 255
Tht. 176a8-b2, 251
Tht. 179e3-4, 314
Tht. 180e, 208
Tim. 40d6-e4, 50–51
Tim. 72a1ff, 113
Tim. 72b9-c1, 195
Tim. 90b1-6, 250–251
Plutarch
Ages. 3.3–5, 111
fr. 178.5–13 Sandbach, 268–269
Lys. 22.5–6, 111
Mor. 385c, 127
Mor. 415b-c, 318
Mor. 746b, 146
Mor. 756e10-11, 239
Mor. 975b11, 195
Mor. 1114b-c, 164
Mor. 1114d-e, 301–302
Peric. 6, 26
Peric. 32.2, 42–43
Porphyry
Abst. 3.26.1–4, 244
Antr. 22.6–23.7, 247–248
VP 30, 151, 323
Proclus
in R. 2.113.6–9, 277
Protagoras
B4, 45, 47

ps.-Aristotle
Mu. 401a25ff, 140
Pepl. fr. 641.7–8 Rose, 229–230
ps.-Euripides
Rhes. 971–3, 255
ps.-Plato
Ax. 371d5-e4, 273
PW
202, 266
216, 154

Satyrus
vit. Eur. col.10, 42
Sextus Empiricus
M 7.51, 128, 130
M 9.17–18, 44
M 9.20–1, 245
M 9.49, 46
M 9.54, 44
M 9.56, 42
M 9.57, 42
M 9.137–90, 46
M 10.18–19, 56
PH 3.2, 46
PH 3.2–12, 46
PH 3.123.1–2, 55
Simplicius
in Cael. 7.556.12–14, 220
in Cael. 7.557.20–558.17, 301
in Cael. 7.558.8, 203
in Cael. 7.559.14–560.1, 303
in Ph. 9.22.26–31, 314
in Ph. 9.24.13–21, 21
in Ph. 9.29.18, 208
in Ph. 9.30.20–31.7, 187–188
in Ph. 9.38.18–39.21, 235
in Ph. 9.38.30–9.39.18, 233
in Ph. 9.39.14–19, 238–239
in Ph. 9.39.19–21, 233–236, 238, 239, 243, 348–350, 352, 356, 358, 359
in Ph. 9.39.27–9.40.6, 234, 238
in Ph. 9.143.10, 208
in Ph. 9.144.28, 234
Solon
fr. 13 W, 35
Sophocles
El. 25–6, 122
El. 62–4, 276–277
OT 298–9, 110, 115
OT 484, 110
OT 496–501, 110
TrGF 4.837, 267, 268, 270, 272
Stesichorus
PMG 185, 257, 351
SVF
1.264, 46
1.538, 270
2.42, 284

Tertullian
de Carn. Christ. 5.1–4, 49
de Praesc. Haeret. 7.9–13, 51
Thales
A15, 20
A22, 20, 23
A23, 20
Theognis
139–41, 198
373–82, 86
713–14, 94
731–52, 86
Theophrastus
Sens. 1–2, 169
Sens. 2.5–4.8, 169–175
Sens. 3.2, 176, 181
Sens. 3.2–4, 177
Sens. 3.3, 183
Sens. 3.3–4, 180
Sens. 3.4, 249
Sens. 4.1, 190, 195, 241
Sens. 4.4–6, 180, 241, 249
Sens. 4.5–6, 177, 231
Sens. 4.7, 183

Xenophanes
A1, 148, 154, 315
A6, 152
A7, 152
A12, 41–42, 79, 141, 315
A13, 150–151, 314, 344
A14, 141
A24, 115
A26, 150
A28.7, 315
A30, 143
A31.9, 116

Xenophanes (cont.)
A32, 141
A32-3, 118, 145, 148
A33, 143
A35, 152
A38, 119, 143
A39, 119
A41, 143
A41a, 135
A43, 119, 143
A44, 119
A45, 119
A46, 119
A52, 26, 104–106, 120, 144
B1, 343–344
B1.13–16, 141
B1.17–18, 152
B1.21–3, 147, 149
B1.24, 125, 141
B2, 45, 147–149
B2.6, 134
B2.10, 120
B2.11–14, 148, 152
B2.19–22, 153, 154
B3, 142, 147, 148, 149, 153, 154
B5, 153
B7, 147, 148, 151, 152–153, 161, 244, 316
B8, 45, 104, 148, 151–152, 153, 346
B9, 152
B10, 147
B10-16, 42, 119, 142, 343
B11, 344
B11.1, 120
B11-12, 125, 141, 143, 148, 312
B12, 149
B14, 41, 143, 147, 148, 312, 343
B14.1, 315
B14-16, 125
B15, 326
B15-16, 142–143
B16, 143, 148
B17, 148
B18, 105, 116–128, 131, 132–134, 316
B18.1, 143–144
B18.2, 141, 148, 149, 322
B20, 151
B21, 147, 148
B22, 154
B23, 42, 115, 125, 139, 141, 150
B23-6, 125, 319
B24, 116, 137, 150, 315
B25, 21, 116, 122, 137–139, 143, 145, 150, 315
B26, 138, 141, 142, 143, 315
B27, 120
B28, 134, 319
B29, 120, 139
B30, 119
B32, 119, 134, 143
B33, 139
B34, 60, 115, 128–133, 141, 146, 150, 316
B34.2, 125, 130, 146
B34.3, 138, 145, 147
B34.4, 41, 140, 146
B35, 42, 146–147, 311–312
B36, 124–126, 133–134, 136, 137, 139, 140–141, 145
B38, 121–122, 134–136, 139, 141, 150
B45, 45, 104, 153, 346
Xenophon
Anab. 5.6.29, 110–111
Anab. 6.1.31, 110–111
Cyr. 1.6.2, 110
Cyr. 1.6.7, 211
Cyr. 1.6.46, 108, 110
Hell. 3.3.3, 111
Hipp. 9.9, 110
Mem. 1.1.1, 43
Mem. 1.1.9, 110
Mem. 1.4.2–18, 45, 141
Mem. 1.4.15–18, 108
Mem. 4.3.11–13, 141
Mem. 4.3.13, 117–118
Symp. 4.47–9, 108

GENERAL INDEX

Abaris, 277
Aelius Aristides, 268
Aeschylus, 51, 138, 195, 256, 339
Aithalides, 277
Alcmaeon, 38, 115, 130, 170, 244
alêthea, and cognates
  in epic poetry, 67–68
  in Parmenides, 156, 296
Ameinias, 274–275
Anaxagoras, 38, 339
  and perception, 169, 170, 178, 191
  and religion, 26, 42–44
  Mind in, 22, 37–38, 277, 290
Anaximander. *See* Milesian, the philosophers
Anaximenes. *See* Milesian, the philosophers
Antiphon, 111
Aphrodite, 33, 71, 89, 94, 239, 261, 328
Apollo, 26, 28, 110, 115, 263, 276, 277, *See* also Heraclitus: on Apollo
  Delphic Apollo. *See* divination: the Delphic oracle
approximation to the divine (in Homeric and Hesiodic poetry), 251, 261–264, 270–271, 317–318, 345
Apuleius, 269
Aristeas, 277
Aristophanes, 42, 44, 45, 46, 269
Aristotle
  on becoming like god, 251, 281, 283
  on early Greek philosophy, 37–38
    on Parmenides and others on perception and cognition, 183–184, 190–193, 240, 330–331
    physiologoi and *theologoi*, 38–39
  on Hesiod, 55–56
  on initiation, 284
  on Parmenides, 183–184, 186, 190–193, 220, 249–250
  on vital heat, 245
Athena, 28, 80, 89, 228–229, 259, 262–263, 354

becoming like god (in philosophy), 250–251, *See* also Parmenides: and becoming like god
Betegh, G., 17, 236
blindness and deafness, 194–195
Bryan, J., 147, 202
Burkert, W., 8–9, 153, 243, 270, 352–353
Burnet, J., 10, 11, 16

Calchas, 76–77, 109, 110, 113
Cicero
  his character Cotta on traditional Roman religion, 50
  on divination, 104–105, 109, 112, 113, 115, 131
Cole, T., 67
Colotes. *See* Parmenides: Colotes on
Cornford, F.M., 16
Coxon, A.H., 189
Croesus, 113–114
Curd, P.K., 18, 359

Delian maidens, 94
Delphic oracle. *See* divination: Delphic oracle
Demeter, 276, *See* also *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*
Democritus, 7, 170, 178, 233, 240, 241, 277
Denyer, N., 108
Derveni papyrus, 17, 140, 236, 284
Dillery, J., 153
Diogenes of Apollonia, 21, 22, 38, 170, 244
Diomedes, 262–263

Dionysus, 238, 246, 261, 268, *See* also *Homeric Hymn to Dionysus*
Diopeithes, decree of, 42–43
divination, 14, 15, 26, 31, 45, 108–116, 311, 345
  and approximation to the divine, 109–110, 114–115
  and knowledge-claims, 109–110, 114, 128
  and rationality. *See* rationality: and divine disclosure: in divination
  and *zêtêsis*, 127–128
  as conjectural, 110–114, 327, 340
  itinerant diviners, 153
  mantic families, 112, 114–115
  practised by amateurs, 110–111, 113
  technical vs inspired, 112
  the Delphic oracle, 26, 31, 48, 87–88, 111, 113–114, 127, 154, 265–266, 340
  Xenophanes on. *See* under Xenophanes
divine disclosure, 6–7, *See* also Hesiod: the Muses' address, and entries under Empedocles, Parmenides, Xenophanes
  and rationality. *See* rationality: and divine disclosure
divine revelation. *See* divine disclosure
Dodds, E.R., 14, 16, 104, 263–264
double motivation, 80, 262–263
Doxa. *See* Parmenides: *Doxa*
Doxastic thing, 156

early Greek philosophy
  and religion. *See* religion, Greek: and philosophy
  as a historiographical category, 54, 158, 344–345
  as mechanistic and non-teleological. *See* Plato: on early Greek philosophy
  early Greek epistemology
    relation to theology, 1, 53, 309, 310–311, 337–339, 346
    requiring an interdisciplinary approach, 7–9, 346
  scholarly schisms about, 7, 11–12, 17–18, 346
Eleusinian mysteries. *See* mystery initiations

Empedocles
  and Hesiod, 59, 319, 335, 337–338
  and Parmenides, 319, 335, 337–338
  and Xenophanes, 319, 337–338
  daimonology and metempsychosis in, 238, 320–327, 330–333, 335–337, 338
    the *daimôn* as material, 337
  his attitude to divine disclosure, 334–335, 337–338, 342
  his Muse, 319, 333–335, 337, 342
  ideas of consciousness in, 332–333
  Love and Strife
    exerting moral as well as physical influence, 320, 332–333, 336
    Love as epistemic object, 328–330, 331
    the question of corporeality, 290
  on experience and wisdom, 151, 320, 322–333
  on perception and understanding, 169, 170–171, 191, 241, 325, 328–332, 333
  rejecting animal sacrifice, 322, 337, 344
  self-identity in, 335–337
  theology and epistemology in, 6, 318–339
  views on religion and philosophy in his thought, 17, 320
Epicharmus, 194–195, 228, 230, 251
Epicurus and Epicureanism, 45–46, 56, 104, 105, 251
epikleseis, 33
Epimenides, 75, 148, 151, 277
  his longevity, 151, 322
epistemically significant interactions. *See* divine disclosure
epistemology, early Greek. *See* early Greek philosophy: early Greek epistemology
eschatology. *See* mystery initiations and entries under Empedocles, Euripides, Homer, Parmenides, Pindar, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans
  aethereal, 228–230, 242, 244, 245, 356
etyma, and cognates, 68–69

Euripides, 42, 44, 45, 46, 113, 256
eschatological ideas in, 228–229, 230, 236–237, 241

faith. *See* religious belief

Gemelli Marciano, L., 18
Gernet, L., 162
gifts, divine, 86
godlikeness. *See* approximation to the divine, becoming like god
Gold Tablets, 237–238, 243, 244–245, 270, 271–274, 345
Gould, J., 41
Gregory of Nyssa, 50

Harrison, T., 41
Hecataeus, 29–30, 33, 55, 148, 323, 343
Hecate. *See* Hesiod: on Hecate
Helios and Heliades, 256–257, 258–259, 264, 269, 315, 347, 351, 352, 356–358
Heracles, 30, 140, 259, 263, 271, 274, 276
Heraclitus, 6, 21, 30, 55, 169, 265, 322, 339, 340, 359
and traditional religion, 48
on Apollo, 114
on names, 204
on the soul, 38, 161, 233, 236
Hermes, 28, 66, 71, 89, 257, 351, *See* also *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*
Hermotimus, 277
hero cult, 275
Herodotus, 30–31, 47, 117–118, 125, 145, 339, 343
Hesiod
ambivalence in, 3, 34–35, 59, 85–86, 99–100, 101–102, 314, 318
and Parmenides, 59, 254–255, 310–311, 312–314, 317–318, 352
and philosophy, 3, 52–60, 310–314, 317–318
and theodicy, 34–35, 84–86, 100–101
and Xenophanes, 59, 310, 311–312, 314, 317–318
approximation to the divine and godlikeness. *See* approximation to the divine
Aristotle on. *See* Aristotle: on Hesiod
echoes of divinatory language in, 76–77
excursus on seafaring, 3, 97–101, 131, 310
expressing an epistemological framework, 53, 101–103, 309–310, 339–340
his narrative of human Races, 57, 58, 317–318
his poetic persona, 64, 312
his staff, 75–76
on female and male, 84, 86–90, 91, 93, 313
on gods and natural, psychological and social phenomena, 56, 57–58
on Hecate, 83, 84, 85, 93
on Prometheus and Pandora, 57, 58, 66, 88–90
on Zeus, 34–35, 57–58, 61, 74, 84–90, 91, 95–98, 99–101
the Muses' address, 2–3, 61–103, 309–310, 311–314, 317, 339–340
interpretations of, 62–63
its constitutive terms, 65–72
motivation for, 92–93
shepherds . . . mere bellies, 74–75, 313
whenever we wish, 83–84, 85–86, 93, 100
the prescriptive force of his narratives, 57, 72, 92, 339–340
the proem to the *Works and Days*, 95–97
Hippocratic corpus, 17, 236, 245
On the Sacred Disease, 27–29, 343
historiê. *See* wandering: as an Ionian ideal
Homer
on the soul after death, 161
the cave of the Nymphs, 247–248, 257
theological attitudes, 23, 30, 57–58
approximation to the divine and godlikeness. *See* approximation to the divine
on divination, 108–115, 128–129, 345
on Muses and poetic inspiration, 63, 80–82, 93–94, 194
Homeric Hymn to Demeter, 79, 86, 268, 270–271
Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, 34, 79
Homeric Hymn to Hermes, 77, 82, 83, 94, 102

homoia, 69–71
homoiôsis theôi. *See* becoming like god, Parmenides: and becoming like god

irrationality. *See* rationality: and irrationality
  and Greek religion. *See* religion, Greek: and irrationality
Isocrates, 267, 270

Jaeger, W., 16

katabasis, 254, 257, 276–277, 347, 350–353, 357–358
Kingsley, P., 12, 18, 274

Laks, A., 13
Leonymus, 277
Lesher, J.H., 12, 17–18, 104, 106, 119, 131–132, 138, 149
Lloyd, G.E.R., 16–17, 48, 59, 152
Long, A.A., 158, 223
luxurious multiplicity. *See* Versnel, H.S.

Mansfeld, J., 223–224
mantikê. *See* divination
Martin Luther, 49
Marx, K., 51
Melissus, 208, 220, 287
metempsychosis, 252, 272–273, *See* also entries under Empedocles, Parmenides, Pindar, Plato, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans
mêtis, 87–90, 91, 94, 238, 330–332
Milesian, the philosophers, 16, 19–26, 343
  Anaximander, 20–21, 22, 25, 148, 201, 232
  Anaximenes, 21, 23–26, 47, 201, 244, 290–291
  and traditional religion, 19–20, 22, 25–26, 39
  Thales, 20, 25–26, 38, 148
    all things are full of gods, 20, 23
Mogyoródi, E., 139
Mopsus, 114, 154
Mourelatos, A.P.D., 190, 197, 198, 210, 254, 264, 307, 359

Muses. *See* under Empedocles, Hesiod, Homer
mystery initiations, 255, 267–273, 279, 351
  and altered states of consciousness, 284
myth, 8, 14, 16, 17, 19–20, 25–26, 44, 56, 147, 320, *See* also theology: Varro's tripartite theology
myth-critics, 29–33, 343

natural theology, 36–37, 39, 41, 345–346
Nehamas, A., 200
Nestle, W., 16
Nestor, 68, 94, 152, 322
Nietzsche, F., 62, 166–167
Numenius, 247–248

Odysseus, 15, 65, 66, 71, 81–82, 129, 262, 263
  and Parmenides. *See* Parmenides: and the *Odyssey*
  as a poet-like figure, 94
On the Sacred Disease. *See* Hippocratic corpus: *On the Sacred Disease*
Orphica, 140, 257, 276, *See* also Derveni papyrus, Gold Tablets
  Orphic anthropogony, 246
Owen, G.E.L., 163

Palaephatus, 31–33, 343
Palmer, J.A., 294–295
Pandora. *See* Hesiod: on Prometheus and Pandora
Parker, R., 41, 46, 114
Parmenides
  alêtheiê in. *See* under *alêthea*
  and becoming like god, 5, 252–284, 313, 341
  and Hesiod, 59, 254–255, 310–311, 312–314, 317–318, 352
  and Ionian cosmology, 292
  and mystery initiations. *See* mystery initiations
  and oracles, 265–267
  and sense-perception, 169–184, 190–195, 196, 211, 216–217
  and the Gold Tablets. *See* Gold Tablets
  and the *Odyssey*, 264–265
  and the Pythagoreans. *See* Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans

and vital heat, 231–232
and Xenophanes, 308, 314–318
verbal echoes in Parmenides, 314–315
as transformative, 157–158, 283–284, 341
Colotes on, 157, 158, 164, 301–302
Doxa
as deceptive, 168, 199–203, 206–207, 209, 214–215, 286
expressing Parmenides' own views, 167, 199–201, 215–216, 220
framed pejoratively, 167, 168
its governing goddess, 233–239, 248, 315, 344
its scope and nature, 164–165
the reasons for it, 4, 160–161, 163–168, 196–197, 215–221, 278
Doxa as dialectical, 163–165
Doxa as pragmatic, 165–166
eschatological topography in, 242, 254–255, 347–359
his attitude to divine disclosure, 5, 223–224, 266–267, 279–284, 340–342
his embryology, 237–239
his goddess
anonymous, 267–268, 355–356
as aether, 248
main interpretations of, 11
his Homeric language, 264
his ontology, 4, 157, 211–214, 215, 285–303
consubstantial interpretations, 290–293
Doxastic things as non-existent, illusions, 287–289
Doxastic things as things-that-are, 293–294
Doxastic things available for discussion, belief, (in)correct accounts, 286, 303
technical vs non-technical uses of 'to be', 298–299, 300
the modal interpretation, 294–295
the problem of colocation, 290
the two-worlds interpretation, 289–290
what-is
as intelligent and divine, 290, 300–301, 307–308, 315–316, 344
as what *really* is, 295–301
in later ancient readers, 301–303
cannot be identified or aligned with Light (or Night), 186–187, 225–226, 280
not a cosmogonic or cosmological principle, 292, 300–301
the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality, 300–301, 308
his theory of human cognition, 4, 169–184, 195–196, 216–217, 239–240, 280
its doxographic context, 169–175, 190–193, 195, 240–242
responses to its paradoxical implications, 222–227
inscriptions about him discovered in Elea, 277
intelligence and intelligibility in *Alêtheia*, 304–308
krisis (of *Alêtheia* vs of *Doxa*), 158–159, 184–190, 195–196, 226–227, 278–279, 280–282, 340–341
notion of rationality in, 340–342
on aether, 230–231, 258, 349–350, 352–353, 356, 358
on female and male, 248–249, 313
on naming, 188–190, 203–208, 300
on the soul, 5, 161, 227–228, 232–237, 242–243, 247–248, 249–250
and death, 234–237
and metempsychosis, 235–236, 237–238, 242–243, 245, 256
its divinity, 242–244, 247–248, 249–250, *See* also Parmenides: and becoming like god
soul and mind in Parmenides, 239–242, 282
the proem, 250–278, 279, 280, 347–348, 350–359
echoing *Doxa*'s imagery, 159–160, 248
the knowing man, 255, 258–259, 277–278, 355

Parmenides (cont.)
the *kouros'* journey
as a journey of the soul, 238, 255–260, 274, 276–277, 355
its status, 13, 162, 280, 284, 347–348
its trajectory, 254, 257, 347–359
the *kouros* as dependent, 259–260, 280
the two parts of his poem, 155–156
distinguished by ancient commentators, 220
interpretative questions about the relation between them, 160–161
Pascal, 49
Persephone, 243, 246, 269, 272
Phaethon, 256, 258, 356, 357
Pherecydes, 59, 244, 246
Philo, 150
Philoponus, 20, 201
Phormio, 277
Pindar, 246, 339
on death and initiation, 245, 269, 270
on metempsychosis, 243
Plantinga, A., 49–50
Plato
his myth of Er, 247–248
his ontological preoccupations and Parmenides', 285, 302
on becoming like god, 250–251, 252, 281, 283
on divination, 112, 113, 130, 131, 195
on early Greek philosophy, 21, 37–39
on metempsychosis, 243, 245
on mystery initiations, 269, 270
on poetic inspiration, 81
on Socrates' trial. *See* Socrates: his trial
Plutarch
on divination, 26, 127
on mystery initiations, 268–269
on Parmenides, 157, 164, 239, 301–302, 303
poetic inspiration, 14, 80–82, 265, 266–267, 339
prayer, 22, 25, 26, 28–29, 41, 45, 46, 96, 141, 343
presocratic philosophy. *See* early Greek philosophy
Prodicus, 44
Prometheus. *See* Hesiod: on Prometheus and Pandora
Protagoras, 42, 45, 47
pseudea, and cognates, 65–67
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, 55, 148, 274–277
a social and political force in South Italy, 274
and metempsychosis, 151, 161, 238, 244, 275, 323
Pythagoras as (semi-)divine, 275–276
Pythagorean quietude, 274–275
the *katabasis* of Pythagoras, 276–277

rationality
and divine disclosure, 5–6, 10–12, 15, 51, 282–284, 334–335, 338, 339–343
in divination, 106, 110–114, 145–146, 340
and irrationality, 10–19
and religious belief. *See* religious belief
as a type of thinking, 2, 15, 343
as secularising, 2, 14, 36, 342–343
requiring disambiguation, 19, 35, 342–343
religion, Greek
and irrationality, 33–35
and philosophy, 2, 14, 36–48, 343–346
evidence of social backlash, 42–45, 46, 346
philosophical criticisms and appropriations, 2, 5, 41–42, 45–46, 47–48, 274, 343–345
philosophy as part of religion, 2, 48, 346
views of the relations between them, 16–18, 45
beliefs in, 40–41, 48, 50, 51
cognitive approaches to, 41
tolerance and flexibility of, 40, 45–47, 346
unknowability of the divine, 34, 47, 346
religious belief, 48–51, 342–343
Rohde, E., 239
Rowe, C.J., 56–58

sacrifice, 25, 26, 28, 41, 44, 45, 74, 88, 150–151, *See* also Empedocles: rejecting animal sacrifice
Schofield, M., 278, 279
Sedley, D.N., 168
Simplicius
  his evidence for Parmenides' conception of soul. *See* Parmenides: on the soul
  his evidence for Parmenides' eschatological topography. *See* Parmenides: eschatological topography in
  on Parmenides' ontology, 301, 303
  on the two parts of Parmenides' poem, 220
Sirens, 84, 93–94
Socrates
  his divine sign, 127, 339
  his trial, 43–44, 45, 46
Sophocles, 110, 113, 114, 195, 270, 272, 276–277
soul. *See* entries on soul or metempsychosis under Empedocles, Heraclitus, Homer, Parmenides, Pindar, Plato, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans
  as aethereal. *See* eschatology: aethereal
  as divine, 243–246, *See* also Parmenides: on the soul
Stoicism, 20, 46, 105, 245, 251, 269

Tabula of Cebes, 275
Teiresias, 109, 110, 114–115, 150, 154, 194, 264
Tertullian, 49, 51
Thales, *See* Milesian, the philosophers
theodicy. *See* under Hesiod, Xenophanes
theology, 8, 345, *See* also natural theology
  Varro's tripartite theology, 36
theology of approximation, 251
Theophrastus
  his account of Parmenides in *de Sensibus*. *See* Parmenides: his theory of human cognition
  on the two parts of Parmenides' poem, 220
Thriai, 67, 77, 83, 84
transmigration. *See* metempsychosis
Trophonius, 284

Varro, 36
Versnel, H.S., 33–35, 41
Vlastos, G., 184, 190, 224–227, 233

wandering
  and divination, 153
  as an Ionian ideal, 148–149, 322–323
  in Empedocles, 321, 326
  in Parmenides, 197–198, 216, 264–265
  in the *Odyssey*, 148, 264–265, 322
Wittgenstein, L., 49

Xenophanes
  and Colophon, 142, 149, 154
  and Eastern influences, 154
  and Hesiod, 59, 310, 311–312, 314, 317–318
  and monotheism, 125
  and Parmenides, 308, 314–318
  and the idea of progress, 148–150
  and theodicy, 141–142
  criticisms of traditional religious attitudes, 41–42, 142–143, 149, 150–151, 343
    on divination, 41, 104–107, 119–121, 123, 130–132, 139, 144–154, 343
  divinatory language in, 128–129, 152–153
  expressing a unified world-view, 148–150
  his attitude to divine disclosure, 3–4, 104–154, 310, 311–312, 316, 340
    intentionality in his notion of disclosure, 106–107, 133–134, 136–142, 144–145, 310
    its role in human inquiry, 133–143, 144–145
    rejecting one notion of disclosure and promoting another, 106, 116–128, 143–144
  insisting on a strict boundary between mortal and divine, 150–151, 252, 279, 316, 318

Xenophanes (cont.)
on belief and practice in religion, 343–344
on his own wisdom, 107, 146–154
on his longevity, 151–152, 322–323
on intelligent divine governance, 137–139
on knowledge, 106, 115, 128–133, 146, 150, 316
and personal experience, 129–130
theological methodology in, 142–143
Xenophon, 45, 117–118, 141
on divination, 108, 110–111

Zalmoxis, 276
Zeus, 17, 28, 32, 33, 44, 66, 110, 119, 140, 229, 246, 257, 261, 269
Hesiod on. *See* Hesiod: on Zeus
his mind, 98, 100, 137–138, 183